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 ABSTRACT 
(DEUTSCH) 
 
 
Gegenstand der vorliegenden Untersuchung ist der Freundschaftsbegriff der 
Renaissance, der seinen Ursprung wesentlich in der antiken Philosophie hat, seine 
Darstellungsweisen in der europäischen (insbesondere der englischen und 
italienischen) Literatur des fünfzehnten und sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, und der 
Wandel, dem dieser beim Epochenwechsel zur Aufklärung im siebzehnten 
Jahrhundert unterworfen war. 
Meine Arbeit vertritt die Hypothese, dass sich die Konzeptionen der verschiedenen 
Formen zwischenmenschlicher Beziehung die sich spätestens seit dem achtzehnten 
Jahrhundert etablieren konnten, auf die konzeptionellen Veränderungen des Freund-
schaftsbegriffs und insbesondere auf den Wandel des Begriffsverständnisses von 
Freundschaft und Liebe während der Renaissance und des sich anschließenden 
Epochenwechsels zurückführen lassen. 
Um diese Hypothese zu verifizieren, habe ich daher nach einer kurzen Übersicht 
über die konzeptionellen Ursprünge des frühneuzeitlichen Freundschaftsbegriffs 
zunächst das Wesen der primär auf den philosophischen Idealen der antiken Denker 
beruhenden Freundschaftskonzeption der Renaissance analysiert. Hierbei ließ sich eine 
grundlegende Disparität zwischen den klassisch inspirierten Idealvorstellungen und 
deren realer Umsetzung in der frühen Neuzeit nachweisen, die sich im weiteren 
Verlauf als mit ursächlich für die weitere Entwicklung des Freundschaftsbegriffs 
herausstellen sollte. Anschließend habe ich die weiteren Faktoren untersucht, die zu 
eben jenem Transformationsprozess führten, dem der Werte- und Normenhorizont des 
humanistischen Freundschaftsbegriffs vom Anbeginn der Epoche bis hin zur 
Aufklärung unterlag, und der letztlich zu einer Aufspaltung der traditionellen 
Beziehungskonzeptionen und zu einer Abwertung des Freundschaftskonzeptes führte. 
Diese Hypothese wird anhand ausführlicher Textanalysen repräsentativer Schriften 
zum Themenbereich untermauert. Neben Lyrik- und Dramentexten sind fiktionale 
Prosaschriften hierbei ebenso vertreten wie philosophische und theologische 
Abhandlungen oder die Korrespondenz herausragender Dichter der Epoche. 
Da zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Liebesbegriffs bereits ausführliche Studien 
vorliegen, es bislang zur Evolution der Freundschaftsidee jedoch kaum Unter-
suchungen gibt, mag diese Arbeit zum Ausgleich des bestehenden Forschungsdefizits 
beitragen. 
 ABSTRACT 
(ENGLISH) 
 
 
The present study will focus on the concept of friendship in the Renaissance, which 
had its origins mainly in classical philosophy, the way in that it was represented in the 
European, and especially the English and Italian literature of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, and the conceptual change to which it was subjected in the course 
of the transition from the period of the Renaissance to the age of the Enlightenment in 
the seventeenth century. 
The hypothesis on which my work is founded, assumes that the different 
conceptions of the various kinds of interpersonal relationship that have become 
established since the eighteenth century, could be related to the change of the 
conceptualization of friendship and love in the course of the Renaissance and the 
ensuing transition from this period to the next. 
In order to verify this hypothesis, I have first provided a brief overview of the 
conceptual origins of the early modern notions of friendship before I have analysed the 
nature of the friendship conceptions of the Renaissance itself, which are indeed 
primarily based on the philosophical ideals established by the classical thinkers in their 
theories of the subject. This examination has revealed the clear disparity that there had 
been between these classically inspired idealized conceptions and their realization in 
the early modern period. We might therefore say that it was certainly this disparity 
and the impossibility of reconciliation that have been causally responsible for the 
further development of the concept of friendship. Moreover, from the examination of 
the additional factors that have led to the transformation to which the humanistic 
conception of friendship was subjected in the course of the time from the dawn of the 
period to its end in the seventeenth century, we might conclude that in this century 
there has been a definite process of diversification of the traditional relationship 
conceptions, and that this process has led not only to a new set of views on 
relationships but to a debasement of the concept of friendship in particular. 
This hypothesis is verified by the extensive textual analysis of a number of 
representative contemporary sources dealing with the topic of friendship. Besides 
some fictional prose, there are also some pieces of poetry and drama, as well as various 
philosophical, theological, and even some epistolary texts included in this selection. 
As there are already comprehensive studies of the history of the development of the 
concept of love, yet until now hardly any of the conceptual evolution of the idea of 
friendship in existence, this work might be able to contribute to the filling of this gap. 
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 INTRODUCTION: 
OF A CONCEPT WE HAVE LOST 
n the year 1777, in the heyday of the European Enlightenment and about one and 
a half centuries after the end of the Renaissance, an English essayist by the name 
of Susannah Dobson finds it apparently necessary to introduce the preface to her 
philosophic treatise on the topic of friendship, her Dialogue on Friendship and Society, 
with the following excuse: 
To address the Public on Friendship, I am sensible requires an apology.—On 
so worn-out a subject, I cannot hope to present the world with any original 
sentiment; and it will be happy should I escape enthusiasm on the one hand 
or insipidity on the other.1 
Now, from these words we can conclude that late eighteenth-century readers had 
already been well acquainted with the various conceptions of friendship when 
Dobson's book was published, and that there had thus formerly been an enthusiasm 
for the topic that was now, at Dobson's time, no longer considered an adequate 
attitude towards the matter. And indeed, there had been much more enthusiasm for 
the subject in the period preceding the Enlightenment, the Renaissance—and not only 
then. 
When Dobson wrote her essay on friendship in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, she could look back on almost four millennia of literary treatment of the topic. 
Presumably the oldest texts that deal with friendship as one of their major themes are 
the Sumerian tales about the life and deeds of the legendary Mesopotamian king 
Gilgamesh (fl. 28th or 27th BC), of which the first written versions in cuneiform date 
back to the time between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries BC. These narratives 
were later (about 1200 BC) incorporated into a longer poem, nowadays known as The 
Epic of Gilgamesh.2 It tells the story of this famous ancient king of Uruk, who considered 
                                                   
1 S[usannah] Dobson, A Dialogue on Friendship and Society, by the Translator of the Life of Petrach (London: 
Becket, 1777) iiv. 
2 The epic that was compiled from the various Sumerian stories survives in a number of versions in 
different Semitic and Indo-European languages, all written in cuneiform on clay or stone tablets, of 
which most yet only exist in fragments. The text that is today known as The Epic of Gilgamesh is 
primarily derived from an Akkadian cuneiform version of the poem, engraved on eleven stone tablets 
that were found in the ruins of the library of Ashurbanipal, king of Assyria (669-633 B.C.), at Nineveh. 
Although this is the fullest surviving version of the epic, it too only survives in fragments, since all of 
the eleven tablets are damaged, due to the library's destruction by the Persians in 612 BC. To these 
eleven tablets, modern scholars have then added another one whose text provides a suitable appendix 
to the original set. Thus consisting of a dozen tablets, the Epic is now usually divided into twelve parts, 
each relating to one of the twelve tablets. Additionally, each line on the tablets was numbered so that a 
I 
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himself the most important and most powerful man on earth and who thus believed to 
be so self-sufficient that he would never be in need of the help or advice of anyone else. 
He was indeed so sure of himself that he even believed to be godlike. After a while, 
Gilgamesh's unduly egocentric attitude annoyed the real Gods in fact so much that 
they decided to provide him with a friend, with whom he should then spend his life as 
an equal partner. (The name of this friend was Enkidu, presumably in allusion to the 
Sumerian word enki, meaning 'creator' or 'God'.). Yet, after the two had made friends 
with each other and had even became what later eras were to describe as one another's 
'other self' or 'one soul divided into two bodies' (or what Giuseppe Furlani in his 
influential essay on the friendship theme in the epic refers to as the "eterni prototipi 
degli amici fedeli"), the Gods soon regretted their decision as the two friends began to 
suffer from the same megalomania from which the Gods had wished to cure 
Gilgamesh by providing him with a friend.3 Now, together, the friends developed such 
an exaggerated view of their own power that they even dared to rebel against the Gods 
themselves and finally even killed a divine animal, a heavenly bull. The Gods therefore 
decided to punish the friends by killing only one of them and letting the other one 
suffer from the grief over the loss of his friend.4 So, they agreed on depriving 
Gilgamesh of his friend by letting Enkidu die. The sentence had indeed the expected 
effect, as Gilgamesh suffered bitterly from the loss: 
'My friend, whom I loved deeply, who went through every hardship with 
me, 
Enkidu, whom I love deeply, who went through every hardship with me, 
the fate of mankind has overtaken him. 
Six days and seven nights I mourned over him 
and would not allow him to be buried 
until a maggot fell out of his nose. 
I was terrified by his appearance (?), 
I began to fear death, and so roam the wilderness. 
The issue of my friend oppresses me, 
so I have been roaming long trails through the wilderness. 
The issue of Enkidu, my friend, oppresses me, 
so I have been roaming long roads through the wilderness. 
                                                                                                                                                            
reference system could be established that makes it possible to refer to the different passages of the epic 
in quite the same way as we would refer to the passages of Greek, Latin, or English poems. Cf. Richard 
Hooker, "Mesopotamia: Gilgamesh," World Civilizations, ed. Richard Hooker, vers. June 1999, 
Washington State University, 18 Feb. 2000 <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/meso/gilg.htm>. 
3 Giuseppe Furlani, "L'Epopea di Gilgames come inno all'amicizia," Belfagor: Rassegna di varia umanità 1 
(1946): 589. –  "[…] eternal prototypes of loyal friends." Trans. mine. 
4 Furlani explains the Gods' decision by remarking: "Tutto può conseguire l'amicizia tra due esseri umani, 
tranne vincere la morte, quest'ultima spezzando inesorabilmente i vincoli strettissimi che legano 
insieme amico ed amico." Furlani 579. – "Everything can be achieved by the friendship between two 
human beings, only death it cannot defeat, which relentlessly shatters even the closest bonds that bind 
two friends together." Trans. mine. 
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How can I stay silent, how can I be still? 
My friend whom I love has turned to clay.'5 
The loss of his beloved companion had in fact such a devastating effect on Gilgamesh 
that from then on he feared nothing more than his own death and the wish to live 
forever finally became an obsession with him. Needless to say, he did not succeed in 
the realisation of this wish.6 Interestingly enough, however, it is exactly the opposite 
motif—i.e. not to see any reason for living any longer after the friend has died—that 
can be found in most of the literary representations of friendship dealing with the 
death of one of the friends dating from later times. That the loss of a close friend makes 
the other one fear his own death is indeed a motif that has only rarely been presented 
in the literary treatment of the topic since The Epic of Gilgamesh.7 
About a thousand years after the Sumerian stories of Gilgamesh's friendship with 
Enkidu had been engraved for the first time, the Greeks as well, and later also the 
Romans, began to consider friendship a theme worthy for further contemplation. In 
fact, friendship now even became a topic that enjoyed an extraordinary popularity not 
only with the poets but also with the philosophers of the time. The ancient Greek and 
Latin writings, from the works of Homer to those of Seneca and Lucian, are indeed 
more often concerned with the philosophical and poetical treatment of the subject than 
those of any other period in history are. 
In the following centuries, however, the enthusiasm for the topic dwindled away. 
One can, in fact, almost speak of a neglect of the subject in the Middle Ages, as the 
attitude towards the matter that the authors of medieval times show in their writings 
clearly reveals a decided lack of interest in friendship—at least when compared to the 
enthusiasm that the classics had shown for the topic. Of course, there are still a number 
of writings of theological and poetical concern dating from that time that deal with the 
subject, yet usually only in passing and in a way that has no longer anything to do 
with the idealization of friendship that is so characteristic of the classical treatments of 
the topic. 
                                                   
5 The Epic of Gilgamesh (10.58-71), ed. and trans. Maureen Gallery Kovacs, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1989) 85. As I assume that most of my readers share my difficulties in understanding ancient Akkadian 
texts, I hope I might here be excused for making use of Kovacs's scholarly translation instead of 
providing the cuneiform original. As mentioned before, the text of the epic only exists in fragments, 
and some parts of the above quoted passage have also unfortunately been lost. Words in italics are thus 
marking a restoration that has been "supplied by the obvious demands of context or by conjecture." 
(Kovacs xiv.) The question mark in parentheses following that part additionally indicates that it also 
contains an uncertain restoration of a word where the correct translation of the original would not 
make any sense in the given context. 
6 Cf. also Hartmut Schmökel, trans., introduction, Das Gilgamesch Epos, 8th ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
1992) 11-20; and Furlani 579-89. 
7 One of the few exceptions is Augustine's description of his friendship with an unnamed youth in his 
Confessiones. See Augustine, Confessiones 4.4.9 – 4.6.11. 
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However, after the period of the Middle Ages, the interest in this classical 
idealization of friendship was again revived by Renaissance humanism, and the 
treatment of friendship in literature became almost as frequent as it had been in 
classical times. So, when Dobson wrote her essay on the nature of friendship in the late 
Enlightenment, she truly had to see her work as a continuation of a very old tradition. 
Hence, she was clearly aware that she could hardly take a look at the subject from a 
completely new perspective, one from which it had never been seen before. It might 
have been this awareness that made her apologise so modestly for her undertaking. 
Leaving Dobson and the year 1777 another 225 years behind and jumping into the 
present of the early twenty-first century, do we still have to regard writing about 
friendship as so worn-out a matter? Does this study too have to make an apology for 
its objective? Do we, like Dobson's contemporaries, still have a universally applicable, 
clearly defined, and commonly acknowledged conception in mind when we speak 
about friendship? Of course, we are quite familiar with the term friendship and even 
more with the term friend, as most of us use it nearly every day to describe our 
relationships with a number of people. We are thus instantly inclined to answer at least 
the last question, that of the commonly accepted conception of friendship, with a 
definite 'yes', but Ursula Nötzoldt-Linden might be right, when she remarks in her 
sociological study of the role that friendship plays in our lives today: "Die scheinbare 
Vertrautheit des Begriffes verführt zu der stillschweigenden Annahme darüber, daß 
jeder ihn mit derselben Plausibilität und ähnlichem Bedeutungshorizont verwendet."8 
That this, in fact, is not the case, becomes obvious when we try to formulate our notion 
of friendship, when we have to define the exact meaning of the concept and to decide 
which characteristics do belong to it and which do not. A task that is certainly for most 
people—even for those frequently using the term to denote their relationships with 
particular persons—not an easy one, much less one that could be spontaneously solved 
with satisfaction. What qualities, for instance, characterize our friends and what makes 
them different from all those other people we also deal with but whom we would not 
regard as our friends? Is a friend merely someone we find sympathetic and who also 
shares our interests? There are certainly quite a number of people who meet these 
conditions but does this automatically make them become our friends? If not, what is it 
that distinguishes them from those we would regard as our friends. Today, it is indeed 
not still that easy to define the terms friend and friendship. Contrary to Renaissance or 
even classical times, virtuousness is hardly a measure for someone's suitability as a 
friend anymore and the similarity of the friends' origin is usually also no longer 
considered a necessary prerequisite for their friendship. So, the question is, what 
exactly constitutes our conception of friendship, or rather, as Leroy S. Rouner puts it: 
                                                   
8 Ursula Nötzoldt-Linden, Freundschaft: Zur Thematisierung einer vernachlässigten soziologischen Kategorie 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994) 23. – "The apparent familiarity with the concept is tempting to 
take it for granted that everyone is referring to it with the same plausibility and with a similar idea of 
its semantic content in mind." Trans. mine. 
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"How has our understanding of friendship changed?"9 The answer to this question, as 
he directly goes on to explain, 
is difficult to answer, because most talk of human relationships is now 
sexually charged. To say that two people have 'a relationship' implies that 
they are lovers. Nonsexual friendships are probably as important today as 
they ever were, but we understand them less well because there is little 
reflective talk about them. Sexuality dominates our talk about intimacy with 
one another.10 
And in fact, we are certainly quite settled in our notion of love and the relations that 
are based on love, as most people would indeed agree on taking the facts that the 
partners have sex with one another exclusively, that they spend most of their time with 
each other, and that they often live together as the commonly accepted indicators of an 
erotic love relationship. Everything else is generally regarded as a free, open, or even 
morally questionable, but in every case unusual kind of sexual relationship. That we 
have such clear notions of what love is and of what does belong to a love relationship 
and what does not, is certainly also due to the clear conception we have of the 
institutionalized form of this kind of relationship, viz. marriage. Contrary to this clear 
idea of love, we have though no means by which we could classify our friendships; we 
do normally not sleep with our friends nor do we necessarily spend most of our time 
with them, and only very seldom do we share our home with them. Thus, it seems as if 
we are quite disorientated when it comes to the question what friendship is, and trying 
to define the nature of this very special relationship, we usually end up with some 
rather vague but nevertheless quite idealistic notion of the matter, just like Clive 
Staples Lewis, for example, when he gives the following suggestion: "This love, free 
from instinct, free from all duties but those which love has freely assumed, almost 
wholly free from jealousy, and free without qualification from the need to be needed, is 
eminently spiritual. It is the sort of love one can imagine between angels."11 Now, 
looking for a clear definition of friendship, this is certainly not a very helpful 
proposition, but it hints at the dilemma in which we are today, when we try to find an 
exact definition of this relationship, a relationship that has to be located somewhere 
between the affectionate relations between lovers or the members of a family on the 
one hand and the purely functional and utilitarian business relationships of every day 
                                                   
9 Leroy S. Rouner, introduction, The Changing Face of Friendship (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1994) 1. 
10 Rouner 1. 
11 Clive Staples Lewis, The Four Loves (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960) 91. When Lewis calls friendship a 
kind of love, he does so in accordance with the original meaning of the term 'friendship'. Not only in 
Latin in which the word for friendship, amicitia, is directly derived from the word for love, amor, but 
also in many Germanic languages, the term for friendship is etymologically closely connected with that 
for love. The English word 'friend', for example, is derived from the Middle English frend that comes 
from the Anglo-Saxon freónd, meaning 'loving'. The Icelandic frændi is derived from frjá, to love. And 
the Gothic frijonds, a friend, is also the present past of frijon, to love. Cf. Walter W. Skeat, ed., "Friend," 
The Concise Dictionary of English Etymology (Ware: Wordsworth, 1993). 
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life. The definition of the concept of friendship has indeed become a matter of 
individualism, as friendship itself has nowadays become an utterly individual affair, 
or, as Lillian B. Rubin puts it in her empirical study of contemporary attitudes towards 
friendship: "Friendship in our society is strictly a private affair. There are no social 
rituals, no public ceremonies to honour or celebrate friendship of any kind, from the 
closest to the most distant—not even a linguistic form that distinguishes the formal, 
impersonal relationship from the informal and personal one."12 
However, even more difficult than the question what friendship is, seems to be the 
one what features and qualities a friend has or should have. The general disorientation 
concerning this matter is illustrated by the many different terms we use to characterize 
our relationships with others as precisely as possible. We are used to classifying others 
as colleagues, fellows, peers, mates, companions, associates, comrades, chums, 
confidants, partners, friends, close friends, and even best friends. This variety of terms 
to synonymize the term friend, or rather to describe the different meanings we associate 
with this term, already hints at the phenomenon: most people use the term friend not 
just to refer to persons with whom they are connected by a very intimate bond (who do 
yet not belong to their own family), but also to refer to people with whom they have a 
relationship different from one of the clearly classified ones like those of family bonds 
(like brothers or cousins), professional relations (like colleagues, clients, or superiors), 
or other strictly defined kinds of personal or professional relationship (like neighbours 
or comrades in arms).13 But when asking ten persons for exact definitions of these 
terms, we would probably evoke ten different answers. 
When Rubin, in the course of her empirical study, asked her interview partners 
whom of their acquaintances they would regard as 'close friends' or even 'best friends' 
she was quite astonished that, when she called on these friends and asked them exactly 
the same question, more than half of them (64%) did not even mention the persons 
who have just declared them to be their most intimate friends! Confronted with the 
statements of their supposed friends (the members of the first group), they were 
usually quite astonished themselves and explained that they had simply not regarded 
these people as friends, much less as close friends, and the relationships with them by 
no means as that significant. Only fourteen per cent of Rubin's interview partners of 
the second group agreed with the statement of their acquaintances of the first one and 
in turn also regarded them as belonging to the circle of their close or even best 
                                                   
12 Lillian B. Rubin, Just Friends: The Role of Friendship in Our Lives (New York: Harper & Row, 1990) 4. Her 
statement that there is no linguistic form that distinguishes the formal from the informal relationship is 
though of course only true for languages like English in which merely the personal pronoun you 
exists—contrary to, for example, languages like German and French, in which the speaker can address 
the person he is talking to either with the informal personal pronoun Du/tu or with the formal one 
Sie/vous.  
13 For a sociological study of this phenomenon, see, for example, C. S. Fischer, "What Do We Mean by a 
'Friend'?: An Inductive Study," Social Network 3 (1982): 287-306. 
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friends.14 This surprising result of her study led her to the quite unsatisfying 
conclusion that "we have friends, and we have 'just' friends; we have good friends, and 
we have best friends. Yet such is the elusiveness of the idea of 'friend' that not even the 
people involved can always say which is which."15 
This, however, instantly leads us back to the question: What qualities go to make a 
close friend? Concerning this, Rubin reports on the findings of her survey: 
'What is a friend?'—a question I asked everyone I talked with. the answers I 
heard varied somewhat depending on class, gender and generational 
perspectives. But regardless of the experienced reality of their lives and 
relationships, most people presented some idealized definition of 
friendship. Trust, honesty, respect, commitment, safety, support, generosity, 
loyalty, mutuality, constancy, understanding, acceptance.16 
So, there is apparently some sort of common notion of what friendship is about and 
consequently also one of the qualities a friend should have. But has this listing of the 
positive features of friendship anything to do with the friendships that the inter-
viewees have in reality? According to Rubin, it has not: "Nothing wrong with the list, 
of course. It just doesn't match up with the friends they described late in our 
discussion."17 
Yet, when the abstract idea of what friendship is or should be and the realities of 
friendship diverge so greatly from each other, what could be the reason for this? Is it 
indeed merely infantile wishful thinking, the fantasy of a true and perfect friendship 
denied to us in reality, that dominates our abstract notion of this kind of relationship, 
as Rubin believes?18 Or is it rather the intellectual heritage of the age-long history of 
ideas of friendship, ideas that are directly or indirectly referred to and reflected upon 
in thousands of texts, the oldest of which dating back to ancient times, that constitute 
the source of our notions of the subject? In fact, the conscious or unconscious adoption 
of literary ideals would explain why the idealized definitions of friendship that most 
people produce when asked to describe the nature of this form of relationship usually 
consist of a real hotchpotch of ideas and views of friendship, all derived from different 
ages and different conceptions and theories of the subject. We would thus 
automatically and usually unconsciously employ adopted parts of traditional or 
historical theories and conceptions of friendship to describe our notion of its nature 
when we have to define this abstract concept—just as we make in everyday 
conversation unconsciously use of traditional proverbs, sayings, and idiomatic 
expressions to describe certain situations or circumstances because we know that they 
                                                   
14 See Rubin 6-7. 
15 Rubin 7. 
16 Rubin 7. 
17 Rubin 7. 
18 See Rubin 7. 
16 The marriage of true minds 
somehow apply to these, yet without really knowing where the expressions derive 
from or how and why they were originally coined. 
So, it seems as if we have nowadays lost the knowledge of the norms and values 
that underlie a specific concept of friendship. And this means that we have lost the 
clear common notion of what friendship is itself, the universal, generally 
acknowledged conception of friendship that has formerly existed, something that was 
so naturally a part of common knowledge not only during the Renaissance but almost 
throughout the whole of history—something that was even in 1777 still something so 
ordinary that an author of that time considered it appropriate to apologise for 
discussing the matter in a treatise. 
It is indeed difficult to say why we have lost this clear common notion of friendship, 
but a possible explanation for the disregard of the concept and thus for the ignorance 
of specific friendship conceptions today is given by David Bolotin when he says: 
Friendship does not seem to fit into any of the modern systems of thought. 
Our Individualism, for example, must distrust or disregard the natural 
society among friends. There is no room for the generosity of true friendship 
in those doctrines which begin from the premise that man is naturally 
selfish. And at the other pole of modern thought, our hopes for universal, or 
even national, brotherhood tend to make us lose sight of so private and 
exclusive a relationship.19 
That it is indeed the specific nature of friendship that makes it so different from those 
kinds of relationship that tend to dominate our lives today, and especially from our 
family and love relations, is also supposed by Lewis when he remarks: "Friendship is—
in a sense not at all derogatory to it—the least natural of loves; the least instinctive, 
organic, biological, gregarious and necessary. It has least commerce with our nerves; 
there is nothing throaty about it; nothing that quickens the pulse or turns you red and 
pale."20 Friendship is thus, according to him, too different from the kinds of 
relationships we are so familiar with, and it cannot produce the feelings that we are 
used to and that we expect to experience when we have a close and intimate 
relationship with someone. 
As to the question when exactly the clear common notion of what friendship is has 
vanished, we have to admit that no definite point in history can be determined with 
absolute certainty. Yet, when looking at the development of common attitudes towards 
friendship, or rather towards different ideas of friendship, throughout the centuries, 
we will find that there was a clearly noticeable change in the estimation of friendship 
and thus in the social significance of this kind of relationship with the turn from the 
period we usually refer to as the Renaissance to the one that is commonly called the 
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Enlightenment. Of course, the use of such periodizing terms as "Renaissance" and 
"Enlightenment" is not undisputed and often indeed problematic, for which modern 
historians tend to avoid this way of periodizing the period between 1400 to 1800 by 
simply referring to it as the early modern era. When examining the history of the idea 
of friendship, however, we will find it quite helpful to make use of these terms, as they 
can help to define the different phases of the conceptual change to which the idea of 
friendship was subjected in the course of the period. In fact, with the begin of the 
fifteenth century, and the advent of the intellectual movement of humanism, there is 
also the emergence of a certain enthusiasm for the idea of friendship to be noticed, and 
when the overwhelming influence of Renaissance humanism eventually decreased at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century due to the increasing importance of new 
modes of thinking, we can find another decisive change in the attitude towards the 
meaning of friendship. The view of friendship that we can then find from the late 
seventeenth century onwards, is indeed completely different from the one we have 
seen during Renaissance times, and much more similar to the general notion of what 
friendship could be that we can find today. The hypothesis that this study therefore 
wants to put forward, is that there was a decisive conceptual change in the view of 
friendship taking place in the first half of the seventeenth century, and thus exactly at 
the turning point from the period of the Renaissance to the early years of the age of the 
Enlightenment. Furthermore, it wants to hypothesize that this change was the 
inevitable consequence firstly of the incompatibility of the idealized view of friendship 
in the Renaissance with the socio-cultural development that took place during this age 
and secondly of the emergence of a new, much more positive attitude towards the 
concepts of love and marriage due to the common search for a universal kind of 
integrated relationship that unites both the sensual and the intellectual satisfaction of 
the partners. This change, as we will see, was then crucially determining the further 
development of the concept of friendship (as well as of that of love) and is thus in the 
end responsible for the difficulties we nowadays have in defining it. 
To understand our difficulties in defining a definite and complete concept of 
friendship and to identify the origins of the fragmentary ideas of friendship that we 
have today, it is hence necessary to go back to the roots of these fragments, to 
rediscover and contextualize the old conceptions of friendship, and to analyse the 
reasons for their disappearance. It is therefore the aim of this study to examine the old 
conceptions and theories of this 'private and exclusive relationship', to recall the 
traditional notions of a concept that we seem to have lost. We will thus have to take 
first a brief and general look at the conceptualizations of friendship in antiquity—the 
mentor and the intellectual source of the Renaissance, as it were—before we will then 
deal with the influence that these inherited ideas had on fifteenth- and sixteenth-
century literature and life in detail. Following this, we will then try to identify the 
reasons that led to the decline of the classically inspired conceptions of friendship in 
the early seventeenth century—the decline that is in the end also responsible for our 
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own ignorance of the matter—and to the redefinition and diversification of the 
traditional concepts of love and friendship. 
Now, having just said that the aim of this study is to examine the old conceptions 
and theories in order to produce a suitable portrait as exact and authentic as possible of 
the conception that the educated people of the Renaissance had of friendship, we will 
though inevitably have to face the usual "sticky problems pertaining to the history of 
culture and of ideas," as David Konstan puts it in his study of the conceptions of 
friendship in ancient times.21 The problem is, as he rightly explains, that "the idea of 
friendship is not uniform over various cultures or even within a single culture at any 
given moment […]; at any time, including today, sundry conceptions of friendship co-
exist, and not all conform to the dominant fashion."22 So, to maintain that by simply 
examining the literary representations of friendship dating from a particular time, we 
could tell exactly how the people of that time thought about the matter would be 
illusionary and extremely unscientific. However, as we cannot travel back in time in 
order to interview the contemporaries of the period directly, we have to rely on the 
written statements they have bequeathed to us. The problem with these writings, of 
course, is the fact that the way in which friendship is represented in the various kinds 
of text does not always reflect the authors' real attitudes towards the subject, but, on 
the contrary, does usually fulfil a certain function, according to the particular aims that 
the writers pursue with their representation of friendship. The reason for which 
friendship is represented on the stage, for example, is usually different from the one 
for which it is made the topic of a poem or for which it is made the subject of two 
friends' correspondence with each other. We will come to these different motivations 
for representing friendship in texts later on again, but for the moment it seems already 
necessary to hint at the problems that occur when one tries to set up a generally valid 
statement about the view of friendship at any particular time. In the end, we have 
indeed to agree with Nötzoldt-Linden, when she says in the introduction to her 
sociological study of the phenomenon of friendship: "Freundschaft [...] entzieht sich 
dem perfektionistischen Bemühen, alle Facetten des Phänomens auf einmal 
einzufangen."23 
So, the aim of this study is therefore not to present an idea of the socio-historical 
realities of friendship in the Renaissance, much less to present a definite image of what 
friendships in the period really looked like. The aim is instead to examine the literary 
representations of the different conceptions of friendship at the time in question. This 
study is thus rather to be seen as a literary-historical or cultural-historical examination 
of the subject than as a socio-historical analysis. The primary objective is thus to find 
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out how friendship was thought—not how it was actually lived. However, socio-
historical conditions have of course a direct influence on the way in which friendship is 
represented in literature, as they clearly determine the way in which the idea of 
friendship is conceptualized. On the other hand, the representation of friendship in 
literature has certainly also an effect on the way in which this kind of relationship finds 
manifestation in reality. There cannot be any doubt that there is always some kind of 
interaction taking place. More generally speaking, this means, as Ulrich Seeber puts it 
in the preface to his history of English literature: "Indem Literatur den 
gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Wandel abbildend, deutend und kommentierend 
begleitet, gestaltet sie ihn auch mit."24 The aim of a study that deals with the 
representation of friendship in the literature of a particular time in the past must 
therefore also be to examine the connection between these representations and the 
cultural and social conditions at that time, in order to explain the change of friendship 
conceptions and friendship representations that took place at the transition from one 
period to another. In other words, to explain the transformation to which the concept 
of friendship was subjected in the early seventeenth century, at the end of the 
Renaissance and the dawn of the early Enlightenment, we will also have to take a look 
at the socio-historical developments that took place in this crucial period of transition. 
So, in the examination of the nature, the origins, the development, and the change of 
Renaissance conceptions of friendship, this work will follow the interdisciplinary 
tradition of literary-historical and cultural-historical studies. To do so, it will have to 
take a look at the various forms of text that deal with the topic of friendship. Its 
argumentation will thus mainly be based on the analytic interpretation of several 
selected writings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—viz. fictional, theoretical, and 
epistolary ones. To give an authentic impression of the way in which the view of 
friendship was represented in the literature of the time, it will have the writers of the 
past speak for themselves as often as possible, and to a reasonable extent. 
However, as mentioned above, it is not only the aim of this study to portray the 
origins, the nature, and the development of the conceptions of friendship in the 
Renaissance. Its main intention is, by doing this, to analyse the causes that led to the 
decline of these conceptions and to the emergence of new ones in the time following 
the Renaissance—causes that had their origin already in the fifteenth- and sixteenth 
centuries. It is furthermore the objective of this work to verify the hypothesis that the 
decay of the idealized conception of friendship in the early seventeenth century was 
due not only to one but to a number of reasons. 
So, contrary to the opinion of scholars like Mario Scotti, who, although realizing that 
the social significance of and the common esteem for friendship has undergone a 
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decisive decrease since the Renaissance, cannot see the reason for this decrease in the 
conceptualizations of friendship in the Renaissance itself, but still believe the 
Renaissance view of friendship to be the mere imitation of classical notions, this work 
is based on the conviction that the conceptions and representations of friendship in the 
Renaissance were much more than only reminiscences of classical philosophy.25 This 
study will show that the revival of the classical enthusiasm for idealistic friendship 
conceptions at the beginning of the Renaissance came in fact at a time when modern 
ways of thinking were already beginning to gradually develop a mental attitude that 
led in the end not only to the decay of these traditional views on friendship, but to a 
new, a polarized view of relationships in general—a view that was to dominate the 
common notion of personal bonding throughout the following centuries. In fact, our 
own tendency to see any kind of relationship—consciously or unconsciously—in terms 
of either affection or utility has its origin in this early modern period. The highly 
idealistic view of friendship that is to be found in the classical philosophical theories, 
however, on which the early Renaissance writers drew intensely to develop their own 
understanding of the concept, appeared to be incompatible with this new mode of 
thinking. With their strong emphasis on the ethical aspect of friendship and especially 
on the moral duties attached to it, this view did not correspond to the mere distinction 
between relationships that are mainly based on utility and those that are 
predominantly founded on affection, passion, or love. Friendship in the classical sense 
is thus not simply a form of relationship between these extremes, as it indeed includes 
both affection and utility, but is also a kind of relationship that is founded on 
something that has become almost insignificant to modern views of the matter, as it is 
first and foremost based on virtue, honour and/or spirituality. This might explain why 
the revival of the classical notions of friendship had to struggle against the increasing 
influence of modern ideas almost from the very beginning of their appearance in the 
European Renaissance. 
In the end, the disharmony between the idealized view of friendship, which was 
based on the revived classical ethical ideals, and the modern modes of thinking, which 
were slowly evolving at the same time, led to a profoundly inconsistent view of 
friendship in the Renaissance and to the attempt to adjust the old conceptions to the 
new attitudes towards relationships. In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, the notions and thus also the representations of friendship became 
increasingly ambiguous and contradictory, which finally led to a redefinition of the 
concept of friendship and to a diversification of relationship conceptions in general. In 
consequence of this process, friendship was, in addition to the old ideas, in the 
following mainly conceptualized as either a functional and useful relationship or as a 
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highly emotional one. As an emotional relationship, it had to enter into competition 
with a new conception of marital love that resulted from the development of a new 
esteem for women in the Renaissance. This, however, was a competition that it could 
not win, and in the end, the classical concept of friendship was, for the most part, 
absorbed by a completely new set of relationship conceptions that emerged at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. Affectionate friendship, now also conceivable as 
a non-sexual relationship between the sexes, was though now often directly associated 
with the concept of love, and closely connected especially with the idea of sensual love 
it was soon transformed into at least two new forms of intimate relationship: into a 
heterosexual love relationship that was defined by the concept of companionate 
marriage (the idealized concept of an integrated relationship that unites both sensual 
and intellectual love), and into a homosexual relationship that, although utterly sexual, 
was still disguised by the concept of platonic friendship. As a functional relationship, 
however, friendship had now been deprived of its affectionate and particularly of its 
specifically ethical and hence of its highly idealistic qualities and was thus subjected to 
an inevitable debasement. 
To understand how it could come to this development it is of course necessary to 
examine the nature of the concept of friendship in the Renaissance in detail. Since 
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century notions of friendship were though almost entirely 
adopted from the classics, it seems to be adequate to obtain a brief and general 
overview of the characteristic features of the friendship conceptions in classical 
philosophy first. 
Chronologically, however, there is of course a wide gap between the end of 
antiquity and the beginning of the Renaissance, a gap that is usually left blank when 
the sources of the conceptions of friendship in the Renaissance are dealt with. There is 
of course quite a good reason for this neglect of such a long period of time that covers 
almost a thousand years. In the period that fills the gap between classical and early 
modern times—usually referred to as the Middle Ages—the notions of friendship were 
predominantly determined by the Teutonic idealization of kin-relationship and by the 
commandments of Christian doctrine. This means that friendship was either 
considered an individualized form of Christian charity—as in the theological 
contemplation of Saint Aelred of Rievaulx and Thomas Aquinas—or conceptualised in 
the feudal-Teutonic terms of chivalry and brotherhood. In medieval times the 
conception of those relationships that the classical writers and those of the Renaissance 
would have regarded as friendships, was rather similar to that of family connections. 
And since, in the hierarchy of the feudal family, the relation between friends was best 
reflected by brothers who were almost equal to each other concerning their age and 
position, friendship came under the concept of brotherhood. However, as the medieval 
conceptions did not affect the Renaissance view of the matter to such an eminent 
extent, we might therefore be excused, if we will here rather neglect these medieval 
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notions, that do in fact deserve a detailed analysis on their own—which has though 
already been provided by a number of scholars who are much more into medieval 
studies than I am.26 
In this study, we will therefore concentrate on the reassessment and the 
representation of the classical conceptual heritage in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century 
literature on friendship. We will see how the humanistic writers praised the ethical 
ideals of classical friendship as well as how they endeavoured to create a practical view 
of friendship on the basis of these inherited idealized conceptions. 
Taking a look at the correspondences of Marsilio Ficino and Sir Philip Sidney, we 
will also see how some Renaissance writers tried to actually translate the classical 
ideals into their own friendships and how they thus tried to overcome the disparity 
between the ideality and the reality of friendship. It is in this part of the study that the 
ambiguous character of the representations of friendship conceptions in the 
Renaissance will be revealed most comprehensively. 
After that, we will come to the conceptual change that the concept of friendship had 
to undergo in the late Renaissance. Here, we will first see how the increasingly 
mercantilistic attitude that characterizes the general mode of thinking at the beginning 
of the seventeenth century led to a disregard of the ethical ideals of friendship and thus 
to the debasement of the classically inspired concept of friendship itself. 
We will furthermore examine the rivalry between the concepts of friendship and 
love that emerged at that time, we will see how the concepts of friendship and love 
were then redefined, how this redefinition led to a number of various new 
conceptualizations of love and friendship that overcame the traditional conventions 
that had formerly only recognized same sex friendships and love relationships 
between the sexes, how in the end the importance and the meaning of friendship 
gradually sank into oblivion, and how love has from then on determined the code of 
intimate relationships. 
 
In the last two decades, and especially in recent years, the treatment of the concept of 
friendship has indeed become quite popular with writers of cultural, literary, art-
historical, philosophical, sociological, or socio-historical studies. Interestingly enough, 
however, for some reason or another this does though not apply to the topic of 
friendship conceptions in the Renaissance. In fact, up to now, as Peter Burke puts it in 
his brief essay on Humanism and Friendship in Sixteenth-Century Europe, "compared to 
classicists, medievalists, and specialists on the nineteenth century, historians of the 
Early Modern period have had little to say about friendship."27 Of the publications on 
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friendship of most recent years, there is indeed, apart from Burke's short essay, only 
Ullrich Langer's analysis of the literary representations of friendship in some few 
selected works from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries that has to be mentioned 
when looking for studies of Renaissance conceptions of friendship.28 
It seems, as if friendship is today mainly considered a subject for psychological or 
sociological examinations. There are in fact numerous works on the influence of 
friendship relations on either the individual psyche or the societal structures in 
general. Some of these studies are for example those of Steve Duck (1983), Graham A. 
Allan (1989), and Roy Porter and Sylvana Thomaselli (1989).29 
As far as literary-historical or philosophico-historical studies are concerned, there 
are though indeed, as already indicated by Burke in his brief statement, also a number 
of works on the friendship conceptions of classical times, and particularly studies like 
those of Horst Hutter (1978), David Bolotin (1979), A. W. Price (1991), and especially 
David Konstan (1997) provide adequate approaches to the notions and theories of 
friendship put forward by the classical philosophers.30 Besides these studies of the 
classical views of the topic, there are also a few works concerning the friendship 
conceptions of medieval times, such as those of Robert Edwards and Stephen Spector 
(1991), Carolinne White (1992), Reginald Hyatte (1994), and Verena Epp (1999).31 
Finally, there are also some studies of the specifically German phenomenon of the 
friendship cult in the eighteenth century. The most significant among these are 
certainly still those by Wolfdietrich Rasch (1936) and Albert Salomon (1979).32 Yet, 
there are in fact only very few works on the friendship conceptions of the Renaissance. 
Of course, there are a handful of publications, mostly scholarly articles, on the 
representation of love and friendship in Shakespeare, and some other studies in which 
                                                   
28 See Ullrich Langer, Perfect Friendship: Studies in Literature and Moral Philosophy from Boccaccio to Corneille 
(Genève: Droz, 1994). 
29 See Steve Duck, Friends, for Life: The Psychology of Close Relationships (Brighton: Harvester, 1983); Graham 
A. Allan, Friendship: Developing a Sociological Perspective (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1989); and Roy Porter and Sylvana Tomaselli, eds., The Dialectics of Friendship (London: Routledge, 
1989). 
30 See Horst Hutter, Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice 
of Friendship (Waterloo (Ont.): Wilfrid Laurier UP, 1978); David Bolotin, Plato's Dialogue on Friendship: 
An Interpretation of the Lysis with a New Translation (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979); A. W. Price, Love and 
Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); and David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). 
31 See Robert R. Edwards and Stephen Spector, eds., The Olde Daunce: Love, Friendship, Sex, and Marriage in 
the Medieval World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Carolinne White, Christian 
Friendship in the Fourth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992); Reginald Hyatte, The Arts of 
Friendship: The Idealization of Friendship in Medieval and early Renaissance Literature (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1994); and Verena Epp, Amicitia: Zur Geschichte personaler, sozialer, politischer und geistlicher Beziehungen 
im frühen Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1999). 
32 See Wolfdietrich Rasch, Freundschaftskult und Freundschaftsdichtung im deutschen Schrifttum des 18. 
Jahrhunderts: Vom Ausgang des Barock bis zu Klopstock (Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1936); and Albert 
Salomon, "Der Freundschaftskult des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland: Versuch zur Soziologie einer 
Lebensform," Zeitschrift für Soziologie 8 (1979): 279-308. 
24 The marriage of true minds 
the subject is only mentioned in passing. But the only comprehensive work on 
Renaissance literary representations of friendship still remains Laurens J. Mills's One 
Soul in Bodies Twain, of 1937—and even this is merely about the literature of sixteenth- 
and early seventeenth-century England.33 And the only comprehensive representations 
of the literary treatment of friendship in European history as such are Edward 
Carpenter's Ioläus: An Anthology of Friendship and Carl Friedrich Stäudlin's Geschichte 
der Vorstellungen und Lehren von der Freundschaft, which even date back to the years 
1906 and 1826!34 
A comprehensive study of the origins, the nature, and the development of 
friendship conceptions in the Renaissance was thus still to be written, which might 
have also been due to the fact that the cultural- and literary-historical interpretation of 
friendship conceptions and representations in the last twenty years usually 
disappeared into the literary or historical examinations that came under the heading of 
gender studies. In such cases, Renaissance notions of friendship were merely 
considered in terms of gender roles and sexual identities. The works of Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick (1985), Josef Pequigney (1985), and Lorna Hutson (1994) are, for example, of 
this kind.35 
So, unfortunately, in most studies friendship only appears as a minor aspect of some 
other subject, and works that deal with friendship exclusively are indeed rather 
seldom. The studies mentioned above are though of course only some few examples of 
what has been written about friendship, especially in the last two and a half decades. 
However, more references to the various works dealing with the subject will be given 
in the course of this study where applicable, i.e. whenever we will come to certain 
aspects of this examination on which there are already excellent studies existing, these 
will be referred to. By this means, of course, only a selected bibliography of previous 
works on friendship can be provided. Yet, although there is no complete overview of 
the writings on friendship of the last one and a half decades, there is indeed a 
comprehensive overview of the writings on friendship before 1985. For this almost 
complete listing of works on friendship from the various scholarly disciplines 
published up to the mid-eighties, please see the annotated bibliography by Janet L. 
Barkas (1985).36 
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 1 THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: 
THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE 
or every study that is concerned with the literary or philosophic representation 
of a particular concept at a particular time in history, the first step towards the 
true understanding of the concept's appearance at that time and whether it 
came from a process of continuity or transformation, must necessarily be to identify 
the concept's roots. For every study that is concerned with the notion of friendship at 
any time in the last one and a half millennia, this means that it has to take at least a 
brief look at the friendship conceptions of antiquity, since it was then that the ideas 
were produced that determined the representation of friendship from the Confessiones 
of Augustine (AD 354-430) to the essays of Emerson (1803-82), and which still form an 
essential part of our twentieth-century view of the subject. Now, especially for the 
present study, which is concerned with the early modern notions of friendship, the 
knowledge of the fundamental ideas underlying the classical conceptions is of crucial 
importance, since the humanistic ideas of friendship in the Renaissance were indeed by 
no means original but were almost entirely founded on the views and theories that had 
already been formulated in classical times. In fact, what the Renaissance brought about 
in terms of literary friendship representation was hardly more than the interpretation, 
combination, and refinement of these inherited ideas on the subject. 
However, this introductory chapter on the classical heritage of the Renaissance 
conceptions of friendship and of the enthusiasm of the writers of this time for idealized 
ethical views on the matter neither can nor shall provide a decent philosophical or a 
proper socio-historical representation or even an analytic classification of the various 
friendship conceptions that emerged in the course of Greek and Roman antiquity. The 
Renaissance, in fact, has adopted the various fragments of classical friendship ideology 
and philosophy almost indiscriminately, without examining the particular socio-
historical contexts that led to the development of the different theories and conceptions 
of friendship in ancient times. For Renaissance writers and philosophers, merely the 
isolated statements on the matter, as they appear in the various classical theories, had 
been of interest—and this indeed almost exclusively, as the originators of these 
theories were for them only in the cases of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero of considerable 
significance—by no means, however, had there been any further interest the 
philosophical and socio-historical context in which these theories have to bee placed, 
i.e. the background of the time in which the different classical conceptions emerged 
and against which they have to be seen when properly analysed, remained completely 
insignificant for their treatment in early modern times. The fragments of classical 
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friendship conceptions that the Renaissance recycled for its own notions of the topic 
had thus merely been classified by the early modern writers according to the 
ideological point of view that they represent and at best also according to the authors 
of the sources in which they first appear, but there was no classification whatsoever in 
relation to the cultural circumstances that provoked the emergence of these inherited 
ideas in the first place. 
As the intention of this study shall therefore not be to provide a comprehensive 
representation and analysis of the existing classical philosophical and lyrical texts on 
friendship—a work that has already been excellently done by various scholars of the 
respective disciplines1—I can and will here not focus on these conceptions to a much 
greater extent as is necessary to get at least a vague notion of the amount of classical 
ideas on friendship on which the Renaissance could base its own views on the matter. 
And as the socio-cultural background of the different ideas played absolutely no role 
in their reception by the Renaissance, it seems consequently more than acceptable to 
neglect it here as well. 
The necessary overview of these classical ideas can thus only be relatively brief, of 
course, though it still has to cover, as Carolinne White puts it in a similar chapter 
introducing her study of the Christian view of friendship in the fourth century, "not 
only some of the philosophical theories and the changes in meaning or application of 
the terms involved […], but also the more popular views of the subject as they were 
handed down, often in the form of proverbs of unknown origin, [since] both these 
strands are evident in later thought."2 We will therefore take a quick look at some of 
the classical commonplaces before we will take a more detailed one at the three 
independent theories that influenced the view on friendship in the Renaissance to the 
utmost extent—namely those of Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.3 
 
                                                   
1 For more detailed discussions of the conceptions of friendship in antiquity, see, for example, David 
Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997); John T Fitzgerald, Greco-
Roman Perspectives on Friendship (Atlanta: Scholars P, 1997); Luigi Pizzolato, L'idea di amicizia nel mondo 
antico classico e cristiano (Torino: Einaudi, 1993); Horst Hutter, Politics as Friendship: The Origins of 
Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship (Waterloo: Laurier UP, 1978); Jean 
Claude Fraisse, Philia: La notion d'amitie dans la philosophie antique: Essai sur un probleme perdu et retrouve 
(Paris: Vrin, 1974); and Ludovic Dugas, L'amitié d'après les moeurs populaires et les theories des philosophes 
(Paris: Alcan, 1894). For comprehensive analyses of the conceptualisations of friendship in medieval 
times, see, for instance, the essays in Julian Haseldine, ed., Friendship in Medieval Europe (Stroud: Sutton, 
1999); Verena Epp, Amicitia: Zur Geschichte personaler, sozialer, politischer und geistlicher Beziehungen im 
frühen Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1999); Reginald Hyatte, The Arts of Friendship: The Idealization of 
Friendship in Medieval and early Renaissance Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1994); and the contributions in 
Robert R. Edwards and Stephen Spector, eds., The Olde Daunce: Love, Friendship, Sex, and Marriage in the 
Medieval World (Albany: State U of New York P, 1991). 
2 Carolinne White, Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992) 13. 
3 Since the works of Plato, Aristotle, and especially Cicero were by far the most important sources from 
which the Renaissance drew its knowledge of ancient philosophy concerning the subject, this study 
also restricts its representation of the classical conceptions to these writers. 
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Having said that any examination of the representation of friendship in the last 1500 
years needs to take a look at the classical conceptions does yet not mean that these had 
also been the earliest notions of friendship presented in literature. In fact, neither the 
Greeks nor the Romans were the first to consider friendship a subject for literary 
treatment. The relationship between two people that was neither based on the bonds of 
kinship nor motivated by libidinal drive, had already inspired writers of much earlier 
ages, as the example of the Akkadian Epic of Gilgamesh has shown.4 But the classics 
were indeed the first to treat this phenomenon also on a philosophical level, and since 
then, due to their influence on later writers, the topic of friendship has always been an 
object of consideration not merely for poets but mainly for philosophers. In fact, the 
classical conception of friendship was primarily determined by the thought of the great 
Greek and Roman thinkers, whose theoretical approaches reached from the universal, 
as in the cosmology of Empedocles (c. 490-430 BC), to the specific or personal, as in the 
Greek friendship theories of Socrates (c. 470-399 BC), Plato (428-348 BC), and Aristotle 
(384-322 BC) and the Roman reconsiderations of these by Cicero (106-43 BC). Since this 
study is yet exclusively interested in the inter-human aspect of friendship we will thus 
consequently have to neglect Empedocles' cosmological theory and will rather 
concentrate on the classical conception of personal friendship.5 
To speak of the conception of friendship in classical times, however, is not quite 
accurate. It is, in fact, more appropriate to speak of different conceptions rather than of 
one generally accepted idea of friendship. Of course, there were unanimously accepted 
commonplaces that indeed formed the general foundation of the different conceptions, 
but there was not just one single theory of amity in ancient times. 
In fact, even if the ancients had agreed on a general theory, they would not have 
been able to express it, since the vocabulary of friendship in Greek is far from being 
equivalent to that in Latin. 
According to David Konstan and other classical scholars, the Greek term usually 
translated as friendship is philia (φιλ…α) or, in its more poetic form, philotēs (φιλÒτης).6 
This translation, however, suggests a closer connection between the ancient Greek and 
the modern concept than there really is. In Greek, Konstan explains, philia has indeed a 
                                                   
4 See 9. That the Greeks could already look back on a tradition of literary treatment of friendship becomes 
evident from the way in which they approached the topic. 
5 Empedocles believed that the stability of the universe and of everything that exists was due to the 
balance of two cosmological principles, that of friendship/love (Philia) on the one hand and that of 
strife (Neikos) on the other. In his theory, Philia represents the unifying force that brings the things 
together while Neikos represents the separating force that drives the things apart. Yet, for a thorough 
analysis of Empedocles' cosmology, see, for example, the excellent study of Denis O'Brien, Empedocles' 
Cosmic Cycle: A Reconstruction from the Fragments and Secondary Sources (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1969); or those of Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean 
Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); and Romain Rolland, Empédocle d'Agrigente et l'age de la haine 
(Paris: La Maison Française, 1918). 
6 See Konstan 2-3 and 9. 
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much wider semantic range than the modern friendship, and although there is some 
dispute about the question whether the term philos (φ…λος), from which philia and 
philotēs are derived, denotes more than just the meaning of the modern friend,7 most 
scholars do agree upon the view that "the form philia does in fact cover relationships 
far wider than friendship, including the love between kin and the affection or 
solidarity between relatively distant associates such as members of the same fraternity 
or city."8 Konstan therefore concludes that "it would indeed be true to say that there is 
no single Greek term quite equivalent to 'friendship,'" and that it is therefore "often 
misleading or simply wrong to translate it [philia] as 'friendship,' although the practice 
is quite general […]."9 The ancient Greek usage of philia, because of this wide extension 
of the concept, has thus indeed the potential to cause confusion and misinterpretation, 
particularly with modern readers who are not acquainted with such a broad definition 
of "friendship." Even though not quite accurate, we will here nevertheless follow the 
general practise of which Konstan speaks, and read the Greek philia in the given texts 
as if it merely means "friendship." However, we might be excused for doing so—even 
though it seems in actual fact to be quite unscientific—not only because in the passages 
of the texts we will deal with in the following this seems to be indeed the most 
adequate translation but primarily because this was also exactly the way in which the 
Renaissance writers interpreted the term, and as it is first of all this early modern 
interpretation of the term in which this study is interested, and not the modern 
philological quest for the true meaning of the term in classical times, this method 
appears to be tenable. 
The Latin vocabulary of friendship, on the other hand, makes it much easier for the 
modern reader to comprehend its meaning. The Romans subsumed their notions of 
friendship under the name amicitia, a concept with a much narrower semantic range 
than that of the Greek philia. "Unlike Greek," Konstan therefore states, "Latin has a 
                                                   
7 This view is denied, for instance, by David Konstan in his recent study of the conceptions of friendship 
in classical times. See Konstan 2-3 and 9. 
8 Konstan 9. 
9 Konstan 9. That there is no separate expression for friendship does yet not mean, that the Greeks had no 
separate conception of such a relationship, but friendship in the modern sense, i.e. as an affectionate 
relationship between two persons on the basis of similar interests and opinions, is indeed only one 
aspect of the ancient concept of philia. Besides this it can also refer to one's social, political, and family 
relationships or, especially when it appears in the form of philotēs in early Greek writings, to one's 
relationship with a companion or comrade-in-arms (hetairos/˜τα‹ρος) or to the guest-friendship with 
visitors from foreign countries (xenoi/ξšνοι)—although these two specific forms of philia were also 
individually referred to as hetaireia (˜ταιρε…α) and xenia (ξεν…α). Cf., for example, Konstan 2-3, 8-9, 67ff; 
Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of Friendship (Albany: State U of New York P, 1995) 5-8; and 
especially A. W. H. Adkins, "'Friendship' and 'self-sufficiency' in Homer and Aristotle," CQ 13 (1963): 
30-45. For a comprehensive account of xenia and other ritualised friendships, see Gabriel Herman, 
Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987) 10-13 and passim. And for a 
thorough discussion of the semantic range of philia in comparison with other terms of friendship like 
hetaireia and xenia, see Pat Easterling, "Frienship and the Greeks," The Dialectics of Friendship, ed. Roy 
Porter and Sylvana Tomaselli (London: Routledge, 1989) 11-25; and Franz Dirlmeier, Philos und Philia im 
vorhellenistischen Griechentum (München:, 1931) passim. 
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word for friendship."10 And indeed, the Latin word amicitia has nearly the same 
meaning as friendship, or comes at least much closer to the modern concept of 
friendship than the Greek term philia, as Konstan explains: 
Though amicitia has a certain breadth of meaning, as does the English 
"friendship," and may assume, especially in philosophical contexts, some of 
the wider connotations of philia, it does not normally designate love in 
general but rather the specific relation between friends (amici). […] 
There is thus no need to demonstrate for Latin as for Greek that the 
vocabulary of friendship marks off a field of relations different from kinship, 
ethnicity, and utilitarian associations such as business partnerships.11 
And yet, amicitia has long been seen as the Roman word for political relationships and 
aristocratic alliances that would lack any sentiment of personal intimacy. This view, 
however, has lately been rejected by most scholars, since, as J. G. F. Powell puts it in 
the introduction to his edition of Cicero's Laelius, "it is unjustified in Latin usage, and 
unnecessarily confusing."12 And he makes the argument clear by stating: "Amicitia may 
have slightly different connotations from the English word 'friendship', but nobody 
who reads the Laelius – or indeed any other Latin literature – can doubt that its 
primary meaning is essentially the same. It refers properly to a personal relationship 
involving genuine feelings of goodwill and affection on both sides."13 
The difference between the Greek and the Roman vocabulary of friendship, 
however, is indeed only of minor significance for the present study, which is primarily 
concerned with the concept of friendship in early modern times. Since, from Roman 
times onwards, philia had usually been translated as amicitia, which Renaissance 
writers then also rendered into the vernaculars by terms like friendship, amitié, amistad, 
amicizia, or Freundschaft (here, of course, given in their modern spelling), it is here 
indeed not necessary to go further into detail about this point.14 
Now, instead of one generally valid theory of friendship, there was rather a 
multitude of theories circulating around the different philosophical schools that existed 
in classical times. Friendship was such a popular subject in ancient Greece and Rome 
that we find it not only as a topic in the dialogues of Plato, the ethics of Aristotle, or the 
moral writings of Cicero but as a theme widely treated by nearly every other 
philosopher or philosophic school as well. It appears equally in the ethical writings of 
                                                   
10 Konstan 122. 
11 Konstan 122. 
12 J. G. F. Powell, trans., introduction, On Friendship & The Dream of Scipio, by Marcus Tullius Cicero 
(Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1990) 22. This view is also held by Konstan. Cf. Konstan 123. 
13 Powell 22. 
14 However, although it is not represented in the writings that interpret the Greek sources in later ages, 
the knowledge that there is a difference between philia and amicitia—or the modern terms of friendship, 
which share more or less the same meaning as amicitia—is indeed necessary for the understanding of 
the classical conceptions of friendship themselves. 
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Plutarch (AD 46-after 119), in the letters of Seneca (4 BC-AD 65), in the poetry of 
Euripides (c. 484-406 BC), Horace (65-08 BC), and Ovid (43 BC-AD 17/18), in the 
treatises of Xenophone (431-before 350 BC), Speusippus (d. 339/338 BC), Xenocrates (d. 
314 BC), and Theophrastus (c. 372-287 BC), as in the doctrines of the Pythagorians, the 
Epicureans, and the Stoa.15 And since these writers and schools produced divers 
doctrines concerning the definition of those fundamental qualities that must affect all 
human relations (namely the nature of man, that of society and of morality in general), 
they consequently had to come to different hypotheses concerning friendship as well. 
Yet, however different the various conceptions might be, when we take a closer look 
at them, we will find that nearly all of them share at least two characteristics: a fairly 
idealistic view of friendship, and the stress they put on its high moral value. This 
common ground on which the classical philosophers meet, is probably best summed 
up by C. S. Lewis when he says that "to the Ancients, Friendship seemed the happiest 
and most fully human of all loves; the crown of life and the school of virtue."16 With 
this one sentence he perfectly summarizes the main ideas that the classical conceptions 
share: First of all friendship is a kind of love, secondly it leads to happiness and virtue, 
and thirdly it is the highest objective one can achieve in his entire life.17 In fact, this 
common denominator, to which nearly all of the theories can be reduced, led in later 
ages to an indiscriminate view of the classical theories. It is for this reason that we find 
a mixture of Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic, and Ciceronian ideas, combined 
with some few remnants of Christian and chivalric doctrines, when we look at the 
conceptions of friendship in the Renaissance. Due to the permanent citation of the 
classical sources in the Renaissance, various aspects of the original theories became 
alienated from their authors. Some of their thoughts even became commonplaces, and 
by this, got detached from their origin. 
However, most of the classical thoughts that became commonplaces in the 
Renaissance had in fact already been theoretical commonplaces in classical times. The 
old Greek and Roman philosophers simply adopted them to back up their own views 
with generally accepted notions of the topic. And by integrating these commonplaces 
into their theories, they preserved them for the revival in later ages. Without this 
integration, these notions might have never entered into the conceptions of friendship 
in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. And some of these classical ideas might 
indeed seem familiar to the modern reader as well, as they still form a part of our own 
conception of the nature of friendship. It was, for example, generally believed that: 
o there is a close, reciprocal connection between friendship and justice, 
                                                   
15 For a more detailed overview of the philosophical treatment of friendship in Greek and Roman times, 
see Powell 2-3. 
16 Lewis 69. 
17 Cf. Mills 6. 
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o there is a mutual connection between friendship and virtue,18 
o two friends are like one soul existing in two bodies,  
o the equality of the friends is a necessary precondition for friendship,19 and that 
o the frankness of speech in an intimate conversation between friends is a quality 
that distinguishes friendship from other relationships. 
Besides these notions of friendship there were also commonly accepted considerations 
concerning the friends themselves, such as the questions: 
o Who is considered a friend? 
o What kind of character and which other qualities should he have? 
o How can a true friend be distinguished from a flatterer or a false friend? 
o How much attention should the friends pay to each other and how much time 
should they spend together? 
o With how many friends can a man share such a close relationship? 
o How long will a friendship last, and what kind of circumstance could lead to a 
separation? 
o Should the friends only share good news with each other, or the bad ones as 
well? 
o Should friends always be honest, or are they allowed to lie in order not to hurt 
one another? 
o Is friendship something for good times only, or for bad times as well? 
o Will spatial separation end the friendship? 
o Should friends share not only thoughts and time but also material goods?20 
As we have said, most of these views and ideas, which had originally been classical 
commonplaces of friendship, were used by the Greek philosophers to support their 
individual theories on friendship, i.e. commonly accepted ideas were more or less 
absorbed into their specific conceptions. In the Renaissance, however, they were again 
extracted from those individual theories, blended, and reorganized, so that, in the end, 
they formed a patchwork-like pattern on which the humanistic conception of 
friendship was based. What we see in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in 
Europe is therefore not primarily the development of a new interest in Aristotelian or 
Ciceronian theories on friendship in particular but the development of a new interest 
in classical notions of friendship in general. The multitude of classical thoughts 
concerning friendship was to become the reservoir from which the Renaissance could 
draw its ideas about the subject.21 
                                                   
18 For Plato, this connection is the end, for Aristotle it is the precondition of friendship. See 43 and 50 
below. 
19 This is especially stressed by Aristotle. 
20 This question was particularly popular with the Pythagoreans. 
21 Cf. Mills 384n49. 
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It might hence be appropriate to have a brief look at how the classical philosophers 
incorporated these ideas into their well-rounded theories about the nature of 
friendship, before we will come to the analysis of how these complete concepts were 
again fragmented by the poets and essayists of the Renaissance. This will first of all 
help to identify the separate fragments, to relate them with others of the same 
theoretical source, and by this, to recognize which of the details belonged to which 
conception. This knowledge will then help to make out with whom of the Renaissance 
writers and at which time—i.e. whether quite at the beginning or rather towards the 
end of the period—which of the classical theories dominated the literary representation 
and with whom and at which time there is simply no individual philosophical school 
recognizable in the writings, which rather merely present a real hotchpotch of classical 
ideas of friendship. This will then finally help to understand not only which role the 
classical theories played per se in the rise and fall of the idealized conception of 
friendship in the Renaissance, but also which role each individual theory played in this 
development. 
However interesting an extended examination of the various commonplaces of 
philia and amicitia and the numerous treatments of their different aspects in classical 
literature would be, it would yet go far beyond the scope of this study. In fact, this 
cannot be the place to give a comprehensive account of the complete variety of all the 
different perspectives classical poets and philosophers took on friendship, since not all 
of them really took an influence on the view of the topic in the Renaissance. In fact, 
besides the mentioned commonplaces and the several isolated ideas of friendship that 
repeatedly appear in the writings of quite a number of well-known Greek and Roman 
writers from Homer to Seneca, there were hardly more just three individual 
approaches to a theory of friendship that really played a significant role in the 
Renaissance reception of the classical conceptions of the subject: with the Greeks, 
Plato's integrated theory of friendship and love as established chiefly in the Lysis and 
the Symposium, and Aristotle's comprehensive analysis of friendship as elaborated in 
his three ethical treatises—the Magna Moralia, the Eudemian-, and the Nicomachean 
Ethics—and with the Romans, Cicero's theory of friendship as applied ethics that he 
presents in his famous dialogue on friendship, the Laelius de amicitia. Of these three 
ancient philosophers, the credit for preparing the ground for philosophical treatments 
of personal friendship is certainly to be given to Plato. Aristotle's theory of philia, 
however, is definitely the most important and most comprehensive of all; yet by far the 
most influential work on friendship in the Renaissance was Cicero's dialogue De 
amicitia. 
As these three theories had an enormous impact on the treatment of the topic in the 
Renaissance, we will have to take a closer look at them in the following. However, the 
present study can of course only provide a brief summary or synopsis of each 
approach, and since the main aim of their representation in this study is to show the 
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origins of the conceptions valid in later times, we will also merely concentrate on the 
description of these theories and avoid a detailed interpretation or analysis. For 
discussions that are more comprehensive, the interested reader is asked to consult 
some of the various monographs that exist on the individual theories and their 
authors.22 
 
1.1. PLATO'S INTEGRATED THEORY OF 
FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE 
Among the three classical writers on personal friendship we will now have a look at, 
Plato was the first to write about the topic in his Socratic dialogues. Referring to the 
Socratic approach to philosophy in general, A. E. Taylor, in quoting Cicero, points out 
that "Socrates 'brought down philosophy from heaven to earth'—i.e., from the nature 
speculation of the Ionian and Italian cosmologists to analyses of the character and 
conduct of human life […]."23 For the conception of philia, this means that it is now no 
longer regarded as the cosmological principle that it has been with Empedocles but as 
a form of personal relationship. 
Yet, however important friendship was now regarded as being to man's social life, 
the role it plays in the context of Socrates and Plato's philosophy is though only second 
to that of love. For Socrates, love is the driving force behind friendship and the means 
by which the friends will finally ascend to the state of true virtue and wisdom, and the 
sight of the absolute beauty, i.e. the idea of the ultimate good. Friendship, however, is 
the form of relationship in which love will lead the friends to this height. Therefore, as 
far as the Socratic-Platonic philosophy is concerned, the concepts of friendship and 
love (œρος/ eros), though individually treated in separate dialogues, have to be 
                                                   
22 For more detailed discussions of the Platonic view of love and friendship, see, for instance, Robert 
Lloyd Mitchell, The Hymn to Eros: A Reading of Plato's Symposium (Lanham: UP of America, 1993); A. 
W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); David Bolotin, Plato's 
Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the 'Lysis' with a New Translation (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979) 
and Willibald Ziebis, "Der Begriff der Philia bei Plato," diss., U Breslau, 1927. More extensive surveys of 
Aristotle's theory of friendship are to be found, for example, in Ahmad Berwari, Die Theorie der 
Freundschaft bei Aristoteles (Marburg: Tectum, 1997); Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Aristotle's Philosophy of 
Friendship (Albany: State U of New York P, 1995); Paul Schollmeier, Other Selves: Aristotle on Personal and 
Political Friendship (Albany: State U of New York P, 1994); Maria Fasching, Zum Begriff der Freundschaft 
bei Aristoteles und Kant (Würzburg: Königshausen, 1990); and Erenbert Josef Schächer, Quellen- und 
problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der philia-Theorie bei Aristoteles und im frühen 
Peripatos (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1940). Finally, an ampler account of Cicero's conception of friendship 
is given, for instance, in Karl August Neuhausen, M. Tullius Cicero, Laelius: Einleitung und Kommentar 
(Heidelberg: Winter, 1981); in Fritz-Arthur Steinmetz, Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios: Nach einer 
Analyse von Ciceros 'Laelius de Amicitia' (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1967); in Friedrich Lossmann, Cicero und 
Caesar im Jahre 54: Studien zur Theorie und Praxis der römischen Freundschaft (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1962); or 
in Josef Steinberger, "Begriff und Wesen der Freundschaft bei Aristoteles und Cicero," diss., U 
Erlangen, 1956. 
23 Alfred Edward Taylor, "Socrates," Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 29 July 1999 <http://search.eb.com/ 
bol/topic?eu=117549&sctn=1&pm=1>. 
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considered in association with each other. The following summary of Socrates and 
Plato's conception of friendship will thus also include a brief look at their theory of 
love. The dialogues in which Plato deals with friendship and love—apart from the 
discussion of love in the Phaedrus—are the Lysis, which is concerned with the 
examination of philia, and the Symposium, in which he elaborates the Socratic theory of 
eros.  
Summarizing the quintessence of Plato's Socratic theory of friendship that he 
elaborates in the Lysis is yet not that easy, as the difficulty that some of Plato's early 
dialogues present us with, especially the shorter ones to which also Lysis belongs, is 
their aporetic and elenctic character. In each of these dialogues, Socrates enters into the 
discussion about a difficult subject and by the successive refutation (œλεγχος/elenchos) 
of his own suppositions and every potential answer to the puzzles he is posing in the 
course of the conversation he finally ends without providing a satisfying solution to 
the problems in question.24 Now, the Lysis, in fact, is such a 'dialogue of search', as it 
leaves the reader in a state of confusion and perplexity (¢πορ…α/aporia). At the end of 
the dialogue, Socrates is not able to tell what the exact nature of friendship is, or to 
describe the characteristics of a friend, and has to admit: "[…] but what a 'friend' is, we 
have not yet succeeded in discovering."25 Yet, this confession should not lead us to 
consider the Lysis a failure, as Socrates' aim is not primarily to describe or analyse the 
nature of friendship—at best, he is interested in the definition of a friend. His actual 
interest is directed towards the friend's motives for loving each other. Socrates' 
intention is thus not to examine what friendship is, but what causes it, i.e. the reasons 
for its development. However, he does in fact not even satisfyingly succeed in 
answering this question. The achievement of the Lysis is thus not the provision of any 
solutions but the laying of the theoretical foundation not only for Socrates' discussion 
of love, but also for all later treatments of friendship. 
 
The Lysis reports the conversation between Socrates and two of his pupils, 
Menexenus and Lysis. The boys regard each other as friends, which causes Socrates to 
ponder on friendship. He first reflects on the apparent equality of the friends. The idea 
that friends need to be equal or at least similar to each other was one of the classical 
commonplaces later on also adopted and emphasised by Aristotle and Cicero. But in 
comparison to their conception, which predominantly stressed the equality of the 
friends' character and social standing, Socrates primarily thought of the similarity of 
their financial background. He supported the archaic idea that friends should have all 
things in common and should share above all, not time or thoughts, but their 
                                                   
24 Cf. Jonathan Barnes, "Plato," Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 19 July 1999 <http://search.eb.com/bol/ 
topic?eu=115123&sctn=11>. 
25 "[...] οÜπω δ Ó τι œστιν Ð φ…λος οŒο… τε ™γενÒµεθα ™ξευρε‹ν." Plato, Lysis 223b. – Trans. W. R. M. Lamb, 
Lysis; Symposium; Gorgias, by Plato, 2nd ed., The Loeb Classical Library 166 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
UP, 1991) 71. 
The theoretical foundations: The classical heritage 35 
possessions with each other.26 This had already been a commonplace of friendship in 
Presocratic times and was particularly highlighted by Pythagoras and his disciples. For 
Socrates, the proposition that friends should share their belongings was certainly also a 
vital requirement. He did not run a philosophic school of his own—like Plato or 
Aristotle—nor did he charge any fees for his lessons. For his livelihood, he was 
therefore absolutely dependant on his pupils—whom he considered his friends—to 
share their possessions with him. In the theories of Aristotle and Cicero, however, 
there was no room for the idea of friendship as a community of property anymore, and 
in the course of time, after a short revival in the Christian notions of friendship in 
patristic and medieval times, it became increasingly unpopular and finally, by the time 
of the Renaissance, although still discussed, it was almost completely dismissed. 
But there is more than only this material facet to the idea of equality between 
friends in Socrates' conception. Homer says that the Gods would lead similar men 
together.27 But this would mean that equal men were always friends.28 For Socrates this 
is doubtful, since bad persons can never become friends, even if they are equal in their 
badness. Bad people are in fact not even always similar to themselves as they are of an 
unsteady and unbalanced nature, and since they cannot always be similar to 
themselves, they cannot be similar to anyone else, of course. Good persons on the other 
hand are consistent in their nature and are therefore similar to each other. Thus, in 
Socrates' opinion, friendship can only exist between good men, which excludes the 
possibility that any kind of friendship could exist between bad people, or between a 
good and a bad person.29 This, however, leads to the question why good men should 
make friends, since, being equal in their good disposition, they would have no benefit 
from each other and therefore no motivation to become friends.30 
Is the solution to this problem the assumption that friendship can only exist 
between unequal men, since they would be attracted to each other by their inequality? 
Would such a state of difference create a friendship in which the friends complement 
each other, and would thereby lead to a situation of mutual benevolence and esteem? 
If this were so, the bad man would make friends with the good, the unjust with the 
just, and he who hates with the one who loves. As this is as unthinkable as the 
friendship between equally good men logical, Socrates concludes: "So neither is like 
friend to like, nor opposite friend to opposite."31 
                                                   
26 See Plato, Lysis 207c and Phaedrus 279c. 
27 See Homer, Odyssey 17.218. 
28 See Plato, Lysis 214a-b. 
29 See Plato, Lysis 214c-d. Aristotle will later on contradict this view. In his threefold categorization, there 
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cannot cover yet. See 49. 
30 See Plato, Lysis 214e-215c. 
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49. 
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The solution must therefore be that there are three different types of objects: the 
good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. Here the good, the bad, and the 
'neither good nor bad' are meant in both senses, the person or thing that has the 
respective quality, and the principle of the good, bad, or 'neither of both' per se. Since 
the bad can have no friendship at all, and the good will have no friendship with 
another good, the only possible combination that remains, is the friendship of the good 
with the 'neither good nor bad'.32 The reason for the affection that underlies this 
friendship is the attraction the good has for the 'neither good nor bad' because of the 
presence of the bad in the latter. This causes the 'neither good nor bad' to develop a 
desire for the good, since, through the friendship with the good, it hopes to eliminate 
this bad part in itself. "In other words," David Bolotin explains, "friendly love—in the 
best sense—is the love of imperfect beings, like us, for those who are good and capable 
of helping us to become better and happier. According to this suggestion, our friendly 
love of the good depends on the presence of evils and on our need to free ourselves 
from them."33 The idea of friendship is thus brought into a close connection with that of 
desire (™πιθυµ…α/epithumia)—the desire for the good, and by the friendship with the 
good, to become equally good as well. So it is the desire of the 'neither good nor bad' to 
be good, from which its wish to have a friendship with the good originates.34 The good, 
on the other hand, will reciprocate the friendly approach of the 'neither good nor bad' 
for the sake of the good per se.35 In Plato's rather intricate style this reads as follows: 
"So what is neither bad nor good is a friend to the good because of what is bad and a 
foe, for the sake of what is good and a friend. […] Hence the friend is a friend of its 
friend for the sake of its friend and because of its foe."36 Socrates tries to clarify this by 
the following example: The body is a thing neither good nor bad. By getting ill, it 
receives the presence of the bad (the illness), which it tries to eliminate by asking 
'medicine' for help (the friendship with the good). Both the body and 'medicine' 
acquired this friendship for the sake of health (the good per se).37 Significantly, in this 
context the good per se is called 'a friend' as well. It is this 'friend' for whose sake only 
the friendship exists, the first principle of friendship, or the 'first friend'—the proton 
philon (πρýτον φ…λον).38 
That the good will do something for the sake of the good per se, and against the 
bad, seems to be the motive for the formation of a friendship. But what happens to a 
                                                   
32 See Plato, Lysis 216d-217b. 
33 Bolotin 11. 
34 Cf. Price 7. 
35 See Plato, Lysis 216c-218c. 
36 "ΤÕ οÜτε κακÕν οÜτε ¢γαθÕν ¥ρα δι¦ τÕ κακÕν καˆ τÕ ™χθρÕν τοà ¢γαθοà φ…λον ™στˆν ›νεκα τοà 
¢γαθοà καˆ φ…λου. [...] “Ενεκ' ¥ρα τοà φ…λου <τοà φ…λου> τÕ φ…λον φ…λον δι¦ τÕ ™χθρÒν." Plato, Lysis 
219a-b. – Trans. Lamb 57. 
37 See Plato, Lysis 219a-b. 
38 See Plato, Lysis 219d. Cf. Hutter 100. 
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friendship when, through the restoration of the good in the 'neither good nor bad' and 
the eradication of the bad, the original basis for that friendship vanishes? Will the 
'neither good nor bad' still have the desire to continue the friendship with the good 
when it is of no further use?39 Apparently not, since Socrates rhetorically asks: "Is not 
this the nature of the good—to be loved because of the bad by us who are midway 
between the bad and the good, whereas separately and for its own sake it is of no 
use?"40 
As there is obviously no enduring love of the good per se that could provide the 
foundation for durable friendships, Socrates has to lead his considerations into another 
direction. What remains, however, is the basic assumption that friendships exist, on the 
one hand because, and on the other for the sake of something. This 'something', 
Socrates infers now, must be a thing one lacks, and what one lacks, but another one 
has, must be something that was originally possessed, but was somehow lost or taken 
away. "So it is one's own belongings, it seems, that are the objects of love, friendship, 
and desire."41 The desire for these objects, one's 'own belongings', is therefore the initial 
motivation for making friends with others. This means, friends love each other because 
they somehow belong to one another, as Plato has Socrates say: "And in a case where 
one person desires another, my boys, or loves him, he would never be desiring or 
loving or befriending him, unless he somehow belonged to his beloved either in soul, 
or in some disposition, demeanour or cast of soul."42 
Socrates concludes as follows: a durable friendship is only possible between those 
who belong together. Due to what was said before about the impossible friendship 
between equals, it must therefore be assumed that those belonging together cannot be 
alike but must somehow differ from each other. Accordingly, friendships can exist 
between 'neither good nor bad' and bad or good people just as between bad and good 
men. This, however, contradicts Socrates' earlier inferences. The good cannot belong to 
the 'neither good nor bad' or even to the bad, nor can any of these qualities belong to 
anything else but to its counterpart. The good can therefore only belong to the good, 
the bad to the bad, and the 'neither nor' to its equivalent. The good can thus only have 
a friendship with another good. This is yet exactly what Socrates has already proven 
illogical.43 Here the discussion of the origin and the nature of friendship has reached an 
impasse and the examination ends in an aporia. 
                                                   
39 See Plato, Lysis 220b-d. 
40 "«ρ' οÛτω πšφυκš τε καˆ φιλε‹ται τ¢γαθÕν δι¦ τÕ κακÕν Øφ' ¹µîν, τîν µεταξÝ Ôντων τοà κακοà τε 
καˆ τ¢γαθοà, αÙτÕ δ ˜αυτοà ›νεκα οÙδεµ…αν χρε…αν œχει." Plato, Lysis 220d. – Trans. Lamb 63. 
41 "Τοà ο„κε…ου δ», æς œοικεν, Ó τε œρως καˆ ¹ φιλ…α καˆ ¹ ™πιθυµ…α τυγχ£νει οâσα, [...]." Plato, Lysis 
221e. – Trans. Lamb 65. 
42 "Καˆ ε„ ¥ρα τις ›τερος ˜τšρου ™πιθυµε‹, Ãν δ' ™γè, ð πα‹δες, À ™ρ©, οÙκ ¥ν ποτε ™πεθÚµει οÙδ ½ρα 
οÙδ ™φ…λει, ε„ µ¾ ο„κε‹Òς πV τù ™ρωµšνJ ™τÚγχανεν íν À κατ¦ τ¾ν ψυχ¾ν À κατ£ τι τÁς ψυχÁς Ãθος 
À τρÒπους À εδος." Plato, Lysis 222a. – Trans. Lamb 67. 
43 See Plato, Lysis 222c-d. 
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However, Plato's Lysis, in all its elenctic inconsistency, has to be regarded as a first 
attempt to examine the origin and the basic principles of friendship. As such, it already 
provides the starting-points for following reflections on the nature of friendship, viz. 
the propositions "that it is shared goodness and not any sort of likeness that underlies 
friendship (214d); that the inconstancy of the bad in relation to themselves makes them 
unfit to befriend others (214c-d); and that affection for other persons must somehow be 
grounded in a desire that terminates in a primary object of love (219c-220b)," as 
Michael Pakaluk sums it up.44 It is especially this last proposition and the assumption 
that "the basis of [this] desire is rooted in a metaphysical incompleteness of the human 
soul," as Konstan puts it, with which Plato links the Socratic theory of philia in the Lysis 
with that of eros in the Symposium. 45 
 
The Symposium is an account of a conversation, held at a banquet that took place in the 
house of Agathon in order to celebrate the great success of his first play, presumably 
on some evening in the year 416 BC. According to Plato, the whole conversation on 
that evening was on a single subject, namely that of love (œρος/eros). In the dialogue, all 
the participants of the banquet have to contribute a speech on this topic, and the 
multitude of different perspectives on eros reflects the variety of notions that existed of 
the theme in ancient times. Besides the praise of the God Eros in Agathon's speech,46 
the praise of the custom of boy-loving in the speech of Pausanias,47 and the 
mythological story of the human archetypes told by Aristophanes,48 there is even a 
representation of some of the ideas of Empedocles' cosmological theory in the speech 
of Eryximachus.49 
When it comes to Socrates' turn to contribute something to the topic, he gives an 
account of a conversation he once had with a Mantinean woman named Diotima.50 He 
first stresses that what one loves and desires must necessarily be what one has not, is 
not, or lacks; since, if one possessed it oneself, there would be no reason to desire, and 
hence none to love it.51 In Socrates' philosophy, the object of love is therefore the same 
as that of friendship.52 Since, by general agreement, one can only love something that is 
beautiful, and not something that lacks beauty, and since the good is also beautiful, 
one will always love the beautiful and the good—in the concrete as well as in the 
                                                   
44 Michael Pakaluk, ed., Other Selves: Philosophers on Friendship (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991) 1. 
45 Konstan 73. 
46 See Plato, Symposium 194e-197e. 
47 See Plato, Symposium 180c-185e. 
48 See Plato, Symposium 188c-194e. 
49 See Plato, Symposium 186a-189b. 
50 See Plato, Symposium 201d. 
51 See Plato, Symposium 200a-e. 
52 Cf. 36f. 
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abstract sense. Consequently, neither the lover (™ραστ»ς/erastēs), the subject of love, 
can be beautiful or good (since he desires these qualities, which he would not do if he 
already had them), nor can love in itself be beautiful or good. Only the beloved 
(™ρæµενον/ erastos), the object of love, possesses these two qualities.53 Here Socrates 
clearly implies that the quality of love is solely attributed to its subject and not to its 
object. Love is therefore only a defect, an imperfection on the side of the lover. 
The fact that the lover, and love itself, are not beautiful, wise, or good, does not 
mean that they are inevitably ugly. They are rather like the 'neither nor' of the Lysis.54 
This leads to the following two conclusions. Firstly that love is the search for the lost 
good,55 and that the meaning and end of love is happiness, since the achievement of 
the beautiful and good results in happiness.56 Secondly that for the one who is already 
beautiful, wise, and good, and therefore happy, obviously no reason for loving 
remains.57 
The end of love, however, is not only to achieve the good and beautiful, but also to 
retain the possession of it forever.58 The meaning of love is therefore to tie the beautiful 
and good qualities of the beloved constantly to the lover. It is the purpose of the lover 
to unite with the beloved and thus, in an act of reproduction, to merge his own 
qualities with the goodness and the beauty of the beloved. The lover does thereby not 
only mingle his personal characteristics with the qualities of goodness and beauty but, 
by means of generation, also obtains a certain kind of immortality. In fact, since beauty 
and goodness are immortal qualities, the lover, too, has to achieve immortality if the 
union should be forever. But since immortality in itself is considered something good 
and beautiful, something that the lover does not have, his desire and love will 
naturally be directed towards the achievement of immortality as well.59 
Those whose bodily qualities have an advantage over their mental capacities will 
thus find their immortality in the love of good and beautiful women and the 
generation of children. Those, however, whose qualities are more of an intellectual 
nature, will also seek a way to raise these qualities to immortality. In contrast to those 
of the first group, they will achieve this by the love of boys rather than of women, by 
uniting with one who possesses the qualities of goodness and beauty and by 
                                                   
53 See Plato, Symposium 204c. 
54 See Plato, Symposium 204b. Cf. 36. 
55 As with the idea of the 'own belongings' in the Lysis, Socrates here believes that one can only desire and 
love something that was formerly possessed but then somehow lost. In the Symposium, this 'something' 
is the good the lover has lost—in contrast to the Lysis, where the idea of the 'own belongings' is not 
directly connected with that of the proton philon, the good per se, but could refer to the good as to the 
bad or the 'neither nor'. Cf. 37f; and Plato, Lysis 219d, 221e. 
56 See Plato, Symposium 205a. 
57 See Plato, Symposium 204a. 
58 See Plato, Symposium 206a. 
59 See Plato, Symposium 206a-207d. 
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procreating their kind of children with him.60 In search of an appropriate partner, the 
lover is looking for someone who is good and beautiful in both body and soul, as he 
naturally do not want to unite with someone who is physically repulsive. When he has 
found such a beautiful boy with a good soul, both can mentally unite; and by means of 
teaching and instructing the boy, he can generate his ideas and opinions in him. The 
thoughts, discoveries, and insights they gain from their conversations, and the 
goodness and virtue that develops from the union of their souls are the products of 
their love-friendship and therefore, in fact, their spiritual children.61 Such is the kind of 
immortality that is gained by the union of souls. Concerning the lover (™ραστ»ς/ 
erastēs) and his beloved (™ρèµενος/erōmenos), and the children engendered by their 
friendship, Diotima extols the virtues of this friendship to Socrates by saying: 
'For I hold that by contact with the fair one and by consorting with him he 
bears and brings forth his long-felt conception, because in presence or 
absence he remembers his fair. Equally too with him he shares the nurturing 
of what is begotten, so that men in this condition enjoy a far fuller 
community with each other than that which comes with children, and a far 
surer friendship, since the children of their union are fairer and more 
deathless. Every one would choose to have got children such as these rather 
than the human sort […].'62 
The main characteristic of love is therefore either the physical or the intellectual 
reproduction of the lover in beauty.63 
A thorough description of the nature of this love-friendship is also to be found in 
the Phaedrus, where Socrates emphasises the exceptional value of the friendship 
                                                   
60 The custom of boy-loving in ancient Greece, of which Pausina gives us a brief but vivid idea in his 
praise of love (see Symposium, 180c-185e), was closely connected with the concept of education, as 
Michel Foucault poits out: "En Grèce, la vérité et le sexe se liaient dans la forme de la pédagogie, par la 
transmission, corps à corps, d'un savoir précieux; le sexe servait de support aux initiations de la 
connaissance." Michel Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité: La volonté de savoir, vol. 1, 3 vols. ([Paris]: 
Gallimard, 1976) 82. – "In Greece, truth and sex were linked, in the form of pedagogy, by the 
transmission of a precious knowledge from one body to another; sex served as a medium for initiations 
into learning." Trans. Robert Hurley, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, by Michel Foucault, vol. 1, 
3 vols. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) 61. For a detailed account on pederasty in ancient Greece see, 
for example, Eva Cantarella, Bisexuality in the Ancient World, trans. Cormac Ó Cuilleanáin (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992) 17-35. For an analysis of how some passages in the Symposium, especially 
Aristophanes' story (see Symposium. 188c-194e), reveal a classical conception of a sort of homosexual 
identity, see David M. Halperin, "Sex before Sexuality: Pederasty, Politics, and Power in Classical 
Athens," Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past, ed. Martin B. Duberman, Martha 
Vicinus, and George Chauncey (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991) 43-45. 
61 See Plato, Symposium 208d-209c. 
62 "¡πτÒµενος γ£ρ, οµαι, τοà καλοà καˆ Ðµιλîν αÙτù, § π£λαι ™κÚει τ…κτει καˆ γενν´, καˆ παρëν καˆ 
¢πëν µεµνηµšνος, καˆ τÕ γεννηθν συνεκτρšφει κοινÍ µετ' ™κε…νου, éστε πολÝ µε…ζω κοινων…αν τÁς 
τîν πα…δων πρÕς ¢λλ»λους οƒ τοιοàτοι ‡σχουσι καˆ φιλ…αν βεβαιοτšραν, ¤τε καλλιÒνων καˆ 
¢θανατωτšρων πα…δων κεκοινωνηκÒτες. καˆ π©ς ¨ν δšξαιτο ˜αυτù τοιοÚτους πα‹δας µ©λλον 
γεγονšναι À τοÝς ¢νθρωπ…νους,[...]." Plato, Symposium 209c. – Trans. Lamb 201. 
63 See also Price 15. 
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between the lover and the boy, and especially stresses the reciprocity of their love.64 
Contrary to the uncertainty he expresses in the Lysis concerning the question whether 
friends should be of an equal or unequal nature, Socrates leaves here—in the 
Symposium as in the Phaedrus—no doubt that the lover and his beloved (i.e. the friends) 
must be dissimilar to each other, as this is the necessary precondition of their 
relationship. In fact, this kind of friendship requires the inequality of the friends, as 
both are interested in something else. The lover admires the beauty of the boy and the 
beloved boy admires the erudition of his lover. Consequently, we can assume that the 
lover has to be as virtuous and wise, as the beloved is beautiful, and vice versa. If the 
motivation of the lover for entering into a friendship with the boy is to achieve 
immortality, the boy's motivation is to achieve knowledge and virtuousness. Therefore, 
both love each other for lack of something they want to achieve. It is usually the older 
friend who is in search of beauty and the younger one who is in search of wisdom, 
wherefore this love-friendship normally develops between a youth and his mentor. 
This kind of friendship is thus distinctly different from the one between equal friends, 
who usually are of the same age and share the same interests. Although this notion of 
different sorts of friendship—some being based on the equality of the friends, others 
on their inequality—is briefly discussed in the Lysis and also mentioned in the 
Phaedrus,65 neither Socrates nor Plato seems to pay enough attention to this distinction 
as to examine it in detail. 
We are certainly coming to the heart of Socrates' considerations of the nature of love 
(and friendship) when Diotima presents the theory of what we might call the 'ladder of 
love'. It describes the various phases through which the lover has to go on his way to 
the ultimate end of his love. This end, at first defined as the achievement and the 
possession of the beautiful object (see above), is now redefined as the sight of pure 
beauty itself. The lover achieves this sight of absolute beauty, which in Plato's 
philosophy also represents the idea of the highest good, by beginning to value the sight 
of a specific beauty—the body of the boy he loves.66 The physically perceivable beauty 
of the boy's body is, as it were, the reflection of the highest beauty itself that is not 
physically perceivable anymore. The appreciation of the physically beautiful is 
therefore the initial precondition to reach the stage of the highest beauty. This is the 
point where Socrates brings sexual desire into a direct connection with virtue, since 
virtue is defined as the love of the good. Erotic energy serves, so to speak, as the 
foundation, as the fuel for the development of virtue. In this context, sexual desire is 
not only described as an independent and legitimate form of love but, being the first 
step on the ladder of love, it also directly points to its end, the virtuous love of 
                                                   
64 See Plato, Phaedrus 255a-256a. 
65 See Plato, Phaedrus 240b-c. 
66 See Plato, Symposium 210d-e. 
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beauty.67 Now, love is no longer just the desire for the beautiful object, but by shifting 
its direction from the particular to the general, it becomes the desire for beauty itself. 
Beginning with the admiration of the beloved's body, the lover has to ascend the 
following steps on the ladder of love: First he will, attracted by the beauty of the boy's 
body, love the boy and engender good and virtues conversations with him. Then he 
will realize that the beauty of this specific body is related to that of other bodies, as it is 
the same beauty that is common to them all. This means that he would consequently 
have to love all the other bodies just as the specific one. He will therefore come to have 
a lower opinion of the love of bodies.68 
On the second level, the lover will thus place his love for the boy's soul over that for 
his body. He will lead elaborate discussions about such subjects as the beauty of 
observances and laws and will come to the realization that this beauty is also the same 
in all laws and observances. Seeing the beauty of things intellectual, he will despise the 
love for physical objects. This is the level where friendship has its place.69 
After the sight of the beauty of observances and laws, the lover learns about the 
beauty of knowledge. But this beauty is already so comprehensive and great that he 
comes to consider the beauty of a single object too trivial to be really appreciated.70 
Being drawn towards the width and greatness of this beauty, he will advance his 
thoughts and interests in unlimited philosophy to such an extent that he eventually 
arrives at the stage where the vision of a single knowledge is revealed to him. This is 
the knowledge of absolute beauty (i.e. the idea of the highest good) itself. In the end, 
the lover thus reaches the level of absolute wisdom and virtue and partakes, as it were, 
in the idea of the highest good, i.e. he obtains a friendship with heaven and becomes 
immortal.71 
The conclusion we can therefore draw from this crucial passage is that in the 
Socratic-Platonic conception, wisdom (i.e. philosophy) and its beauty, are the real ends 
of love (and friendship) and will lead to immortality, just as Diotima says, when she 
summarizes the whole theory: 72 
                                                   
67 In the Phaedrus it is yet stressed that, at least on the level of learning and philosophy, the expression of 
physical love should no longer be performed. See Plato, Phaedrus 256b-e. However, with Socrates, 
carnal love is not despised, but included in his concept of virtuous love and friendship—in contrary, 
though, to the late Plato and to Aristotle. See G. R. F. Ferrari, "Platonic Love," The Cambridge Companion 
to Plato, ed. R. Kraut, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992) 260-61. 
68 See Plato, Symposium 210a-b. 
69 See Plato, Symposium 210b-c. 
70 See Plato, Symposium 210c-d. 
71 See Plato, Symposium 210d-e, 212a. Plato here lays the foundation of his theory of ideas, i.e. his 
conception of the realm of forms, which he elaborates in his later dialogues. 
72 For a detailed analysis of Diotima's 'ladder of love', see Price 38ff, 45ff. 
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'So when a man by the right method of boy-loving ascends from these 
particulars and begins to descry that beauty, he is almost able to lay hold of 
the final secret. Such is the right approach or induction to love-matters. 
Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty 
be ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and 
from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to 
beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and from 
learning at last to that particular study which is concerned with the 
beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end he comes to know the very 
essence of beauty. […][And] when he has begotten a true virtue and has 
reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all 
men, is immortal.'73 
 
In conclusion, we can state that in Socrates' philosophy, of which Plato gives us a vivid 
account in these two dialogues, there is an inseparable interconnection between the 
idea of philia and that of eros. One can only become the friend of another by sincerely 
loving him. Love, therefore, leads to friendship, or, in other words, friendship is the 
aim and end of love. That love, or at least affection, is a necessary precondition of 
friendship has yet always been a commonplace and is certainly no innovation of 
Socrates' conception. The innovation of his theory is rather the interdependence 
between the concepts concerning their function, namely to lead the friend (or the lover, 
as he is referred to in the Symposium) to the state of absolute wisdom and virtue. This 
conception is in fact exceptional, since "in classical Greece erotic love and friendship 
were understood normally to be incompatible relationships," as David Konstan 
remarks.74. In most other theories that are concerned with the achievement of virtue by 
means of having a relationship with someone, the capacity of achieving virtue is in fact 
exclusively ascribed to friendship, since the idea of virtue is usually closely connected 
with that of equality, and the equality of the partners is one of the major characteristics 
of philia but not of eros. In general, philia and eros have thus to be conceptualised 
differently, but in Socrates' theory the differences become blurred. The peculiarity of 
the Socratic-Platonic conception is that Plato in the Symposium—just like Aristotle later 
on in his Nicomachean Ethics—refers to the relationship of a male adult lover and his 
male under-age beloved as philia, and thus obviously conceives of it as a kind of 
friendship.75  
                                                   
73 "Óταν δ» τις ¢πÕ τîνδε δι¦ τÕ Ñρθîς παιδεραστε‹ν ™πανιëν ™κε‹νο τÕ καλÕν ¥ρχηται καθορ©ν, σχεδÕν 
¥ν τι ¤πτοιτο τοà τšλους. τοàτο γ¦ρ δ» ™στι τÕ Ñρθîς ™πˆ τ¦ ™ρωτικ¦ „šναι À Øπ' ¥λλου ¥γεσθαι, 
¢ρχÒµενον ¢πÕ τîνδε τîν καλîν ™κε…νου ›νεκα τοà καλοà ¢εˆ ™πανιšναι, éσπερ ™παναβαθµο‹ς 
χρèµενον, ¢πÕ ˜νÕς ™πˆ δÚο καˆ ¢πÕ δυο‹ν ™πˆ π£ντα τ¦ καλ¦ σèµατα, καˆ ¢πÕ τîν καλîν 
σωµ£των ™πˆ τ¦ καλ¦ ™πιτηδεÚµατα, καˆ ¢πÕ τîν ™πιτηδευµ£των ™πˆ τ¦ καλ¦ µαθ»µατα, καˆ ¢πÕ 
τîν µαθηµ£των ™π' ™κε‹νο τÕ µ£θ»µα τελευτÁσαι, Ó ™στιν οÙκ ¥λλου À αÙτοà ™κε…νου τοà καλοà 
µ£θηµα, †να γνù αÙτÕ τελευτîν Ö œστι καλÒν. [...] τεκÒντι δ ¢ρετ¾ν ¢ληθÁ καˆ θρεψαµšνJ Øπ£ρχει 
θεοφιλε‹ γενšσθαι, καˆ ε‡περ τJ ¥λλJ ¢νθρèπων ¢θαν£τJ καˆ ™κε…νJ." Plato, Symposium 211b-212a. – 
Trans. Lamb 205-09. 
74 Konstan 38. 
75 See, for example, Plato, Symposium 209c; and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.4, 1157a. 
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However, that the nature of the friendship between friends is distinct from that 
between a lover and his beloved is indisputable and not denied by Socrates. For him, 
too, lover and beloved are far from being equal and what they gain from their 
friendship is by no means comparable. In fact, when Socrates comes to the idea of the 
'ladder of love,' love and friendship do not lead both friends or lovers to the height of 
the idea of the highest good, but only one of them, viz. the older mentor as the lover of 
beauty. Hyatte gives a brief account of this peculiar idea of the one-sided dispensation 
of the benefits of love-friendship and of Plato's paradoxical conception of a solitary 
friend and lover who can only ascend to the view of absolute beauty by means of a 
friendship with a boy whose role in this friendship is so insignificant that it is not even 
mentioned: 
Once Socrates begins, however, to investigate the ultimate object of philia 
and posits ideal Beauty, he shifts the discussants' attention from the pair of 
lovers-friends to a single man's rational and transcendent love of the 
absolute. […] 
Plato does not provide an explanation of the role of the 'other,' the second 
equal person in a friendly relationship, and consequently a theory of the 
reciprocal activity of friendly parties on the way to ultimate happiness is not 
possible. […] Plato's metaphysics leaves one with a paradoxical single 
friend, the universal philos of all good persons, actions, and ideas and the 
particular friend of none.76 
Viewed logically, the theory seems to imply that the youth, the beloved of the lover, 
also ascends to a higher state of knowledge and virtue—yet, this is nowhere explicitly 
formulated. 
Probably precisely because of this problematic role of the beloved as a friend, and 
due to the aporia of the Socratic approach to friendship in the Lysis, Plato's works, in 
comparison with those of Aristotle and Cicero, contributed least to the contemplations 
of the subject in later times. It was rather his treatment of love in the Symposium and 
the Phaedrus that interested following philosophers, especially the Renaissance 
humanists. And it were then their immediate successors who, at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, finally made use of Plato's integrated theory of love and 
friendship to create a new concept of a love-friendship relationship between the sexes 
that in the end, among other causes, led to the debasement of the idealized conception 
of friendship that had dominated the Renaissance, as we will see later on. The 
knowledge of the basic ideas of Plato's Symposium is therefore necessary to understand 
how the transformation that the concept of friendship underwent at the end of the 
Renaissance was theoretically backed up.  
The importance of the Lysis, however, in general and to this study in particular, does 
though rather result from the fact that it contains a number of significant propositions 
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that served as a starting-point for many philosophic approaches to friendship in 
antiquity itself. As the most prominent among them certainly ranks Aristotle's 
treatment of the subject in his Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics.77 In creating his theory 
of friendship, Aristotle adopts both individual ideas and general propositions from 
Plato, and especially his notion of the close connection between friendship, virtue, and 
the idea of the good per se mirrors the basic assumption of the Socratic conception. 
 
1.2. ARISTOTLE'S COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF FRIENDSHIP 
Even if it is still a matter of scholarly disagreement whether Plato or Aristotle is to be 
considered the supreme figure of classical philosophy, the acceptance of Aristotle's 
dominating role in the field of classical friendship theory is clearly beyond dispute. The 
community of scholars is in fact unanimous in its acknowledgement of the quality and 
the outstanding significance of his approach. Hyatte, for example, points out that 
Aristotle "was the first to formulate a complete theory of friendship […] where he 
identifies, defines, and classifies most species of philia."78 For Konstan, "Aristotle's 
analysis of friendship in the context of his discussion of philia […] is the most 
comprehensive and intelligent treatment in all antiquity."79 And Hutter equally 
remarks: "The discussion of philia in Aristotle is the most comprehensive and most 
extensive of all such discussions to be found in Greek philosophy. […] None of them is 
equal to it in breadth and depth of vision."80 
In fact, if one had to choose a single text from the enormous variety of friendship 
literature in classical antiquity to represent the remarkable concern for the topic in the 
period, it would have to be books eight and nine of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.81 
This treatise incorporates all or at least most of the classical notions of friendship in one 
theory and uniquely combines practical with ethical considerations. The systematic 
analysis of philia in these two books is by far the most comprehensive exposition of the 
subject to be found in classical literature. Above all, we would have to choose 
Aristotle's theory because its influence on subsequent works on friendship, in antiquity 
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as in later periods, exceeds that of any other classical writing of Greek origin. Only 
from Roman antiquity onwards, the influence of the Nicomachean Ethics is accompanied 
and sometimes even surpassed by that of Cicero's Laelius de amicitia, which clearly 
draws on the Aristotelian ideas itself. 
 
Due to its aporetic nature, Plato's approach to a theory of friendship remains quite 
vague and general. In defining friendship and love as the means that lead to the sight 
of the ultimate good, it denies the possibility that friendship itself could ever be this 
good. With Aristotle, the view of friendship becomes more explicit and develops into a 
systematically defined concept. Seeming to be a more practical conception at first, due 
to the greater sense of realism that is reflected in Aristotle's theory, it turns out to be 
much more idealistic than that of Plato. Friendship is now not only the way to virtue 
but somehow also becomes a state of virtue itself, as Aristotle states right at the 
beginning of the eighth book of his Nicomachean Ethics: "Our next business after this 
will be to discuss Friendship. For friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue; and also it is 
one of the most indispensable requirements of life."82 The special emphasis Aristotle 
places on the connection between friendship and virtue becomes obvious by the fact 
that he dedicates his initial statement to it, although the idea of the virtuous quality of 
philia does not apply to friendship in general, but only to his concept of perfect 
friendship (τελε…α φιλ…α/teleia philia), which is introduced later in the text. 
Since the mutual feeling of affection that friends have for each other is an essential 
characteristic of friendship, Aristotle begins by analysing the nature of this feeling, and 
tries to identify the objects to which it is directed. On the principle that not everything 
is loved but only that which is loveable or what is considered loveable, Aristotle comes 
to the proposition that everything that is loved must be either good, pleasant, or 
useful—or must at least seem to be so. Following this definition, someone can therefore 
only love something that possesses at least one of these three qualities, which can 
therefore be called the three motives for loving. One might however say that 'useful' 
means the same as 'productive of some good or pleasure', so that in the end only two 
motives of love remain, since something which is useful, will consequently result in 
something that is either good or pleasant.83 The nature of things that are good is yet 
somehow different from that of things that are pleasant or useful, since these latter 
qualities only apply to the individual lover. This means that something that is pleasant 
or useful for some does not have to be so for others. With the good, it is different since 
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83 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, 1155b. 
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there are two different kinds: the individual or personal good, and the absolute good. 
Accordingly, there are things that are good for someone, but do not have to be equally 
good for another, and things that are good per se. These latter ones are equally good 
for all and therefore generally loveable.84 
Having defined friendship as a state of mutual affection, it can consequently only 
last as long as affection exists on either side. This is also the reason why we do not 
speak of friendship when we want to characterize our affection for inanimate things, 
since, in this case, our feelings are not reciprocated. Accordingly, having a feeling of 
goodwill and benevolence for persons who do not reciprocate this affection can 
therefore not be regarded as having a friendship either. The foundation of friendship is 
therefore the mutual affection of two people who are totally aware of the reciprocity of 
their feelings, since mutual affection is not yet friendship when either side is ignorant 
of the feelings of the other: "To be friends therefore, men must (1) feel goodwill for 
each other, that is, wish each other's good, and (2) be aware of each other's goodwill, 
and (3) the cause of their goodwill must be one of the lovable qualities mentioned 
above."85 
As there are three motives for loving someone, there are correspondingly also three 
sorts of friendship that originate from these motives. With each of these friendships, 
there is a kind of mutual affection, known to both sides, and each party wishes the 
other only the best with regard to the reason for which the friendship exists. If the 
friendship, for example, is based on bilateral utility, it is not the personality of the 
friend that is of interest but only the cause of his usefulness. And with regard to this 
cause, the friend will certainly wish him the very best. Friendships of this sort are to be 
found among merchants, people who have an eye to their own interests in general, and 
mainly among elderly persons who have no further need for pleasures, but a 
considerable one for utility.86 The same applies to friendships that are based on 
reciprocal pleasures. Here the friend is again not appreciated for what he is, but for 
that which makes him pleasant. Those are the prevailing friendships among the young. 
Their orientation is mostly hedonistic and they change their friends as often as they 
change their preferences concerning the things that provide them with pleasure. Here, 
among the friendships of the young, Aristotle also includes the erotic relationships, 
which he considers equally changeable and inferior as all other relations that exist for 
the sake of pleasure.87 For Aristotle, these are only inferior friendships since the friend 
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is rather loved for the function he fulfils than for his own sake. Such friendships are 
normally not of long duration, as they only exist as long as the reason for which they 
exist (either pleasure or utility) remains.88 
The third sort of friendship is formed neither for the reason that the friend is useful 
nor because he is pleasant, but because he is good. The quality of being good is here 
and in the following also meant in the sense of being virtuous. Good and goodness are 
accordingly used as synonyms for virtue. This kind of friendship exists only because 
both friends love the good—the good per se and the good in the friend. In such a 
friendship, the friends will wish each other all the best for the friend's sake only. They 
love and cherish each other because of their personalities and not because of some 
trivial profit, pleasure, or utility. A friendship of this kind can only exist because each 
friend is good in himself, good in the absolute sense, and good for his friend. The 
friendship will therefore last as long as the friends continue to be good, and since 
goodness is a durable quality, such friendships are likely to be enduring.89 For 
Aristotle, this is the true and perfect friendship: "The perfect form of friendship is that 
between the good, and those who resemble each other in virtue."90 
However, when this kind of friendship is entirely based on the equality of the 
friends' goodness, the question arises, whether the friendship should be ended, when 
the friends become unequal in their virtuousness. For Aristotle this depends on the 
degree to which they differ. If there is the chance that the more virtuous friend can 
help his partner to take him back to the lost stage of virtue, it is his obligation to do so. 
If, however, the discrepancy between them is too distinct, and the friend refuses the 
help, the friendship must be ended, as it has lost its basis. The lost friend should yet 
not be treated as if he had never been one.91 
According to the concept of perfect friendship, a man who is good and virtuous will 
causally be good for his friend. But the virtuous friends will also be of pleasure and 
utility for each other, because virtue itself is pleasant and useful. It is pleasant because 
every virtuous man will appreciate his own conduct for being virtuous, and since the 
conduct of every virtuous man is similar to his own, he must therefore consider it to be 
equally pleasant. It is useful since virtue always generates new virtue in the one to 
whom it is directed. The reason for the durability of such perfect friendships is that 
they include all of the necessary and loveable qualities: the virtuous friends are good, 
and therefore also pleasant and useful for themselves as for each other. One could also 
say that they are good, virtuous, pleasant, and useful—absolute and relative. 
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Here the main contrast to those friendships that Aristotle calls incidental becomes 
obvious. For him the object of every friendship is, as we have seen, something 
absolutely or relatively good or pleasant—which is then consequently also useful. In 
the perfect sort of friendship, these qualities do not only apply to the friendship but 
also to the friends themselves. Such friendships are indeed rare since men of good 
character, who are necessary to form these friendships, are rare. Friendships of the 
inferior kind are possible between nearly everybody, this means between good men as 
well as between a good and a bad, or even between purely bad men, or between men 
of whatsoever character. Here the threefold division of philia allows Aristotle to 
contradict Socrates' conception of a uniform kind of friendship that can only exist 
between truly good men and that denies the possibility that bad people, or a good and 
a bad person, could have any sort of friendship.92 However, Aristotle in a way agrees 
with Socrates again, when he admits that perfect friendship can only exist between 
truly good persons. 93 
A friendship that is built on the absolute virtuousness of the partners has many 
advantages for the friends. It is, for example, an effective insurance against treason 
since a good man, because he is virtuous, will never betray his friend. This is 
something which cannot generally be expected from someone who is called a friend on 
the basis of one of the other two kinds of friendship.94 And as perfect friendship is an 
insurance against betrayal for the individual, so it is for the whole community, since 
both friends will remain virtuous, and virtuous men will never do wrong, neither to 
their friends nor to others, or even the state, nor will they ever allow their friends to do 
so.95 
Perfect friendship also needs time to develop. It is only achieved by a high grade of 
intimacy and confidence, and when the friends have proved to each other that they are 
truly worthy of this kind of friendship. Unless this stage is reached, for every 
relationship, even if it has the potential to become such a perfect friendship, there will 
remain nothing but the friends' wish to have one, as "[…] the wish to be friends is a 
quick growth, but friendship is not."96 To achieve this high grade of intimacy and 
confidence, the friends will have to spend much time together, and for Aristotle, this is 
another essential characteristic of friendship. To support this argument, Aristotle even 
quotes the proverbial saying that friends cannot speak of having a true friendship as 
long as they have not eaten at least a bushel of salt together.97 However, this does not 
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mean that perfect friendships, once achieved, will immediately break off as soon as the 
friends are spatially separated from each other. True friendship will normally 
withstand such a trial, although a long or even permanent separation may indeed do 
harm to the friendship.98 
The reflection on how much time friends should spend together directly leads to the 
question how many friends—or rather how few—a man can consequently have.99 Here 
Aristotle distinguishes between the different kinds of friendship. Concerning the 
inferior sorts one can have quite a number of friends, but a true and perfect friendship 
is something so rare that it can normally only be shared with one single person at a 
time. In carnal love, it rarely happens that someone whose feelings are totally 
concentrated on his beloved is also attracted by others—and the same applies to 
perfect friendship. The reason for this is probably that there are only very few 
candidates who are likely to meet the essential preconditions which such relationships 
require. As erotic love is initiated by the physical attractiveness of the partners, perfect 
friendship is inspired by their virtuousness. The prospects of meeting two or more 
persons who are equally fit to become either one's friend or lover are therefore 
relatively poor. Keeping this and the amount of time that one should spend with his 
friend in mind, Aristotle's statement that there can only be one true friend becomes 
plausible.100 
Recapitulating, we can say that there are three different sorts of friendship, which 
are all based on either the equality or the inequality of the friends in a certain respect 
and on the mutual exchange of something either useful, pleasant, or good.101 In each of 
these friendships, the friends are only interested in that aspect of their friend that 
produces the relevant quality. In relation to this aspect, they wish each other all the 
best, but the friendship can only last as long as the reason for which it was formed 
exists. Ordinary people will therefore form friendships for their personal pleasure or 
utility. It is the equal inferiority of the friends that provides the basis for such 
friendships. We will call these people friends, although their friendship is only a 
reflection of the true, the real friendship. This true and perfect friendship, however, can 
only exist between good men who love their friend for nothing else but the friend's 
sake and whose common virtue constitutes the basis for their friendship. When two 
good men are united in such a relationship, which thereby also obtains the quality of 
being good in itself, this friendship will even increase their virtuousness. Friendship is 
therefore, as it were, an amplifier of virtue. 
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Like Socrates, Aristotle is troubled by the question whether friendship is based on the 
equality or inequality of the friends.102 While in perfect friendship, which is based on 
the virtuousness of the friends, their equality concerning this virtuousness is a 
prerequisite, the inferior kinds of friendship rather require friends of different natures 
and qualities.103 The aim of each friend is here to give something of which he has 
plenty in order to gain something that he lacks.104 As everyone is looking for 
something else, each partner has accordingly a different motive for becoming the 
friend of the other. Different, if not unbalanced, is therefore what the friends gain from 
the friendship. Those who have an advantage over their partners in terms of money or 
social status have naturally more to give than they can expect to receive. The necessary 
compensation can then only be achieved by the agreement that the inferior partner will 
love the superior much more than he is loved in return. Affectionate feelings can thus 
serve as a form of settlement when one partner is inferior to the other, as, for example, 
in friendships between persons of higher and lower rank.105 
Normally, the devotion of the inferior to his superior friend is considered sufficient 
to discharge the debt, even though this can only provide a pretended balance of 
exchange, as it were. It clearly depends on the partners' mutual agreement and the 
superior's demand for affection and respect whether the inferior's devotion to his 
friend is accepted as an equivalent to whatever he receives from him. For these kinds 
of relationship, this is the crux of the matter. Although the equality of the friends' 
nature or qualities is not a prerequisite for these friendships, there has to be a balance 
of exchange—may it be true or, by mutual agreement, pretended. In other words, the 
equality of the friends is thus not a matter of character but of exchange. If the gap 
between the partner's abilities to give is so distinct that it cannot be bridged even by 
the greatest possible contribution of love and respect from the inferior, a friendship 
between the two is impossible. Because of this, there can be no friendship between 
kings and their subjects, or between men and gods.106 
The idea that friendship requires the friends' equality became one of the 
characteristics of classical reflections on the subject; but it is not originally Aristotelian, 
Platonic, or Socratic. It is already to be found in numerous proverbial sayings and 
poetical dictums of the Presocratic era.107 With Aristotle, however, this essential 
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characteristic of friendship becomes explicitly connected with the quality of 
virtuousness. From now on the idea of friendship is inseparably united with the idea of 
virtue.108 
 
However intriguing Aristotle's idea of a perfect friendship between two equally good 
men may be, there still remains a logical problem with this conception. According to 
his theory of a tripartite categorization of philia, each of the three different kinds of 
friendship is not only based on the equality of the friends but also on the mutual 
exchange of a certain quality. But which motivation should truly good men have for 
making friends with other good men when they are very likely to be self-sufficient in 
their goodness and would therefore have no need for friendships? A question with 
which Socrates already concerns himself in Plato's Lysis, and that in the end led to the 
aporia of his approach.109 
Aristotle, however, believes to have found the answer to this problem in the human 
phenomenon of self-love. This approach, of course, requires a philosophical definition 
of self-love that clearly distinguishes it from selfishness. To ascribe self-love as a 
character trait to the good and virtuous, it must be regard as a positive quality. This is 
achieved by means of the following consideration: every human being consists of two 
different parts, of his physical and of his mental qualities. His mental qualities form his 
personality, identity, reason, and soul. His drives, emotions, and needs on the other 
hand belong to his physical qualities. While he has only little power over these bodily 
expressions as they are dominated by nature, his intellect, his will, is deliberately 
controllable. It is this intellect that distinguishes man from beasts. This is the reason 
why the mental qualities are the specific characteristic of man and are therefore 
estimated as his highest and most noble ability. The highest good that man can achieve 
is virtue, and when he, by means of reason, deliberately wishes to become virtuous, he 
has found the only possible way to achieve virtue. The better men are therefore those 
who follow the principles of reason, while worse men rather follow their drives. These 
bad people, however, cannot achieve this highest good as they are completely 
captivated by their emotions and desires, which will never lead them to absolute 
virtue. Since they prefer their animal qualities to their fine mental capacities, they do 
not even want to become virtuous and, accordingly, cannot love themselves, since 
loving oneself means wishing oneself only the very best—and that is virtue. Good men 
will therefore always strive to lead a virtuous life. This is then also to become a leading 
                                                                                                                                                            
harmony that results from the equal and mutual love of friends. Such equal and mutual love leads to 
the sharing of goods and property between friends. Thus friendship, in distinction from other 
relationships, is based on an equality which extends both to the inner life of men and their outward 
possessions." Hutter 112. 
108 Cf. Hutter 112. 
109 See 35. 
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principle of Renaissance philosophy in general and of the early modern philosophy of 
friendship in particular, as we will see later on. 
Those who love virtue will love it absolutely, which means that they do not only 
love their own virtuousness but also that of others. These are of course the other good 
men, and the company and friendship with them will again produce virtue, since 
friendship, as we have seen, is an amplifier of virtue. Making friends with another 
good man therefore means to intensify one's own virtuousness. Loving a friend for the 
friend's sake, and doing him a good turn, is also virtuous. So, each one, in loving his 
friend, loves himself, and in doing him good, he also benefits himself.110 It can 
therefore be assumed that, conversely, everything a good man does for himself will 
also be of benefit to his friend, since the actions of a good man will always be virtuous, 
and the intensification of one's own virtue—by doing virtuous deeds—will always 
positively affect that of the friend as well. 
If everything someone does for his friend is equally good for both, there is hardly 
anything a good man would not do for his friend. This simple statement is not only the 
essence of his idea of self-love, it also provides the solution to the philosophical 
problem how egoism, so characteristic of the human nature, can be united and 
reconciled with altruism.111 Aristotle can therefore even employ his theory of self-love 
to explain the phenomenon of the true friend who is willing to sacrifice himself for his 
best friend.112 According to Aristotle, the friend has in fact no other choice if he wants 
to remain virtuous. Saving his friend's life would be a virtuous deed, but not doing so 
would mean to behave in a dishonourable way. A virtuous man will therefore rather 
choose to lead a shorter but honourable, virtuous, and therefore happier life than a 
longer but disgraceful one in ignominy.113 Here Aristotle does not only link his concept 
of self-love with that of virtue but also with that of happiness (εÙδαιµον…α/ eudaimonia). 
His idea that virtuousness also leads to happiness is based on the following 
assumption: Life is good per se, a virtuous life is even better, and the realization that 
one leads such a virtuous life provides happiness. Since the existence of his own 
virtuous life makes a good man happy, and since the friend is his other self and 
identical to him, the virtuous life of his friend will also provide him with happiness. It 
will, in fact, double it; and for this reason a good man needs a friend when he wants to 
increase his happiness.114 Here, of course, Aristotle's conception of friendship reveals 
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its egoistic character, as the friend is rather loved for the function he performs as an 
amplifier of happiness than for his own sake115. 
From all this might follow that, since the benefit of virtue is simultaneously directed 
towards the self and to the friend, both become the united object of their good and 
virtuous intentions. But as they are the united object of their own good intentions, they 
must consequently also be their united subject. Their friendship is then the power that 
makes this fusion possible. It merges, so to speak, the origin of their virtuousness, their 
reason, into one soul, so that each becomes the 'other self' of his friend, as Aristotle 
describes it: "(for a friend is another self)."116 In fact, the well-known image of the 
single soul that dwells in two bodies, which is frequently associated with Aristotle, 
does not appear in the context of the discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics. The 
statement in which Aristotle used the image to explain his idea of friendship was 
ascribed to him by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, 
to which later authors referred when they linked the expression with Aristotle.117 
Aristotle's theory of perfect friendship is therefore based on the assumption that the 
mere equality of the friends is just the precondition for their friendship. In the course 
of this friendship, due to their love of virtue and for themselves, they become even 
identical to each other. From this follows that each friend has the same feelings and 
intentions for himself as he has for his friend and that thereby the distinction between 
the object and the subject of love disappears. Each of the friends is thus as much a 
loving friend to himself as to his friend.118 The ability to love oneself, however, is 
derived from the ability to love a friend, and not vice versa. Why this is also one of the 
main controversies between the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, is explained by 
Hutter: 
For Plato, one could love another only to the extend one could love oneself 
while for Aristotle one could love oneself only to the extend that one could 
love another. This difference results from the fact that for Plato friendship is 
a means for the attainment of the vision of the world of ideas, whereas for 
Aristotle friendship (due to its character of being a virtue) is an end in itself 
as well as a means.119 
 
With his conception of friendship, Aristotle was the first to succeed in presenting a 
coherent theory of the subject that, complete in itself, also provided the theoretical 
background to notions of the theme that had already existed. Thus, he did not only 
                                                   
115 For a commentary on the question whether Aristotle's concept of friendship is primarily an egoistic or 
an altruistic one, see Pakaluk 29. 
116 "(œστι γ¦ρ Ð φ…λος ¥λλος αÙτÒς)." Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a33. – Trans. Rackham 535. For 
the representation of this idea in Cicero's work, see also 59. 
117 See Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 5.20. 
118 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a. 
119 Hutter 114. 
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incorporate traditional ideas into his theory, he also turned from purely hypothetical 
considerations to a more practical view of friendship. With this approach, Aristotle set 
new standards and inspired most of the subsequent treatments of friendship. Hutter 
even goes so far as to say that "later works on philia, such as those of Epicurus, Stoic 
treatises, and the essay by Plutarch are merely repetitions of views already presented 
by Aristotle."120 What is sometimes said about Shakespeare and his plays seems also 
true for Aristotle and his treatment of philia: it was very difficult to produce anything 
original after him. In fact, until Cicero—definitely influenced by his ideas—became one 
of his most significant successors, Aristotle remained the main authority in the field of 
friendship theory. 
 
1.3. CICERO'S THEORY OF FRIENDSHIP AS APPLIED ETHICS 
The credit for preparing the ground for philosophical treatments of personal friendship 
is certainly to be given to Plato, whereas Aristotle's theory of friendship might be 
considered the most important and perhaps also the most original of all. Probably the 
most influential work on friendship was though written more than two centuries later. 
It were in fact not so much Aristotle's or even Plato's writings but Cicero's Laelius de 
amicita that in medieval times and especially in the Renaissance became a set book as 
far as the matter of friendship was concerned.121  
Although the Laelius is philosophically by no means original and does hardly 
provide any new theoretical detail for the subject—most of Cicero's ideas are, in fact, 
Aristotelian, and Powell rightly states that the "difference between Cicero and Aristotle 
is more one of emphasis and approach than of fundamental doctrine"—the dialogue 
has yet to be reckoned among the most important and influential treatises on 
friendship in history.122 The Laelius is outstanding in its fine, polished style that makes 
it a masterpiece of rhetorical art, and this it is not only due to the eloquent wording, its 
structure is equally skilled: it descends from the theoretic general to the rather practical 
particular. Beginning with a definition of friendship, it ends with examples, principles 
and advises.123 So, Cicero's achievement is not the invention of a completely new 
conception but that he skilfully collected and blended the existing and well-tried 
notions, and, by emphasizing its moral value, produced a practicable theory of 
friendship as applied ethics. He could do so, as in contrast to the Greek treatment of 
                                                   
120 Hutter 107. 
121 For a detailed discussion of the title question of Cicero's treatise on friendship, i.e. the question which 
of the variants of the title was originally given to it by Cicero (Laelius, Laelius de amicitia, Laelius vel de 
amicitia, or just De amicitia), see Karl August Neuhausen, ed., Laelius, by Marcus Tullius Cicero 
(Heidelberg: Winter, 1981) 25-47. 
122 Powell, introduction 19. 
123 Cf. Pakaluk 77. 
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philia as a generic concept, which could refer to any kind of affectionate relationship, 
Latin amicitia was a more exclusive concept that referred to the relation between 
friends only. This enabled Cicero and other Roman philosophers to focus on the 
characteristics of this particular kind of relation. As they were especially interested in 
the private and public value of friendship, they placed special emphasis on the moral 
and social aspects of amicitia. The aim was to set up an ethical yet practicable code of 
friendship.124 
 
Cicero introduces the topic of the Laelius with the statement that friendship has to be 
considered the highest good of all, when he says: "ego vos hortari tantum possum ut 
amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam 
conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas."125 He does indeed not only regard 
friendship as being more valuable than worldly goods, such as wealth, honour, glory, 
peace of mind, and enjoyment, but also as being even more estimable than virtue itself, 
since friendship is the end of virtue.126 In friendship, however, all the things that man 
considers desirable and necessary for his happiness are included. Friendship is 
therefore the key to happiness, and virtue is the way to it. Through their friendship, 
friends will thus be able to achieve happiness when they strive for virtue together.127 
This, however, does only apply to the true and perfect friendship (vera et perfecta 
amicitia) and not to the ordinary or even false ones. There are only few passages in the 
text where Cicero distinguishes between superior and inferior friendship. He 
obviously draws on Aristotle's threefold classification even though he only speaks of 
true friendship in contrast to common ones. He does not distinguish the ordinary 
friendships any further but considers them both pleasurable and profitable.128 His 
categorization is therefore rather twofold and in the context of the Laelius even 
                                                   
124 In doing so, Cicero did not only refer to particularly Platonic-, Socratic-, or Aristotelian thoughts but 
also took Peripatetic- and Stoic opinions into consideration. Yet, although Cicero's philosophy was 
certainly influenced by the Stoics, he regarded their strict idealization of virtue as impracticable. Like 
the Epicureans, he remained in his own ethical conceptions rather realistic, though he never tried to 
integrate Epicurean elements into his own thought. In his treatise on friendship, he even clearly 
dissociates his conception from the predominantly utilitarian ideas of the Epicureans. However, Cicero 
adopted most of his ideas of friendship, in fact, from Stoic and especially from Peripatetic sources, and 
thus indirectly from Aristotle. Cf. Hutter 133n3. Powell is therefore right in saying that "the 
philosophical content of the Laelius appears as a characteristically Ciceronian mixture, with elements of 
Stoic idealism incorporated alongside the more practical observations of the Peripatetics." Powell, 
introduction 20. 
125 Cicero, Laelius 5.17. – "All that I can do is to exhort you to rank friendship above all other things in 
human life. There is nothing so natural, nothing so beneficial either in favourable or in unfavourable 
circumstances." Trans. Powell 37. 
126 See Cicero, Laelius 6.20. In this, of course, he differs from Aristotle and rather resembles the Socratic 
view presented by Plato. For Cicero as for Socrates, virtue only produces and maintains friendship; for 
Aristotle, friendship itself is a kind of virtue. See 46. 
127 See Cicero, Laelius 22.83-84. Here Cicero agrees with Aristotle in assuming that there is a causal 
connection between virtue, friendship, and happiness. See 53. 
128 See Cicero, Laelius 6.22. 
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ambiguously and inconsistently employed. In fact, most of the time Cicero only speaks 
of friendship in general without making any distinction. 
Like his predecessors, Cicero emphasizes the idea that friendship can only exist 
between truly good men.129 In contrast to the Aristotelian or the Stoic conception, 
however, his definition of 'good' corresponds to its conventional meaning and does not 
denote an unattainable philosophical ideal.130 He considers friendship to be better than 
kinship since friendship fundamentally needs the friends' mutual benevolence to exist. 
Without benevolence, friendship would be impossible. Kinship, however, can also 
exist without goodwill.131 
For Cicero, the main characteristic of friendship is that it "originates in Nature, and 
is based on a complete community of thought and action between virtuous men":132 
"Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum 
benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem haud scio an exepta sapientia nihil 
melius homini sit a dis immortalibus datum."133 In such a relationship the friends will 
equally share happiness and sorrow, talk to each other as they would to themselves, 
and enjoy the pleasures of life together.134 
In contrast to the Epicureans, who considered friendship mainly in terms of utility, 
Cicero, like Aristotle, insists on the idea that true friendship can only arise from mutual 
affection and each friend's love for the virtuous soul of his friend. It is the perception of 
virtue, or to be precise, the perception of the virtuous character of the friend that 
evokes affection for him. This affection, and not the hope for profit, is the true origin of 
friendship: 
Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum 
videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit 
amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis, quod quisque minus per se ipse 
posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem 
proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa 
profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est 
                                                   
129 See Cicero, Laelius 5.18. It is not clear if he adopted this idea directly from Aristotle or, as Powell 
suggests, rather from Xenophon's Memorabilia (2.6.16). See Powell, introduction 2. In connection with 
this idea, Cicero at least repeats Aristotle's opinion that friendship is such a close and intimate 
relationship that it should ideally exist only between two friends. See Cicero, Laelius 5.20. 
130 See Cicero, Laelius 5.18-19. 
131 See Cicero, Laelius 5.19. 
132 Powell, introduction 18. The idea that friendship originates in Nature refers to both Cicero's belief that 
Nature itself has created a bond of friendship between those who are naturally close to each other, like 
neighbours or relatives (see Cicero, Laelius 5.18), and his belief that good men are naturally attracted to 
each other. Cf. Powell, commentary 90. 
133 Cicero, Laelius 6.20. – "For friendship is in fact nothing other than a community of views on all matters 
human and divine, together with goodwill and affection; and I am not sure that the gods have given 
men any better gift than this, leaving aside wisdom." Trans. Powell 37. This became in fact a popular 
and often quoted definition for friendship in the Renaissance. 
134 See Cicero, Laelius 6.22. 
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ad benevolentiam coniungendam; nam utilitates quidem etiam ab eis 
percipiuntur saepe qui simulatione amicitae coluntur et observantur 
temporis causa; in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum, et 
quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium. Quapropter a natura mihi 
videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi 
cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis 
esset habitura.135 
Like Aristotle, Cicero here proclaims that utility is the result of friendship, but that 
friendship cannot be the result of utility.136 
Besides the representation of these well-known ideas about the origin and the 
nature of friendship, Cicero also places extraordinary emphasis on the dangers to 
which friendship is exposed. When the friends begin to develop different or even 
opposing interests or political convictions; when one friend undergoes an alteration of 
character due to misfortune or increasing age; when the friends become rivals in 
matters of courtship,137 profession, or social standing; or when one friend expects the 
other to do something that is not virtuous, morally wrong, or even illegal; their 
friendship enters a serious state of crisis. Under such conditions, the friendship might 
be ended or it can even turn into an enmity.138 But when a friendship is past saving, it 
should rather peter out than be abruptly broken off. It is then important to avoid the 
rise of enmity between the former friends.139 
Among those situations that might endanger the continuation of a friendship, one is 
particularly tricky. The question whether one should do his friend a favour when this 
would mean to act against one's own convictions, is a problem that has already 
troubled Aristotle.140 The real question that is here implied is whether it is more 
                                                   
135 Cicero, Laelius 8.26-27. – "Well then: I have often had occasion to think about friendship, and it has 
always seemed to me that a point that deserves most serious thought is this: whether friendship is 
something that we need because of our own weakness and insufficiency, whereby, in a mutual 
exchange of favours, each man receives from another what he could not achieve for himself, and vice-
versa; or whether, though this might indeed be a characteristic of friendship, its cause is something 
else, more fundamental and nobler, with its source in nature herself. For the first thing to bring people 
together in a relationship of goodwill is love (amor), from which friendship (amicitia) derives its name. 
There are, indeed, practical advantages to be enjoyed also by those whose society is cultivated by 
others and who receive favours, under the pretence of friendship, for temporary expediency; but in 
friendship itself, pretence and deception have no place; whatever is done, must be done freely and 
truthfully. For this reason it seems to me that friendship originates in nature rather than in need: more 
because of an attachment of the mind accompanied by a sense of affection, than because of a calculation 
of the amount of advantage that the association will bring." Trans. Powell 41. Here Cicero combines 
various ideas from Plato's Lysis and Symposium, and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Cf. Powell, 
commentary, 93. 
136 See 48. 
137 The rivalry of friends in matters of courtship is an idea that frequently reoccurs in the discussion of 
friendship and especially in the literary treatment of the subject in the Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance. See 185ff. 
138 See Cicero, Laelius 10.33-35. 
139 See Cicero, Laelius 21.76-79. 
140 See 48. 
The theoretical foundations: The classical heritage 59 
virtuous to remain loyal to one's friend than to the principle of virtue itself. For Cicero 
the maintenance of the virtuous conduct of the friends is indispensable—not at least 
because of its political dimension. Since friendship is based on virtue, there can 
consequently be no service rendered out of friendship that aims at something that is 
not virtuous. Vicious conduct cannot be harmonized with virtuous friendship, and the 
friends should never require dishonourable services from one another, nor should a 
friend give in to such demands. If he does it nevertheless, his friendship with the 
instigator will not be an excuse for his actions nor will they serve as a proof of 
friendship or a sign of loyalty. He even cannot consider their friendship to be a real 
one, as true friendship is always based on virtue.141 This statement reveals Cicero's 
special interest in the political and social value of true friendship. His amicitia is, as it 
were, a kind of safety device, which protects the state from any potentially subversive 
actions of the friends. This is also the reason why he regards friendship as the highest 
good and considers the best community to be that which is based on the friendship of 
its members. Reflections on the political advantages of friendship, however, are not 
originally Ciceronian but are already to be found in the Greek discourses. 
Another element that Cicero adopts from his predecessors and which he explicitly 
emphasizes is the conception of the friend as one's 'other self': "Verum enim amicum 
qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui."142 Together with the almost 
proverbial motif of the single soul, or single mind, that dwells in two bodies, this idea 
became, as it were, the symbol of true friendship. If it had not already been so since 
Greek times, it achieved this status at least with the Romans.143 From Aristotle (or 
probably rather from the Peripatetics) he also adopted the idea that the unity of souls 
in friendship must somehow derive from the self-love of the friends since it is the same 
kind of love that is directed towards the friend as to oneself: "Ipse enim se quisque 
diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi 
quisque carus est; quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam 
reperietur; est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem."144 
 
Despite all borrowings, something distinguishes Cicero's dialogue from the writings of 
his predecessors. The Laelius is not designed to approach personal friendship as an 
uncharted subject (like Plato's Lysis), or to establish a complete philosophical theory of 
it (as in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics). Its main purpose is rather to serve as a practical 
                                                   
141 See Cicero, Laelius 11.36-12.42. 
142 Cicero, Laelius 7.23. – "For he who looks at a true friend, sees as it were a reflection of himself." Trans. 
Powell 39. 
143 For Cicero's use of the image, see Laelius 25.91. 
144 Cicero, Laelius 21.80. – "For every person loves himself, not in order to recover some reward of his 
affection from himself, but because everyone is naturally valued by himself; now unless this same 
principle is transferred into friendship, one will never find a true friend, who is, as it were, another 
self." Trans. Powell 65. 
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guide to the right conduct of friends in a friendship. Besides his fundamental notions 
of friendship, which he primarily adopted from his predecessors and that provide the 
theoretical background to his concept, Cicero also presents some ideas of a less 
elementary, but rather practical nature. Most of these practical maxims are in fact 
derived from those fundamental but partly idealized conceptions; and it is the 
combination of both that constitutes Cicero's practicable concept of moral friendship, 
as it were. Since the majority of these guiding principles reoccurred in the literary 
contemplation of friendship from the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, it may now 
be well appropriate to mention the most important ones. 
For Cicero, a friend should ideally have an irreproachable character, although some 
minor faults, as long as they do not endanger life or reputation, should always be 
tolerated by true friends. One should be, however, very careful in the choice of one's 
friends since true and faithful friends are hard to find. Those who will stand by their 
friends in good as in bad times are rare and should hence be held in high esteem.145 
Although both friends should have an impeccable character, it might sometimes 
become necessary to criticize the friend. There should hence be no hesitation to do so, 
if the friendship is considered a true and sincere one. Yet, the rebuke should never be 
harsh or even hurting. Not to criticize the friend for something he has done wrongly 
would though mean to flatter him, and flattery is the most serious enemy of true 
friendship. True friendship needs honesty and loyalty. Otherwise, Cato's complaint 
that we learn more truth from our enemies than from our friends would be justified.146 
Loyalty and confidence are hence the main preconditions for a durable friendship. 
Pretence, hypocrisy, suspicion, and listening to those who make charges against the 
friend, are qualities which are by no means tolerable and which have nothing to do 
with true friendship.147 
Old friendships are, like good wine, the better ones since the friends can look back 
on a long time that they have spend together. Old friends are the closest since they 
have eaten that certain amount of salt together that already Aristotle regarded as the 
best measurement for a good and lasting friendship. Nevertheless, this should not be 
taken as a reason for avoiding new friends or potential friendships.148 
In a friendship between two good men who are of a different social standing, both 
friends should be regarded as being equal since equality is the most characteristic 
feature of friendship.149 The difference in social status, normally a definite obstacle to 
                                                   
145 See Cicero, Laelius 17.61-64. 
146 See Cicero, Laelius 24.88-25.96. 
147 See Cicero, Laelius 28.65-66. 
148 See Cicero, Laelius 19.67-68. 
149 See Cicero, Laelius 19.69-70. 
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the formation of true friendships, is here balanced by the equal virtuousness of the 
friends. 
In times of need, when one friend should help the other, two things are to be 
considered: firstly, to what degree the helping friend is able to give, and secondly, to 
what extent the receiving friend can accept this help.150 Cicero here probably refers to 
the Aristotelian view on this aspect. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle expects the one 
who is in need, not to trouble his friend with his problems since he certainly does not 
want to cause the one who will share all sorrows with him, any of such. On the other 
hand he also expects the one who is able to help, to support his friend without being 
asked, since by this, he does something good for his friend and thus also for himself. 
The best help, however, is that which causes the helper the least trouble, but provides 
the maximum service for the one in need.151 
 
It is certainly due to all the qualities of the Laelius—the elegance of its sophisticated 
style, the combination and inclusion of former conceptions, and the practical character 
of the guiding principles it presents—that it became one of the most popular classical 
sources in medieval times as well as in the Renaissance.152 The fact that the Laelius 
could be read as a practical guide to perfect friendship—similar to the handbooks that 
were written to give guidance for the right conduct of princes or courtiers from 
medieval times onwards153—was though certainly the main aspect that made the 
source so popular, especially with the humanistic readership in the Renaissance. The 
concept it presents was no longer a mere theoretical hypothesis, but so comprehensible 
that people could not only easily grasp its argumentation but were also able to 
translate these ideas into practice. Besides this, the reason for the significance of 
Cicero's Laelius for the scholastic as for the humanistic discussion of friendship is 
certainly not only that it mirrors all the classical notions of friendship—just as 
Aristotle's discourse did before—but also that it was written in Latin, and therefore 
accessible to a larger readership. In other words: "Cicero's importance in the history of 
philosophy is as a transmitter of Greek thought. In the course of this role, he gave 
Rome and, therefore, Europe its philosophical vocabulary."154 
                                                   
150 See Cicero, Laelius 20.71-73. 
151 See Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 9.11-12, 1171b-1172a. 
152 Together with the dialogue De officiis, the Laelius, by later writers often simply referred to as De 
amicitia, was probably the most widely read of Cicero's works in medieval times. It had a definite 
influence on the writings of such Christian authors as Augustine, Aelred of Rievaulx (c. 1110-1167), and 
Peter of Blois (c. 1135-c. 1203). Cf., for example, Powell, introduction 24; and Hyatte 16. 
153 The 'codes of conduct' or 'mirrors for princes,' as these handbooks were called, became extremely 
popular in the Renaissance. For the treatment of friendship in one of these books, see 94ff. 
154 Ferguson and Balsdon, 4 Aug. 1999 <http://search.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=84794&sctn=1>. 
 2 THE REASSESSMENT OF THE CLASSICAL NOTIONS IN 
RENAISSANCE HUMANISM 
here is no doubt that, before the revived enthusiasm for classical thought in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the meaning and significance of personal 
friendship and thus the underlying philosophical and theological conceptions 
of it in the Middle Ages were distinctively different from those in antiquity or the 
Renaissance. During medieval times, the notions of friendship were predominantly 
determined by the Teutonic conception of kin-relationship or by the beliefs of Christian 
doctrine. This means that friendship was either considered an individualized form of 
Christian charity—as in the theological contemplation of Saint Aelred of Rievaulx and 
Thomas Aquinas1—or was conceptualized in the feudal-Teutonic terms of chivalry and 
brotherhood. In medieval times the conception of those relationships that the classical 
writers and those of the Renaissance would have regarded as friendships, was rather 
similar to that of family connections. And since, in the hierarchy of the feudal family, 
brothers were the most equal ones concerning age and position, friendship often came 
under the name of brotherhood. The friends who were engaged in such a friendship 
became 'brothers' either by the mingling of their blood2 or by oath, like the two heroes 
of the Scottish metrical romance Eger and Grime: 
These knights, Sir Egar and Sir Grime. 
They were fellowes good and fine. 
They were nothing sib of blood, 
But they were sworne bretheren good. 
                                                   
1 For a detailed presentation of Aelred's and Aquinas' theories see Mark F. Williams, trans., introduction, 
Aelred of Rievaulx's 'Spiritual Friendship': A New Translation, by Aelred of Rievaulx (Scranton: University 
of Scranton Press, 1994) 18-20; Heinrich M. Christmann, ed., introduction, Summa Theologica: II-II, 23-33, 
by Thomas von Aquin, Die Deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe 17A, (Heidelberg/Graz: Kerle/Styria, 1959) 8-9; 
and Pakaluk 129-130, 146. 
2 "Abundant examples of the rite [of blood-brotherhood] among the peoples of Germanic stock, especially 
in its Scandinavian form, have been collected and analyzed. Here, as elsewhere, it first took the shape 
of an artificial commingling of blood, by which the contracting parties were thought to become brothers 
in fact, bound to each other by ties and obligations no less sacred than those which joined sons of the 
same parents. It was their duty to stand side by side in the conflicts of life, to die together in battle, and 
to avenge their blood if one of them were slain in the absence of the other. The ceremonies of entrance 
on blood brotherhood were sometimes elaborately symbolical, usually involving, at least in the 
Scandinavian rite as illustrated by the sagas, the mingling of the companions' blood in the earth, – the 
common mother of all." Gordon Hall Gerould, "Social and Historical Reminiscences in the Middle 
English Athelston," Englische Studien 36 (1906): 195-96. 
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They keeped a chamber together att home; 
Better loue loved there never none.3 
One might, in fact, even venture to say that for most people in the Middle Ages 
friendship was no longer an ideal form of relationship but merely a means to another 
end. For the scholastics, it was the reflection of the love of God. For the feudal, 
chivalric, and Teutonic societies, it was a useful means to the preservation of a system 
that was based on faith and loyalty. However, when Mills says that 
with the lack of general knowledge of classical views; the emphasis on the 
otherworldly, the religious, and the didactic; the prevalence of feudal and 
chivalric principles in society; and the admixture of friendship notions of 
separate origin, there was, in the Middle Ages, almost no glorification of 
friendship as a boon and privilege on this earth,4 
his view of the situation in medieval times might be a bit too general and simple. Of 
course, the factors he mentions did certainly contribute to a widespread neglect or 
disregard of classical friendship ideals, but the age had produced its own idealized 
conceptions, either more spiritual or more down-to-earth notions of the topic. 
Now, it is of course undeniable that the views on friendship in the Renaissance were 
primarily based on the ideas that had been developed in antiquity. But to 
overemphazise the difference between the medieval and the classical and early modern 
notions of friendship or to speak even of a revival of classical ideas of friendship in the 
Renaissance could of course also give the impression that in the period which directly 
preceded it, these ideas had widely been ignored. This, however, is not quite true. The 
educated elite of the Middle Ages, and particularly the clergy, had been well 
acquainted with the ancient ideas of friendship—at least with those of Roman times, 
since they were written in Latin. And it is precisely for this reason of language that, 
when we look at the major classical theories of friendship presented in the previous 
sections concerning their reception and their importance in medieval times, from the 
most to the least influential, we will find the order to be nearly the reverse of the 
chronological one. 
Cicero's works, for instance, were widely read, and enjoyed a very good reputation 
during the Middle Ages, even though some of them were only accessible in fragments 
and others not yet at all. The Laelius de amicitia, however, was already available in its 
complete form, and the relatively large number of about 500 preserved manuscript 
copies of the text that date back to the period from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries 
document the popularity it enjoyed in medieval as in later times. And the fact that 
Cicero's Laelius was so widely accessible and, since he was writing in Latin, also 
                                                   
3 "Eger and Grime," Middle English Metrical Romances, ed. Walter Hoyt French and Charles Brockway Hale, 
2nd ed. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964) 673. 
4 Mills 17. 
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readable for most of the literate people fostered the overwhelming popularity of this 
work even more. It was held in such a high regard that it even became one of the major 
school texts—besides the Cato Maior in fact the only work of the whole Ciceronian 
corpus—that was used not only by medieval teachers but later on also still by those in 
the Renaissance.5 "In medieval Europe," as Reginald Hyatte points out, "this dialogue 
was one of the most widely read classical works on amicitia perfecta along with Latin 
versions of the Nicomachean Ethics after the twelfth century."6 
Here, Hyatte also hints at the other classical source on friendship that received 
considerable attention with the medieval readership—at least after 1247. In fact, 
although in the ancient world, Aristotle's works had already enjoyed such a 
tremendous reputation that they had become widely accessible by the first century BC, 
in the Middle Ages, Latin editions of his writings were not available to the western 
European scholars and the educated elite before the second half of the twelfth century, 
and some of his works remained inaccessible or incompletely translated even until the 
second half of the following century. For this reason, a complete reception of the 
Nicomachean Ethics was for most scholars not possible before the midst of the thirteenth 
century, when the Oxford scholar Robert Grosseteste (c. 1175-1253) and his circle 
presented a revised and completed Latin translation of the text in the years 1246-47. 
For many medieval thinkers and writers, like Albertus Magnus (c. 1200-1280) and 
Thomas Aquinas (1224/25-1274), this edition provided the first approach to this 
important source. And for years it was to remain the only Latin access to it, until in 
1273 the Flemish translator William of Moerbeke (c. 1215-c. 1286) presented a complete 
Latin edition of all Aristotelian works known by that time.7 
Although Aristotle's writings had been rediscovered and translated into Latin only 
relatively late in the Middle Ages, their influence was enormous. Once his work 
became accessible to a broader scholarly readership, it immediately began to influence 
their views on medieval philosophy, so that the scholasticism of the late thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries became clearly dominated by the new Aristotelianism. 
The same, however, cannot be said about the writings of Plato. With the Romans, 
Plato had still been much read and held in high esteem, although his works had only 
seldom been translated into Latin. In the Middle Ages, however, the reception of 
Platonic ideas took place primarily through the intermediary of the works of the 
patristic Platonists and Neoplatonists, and in particular through the writings of 
Augustine. Plato's own writings did though not meet with much response and copies 
                                                   
5 See Charles B. Schmitt et al., eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) 779; and Neuhausen, Vorwort 1. 
6 Hyatte 26. 
7 Cf. Thompson, appendix J, by Hugh Trendennick, 365; and Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, ed., 
"Aristotelianism: The later Latin tradition," Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 24 May 2000 
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of them were not widely spread. Up to the fifteenth century, only Chalcidius' 
translation of nearly half of the Timaeus, Henricus Aristippus' rendering of Meno and 
Phaedo, and an incomplete version of the Parmenides, translated by William of 
Moerbeke, were available in Latin. The three dialogues in which Plato presents his 
Socratic view on friendship, however, (the Lysis, Symposium, and Phaedrus) were not on 
hand in Latin or in any vernacular versions before the fifteenth century.8 
One can therefore say that the Laelius and the Nicomachean Ethics, together with 
several passages on friendship from Cicero's De officiis and Seneca's Epistulae morales, 
"constituted the canon of amicitia for the Middle Ages."9 And the few though 
remarkable treatises that were written on friendship in the period, and those by Aelred 
of Rievaulx and Thomas Aquinas in particular, were based to a great extent on these 
texts. So, what Laurens J. Mills says about the literature of the English Renaissance in 
his study of the representations of friendship in Tudor literature and Stuart drama, is 
certainly also true for the rest of the European literature of that time: "English literature 
of the Middle Ages is not lacking altogether in the use of the classical theories of 
friendship. It would, in fact, be surprising, considering the amount of learning 
possessed by medieval students and scholars, if no reflections of the classical views on 
the subject were perceptible."10 Thus, what we can find when we look at the literary 
representation of friendship in medieval times is not an ignorance of the classical 
conceptions but rather their skilful transformation into concepts that could be 
harmonized with the doctrines of Christianity and adapted to the realities of feudalism 
and chivalry.11 
For the treatment of personal friendship in the Renaissance, however, these 
medieval notions were only of secondary importance since they influenced the 
humanistic conception only indirectly and rather on the level of religious 
considerations concerning the subject. A detailed analysis of the medieval views, 
inevitable for a comprehensive study of the history of friendship conceptions, would 
though go beyond the scope of this work which is rather interested in the question of 
how the classical conceptions were revived in the literature and life of the 
Renaissance.12 
 
                                                   
8 Cf. Hyatte 10, 10n9; and Schmitt et al. 786f. 
9 Hyatte 16. 
10 Mills 16. 
11 The terminology, however, by which the new ideas of friendship were conceptualized, remained the 
same, as Hyatte points out: "Throughout the medieval period, the Ciceronian-Senecan terminology of 
amicitia vera persisted in large part as the basic vocabulary of amicitia christiana and also of secular sorts 
of friendship in Latin and vernacular works. The pagan terminology persisted, but its semantic content 
was radically altered." Hyatte 40. 
12 For a reference to some excellent studies on the topic of medieval friendship, see 23n31. 
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The emergence and spread of humanistic ideas at the end of the Middle Ages marks 
not only the transition to a new age, the Renaissance, but also the transition from 
medieval to modern times. At this significant point in history, we can notice a gradual 
change in the intellectual attitude to a variety of notions and opinions, and, besides a 
number of other conceptual changes, also a new quality in the conceptualisation of 
friendship. When in late fourteenth-century Florence the first humanists began to 
regard the world—and the role of man in this world—from a different perspective, 
they also challenged the medieval views on the kinds of relationship men should have. 
The humanists' educational ideal of the studia humanitatis—the ideal of an education 
that is devoted to the study of the wisdom of pagan antiquity—led to a new interest in 
and search for classical literature and to a new approach to classical philosophy. The 
re-approach to classical thought in general then also evoked a renewed interest in the 
classical conceptions of friendship.13 Now we can find, as Mills puts it, an "increased 
amount of emphasis on the subject, a preponderance of classical ideas over medieval 
[…], more numerous complaints of the absence of perfect friendships, a more 
enthusiastic welcome to the classical theories as applicable directly to life […], and 
finally, […] frequent use of the theme as adequate motivation in literary 
productions."14 Friendship became in fact a very popular subject for literary treatment 
in writings of various kinds, so that we can find it not only in the numerous essays and 
discourses that dealt with it either exclusively or as part of more comprehensive 
discussions of moral issues, but also as the theme of many pieces of prose, poetry, and 
drama.15 Besides all this, friendship also often appears, directly or indirectly, as the 
major topic of concern in the correspondence of the time's most eminent men of letters. 
It is thus not only the enormous number of different treatments of the subject in the 
period, but precisely the great variety of different genres that proves how popular the 
topic was. That it was dealt with in all kinds of text, texts with so different intentions, 
signifies the importance of which friendship was to the Renaissance humanists. Since 
there are certainly more occurrences of friendship representations in Renaissance 
literature than in classical literature itself, it would indeed be a Sisyphean task to 
examine them all, and the expenditure on such a work would truly be out of all 
proportion to its informative value. Therefore, we will here limit our examination to a 
number of selected texts that represent the nature of the different conceptualizations of 
friendship in the period best. 
Now, talking about the new, favourable attitude towards the classical definitions of 
friendship in the Renaissance does in fact primarily mean talking about the humanistic 
                                                   
13 On the emphasis on classical thought in the Renaissance in general, see, for example, Roberto Weiss, 
The Renaissance Discovery of Classical Antiquity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 
14 Mills 112-13. 
15 For an abridged list of essays or discourses on friendship that were published in England in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Mills 422n172. 
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attitude towards the matter. This in turn means that the further development of this 
attitude and the changes in the conceptualizations and representations of friendship 
per se in the period were closely connected with the spread of humanism and the rise 
and fall of this intellectual 'movement'. Although the fate of humanistic ideas in 
general is not the only factor that determined the history of friendship in the 
forthcoming centuries, it is indeed important to notice the connection between the 
changing views on friendship and the development of humanism itself. 
Humanism was of course a phenomenon of the European Renaissance as such and 
wherever humanistic ideas fell on fertile ground, authors sooner or later also began to 
write about friendship in one way or another. It is, however, quite remarkable that 
there seem to be more instances of classically inspired representations and treatments 
of friendship in the literature of the Italian Renaissance in the fifteenth century and the 
English Renaissance in the sixteenth century than in the writings of French and 
particularly Spanish and German authors of that time.16 This should of course not 
mean that the topic was completely excluded from the works of such writers—in 
Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra's El ingenioso hidalgo Don Quixote de La Mancha, for 
example, the theme of friendship plays an important role indeed—or that friendship 
was not to become a favourite subject for consideration in these national literatures at 
all.17 French contributions to the discussion of the value of friendship, for instance, 
increased in the seventeenth century, and in German literature, the topic even enjoyed 
an overwhelming revival in the so called 'friendship cult' of the eighteenth century. But 
as far as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are concerned, the variety of occurrences 
of the theme in Italian and English sources is outstanding, for which reason we will 
here primarily concentrate on them. To focus on fifteenth-century Italian and sixteenth-
century English writings has furthermore the benefit of gaining a good impression of 
the attitudes towards friendship at the beginning and at the end of the European 
Renaissance, which is of course indispensable to the examination of the development 
that the conception of friendship underwent in the course of the period. 
In the following, we will see in which high esteem the humanists held the topic, but 
also that the close connection between friendship and humanism was one of the causes 
for the concept's later disparagement. Humanism was mainly interested in two aspects 
of knowledge: in its classical origin and in its practicability. Realism was indeed an 
                                                   
16 How popular the topic of friendship really was with writers of the different European countries at that 
time and how present the treatments of this subject really are in the different national literatures has in 
fact to be shown by more detailed studies on the literary representation of friendship in these particular 
literatures. Until today, however, such studies are seldom, as the interest in the topic of friendship is in 
most cases limited to the writings of specific authors, and is not focused on the whole literature of a 
nation at a particular time. One of the few exceptions is the study of Minna Skafte Jensen, "Humanist 
Friendship in 16th Century Denmark," A Literary Miscellany Presented to Eric Jacobsen, ed. Graham D. 
Caie (Copenhagen: Dept. of Eng., U of Copenhagen, 1988) 185-201. 
17 For a detailed discussion of the role friendship played in the work of Cervantes, see Matthew Alan 
Wyszynski, "Cervantes' 'Don Quixote' and the Idea of Friendship," diss., U of Michigan, 1996.  
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important feature of the humanistic approach to philosophical matters; the classical 
conceptions of perfect friendship, however, are for the most part mere ideals, and  
ideals are not that easily put into practice. So, in the end, it was certainly also the 
impossibility of living up to an ideal of friendship that led to a debasement of the 
concept in the early seventeenth century. Thus, when Peter Burke asserts that the 
Renaissance "marks a turning-point in the history of friendship,"18 he is definitely right, 
but the renewed interest in classical ideals of friendship in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries did in fact not lead to an unrestricted or even enduring enthusiasm for the 
subject in the following centuries, nor can the development, as Mills explains, "be 
visualized as a simple overturning of an hour-glass or a mere reversal in direction of 
movement; the situation is too complex for that. In fact, the history of the theme is one 
of growing complexity."19 This complexity makes the representation of the different 
conceptions of friendship and of the history of their development of course quite 
difficult. As the Renaissance did not take place in all European countries at the same 
time, the conceptions of friendship did also not develop in the same way in all places. 
Developments that can be traced in the early fifteenth century in Italy, for example, 
recurred nearly a hundred years later in England, while others took place almost 
exclusively at a particular time in a particular region. The history of friendship in early 
modern times was indeed anything but a unilineal development that began and ended 
with the rise and fall of humanism. There were, in fact, many views on friendship that 
existed and developed parallel to each other: some of them always prominently 
present and with an influence that was of longer duration than the time that is here 
under investigation, some of them existing independently as alternative conceptions, 
some of them occurring only in connection with others, and some of them only 
developing very slowly until they suddenly became more popular and then even led to 
important changes in the general attitude towards the subject. In the following, we will 
therefore examine the different aspects and trace the different developments of the 
conceptualization of friendship in the Renaissance and the early Enlightenment at first 
thematically and then, on the sublevel, also chronologically, hoping thereby to shed 
some light on the complexity of the history of friendship in this period. 
 
2.1. THE ACCESSIBILITY OF THE ANCIENT CLASSICS 
The conceptions and representations of friendship that we find in the writings of the 
late fourteenth to late sixteenth centuries are indeed different from those that can be 
found in the medieval sources. Yet, as we have already said, to speak of a renaissance 
of classical ideas of friendship in order to characterize the early modern attitude 
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towards the topic, as some still use to do, is though not quite correct, since the classical 
ideas already influenced the conceptions of friendship in medieval times. It is, 
however, correct to speak of a renaissance of classical ideals of friendship in this new 
age, as the humanistic authors who were mainly responsible for the revival of these 
idealized conceptions, presented their views of perfect and true friendship in almost 
the same way as the classics had done. So, contrary to the treatment of the subject in 
the Middle Ages, the ancient ideas served now no longer as a mere foundation for 
remodelled conceptions of friendship, but as the genuine model of vera amicitia itself. 
The classical sources from which the humanists derived their notions of how perfect 
friendship ought to be were though still the same as those that medieval authors had 
used (viz. Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, et al.), and besides a certain affinity of some writers 
for Presocratic theories of friendship, only the renewed interest of the Renaissance 
Platonists in the writings and teachings of Plato and the Neoplatonists added a new 
perspective to the reception of the classical views on the subject. 
However, in the Renaissance, as in medieval times, Cicero's Laelius was still 
considered the most important of the various Greek and Roman sources. In the 
fourteenth century, the dialogue enjoyed paramount popularity with early humanistic 
classicists, moralists, and poets like Petrarch (1304-74), who even included it in the list 
of his favourite works. In the 1470s, the first printed versions of Cicero's texts came on 
the market, and in the sixteenth century, editions of his complete writings were 
published by so prominent scholars as Erasmus, Vettori, Lambin, and Paulus 
Manutius.20 Apart from these complete editions there were of course also abridged 
ones—most of which including the Laelius—as for instance those by G. B. Egnazio 
(Venice 1519), Erasmus (Basel 1520), and Robert Estienne (Stephanus) (Paris 1538). 
Moreover, many of Cicero's works were now also translated into English and several 
other European vernaculars. As early as in 1481, for example, an edition of the Laelius 
in the English translation by John Tiptoft left Caxton's press under the title Of 
Friendship, published together with a rendition of Cicero's treatise Of Old Age.21 The 
same translation was then reissued in 1530, before, in 1535, Thomas Lupset's treatment 
and translation of De officiis and De amicitia appeared in his Exhortation to Yonge Men. In 
1577, Thomas Newton published another English edition under the title Frendshippe in 
Foure Several Treatises of M. Tullius Cicero, but the best-known rendering of the Laelius 
into English is probably that by John Harington of Stepney (1520-82), who translated 
the De amicitia for the Duchess of Suffolk, Katherine Willoughby, during 
imprisonment. He referred to his work as The Booke of Freendeship of Marcus Tullie Cicero 
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and had it printed by Thomas Berthelet in 1550.22 In the dedication to this book, 
Harington mentions to have translated the work not directly from Latin but from a 
French rendition, yet to have at least compared his version with the Latin original. It is 
therefore very likely that he used Jean Collin's translation of 1537, titled Le Livre de 
Amytié, and verified his own rendering by comparing it with the Latin edition by either 
Egnazio or Erasmus.23 
In contrast to the humanistic reception of Cicero's Latin writings, that of the Greek 
sources was not without problems. The early humanistic scholars were, as their 
predecessors in medieval times, well educated in Latin, yet only very few of them also 
in Greek. As a result, the majority of readers approached Plato's and especially 
Aristotle's writings by means of their Latin translations, which had been first rendered 
from Arabic versions, and then from the Greek originals. But the rendition of Greek 
ideas into Latin produces certain difficulties. The confusion that might occur in the 
reception of the concepts of love and friendship is, as we have seen earlier in this 
study, due to the different semantic capacities of the Greek and Latin terms.24 While in 
Latin the meaning of the term for friendship (amicitia) is clearly defined, the one for 
love (amor) is rather vague, denoting a number of different emotional states and 
feelings. In Greek, on the other hand, nearly the opposite is the case, as Stephen D. 
Bolton reminds us: 
All forms of desire come under the heading of amor in Latin; Renaissance 
authors tend to treat the theories of Aristotle and Plato as though the same 
conceptual framework applied. This is misleading, since there is no single 
word in Greek which corresponds to amor in all its various meanings. The 
Greek language distinguishes between the different kinds of love by using 
two different verbs: ™ρ£ω, which is etymologically linked with œρως and 
indicates passionate or sexual love, and φιλšω, linked with φιλ…α 
(friendship), which indicates affectionate or friendly love. The fact that these 
two kinds of love are called by the same name in Latin obscures their 
differences to some extent and allows Renaissance authors to think of them 
as being more closely linked than they are in Plato and Aristotle. The 
difference between the two languages leads to a further complication: the 
word φιλ…α is of broader application than amicitia, denoting all types of 
affectionate love, not simply friendship strictly defined. The Greek accounts, 
therefore, have no parallel to the conceptual framework used by Latin 
authors, in which the more precise amicitia is derived from a generic amor.25 
                                                   
22 Cf. Ruth Hughey, John Harington of Stepney, Tudor Gentleman: His Life and Works (Columbus: Ohio State 
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As Bolton here points out, the humanistic authors of the Renaissance, and, in fact, all 
writers since then—and some even despite their knowledge of Greek—tended to treat 
the word philia as if its meaning were the same as that of amicitia, a concept that was of 
course much more familiar to them, due to its similarity to that of friendship. So, when 
we talk about the humanistic reception of Greek ideas of friendship, we should rather 
speak of Greek ideas of philia that Renaissance authors interpreted as ideas of 
friendship, than to assert that these writers simply revived the classical conceptions in 
their genuine form, or even that they understood them in their original meaning. 
Whether the humanists understood Aristotle correctly or not, the whole corpus of 
his texts was now at least newly translated from the Greek. In fact, most humanistic 
scholars wanted to overcome what they regarded as the scholastic barbarism, i.e. the 
unrefined vocabulary and sometimes inappropriate philosophical terminology of the 
medieval translations—although there were also many who still preferred these 
traditional renditions to the new ones. As one of the most significant and influential of 
the early humanistic authors and translators who argued in favour of a new Latin 
terminology to approach the work of the classical Greek philosophers, Leonardo Bruni 
(c. 1369-1444) insisted that Aristotle should to be rendered in a Ciceronian style, and he 
consequently provided new translations of a number of his writings—among them, in 
1416, also a Latin rendition of the Ethics, which was later on also used for the first 
printed edition of the text.26 Despite these new humanistic translations of Greek works, 
however, gradually, more and more scholars were also able to read the texts in the 
original, and in 1495-98, the Venetian Aldine Press of Aldus Manutius and Andrea 
Torresani published a complete edition of Aristotle's writings in Greek, the editio 
princeps.27 That Aristotle, in spite of the renewed interest in Plato and the undiminished 
glorification of Cicero, still remained extremely popular during the following sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries becomes evident from the enormous amount of editions that 
were published of his works in nearly all European countries in this period. "Thanks to 
printing and the vast expansion in college-level arts teaching," Schmitt et al. explain, 
"Aristotle had an enormous diffusion in the Renaissance, in the original, in Latin, in the 
vernacular and in summaries, study guides and manuals of every kind; the most recent 
list of sixteenth-century Aristotelian printing fills 160 pages."28 Besides several 
complete, abridged, and separate editions, either merely presenting the plain text or 
additionally providing annotations, giving the Greek original, a Latin rendition, or 
both, there were also various translations in almost every European language. Since 
the middle of the sixteenth century, works of Aristotle were available in Italian, 
Spanish, French, English, German, and even in Polish. And although the majority of 
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vernacular translations of the Ethics were produced only around the midst of the 
century, as the English rendition of 1547, there were also earlier ones, as the Spanish 
edition by George Coci, which was already available in 1509. Among the range of 
printed works, the Nicomachean Ethics belonged indeed to the most popular writings 
and was not only included in all complete editions (which bore this title often 
unjustifiably) but also in most abridged collections.29 
The popularity of the view of friendship that Aristotle presents in his Nicomachean 
Ethics was probably only surpassed by that of Cicero's representation of friendship in 
the Laelius. Presenting almost the same conception of friendship—Aristotle in 
providing the theoretical foundation, Cicero in refining the theory rhetorically—both 
authors were now often read in parallel and as complementary to each other.30 From a 
modern scholarly perspective, however, Aristotle's theory of philia has certainly to be 
regarded as the most ingenious and significant of the classical contributions to the 
discussion of friendship. One would therefore of course be inclined to believe that a 
readership of times in which friendship was much more a matter of concern than today 
had shared this opinion. The majority of post-classical readers and writers, however, 
judged differently. They clearly preferred Cicero's Laelius de amicitia. The reason for 
this is certainly not an argumentative superiority or originality of thought, as Cicero 
adopted most of his ideas, in fact, from Stoic and Peripatetic sources, and thus 
indirectly from Aristotle. That Cicero enjoyed greater popularity among the readership 
of later periods might primarily be explained by the fact that he wrote in Latin, which 
means that the majority of literate people could study his writings in the original 
without requiring a translation—as most of them did when they wanted to read the 
Greeks.31 Moreover, Cicero's eloquent and elaborate language was much appreciated 
by the scholars of both the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and even served as a 
model of good Latin style. In fact, during the Renaissance, in most humanistic Latin 
schools, Ciceronianism became the standard of teaching the language.32 Another 
explanation might though also to be found in the greater practicability of his ideas. 
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Compared to Plato's theory of philia, Aristotle's is certainly the more practical one, but 
Cicero's treatment of amicitia is even more pragmatic and rather has to be considered a 
handbook than a theory of friendship. 
Compared with the importance of that of Cicero and Aristotle, Plato's direct 
influence on the conceptions of friendship in the Renaissance was indeed only of minor 
significance. Yet, his influence on the early modern conception of love was immense 
and therefore here indeed of special interest when we want to understand how and 
why the conceptual changes concerning the view of love and friendship could take 
place at the end of the period. Without Plato's theories, love would probably not have 
finally replaced friendship as the conceptually and practically preferred kind of 
relationship. In the fourteenth century, after his writings had been nearly completely 
neglected in the Middle Ages, humanistic authors from Petrarch onwards begun to 
rediscover Plato's writings and developed a lively interest in his teachings. He was 
soon held in high estimation and by some even regarded as the master of all classical 
philosophers. Plato was now indeed so popular that it became fashionable among the 
Italian and especially Florentine intellectuals to collect copies of his works, even 
though only very few of these early humanists could in fact also read their collector's 
items, since most of them were only available in Greek at that time. Thus, in 1397 the 
Florentine scholar Manuel Chrysoloras and some of his students began to translate 
parts of Plato's work into Latin, but it was not before 1484 that Marsilio Ficino (1433-
1499), financially supported by Cosimo de' Medici, published the first complete 
translation of Plato's works in Latin. This printed edition reached the number of 1,025 
copies and was so popular among the European scholars that it was sold out within 
only six years. An edition of the Greek original, however, was not printed before 1499, 
but even though by that time Greek scholarship had already been established in Italy, 
Ficino's annotated Latin translation was still preferred by most readers, and therefore 
dominated the reception of Plato's ideas for at least the following century. To speak of 
the reception of Plato in the Renaissance thus means to speak primarily of the 
reception of Ficino's interpretation of Plato—and this was far from being an authentic 
representation of the Platonic philosophy, as Ficino based his understanding of Plato in 
turn mainly on earlier Neoplatonic commentaries like those of Plotinus (AD 205-270) 
and Proclus (410-485), for instance.33 This, however, also means that as far as the 
Renaissance reception of the philosophical notions of Socratic origin are concerned 
(and of the Socratic conception of friendship in particular), we even cannot speak of 
more than merely of a reception of Ficino's reading of Plato's own interpretation of the 
Socratic ideas.34 Yet, despite the demerits of his adaptation, Ficino has at least to be 
given the credit for being the first who made Plato and his philosophy again accessible 
to a European readership after a very long time of neglect. But although Ficino's 
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edition enjoyed great popularity, concerning the conception of friendship, Plato hardly 
ever achieved the repute of Cicero or Aristotle. This is certainly for the most part due 
to the rather incoherent character of his work, which it even retains in Ficino's 
adaptation. Much more popular, as we have said, were Plato's reflections on love, and 
although the topic had already belonged to the most favourite subjects for discussion 
in medieval times, the revived enthusiasm for Platonic ideas now gave the tradition of 
treating the subject in prose or poetry (now mostly in the form of sonnets) a fresh 
impetus. 
 
2.2. THE COMMON LITERARY REPRODUCTIONS 
OF THE INHERITED IDEAS 
The rediscovery of Platonism and its popularization was certainly one of the most 
significant characteristics of the Italian, and particularly the Florentine approach to 
classical philosophy in the fifteenth century; yet, despite their enthusiasm for Plato and 
his theory of love, the Italian philosophers and writers, humanists as well as Platonists, 
also shared a great interest in the classical idea of perfect friendship. Almost 30 years 
before manuscript copies of Ficino's enormously influential commentary on Plato's 
Symposium, his De amore, began to circulate among the educated elite of the time and to 
foster the interest in theories of love, another Florentine had already celebrated the 
glory of friendship. In 1441, in order to promote the use of the vernacular for poetical 
purposes (instead of the commonly used Latin), Leon Battista Alberti (1404-72) 
initiated and organized a poetry contest, the Certame coronario, on the subject of true 
friendship. The poems that participated in this contest had to deal with the topic of la 
vera amicizia and had to be written in the volgare, the Italian vernacular. In fact, there 
was nothing like a standard Italian tongue at that time, but merely several regional 
dialects. So, when Alberti refers to the volgare, he first of all means Tuscan, the kind of 
Italian that, thanks to the tre corone (the three crowns: Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio—
all of Florentine origin and all best known for works that were written in the Tuscan 
tongue) had the strongest tradition of being used for literary purposes, and which was 
thus commonly considered the most suitable dialect for poetry and prose—at least 
until this conviction was challenged by the questione della lingua in the early sixteenth 
century, the debate over which of the several dialects was best suited for a standard 
vernacular style. With the contest, Alberti wanted to show that it was possible to 
present any subject in any form of prose or poetry in the volgare, and thereby to achieve 
the same or an even better quality than with a treatment of the theme in Latin. Another 
advantage of the vernacular was, of course, that literature could be made accessible to 
a wider audience, as even people who could not read, could at least listen to the works 
when they were read to them. So, the use of the vernacular also supported the 
humanistic endeavour to implement new educational standards. 
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The Certame coronario took place in the cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore on 22 
October, and some of the most famous Italian poets of the age competed against each 
other for the laurel wreath endowed by Piero de' Medici (1418-69), among them, for 
example, Antonio degli Agli, Mariotto Davanzati, Benedetto Accolti, Ciriaco d'Ancona, 
and Leonardo Dati. Alberti himself presented a sixteen-verse Italian poem that was 
modelled on Latin hexameters and a prose dialogue on friendship, which he later 
revised and included as the fourth book in his famous work I libri della famiglia. It is in 
this treatise that he has his protagonists agree on the view on friendship that all the 
participants in the contest shared as well, namely that "in vita de' mortali più quasi 
trovarsi nulla sopra alla amicizia da tanto essere pregiata e osservata."35 
The competition was held before a jury consisting of ten apostolic secretaries, and in 
the presence of the Florentine signoria, the archbishop, and the Venetian envoy. In the 
end, however, the jury refused to announce a winner and the laurel wreath was 
donated to Santa Maria del Fiore. Most participants, of course, believed that the jury's 
inability to declare a winner was only due to the secretaries' envious attitude towards 
the volgare and that they simply wanted to prevent the vernacular from becoming too 
influential as an alternative language for literary purposes. Most people, in fact, 
thought that the clergy feared that the coronation of an Italian poet with a laurel 
wreath would undermine the superiority of Latin—the language of the Church—as the 
only acceptable tongue for the written word. Alberti therefore intended to organize a 
second Certame, this time on the subject of envy, but this poetical contest on L'invidia 
never took place, as the officials—for some obscure reason—did not share Alberti's 
enthusiasm for the idea. The success of the Certame on friendship, however, could 
hardly be denied; in less than no time, 200 manuscript copies of the poems that entered 
the contest were sold.36 
This favourable response to the Certame does of course not only reflect the 
popularity of the volgare but also that of the topic of friendship, which it enjoyed not 
only in the early decades of the Italian Renaissance but throughout the whole of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Yet, despite the great interest that the Italian 
humanist showed in friendship, it was their enormous enthusiasm for the topic of love 
whose influence on later European literature in the end overshadowed that of their 
writings on friendship. Mills is therefore certainly right, when, concerning the English 
Renaissance, he says: "It seems safe to say that, on the whole, the Italian literature that 
                                                   
35 Leon Battista Alberti, I libri della famiglia, ed. Cecil Grayson (Bari: Laterza, 1960) 263; Vol. 1 of Opere 
Volgari. – "[…] there is almost nothing to be found in the life of man as well worth cherishing and 
keeping as is friendship." Trans. Renée Watkins, The Family in Renaissance Florence [I libri della famiglia], 
by Leon Battista Alberti (Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1969) 246. 
36 See G. Busetto, "Certame Coronario," Lexikon des Mittelalters, ed. Robert-Henri Bautier and Robert Auty, 
vol. 2 (München: Artemis, 1983) col. 1633-34; and Joan Gadol, Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the 
Early Renaissance (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1969) 218-19. For the text of the poems that participated in 
the contest, see De vera amicitia: I testi del primo Certame coronario, ed. Lucia Bertolini (Modena: Panini, 
1993). 
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reached England stressed love more than friendship, and in no way interferes with the 
assumption that the friendship ideas reached England primarily through the 
humanistic emphasis on the classics."37 What we can find in the representations of 
friendship in the works of continental writers other than Italian, and of course in those 
of English authors, is therefore rather an independent and original approach to the 
classical ideas of friendship than one inspired by the Italian treatments of the topic. 
How thoroughly their reception of the classics in fact was, shows a line from Sir 
Philip Sidney's pastoral romance, The Arcadia, in which one of the characters sums up 
the description of his friendship with the words: "[…] nature began my friendship, 
education confirmed it, and virtue hath made it eternal."38 Here, Sidney incorporates 
three of the most significant ideas from the three major classical theories on friendship 
in a single brief statement: the ideas that friendship originates in Nature (from Cicero's 
Laelius, see 57), that it is strengthened and improved by education (from Plato's 
Symposium, see 42), and that virtue is the means by which friendship becomes perfect 
(from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, see 48). The idea that a true friendship that is 
based on the virtuousness of the friends is thereby made eternal, i.e. that it is here, in 
this world, only founded, and is continued and perfected in heaven, is though, of 
course, a Christian conception (to be found, e.g., in Aelred's De spirituali amicitia, where 
the author states: "Haec est uera et aeterna amicitia quae hic inchoatur, ibi perficitur; 
[…]."39). 
That the Renaissance writers adopted not only the key notions of classical friendship 
theory but the whole range of classical ideas of perfect friendship, is probably best 
illustrated by a very apt example from John Lyly's Euphues—The Anatomy of Wyt of 
1578. Here, Euphues, considering whether he should make friends with Philautus, 
reflects upon the nature of friendship in general: 
I haue red (saith he) and well I beleeue it, that a friend is in prosperitie a 
pleasure, a solace in aduersitie, in griefe a comfort, in joy a merrye 
                                                   
37 Mills 182. On the influence of the Italian sources on the treatment of the topic of love in later European 
literature, and especially in later Renaissance poetry, see, for example, Maurice J. Valency, In Praise of 
Love: An Introduction to the Love-Poetry of the Renaissance (New York: Octagon, 1975); Albert J.Smith, The 
Metaphysics of Love: Studies in Renaissance Love Poetry from Dante to Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1985); and J. W. Lever, The Elizabethan Love Sonnet, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1978). 
38 Sir Philip Sidney, [The Old Arcadia] The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia (The Old Arcadia), ed. Katherine 
Duncan-Jones, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994) 152. Sidney's fictional treatment of the subject is to be 
found in all three versions of his Arcadia. The Old Arcadia, from which this quotation is taken, was 
written in 1580; it was never printed in the sixteenth century but the text circulated in manuscript. 
Sidney began to revise his book, but when he died in 1586, he left the text unfinished. In 1590, this half 
revised version was posthumously published and is now known as the New Arcadia. In 1593 a hybrid 
version, consisting of the first three chapters of the New Arcadia and the last two chapters of the Old 
Arcadia, was published under the title: The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia. Cf. "Arcadia, The," The 
Cambridge Guide to Literature in English, ed. Ian Ousby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
39 Aelred of Rievaulx, De spirituali amicitia 3.79-80. – "This is what true and eternal friendship is: it takes 
shape here, in this world, and is perfected in the next; […]." Trans. Mark F. Williams, Aelred of Rievaulx's 
'Spiritual Friendship': A New Translation, by Aelred of Rievaulx (Scranton: U of Scranton P, 1994) 76. 
The reassessment of the classical notions in Renaissance humanism 77 
companion, at all times an other I, in all places ye expresse Image of mine 
owne person : insomuch that I cannot tell whether the immortall Gods haue 
bestowed any gift vpon mortall men, either more noble, or more necessary, 
then friendship. Is ther any thing in the world to be reputed (I will not say 
compared) to friendship? Can any treasure in this transitorie pilgrimage, be 
of more valewe then a friend? in whose bosome thou maist sleepe secure 
without feare, whom thou maist make partner of all thy secrets without 
suspition of fraude, and pertaker of all thy misfortune without mistrust of 
fleeting, who will accompt thy bale his bane, thy mishap his misery, the 
pricking of thy finger, the percing of his heart. But whether am I carried? 
Haue I not also learned that one shoulde eat a bushel of salt with him, 
whom he meaneth to make his friend? that tryall make trust? that there is 
falshood in fellowship? and what then? Doth not the sympathy of manners, 
make the coniunction of mindes? Is it not a by woord, like will to like? Not 
so common as commendable it is, to see young gentlemen choose thē such 
friends with whom they my seeme being absent to be present, being a 
sunder to be conuersant, beeing dead to be aliue. I will therefore haue 
Philautus for my pheere, and by so much the more I make my selfe sure to 
haue Philautus, by how much the more I view in him the liuely Image of 
Euphues.40 
Here, Lyly (1553/54-1606) refers indeed to a wide range of classical ideas of friendship 
and summarizes almost completely Cicero's view of the subject as it is presented in the 
Laelius; he even cites the proverbial saying of the bushel of salt that, according to 
Aristotle and Cicero, friends should have consumed together before they might regard 
themselves as true friends (see 49 and 60). Such ample representations of the classical 
views on the topic in so concise a passage are in fact seldom, since in most cases, the 
authors only reflect upon specific aspects of the topic. An equally comprehensive 
listing of the different views on friendship can only be found in the various anthologies 
of adages: catalogues reciting the most prominent proverbs and aphorisms of mainly 
classical origin. In 1500, Erasmus (1469-1536) published such a collection of maxims, 
poetical sayings, and literary commonplaces, his Adagia, and in the subsequent edition 
of 1525, we can already find 62 adages concerning the topic of friendship.41 
The Adagia provides, as it were, a reservoir of classical notions of the subject, but of 
all the diverse views on friendship that Erasmus here presents, he explicitly stresses 
the ideas that had already been common to nearly all of the classical conceptions. He 
presents, for example, the notion of "amicitia aequalis",42 the idea that ideal friendship 
can only exist between men who are similar in age, character, and manners, and equal 
in their virtuousness. This notion had in fact become as elementary to the conception of 
                                                   
40 John Lyly, "Euphues—The Anatomy of Wyt," The Complete Works of John Lyly, ed. R. Warwick Bond, 2nd 
ed., vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967) 197. 
41 Erasmus' Adagia enjoyed great popularity among the European humanists, and it was not the only work 
of its kind. In the course of the sixteenth century, such compilations of classical ideas became in fact as 
popular as the original sources they had been fragmented from themselves. 
42 Desiderius Erasmus, [Adagia] Adagiorum chiliades quatuor cum sesquicenturia (Basileae: Episcopius, 1574) 
15.b. – "Equal friendship" (i.e. "Friendship between equals.") Trans. mine. 
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true friendship in the Renaissance as it had been in classical times.43 For a Renaissance 
humanist, speaking about his notion of perfect friendship, such a relationship could 
only exist between those who share certain characteristics, such as a good character 
and good manners, the same age, similar opinions and interest, and so on.44 With such 
an emphasis on similarity and equality, it is not surprising that the ideal image of 
friends was the paradoxical one of almost identical individuals. The friends' aim was 
therefore not to complement but to resemble each other.45 Moreover, as Cicero declares 
mutual affection as the precondition, virtue as the basis, and private and public welfare 
as the objective of perfect friendship, the humanistic writers of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries likewise stressed these qualities as the pillars of the friendship 
conception. Virtue was, as in classical times, clearly seen as the most important of these 
qualities, a quality that is equally demanded as intensified by friendship, and which 
provides the basis for its duration.46 But the initial stimulus to the formation of such a 
companionship, the primum mobile of friendship, as it were, is love, or to be precise: the 
mutual affection of the friends. Mutual love, as was generally agreed, can though only 
exist between equals. The Renaissance conviction that between unequals of any sort, as 
a matter of principle, there can hardly be any kind of reciprocal affection, nor even a 
sense of community, is, for example, still shown in Milton's Paradise Lost, when Adam, 
before the creation of Eve, laments the lack of an equal companion: 
Among unequals what society 
Can sort, what harmony or true delight? 
Which must be mutual, in proportion due 
Giv'n and receiv'd; but in disparity 
                                                   
43 The idea that friends should ideally be equal in standing, be of the same age, and have the same 
dispositions, or, if this is not the case, should at least share the same interests and views on morals and 
political matters, was indeed one of the generally accepted notions of friendship in classical times and 
is explicitly stressed in treatises like Cicero's Laelius, for example. Exactly this idea is, for instance, also 
expressed in a letter that Horace once wrote to one of his friends, in which he assures him of his 
commitment to the conventions of friendship and hospitality: "Haec ego procurare et idoneus imperor 
et non / invitus, ne turpe toral, ne sordida mappa / corruget naris, ne non et cantharus et lanx / 
ostendat tibi te, ne fidos inter amicos / sit qui dicta foras eliminet, ut coeat par / iungaturque pari." 
Horace, Epistles 1.5.21-26. – "Here is what I charge myself to provide—and able and willing I am: that 
no untidy coverlet, no soiled napkin wrinkle up your nose; that tankard and plate become for you a 
mirror; that there be none to carry abroad what is said among faithful friends; that like may meet and 
mate with like." Trans. H. R. Fairclough, Satires; Epistles; Ars Poetica, by Horace, rpt. of 1929 ed., The 
Loeb Classical Library 194 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1991) 283. 
44 The classical idea that true friends should also be of the same rank and have the same social 
background was though usually not stressed by the humanistic thinkers. Most of them considered this 
in fact either irrelevant or not really worth to be mentioned, as most friendships do naturally exist 
between persons of the same origin, education, social standing, and cultural background anyway. 
45 Cf. Barbara Puschmann-Nalenz, Loves of Comfort and Despair: Konzeption von Freundschaft und Liebe in 
Shakespeares Sonetten (Frankfurt a.M.: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1974) 76. 
46 In general, we can say that in the Renaissance the meaning of the term virtue corresponds to the 
common one of classical times and is used as a synonym for morality, goodness, integrity, uprightness, 
and justice, as well as for manliness, power, and strength. Virtue with the semantic meaning of chastity 
or sexual purity, however, did not appear before the end of the sixteenth century. Cf. Puschmann-
Nalenz 75, 175. 
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The one intense, the other still remiss 
Cannot well suit with either, but soon prove 
Tedious alike […].47 
That Milton (1608-74) presents this view still in the seventeenth century shows how 
important it was to the conception of friendship in the Renaissance. 
However, the humanistic writers did not only put emphasis on the equality of the 
friends as a necessity for their friendship, they especially argued for the necessity of 
mutual affection between them. They were indeed convinced that true friendship 
could only originate from love. Affectionate love, of course, can only develop from a 
certain feeling of intimacy between the friends. Intimacy, however, needs time to 
develop. This is the reason why Aristotle and Cicero laid so much emphasis on the 
factor time when they considered the preconditions of perfect friendship. They knew 
that friendship is perfected by time and knowledge, but that they are not the source of 
it. But even if time is not the source of friendship itself—which can, as we have seen, 
only be love—it can certainly strengthen this love, especially when it is so 
consequently spent together as in the case of Rosalind and Celia in Shakespeare's As 
You Like It: 
We still have slept together, 
Rose at an instant, learn'd, play'd, eat together, 
And whereso'er we went, like Juno's swans, 
Still we went coupled and inseparable.48 
Intimacy of this kind will certainly eventually lead to the strong reciprocal affection 
between the friends on which true friendship is based and from which it originates. 
How strong this affection for the friend in some cases really was can be seen from the 
mourning of a man for his lost friend, when both were separated by death. An apt 
example of this can be found in Michel de Montaigne's essay "De L' Amitié". The grief 
he here expresses over the loss of his best friend Etienne de La Boëtie reflects the strong 
emotional bond that must have existed between them:  
Depuis le jour que je le perdy, 
 
quem semper acerbum, 
Semper honoratum (sic, Dii, voluistis) habebo, 
 
je ne fay que trainer languissant; et les plaisirs mesmes qui s'offrent à moy, 
au lieu de me consoler, me redoublent le regret de sa perte. Nous estions à 
moitié de tout; il me semble que je luy desrobe sa part, 
 
Nec fas esse ulla me voluptate hic frui 
                                                   
47 John Milton, Paradise Lost 8.383-89. 
48 Shakespeare, As You Like It 1.3.69-72. That Shakespeare's representation of the friendship between two 
women instead of the usual one between men does not affect the way in which their friendship is 
portrayed, reveals the Renaissance belief that, in principle, there is no difference between the nature of 
male and female friendships. On this point and the attitude towards female friendships, see 207ff 
below. 
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Decrevi, tantisper dum ille abest meus particeps. 
 
J'estois desjà si fait et accoustumé à estre deuxiesme par tout, qu'il me 
semble n'estre plus qu'à demy. 
 
// Illam meae si partem animae tulit 
Maturior vis, quid moror altera, 
Nec charus aeque, nec superstes 
Integer? Ille dies utramque 
Duxit ruinam. 
 
/ Il n'est action ou imagination où je ne le trouve à dire comme si eut-il bien 
faict à moy. Car, de mesme qu'il me surpassoit d'une distance infinie en 
toute autre suffisance et vertu, aussi foisoit-il au devoir de l'amitié. 
 
Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus 
Tam chari capitis? 
 
O misero frater adempte mihi! 
Omnia tecum una perierunt gaudia nostra, 
Quae tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor. 
Tu mea, ti moriens fregisti commoda, frater; 
Tecum una tota de mente fugavi 
 
Haec studia atque omnes delicias animi. 
Alloquar? audiero nunquam tua verba loquentem? 
Nunquam ego te, vita frater amabilior, 
Aspiciam posthac? At certe semper amabo.49 
                                                   
49 Michel de Montaigne, Essais: Livre I, ed. Alexandre Micha (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1969) 241-42. –  
 "Since that day when I lost him,  
 
 which I shall ever hold bitter to me, though always honour (since the gods ordained it so), 
 [Virgil, Aeneid, V, 49-50. (Annotations 217.)] 
 
 I merely drag wearily on. The very pleasures which are proferred me do not console me: they 
redouble my sorrow at his loss. In everything we were halves: I feel I am stealing his share 
from him: 
 
 Nor is it right for me to enjoy pleasures, I decided, while he who shared things with me is 
absent from me. 
 [Terence, Heautontimorumenos, I, 1, 97-8. (Annotations 217.)] 
 
 I was already so used and accustomed to being, in everything, one or two, that I now feel I am 
no more than half: 
 
 [B] Since an untimely blow has borne away a part of my soul, why do I still linger on less dear, 
only partly surviving? That day was the downfall of us both. 
 [Horace, Odes, II, xvii, 5-9. (Annotations 218.)] 
 
 [A] There is no deed nor thought in which I do not miss him—as he would have missed me; for 
just as he infinitely surpassed me in ability and virtue so did he do so in the offices of 
friendship: 
 
 What shame or limit should there be to grief for one so dear? … How wretched I am, having 
lost such a brother! With you died all our joys, which your sweet love fostered when you were 
alive. You brother, have destroyed my happiness by your death: all my soul is buried with you. 
Because of your loss I have chased all thoughts from my mind and all pleasures from my soul … 
Shall I never speak to you, never hear you talking of what you have done? Shall I never see you 
again, my brother, dearer than life itself? But certainly I shall love you always. 
 [Catullus, LXVIII, 20 f.; LXV, 9f. (adapted). (Annotations 218.)]" 
 
 Trans. M. A. Screech, ed., The Complete Essays, by Michel de Montaigne, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1993) 217-18. (The slashes in the original and the capital letters in square brackets in the translation 
indicate from which of the different original editions of the Essais the passages are taken.) 
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Montaigne's frequent use of classical quotations to support his own words illustrates 
how close the relation between the ancient and the Renaissance conceptions of 
friendship in fact was. It does also show, however, how deeply any kind of friendship 
representation, even still in the late Renaissance, was rooted in the tradition of quoting 
from and referring to the classical sources. In its dependence upon the authority of the 
classical writers, Montaigne's essay is in fact quite conventional. And although the 
author's grief over the loss of his friend is certainly authentic, the representation of it 
corresponds exactly to the traditional representations of this literary motif in fictional 
writings.50 That the motif of a man's grief over the death of his friend as a means to 
portray the intensity of the friends' affection for one another is in fact nearly as old as 
literature itself, shows the example of the Epic of Gilgamesh.51 And in classical times, the 
representation of a mourning friend was considered a very suitable means to hint at 
the quality of a friendship, especially of one between heroes, as in the case of Homer's 
Iliad, in which he tells the story of the friendship between Achilles and Patroclus, and 
of the great sorrow that Achilles feels at Patroclus' death.52 So, what makes 
Montaigne's account of his grief so innovative is therefore not the description of this 
grief itself, but the fact that it is real. 
Now, when it is true that friendship originates from affectionate love, and 
affectionate love from intimacy, and intimacy needs time to develop, then this must 
mean that the best friendships are those that were already founded in childhood. The 
representations of fictional friendships therefore often begin with the description of the 
protagonists' friendship in boyhood, or at least with a brief reference to this early 
companionship, as, for instance, in Shakespeare's The Two Gentlemen of Verona, in 
which Valentine says about his friend Proteus: "I knew him as myself; for from our 
infancy / We have convers'd, and spent our hours together […]"53 The motif is in fact 
quite often to be found in Shakespeare's plays. The closeness of the friendship between 
young Rosalind and Celia in As You Like It has already been referred to above, and in 
The Winter's Tale, the nature of the early friendship between the two kings, Polixenes 
and Leontes, is described in great detail by Polixenes himself, who, in a conversation 
                                                   
50 Montaigne's treatise on friendship certainly belongs to most frequently discussed and interpreted of his 
Essais, and the point that is most often disputed is whether his representation is truly a subjective 
account of his own ideas of friendship, which would make it for the time at which it was written 
indeed highly innovative, or merely a compilation of traditional views on the subject that is only 
skilfully applied to the description of a friendship that really existed. For a closer examination of this 
point, see, for example, Maurice Riveline, Montaigne et l'amitié (Paris: Alcan, 1939); Janice S. Green, 
"Montaigne's 'De l'amitié' and the Friendship Tradition," diss., Tufts U, 1970; and Barry Weller, "The 
Rhetoric of Friendship in Montaigne's Essais," New Literary History 9 (1978): 503-523. 
51 See 9. 
52 See Homer, Iliad 19.303-39. 
53 Shakespeare, The Two Gentlemen of Verona 2.4.57-58. For a brief account of the views on friendship 
presented in the play, see Paul R. Thomas, "The Marriage of True Minds: Ideal Friendship in Two 
Gentlemen of Verona," Iowa State Journal of Research 57.2 (1982): 187-192. 
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with Leontes's wife, gives her a lively account of how amazingly innocent the men's 
friendship was, back in their childhood days: 
We were, fair queen, 
Two lads that thought there was no more behind, 
But such a day to-morrow as to-day, 
And so be boy eternal. 
[………………………………………] 
We were as twinn'd lambs that did frisk i' th' sun, 
And bleat the one at th' other: what we chang'd 
Was innocence for innocence: we knew not 
The doctrine of ill-doing, nor dream'd 
That any did. Had we pursu'd that life, 
And our weak spirits ne'er been higher rear'd 
With stronger blood, we should have answer'd heaven 
Boldly 'not guilty', the imposition clear'd 
Hereditary ours.54 
Does this not sound like a memory of better yet vanished times? The idealization of the 
boys' friendship may indeed seem to be a bit too exaggerated; for Shakespeare, 
however, it is merely a necessary means of preparing the ground for the portrayal of 
the friendship between the adult kings. As far as the Renaissance view on the subject is 
concerned, the representation of an honest friendship between adults is hardly credible 
when no hint is given that it was already perfect in their boyhood. And so, right at the 
beginning of the play, the importance of their childhood experiences and the 
foundation that these provided for the friend's later relationship is stressed: 
They were trained together in their childhoods, and  
there rooted betwixt them then such an affection 
which cannot chose but branch now. Since their 
more mature dignities and royal necessities made 
separation of their society, their encounters, though 
not personal, have been royally attorneyed with in- 
terchange of gifts, letters, loving embassies, that they 
have seemed to be together, though absent; shook 
hands, as over a vast; and embraced, as it were, from 
the ends of opposed winds. The heavens continue 
their loves!55 
The representation of a friendship that has its roots in the childhood of the friends does 
of course allude to the amount of time that the friends have spend together, which was 
generally taken as an indication of the good quality of their friendship—in fact a 
literary motif that was already used by classical authors for the same reason, as, for 
example, again by Homer in his story of the friendship between Achilles and Patroclus 
in the Iliad. Thus, Shakespeare's references to the childhood of his protagonists, and the 
                                                   
54 Shakespeare, The Winter's Tale 1.2.62-74. 
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friendship that already existed between them at this early stage, only support his 
representation of the perfect friendship that exists between them at the beginning of 
the play. Nevertheless, there are still some critics who believe that Shakespeare might 
have "distrusted the friendship that begins in childhood."56 Now, this is indeed quite 
an arguable interpretation, but even if he did, this attitude was not commonly shared 
by other writers. 
The motif of the perfect friendship that originates in the childhood of the friends 
was in fact quite popular with Renaissance authors and does of course not appear in 
Shakespeare exclusively.57 Another good example of a friendship story in which this 
motif is used is that of the adventures of the two noble princes Pyrocles and Musidorus 
in Sir Philip Sidney's Arcadia. In describing the friendship of these princes, Sidney 
employs indeed many of the popular motifs that were frequently used in the literary 
representations of the theme at that time, but that the friendship of Musidorus and 
Pyrocles begins in their childhood, is strengthened in their youth, and flourishes in 
adulthood, is here particularly emphasized. As they were brought up together, the 
connection between the two young princes is a very close one, even closer than it 
would have been between brothers, "for Pyrocles bare reverēce ful of love to Musidorus, 
& Musidorus had a delight full of love in Pyrocles."58 The fact that they are not of exactly 
the same age, which could normally be an obstacle to the relationship between young 
boys, does here not cause any difficulties since "by reason that Musidorus being elder 
by three or foure yeares, it was neither so great a difference in age as did take away the 
delight in societie, and yet by the difference there was taken away the occasion of 
childish contentions; till they had both past over the humor of such contentions."59 
Musidorus, being the elder one, teaches Pyrocles everything he knows and Pyrocles is 
"so glad to learn of none, as of Musidorus […]."60 As soon as by the time of Pyrocles's 
sixteenth birthday he has learned so much and has developed so well that he is now in 
no way inferior to anyone else anymore—not even to Musidorus—"which may well 
                                                   
56 Helen Grierson, "Friendship in Shakespeare's Plays," Contemporary Review 120 (1921): 665. For a brief 
overview of the treatment of friendship in the Shakespearean plays, see Grierson 665-676. 
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Vielhauer (Amsterdam: Castrum Peregrini, 1979) 
58 Sir Philip Sidney, [The New Arcadia] The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1922) 190, vol. 1 of The Complete Works of Sir Philip Sidney. 
59 Sidney, New Arcadia 190. 
60 Sidney, New Arcadia 190. 
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seeme woderfull; but wonders are no wonders in a wonderfull subject."61 With this 
comment, Sidney concludes his description of the origin of their friendship. 
Now presenting the story of their friendship in adulthood, Sidney describes it as an 
especially intimate and affectionate one. The friends show all signs of affection for one 
another, including embraces and kisses, share all joys and sorrows, and are united in 
the mingling of their souls, as Sidney puts it when he comments: "there is no sweeter 
taste of friendship than the coupling of their souls in this mutuality either of condoling 
or comforting […]."62 By employing the image of the friends' coupled souls Sidney here 
combines two important classical ideas. On the one hand, he alludes to the Platonic 
conception of the friends whose minds are coupled to reach a higher level of 
perfection; on the other hand, he refers to the famous classical commonplace image of 
the united soul that exists in the bodies of two friends. Now, Sidney's image of the 
coupling of two souls was not the first combination of these notions; both ideas had 
already been included in a third before: in the classical image of the friend as another 
self. This is the idea that Erasmus deals with in his comment on the adage "Amicus 
alter ipse."63 The idea that a friend is something like a 'second self' is yet originally 
ascribed to Pythagoras and his circle.64 Now, from this idea of the friend as 'another 
self' (¥λλος αÙτÒς/allos autos), probably also derives the metaphor of the single soul 
that lives in the two bodies of a pair of friends. Similar images expressing the close 
connection between two partners—whether they be friends or lovers—appear indeed 
frequently in ancient Greek and Roman literature, and they clearly depict the classical 
notion of the character of such relations. In the Symposium, for instance, Plato has 
Aristophanes tell the story of the primeval human prototypes who were of three 
different natures. One was purely male, the second entirely female, and the third 
androgynous. They had two faces, four arms, and four legs and were of extraordinary 
strength and vigour. As they conspired against the gods, Zeus decided to cut them into 
two parts, in order to diminish their power. So he did. And since then, humans have 
the shape they have today and each is still searching for his other half. Those who were 
originally purely male are hence now looking for their other male part, those who were 
entirely female are accordingly searching for another female, and those who were 
formerly both want to reunite with a suitable part of the opposite sex.65 Here love is 
defined as the search for one's other half, friendship as the reunion of two persons that 
originally already belonged to each other. The opinion that one could only have one 
real friend probably also derives from this image of the other self. 
                                                   
61 Sidney, New Arcadia 190. 
62 Sidney, Old Arcadia 148; see also Old Arcadia 39. 
63 Erasmus, Adagia 15.b. – "A friend is another self." Trans. mine. 
64 Cf. Diogenes Laertius 8.10. 
65 See Plato, Symposium 189d-192d. 
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The idea of the friend as another self, however, appears not only in Greek writings. 
In Latin poetry the image reoccurs in so prominent poems as the Odes of Horace (65-08 
BC), in which he writes on the occasion of Virgil's voyage to Athens: 
Sic te diva potens Cypri, 
     sic fratres Helenae, lucida sidera, 
ventorumque regat pater 
     obstrictis aliis praeter Iapyga, 
 
navis, quae tibi creditum 
     debes Vergilium; finibus Atticis 
reddas incolumem, precor, 
     et serves animae dimidium meae.66 
The same image is used by Ovid (43 BC-AD 17/18) in his Tristia, in which he describes 
the friendship of the Greek mythological heroes Orestes and Pylades by referring to 
them as two loving friends "qui duo corporibus, mentibus unus erant."67 
Now, this image was in fact to become the chief symbol of friendship in the 
Renaissance conception of friendship as well. It was even so popular that it was not 
only applied to the relationship between two friends but also to that between three, as 
in the passage in Spenser's Faerie Queene in which the friendship between the three 
brothers Priamond, Dyamond, and Triamond (the three sons of Agape!) is described: 
These three did loue each other dearely well, 
And with so firme affection were allyde, 
As if but one soule in them all did dwell, 
Which did her powre into three parts diuyde; 
Like three faire branches budding farre and wide, 
That from one roote deriu'd their vitall sap […].68 
How lasting the popularity of the idea of the friend as an alter ego in fact was, shows 
an example from the seventeenth century, when in 1685 John Dryden (1631-1700) 
decided to translate Horace's ode on Virgil's embarkation for Greece in order to 
inscribe it to the Earl of Roscommon on his intended voyage to Ireland: 
So may th' auspicious Queen of love, 
And the twin stars (the seed of Jove), 
And he who rules the raging wind, 
To thee, O sacred ship, be kind; 
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And gentle breezes fill thy sails, 
Supplying soft Etesian gales, 
As thou, to whom the Muse commends 
The best of poets and of friends, 
Dost thy committed pledge restore, 
And land him safely on the shore; 
And save the better part of me 
From perishing with him at sea.69 
The image of the friend as another self was indeed to remain the favourite metaphor 
for friendship in literary representations of the subject until well into the Romantic 
period. A friendship conception that enjoyed a popularity of much shorter duration, 
and which was to be almost completely ignored in the early seventeenth century, was 
the idea that friends should hold all their property in common. In classical philosophy, 
it is especially the Pythagorean idea of friendship that is often associated with the 
principle of koinōnia (κοινων…α), the idea that friends should hold all things in 
common.70 But whether it is originally Pythagorean or not, the idea of the shared 
property of friends was in fact a commonplace of philia in classical times and appears 
in philosophical treatments of friendship, as in Socrates' Lysis (207c) or Phaedrus (279c), 
as well as in more literary representations of the subject, as in the Orestes by the Greek 
tragedian Euripides (c. 484-406 BC) in which he has one of the characters state: "Friends 
share everything."71 In the sixteenth century, Erasmus then deals with this notion in his 
comment on the adage "Amicorum communia omnia,"72 and in some contexts it was 
indeed presented as a significant characteristic of friendship, as in Shakespeare's The 
Merchant of Venice, where Antonio assures his friend Bassanio: "My purse, my person, 
my extremest means / Lie all unlock'd to your occasions."73 Overall, however, the idea 
was only considered a minor aspect of the subject, or was even completely rejected as 
an inappropriate view on the matter. In his study of Spenser's conception of friendship, 
Charles G. Smith remarks about Spenser's attitude towards the idea: "[…] in portraying 
true friendship he does not use the proverbial idea that friends' good are common 
goods. It is highly significant that this idea is employed in his delineation of false 
friendship only."74 And concerning the English attitude towards the idea in general, he 
rightly states: "[…] whenever in Renaissance English literature this theory is referred 
                                                   
69 John Dryden, The Poems of John Dryden - Vol. II: 1682-1685, ed. Paul Hammond (London: Longman, 
1995) 363. 
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to, it is usually disapproved. Perhaps this is accounted for by the fact that communistic 
theory was taboo in England in the sixteenth century."75 So, the hostile attitude 
towards the matter was not at all uncommon and Spenser (1552-99) was indeed not 
alone in rejecting the idea, neither in England nor on the Continent. 
That the idea that friends should have all things in common was generally rejected, 
does though not mean that the idea that one should use every means at one's disposal 
to help a friend in need, even if that would mean that one had to share all one's 
property with the friend, was not held in high regard. It was, in fact, the only way in 
which the idea of sharing one's possessions with a friend was accepted. And so, in 
1657, in a period in which the attitude towards friendship was clearly dominated by 
mercantile interests, and in which communistic notions of any kind were fiercely 
turned down, Jeremy Taylor (1613-67) could only dare to take up the idea in his 
Discourse of the Nature and Offices of Friendship by restricting its implementation to 
instances of need: "It is certain that amongst friends their estates are common; that is, 
by whatsoever I can rescue my friend from calamity, I am to serve him, or not to call 
him friend […]."76 It is indeed not the idea that a friend should share all his possessions 
with us but the trust in the friend's readiness to do so when we are in need, which 
derives from this classical belief in the obligation to assist a friend in times of hardship, 
that was to become regarded as one of the most significant characteristics of true 
friendship in early modern times.77 And still today, it is often mentioned first when the 
specific qualities of friendship are to be named. Closely connected with this notion is of 
course the classical idea that only in times of need one could distinguish one's true 
friends from the false ones—the idea that Erasmus deals with in his comment on the 
adage "Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur."78 To be abandoned by one's friends is in 
fact a bitter experience and in classical times, in which the loss of friends and allies 
could have had grave effects on the safety of one's life, the fear of abandonment was 
taken very seriously indeed and led the ancients to emphasize this aspect in the 
treatment of friendship in particular. Thus, in many classical treatises, plays, poems, 
and tales, we can find the recommendation to make friends only with men of proven 
trustworthiness and reliability. A good example of such a piece of advice in literary 
                                                   
75 C. G. Smith 50. 
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form is the famous story of two travelling friends and a bear presented in one of the 
Greek fables of unknown origin that are traditionally ascribed to Aesop (c. 6th cent. 
BC): 
Two friends walking along a road were suddenly confronted by a bear. One 
of them managed to get away and climbed into a tree, but the other, about 
to be caught, lay on the ground and pretended to be dead. The bear sniffed 
at him and he held his breath. They say that bears never touch a corpse. 
When the bear went away the man in the tree asked his companion what it 
was that the bear had whispered in his ear, and his answer was, 'Hereafter 
don't travel in company with friends who fail to stand by you in time of 
danger.'79 
In the Renaissance, as in classical times, it was regarded as a matter of course that in 
perfect friendship a loyal friend would help his 'alter ego' in times of crisis, as in such a 
friendship both friends would naturally observe the rules of virtue. The virtuousness 
of the friends was seen as the most important feature of perfect friendship, since love 
was merely considered the initial motivation for the formation of such a friendship, but 
virtue was regarded as the foundation of its duration. The conviction that a friendship 
that is not based on virtue cannot last for long, is expressed, for example, by Spenser in 
book 4 of his Faerie Queene: 
It often fals, (as here it earst befell) 
That mortall foes doe turne to faithfull frends, 
And friends profest are chaungd to foemen fell: 
The cause of both, of both their minds depends, 
And th'end of both likewise of both their ends. 
For enmitie, that of no ill proceeds, 
But of occasion, with th'occasion ends; 
And friendship, which a faint affection breeds 
Without regard of good, dyes like ill grounded seeds.80 
The humanistic emphasis on virtue as the prerequisite for a perfect and enduring 
friendship was thus certainly as great as it had already been in the classical sources 
that served as the model for the Renaissance representations of the subject. Of course, 
this stress on virtue was precisely what made it so difficult to live up to the conception 
of perfect friendship, and which eventually evoked an increase in critical remarks on 
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the idealization of the topic, as we will see in the following. For the time being, 
however, the idea of the necessity of virtue in friendship clearly dominated the 
Renaissance understanding of the matter. 
 3 REPRESENTATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN 
IDEALISM AND REALISM 
ue to the increase in literary treatments of friendship in the classical sense 
since the rise of humanism at the end of the fourteenth century, we can find 
representations of the ancient conceptions—the idealized as well as the more 
pragmatic ones—in all kinds of writing of the following two centuries. Many of these 
representations are though of course only mere imitations of classical commonplaces, 
which the Renaissance writers frequently copied from the Greek and Roman sources, 
and which they repeatedly presented neither with a new kind of interpretation nor 
with an original point of view. Besides this simple reproduction of classical notions, 
however, one of the most significant characteristics of humanism was its interest in the 
practical value of philosophical theories and in their applicability to real life. Ever more 
often, thoughts on friendship were now no longer the mere theoretical considerations 
of how such a relationship should be that they had been during the Middle Ages. Now, 
the conceptions of friendship also had to be translatable into practice. This, of course, 
posed a major problem. The ancient ideal of perfect friendship that most Renaissance 
writers took as a model was indeed such an idealized conception that it could scarcely 
be put into effect. Only very few were actually able to have such friendships with a 
couple of close friends. For the majority of people, however, the classical idea of prefect 
friendship remained an unattainable ideal. Yet, the solution to the problem was once 
again provided by the ancient theories of friendship themselves, namely by Aristotle's 
idea that there is not one single kind of friendship but several ones, and that these 
different kinds have to be kept distinct when dealt with. So, even though it was not 
possible for everyone to live up to the high standards of the perfect kind of friendship, 
it was still possible for everybody to life up to the standards of the inferior ones, and 
thus to put at least some of the classical ideas of friendship into practice. It is therefore 
no surprise that this idea became one of the most crucial of the classical notions that 
dominated the Renaissance attitude towards the subject. 
Although Aristotle still distinguishes between three individual types of friendship, 
the division can certainly be restricted to only two different sorts: the perfect and the 
inferior ones. In accordance with this distinction, there are now—besides the mere 
imitation of classical commonplaces—also two different kinds of friendship 
representation in Renaissance literature that can be regarded as truly characteristic of 
the early modern approach to the classical ideas. On the one hand, there are the 
enthusiastic accounts of the nature of perfect friendship and of the qualities it either 
demands or possesses, and on the other there are the descriptions of the inferior forms, 
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presenting these in either accusing or apologetic tones. The way in which friendship is 
portrayed in these different kinds of representation is consequently either purely 
idealistic, utterly realistic, or somewhere in between. 
In detail, this means that in Renaissance literature we can find first of all the 
representations of the idealized idea of virtuous, honourable, and true friendship in 
which the friends are portrayed not only as confidants and equal companions, but also 
as loving partners and often even as alter egos. Such representations of perfect 
friendship often appeared in moralizing plays, courtesy books, or the mirrors for 
princes, and they were nearly always presented for didactic purposes. Excellent 
examples of such didactic representations are to be found in Thomas Elyot's The Boke 
Named the Governour and in Richard Edwards's Damon and Pithias at which we will 
have a closer look in the following. 
Then there are those writings that give evidence of some people's endeavour to 
implement the idea of perfect friendship in real life. Especially the correspondence of 
the leading humanist and Platonists of the age reveals their wish to live up to the high 
standards of true friendship. In their letters, they frequently assured each other of the 
quality of their friendship, which, of course, is the clearest sign that they did in actual 
fact not manage to translate their ideals into reality. Nevertheless, it shows how 
seriously the idea of true friendship was taken at that time. We will therefore have a 
brief look also at some of these letters in 3.2. 
Finally, there are those representations of friendship that focus on the utility value 
of this form of relationship. Contrary to the condemnation of this attitude that we can 
find in those writings that idealize and glorify the idea of perfect friendship, these 
presentations of friendship do not only try to justify the emphasis they put on the 
utility of friendship, they do also provide elaborated contemplations of how this utility 
could be maximized. One of the most sophisticated of these considerations is certainly 
the one Leon Battista Alberti presents in the fourth book of his Libri della famiglia, his 
treatise "De amicitia," which we will therefore examine in some detail in 3.3. 
 
3.1. DIDACTIC IDEALIZATIONS: 
FRIENDSHIP AS AN EDUCATIONAL END 
As we have seen from examples like those by Lyly or Sidney in the previous chapter, 
the great majority of representations of classical friendship conceptions in Renaissance 
literature portray an image that glorifies the ideal of friendship in its most perfect 
form. And even when only an inferior or false kind of friendship is presented, it is in 
most cases meant as an argument in favour of perfect or true friendship. For a modern 
reader, this does in fact not seem to be anything to wonder about, as many of the 
modern representations of friendship also present a positive, if not perfect image of 
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friendship—and the topic is today by far not as popular as it has been in the 
Renaissance. Of course, it is in human nature that people like to read about things that 
are somehow idealized, that do not represent things as they usually are in reality but 
as they could be, perhaps as they should be, but certainly as most people would wish 
them to be in their own life. Dealing with Renaissance literature, however, it would not 
do justice to the writings of the time to regard their idealized portrayal of friendship 
merely as a romanticized view of the subject, for it neglects the actual aim most of the 
early modern writers pursued with this kind of representation. Their intention was 
certainly not to simply present a romanticized image of friendship, but was indeed 
much more high-minded, as Mills points out: "When, thanks to the printing-press and 
the enthusiasm of the humanists, the philosophical and ethical aspects of classical 
friendship became familiar to a larger number of people—people who had embraced 
the Renaissance delight in the life here and now—the purpose of those who 
disseminated the classical ideas was didactic."1 The aim was therefore not to present an 
unattainable ideal of friendship as it could only exist in a better world but to depict an 
image of friendship that the readers could use as a model for the fashioning of their 
own relationships. 
This idea, that the main function of literature is to provide examples worthy of 
imitation, is in fact one of the basic propositions in Renaissance literary criticism and 
does of course apply not only to the representation of friendship but to representations 
of everything that becomes the object of literary treatment. Like with many other 
notions that dominated the Renaissance view of things, the original idea on which this 
definition of the main function of literature is based dates back to classical times and 
originally appears in Aristotle's treatise on Poetics. Here, for Aristotle the main 
characteristic of poetry is the mimesis, the imitation of things as they are—or as they 
could be—in reality, produced for the delight of the readers, listeners, or spectators.2 
An excellent Renaissance interpretation and elaboration of this idea is presented, for 
example, by Sir Philip Sidney in his Defence of Poesy.3 Here he expresses the conviction 
that poetry is first of all a means by which the poet skilfully imitates reality: "Poesy 
therefore is an art of imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in the word mimesis—that is 
to say, a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth—to speak metaphorically, a 
speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight."4 On the other hand, however, it 
                                                   
1 Mills 376. 
2 See Aristotle, Poetics 4, 1448b. 
3 The work, posthumously published in 1595, is also known under the title of its twin edition: An Apology 
for Poetry. Another example of a sixteenth-century treatise on literary criticism that reflects on the 
Aristotelian ideas and that also emphasises the educative power of poetry, is The Art of English Poesy, 
which is commonly ascribed to George Puttenham (1529-90). For the discussion of the function of 
literature, see book 1. 
4 Sir Philip Sidney, "The Defence of Poesy," Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones, The Oxford 
Authors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 217. The classical saying that "poetry is a speaking 
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is also a way of giving proper examples of how reality should be. So, for Sidney, it is 
the duty of a poet not to simply imitate what is real, but rather to create a vision of a 
better reality. It is this function of poetical writings to which Sidney refers when he 
speaks of the poet's task to teach and delight: 
For these third [the 'right poets', in contrast to the theologians and 
philosophers] be they which most properly do imitate to teach and delight, 
and to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, 
only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what 
may be and should be. These be they that, as the first and most noble sort 
may justly be termed vates [Latin for poets; also denoting prophets][…]. For 
these indeed do merely make to imitate, and imitate both to delight and 
teach; and delight, to move men to take that goodness in hand, which 
without delight they would fly as from a stranger; and teach, to make them 
know that goodness whereunto they are moved—which being the noblest 
scope to which ever any learning was directed […].5 
According to Sidney, a poet should always be concerned with the right representation 
of virtue, since: "as virtue is the most excellent resting place for all worldly learning to 
make his end of, so poetry, being the most familiar to teach it […]."6 It is the poet's task 
not to present what is, but what should be, just as the philosopher does. But in contrast 
to the philosopher, the poet is able to create a fictional ideal, and, thereby, to give such 
examples of virtue that are both instructive and delightful. The aim of poetry is 
therefore to act as a stimulus to the realization of these idealized examples, "with the 
end of well-doing and not of well-knowing only."7 
Now, at least as far as the topic of friendship is concerned, this attitude towards 
literature seems to have influenced not only Sidney's work as a writer but also his life 
as a friend. His reflections on literature might in fact even be seen as the theoretical 
link between the literary treatment of the fictional friendship between Pyrocles and 
Musidorus in the different versions of The Arcadia and Sidney's own friendship with 
Hubert Languet as it is presented in their correspondence with each other. However, 
the treatment of friendship in Sidney's fictional writings, his considerations of the 
function of poetry, and the reflection of his own friendship with Languet in their 
correspondence, might suggest that all these texts were written exactly in this 
chronological order—which would indeed be logical, according to Sidney's 
propositions in the Defence of Poesy. But, in fact, this is not so. The first version of The 
Arcadia was written in 1580. The exact date of the composition of The Defence of Poesy, 
posthumously published in 1595, is not clearly ascertainable, but it is assumed that it 
                                                                                                                                                            
picture and painting a silent poetry" was indeed very popular in the Renaissance. Cf. Duncan-Jones, 
annotations, Sir Philip Sidney 374n217.221. 
5 Sidney, Defence of Poesy 218. 
6 Sidney, Defence of Poesy 228. 
7 Sidney, Defence of Poesy 219. 
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was written sometime around the year 1581. Sidney's friendship and correspondence 
with Languet, however, already began in 1573. That he used his own fiction as a model 
for his actual friendship is therefore impossible. This does though not mean that he 
could not have been inspired by the idealistic representation of friendship by some 
other author. However, Sidney's conviction that the representation of ideals in poetry 
can serve as a catalyst to their realization, and the fact that the considerations of 
friendship played a dominant role in his writings as well as in his life, makes him an 
important figure in the study of the manifestations of realistic and idealistic 
conceptions of friendship in the Renaissance. We will therefore have to come back to 
him in the next section, where we will have a brief look at some of the letters scholarly 
pen-friends of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have sent to each other in the name 
of friendship. 
 
An excellent example of the idealized representation of friendship for didactic 
purposes is to be found in The Boke Named the Governour by Sir Thomas Elyot (c. 1499-
1546), published in 1531. As a kind of handbook, similar to the courtesy books or 
mirrors for princes that were so popular at the time, the Governour is basically a treatise 
on the education of young noblemen, in which Elyot presents numerous guidelines for 
the right conduct of 'governors'.8 Among the various reflections on the standards of 
behaviour and the moral principles a gentleman should have, and on the best 
educational means by which these qualities might be imparted to the youth, we can 
also find some of his thoughts on friendship. 
Since the exercise of true friendship was seen as one of the cardinal virtues of 
humanism, it was of course not unusual to include such reflections in a humanistic 
courtesy book or mirror for princes (which is here rather a mirror for governors), but it 
is the extent to which it is done, and the way in which Elyot treats the subject that 
made the Governour so important to the popularization of classical friendship 
conceptions in Renaissance England. In English literature, Elyot is in fact the first who 
breaks completely with the medieval moralistic representation of friendship to stress 
instead its practical and affective side—just as it is typical of the classical, and 
especially the Ciceronian conception.9 Concerning the importance of the Governour to 
the development of the conceptualization of friendship in the English Renaissance, 
Mills even goes as far as to say that "here for the first time is there glowing enthusiasm 
in discussing the relationship of friendship to life, a real passion for the ecstasy of 
                                                   
8 The aim of such handbooks was to recall the norms and values of antiquity, especially those of virtue, 
and to convert them into guidelines for the correct behaviour of rulers, courtiers, or noblemen, suitable 
for the needs of their own time. The reader was advised to live up to, or at least to imitate the image of 
what the author considered to be a truly virtuous man, an 'uomo virtuoso' as Machiavelli calls him in 
one of the most famous of such books, his Il principe, written in 1513. Cf. also Wilhelm Berges, Die 
Fürstenspiegel des hohen und späten Mittelalters (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1938). 
9 Cf. Mills, 95-97. 
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friendship as a great amenity of life and a social necessity."10 The Governour was in fact 
so popular that in the course of the sixteenth century eight editions of the book were 
published, the last in 1580. Since there is no work in English literature before Elyot that 
treats the topic of friendship with such devotion to the classical conceptions, we can 
certainly assume that the literary revival of the ancient notions of idealistic friendship 
in England started with the Governour.11 
The Governour consists of three parts (or books), of which the second is nearly 
completely devoted to the topic of friendship. To treat a single subject—other than 
virtue—to such an extent seems to be very unusual for a work of the courtesy book 
genre indeed. Yet, to write about friendship is for Elyot in fact nothing else but to write 
about virtue, as he entirely follows the classical idea that friendship and virtue are 
inseparably connected with each other: "Aristotle saieth/that frēdship is a vertue/or 
ioyneth with vertue/which is affirmed by Tulli [Cicero]/sayenge that frendship can 
nat be without vertue/ne but in good men onely."12 So, indirectly, his treatise is also on 
virtue, and Elyot leaves no doubt that his intention in presenting his thoughts on 
friendship is in fact not so much to delight but to teach, when he reveals his didactic 
purpose right at the beginning: "I will therefore borowe so moche of the gentle 
redar/thoughe he be nigh wery of this longe mater/barrayne of eloquence and 
pleasaunt sentence : & declare some what by the way of very & true frendship. whiche 
perchaunce may be an allectife to good men to seeke for their semblable/on whom 
thay may practise amitie."13 
He begins his reflections with the definition of friendship as a form of benevolence, 
directed towards a single person: "Beneuolence/if it do extende to a hole contraye or 
citie/it is proprely called charitie/and some tyme zele : and if it concerne one 
persone/than is it called beneuolence. And if it be very feruent & to one singuler 
psone, than may it be named loue or amitie."14 After having reflected on the virtue of 
beneficence in general, he stresses the importance of both benevolence and beneficence 
to friendship (and vice versa) and laments the neglect of such virtues in the past, by 
which he clearly means the Middle Ages: 
I haue all redy treated of beneuolence and beneficence generally. But for als 
moche as frendship/called in latine Amicitia/cōprehendeth bothe those 
vertues more specially/& in an higher degree/and is nowe so infrequent or 
straunge amonge mortall men/by the tyrannie of couetise & ambition/ 
which haue longe reigned/and yet do/that amitie may nowe vnethe be 
knowen/or founden throughout the worlde by them that seeke for her as 
                                                   
10 Mills 97. 
11 Cf. Mills 105. 
12 Thomas Elyot, The Book Named the Governor: 1531, English Linguistics: 1500-1800 (A Collection of 
Facsimile Reprints) 246 (Menston: Scolar Press, 1970) 2.11, 141v. 
13 Elyot 2.11, 141r-v. 
14 Elyot 2.8, 129v. 
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diligently/as a mayden wolde seeke for a small siluer pinne in a great 
chāber strawed with white russ bes.15 
Following the classical tradition, Elyot now explicitly stresses the necessity of the 
existence of virtue in the characters of the two friends and consequently regards their 
virtuousness as the essential precondition of their friendship. To illustrate his 
conception of friendship in general and to emphasize the indispensability of the 
friends' virtuousness in particular, Elyot tells the story of the model friends Titus and 
Gysippus. He presents the story in a separate chapter, which he heads with the title: 
"The wonderfull history of Titus & Gisippus, & whereby is fully declared the figure of 
perfect amitie."16 This chapter, as Mills puts it, "gives the earliest fully elaborated 
friendship story to appear in the sixteenth century [in England]."17 This story, as it is 
here presented in the twelfth chapter of the Governour, is briefly summarized by Mills 
as follows: 
Titus, son of a Roman senator, was sent to Athens to study. There he became 
a close friend of Gysippus, son of an honorable Athenian. The two young 
men were of the same size and looked so much alike that even their parents 
could hardly distinguish them. They studied and lived together, and were 
inseparable. When Gysippus' father died, his kin and friends urged the 
young man to marry, and selected Sophronia for him. When on one occasion 
he took Titus along with him as he called on Sophronia, Titus fell deeply in 
love with her. He became sick for love, though bewailing the fact that he 
was thus untrue to Gysippus. Gysippus, visiting Titus, urged him to tell the 
cause of his illness, and after expressing many regrets Titus confessed his 
love for Sophronia. 
Preferring friendship to love, Gysippus urged Titus to marry Sophronia, and 
even brought it about that, unknown to the bride, it was Titus who became 
the husband and not Gysippus. On the next day Gysippus invited the 
nobles of the city to his house; Titus explained what had happened, and 
justified the substitution. Soon after, Titus' father died and he was recalled 
to Rome. He took his bride with him. 
The Athenians resented the behavior of Gysippus, and slighted him; finally 
they despoiled him of his wealth and drove him out of Athens. In poverty 
and distress he travelled to Rome, thinking to ask aid of his old friend Titus. 
He approached Titus' house as Titus and Sophronia were leaving it to go 
riding; they saw him but did not recognize him in his rags, and passed on. 
In despair because he thought Titus ungrateful, Gysippus wandered to a 
barn and lay down. He fell asleep, worn out by fatigue, weeping, and 
sorrow. A murderer placed his bloody knife in Gysippus' hand and 
departed. Gysippus was charged with the crime and, weary of life, 
confessed to it. At his trail, Titus recognized him, and said that e himself 
was the guilty man. But the real murderer was present and confessed, to 
save innocent persons. In the discussion of motives, Titus were reunited. 
Titus took his friend home, where he was welcomed by Sophronia, and 
                                                   
15 Elyot 2.11, 141r. 
16 Elyot 2.12, 145v. 
17 Mills 99. 
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entertained him; he offered Gysippus the free use of all his possessions. But 
since Gysippus wished to return to Athens, Titus collected an army and 
forced the Athenians to restore Gysippus to his former position and 
wealth.18 
Elyot presents the story in great detail although most of his educated readers were 
certainly familiar with the plot, as a version of the story had already appeared as one of 
the tales in Boccaccio's Decameron.19 That another, slightly different version of the story 
is also to be found in the Gesta Romanorum, in Steinhöwel's and Caxton's collections of 
Aesopian fables, and in Petrus Alfonsus' Disciplina clericalis, indicates how popular it 
had already been during the Middle Ages.20 In fact, the question from which source 
Elyot adopted his version of the Titus and Gysippus story is still unanswered. Some 
scholars think that he borrowed it from Boccaccio's Decameron, which would in fact 
make it the first translation of any part of the Decameron into English. Both versions, 
however, show such a great divergence that this appears to be quite doubtful indeed. 
Another supposition assumes that Elyot adopted the story from its version in Petrus 
Alfonsus' Disciplina clericalis, but whether Elyot used Boccaccio, Petrus or even a third 
source remains uncertain.21 
Now, from whatever source Elyot has adopted the narrative of Titus and Gysippus' 
friendship, in contrast to the medieval versions he no longer tells the story of the mere 
guest-friendship that is only part of the commercial relationship of the two men: a 
story that is centred around the love of both for the same woman and that glorifies the 
ideals of chivalry. Instead, he presents the friendship of the two in the warm and 
affective tone that has become as typical of the humanistic representations of 
friendship as it has already been of the classical ones. Yet, even with Elyot the 'new' 
humanistic conception of friendship still has to compete with the traditional court-of-
love convention of medieval times. And this also already hints at the struggle that the 
concepts of love and friendship had to undergo during the Renaissance. With the Titus 
and Gysippus story that Elyot presents to illustrate his view of friendship, "for the first 
time in the sixteenth century," as Mills puts it, "the medieval emphasis on love and the 
                                                   
18 Mills 99-100. 
19 See Boccaccio, Decameron 10.8. For a discussion of Boccaccio's version of the Titus and Gysippus story in 
the Decameron, and the view of friendship he presents here, see, for example, Reginald Hyatte, 
"Reconfiguring Ancient Amicitia Perfecta in the Decameron 10.8," Italian Quarterly 32 (1995): 27-37; or 
Victoria Kirkham, "The Classical Bond of Friendship in Boccaccio's Tito and Gisippo (Decameron 10.8)," 
The Classics in the Middle Ages. Papers of Twentieth Annual Conf. of Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance, 
ed. Aldo S. Bernado and Saul Levin (Binghampton: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1990) 223-
35. 
20 For the treatment of the story in these sources, see Gesta Romanorum, chap.171; Heinrich Steinhöwel, 
Steinhöwels Äsop, ed. Hermann Oesterley (Tübingen: Fues, 1873). 294-301; William Caxton, Caxton's 
Aesop, ed. R. T. Lenaghan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1967) 193ff.; and Petrus Alfonsi, "De 
integro amico," Die Disciplina Clericalis des Petrus Alfonsi: Das älteste Novellenbuch des Mittelalters, ed. 
Alfons Hilka and Werner Söderhjelm (Heidelberg: Winter, 1911) 6.  
21 Cf. Mills 100-01. It has been supposed that Elyot and Boccaccio independently used the same source, a 
Greek romance (now lost) that itself adopted the story from the oriental original. Cf. Mills 388-89n47. 
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classical doctrines of friendship come into dramatic conflict in English literature—but 
not the last," as we will see in section 4.2.22 
That Elyot mirrors Cicero's definition of friendship in summary when he presents 
his own understanding of the matter shows how much his humanistic conception of 
friendship is indeed based on the classical ones:  
Verely it is a blessed and stable connexion of sondrie willes/makinge of two 
parsones one in hauinge and suffringe. And therfore a frende is pprely 
named of Philosophers the other I. For that in them is but one mynde and 
one possession : and that/which more is a man more reioiseth at his frēdes 
good fortune than at his owne.23 
It is only to illustrate this view of friendship, that Elyot tells the story of Titus and 
Gysippus. That he uses the companionship of the two friends as a model for the perfect 
friendship he wants to present can also be seen from the résumé he gives after having 
told the story: "This example in the affectes of frendshippe expresseth (if I be nat 
deceyued) the description of frendship engendred by the similitude of age and 
personage : augmented by the conformitie of manners and studies : and confirmed by 
the longe continuaunce of company."24 From this and the previous quotation we can 
clearly see what Elyot regards as the essential characteristics of true friendship: the 
selflessness of the friends and their readiness to sacrifice their own lives for each other 
as the result of their loving companionship, and their equality or similarity and the 
time that they have spent together as its prerequisites. These classical commonplace 
notions play indeed such a significant role in Elyot's view of the subject that he refers 
to them repeatedly in his treatise. In fact, the story of Titus and Gysippus is not the 
only one he presents to illustrate his ideal of perfect friendship—although it is the one 
he elaborates to the greatest extent; he also gives brief accounts of the famous classical 
stories of Damon and Pithias, and Orestes and Pylades, and at least in the latter one, he 
again refers to the idea of the similarity between the friends, when he mentions how 
"wonderfull like in all features" they were.25 The notion that similarity, or equality, is a 
                                                   
22 Mills 103. 
23 Elyot 2.11, 144r. 
24 Elyot 2.12, 160v. 
25 Elyot 2.11, 144r. In classical times, Orestes and Pylades were indeed renowned for their exemplary 
friendship. Being popularised by Euripides in his Orestes, their story soon ranked with the most famous 
examples of true friendship that everyone was acquainted with; among them the stories of so well-
known couples as Achilles and Patroclus, Theseus and Pirithous, and, of course, Damon and Pithias 
(var.: Pythias or Phintias). One of the best known collections of short stories dealing with such 
exemplary friendships is the dialogue Toxaris by the Greek rhetorician, pamphleteer, and satirist Lucian 
(AD 120-after 180). Here Lucian presents several of the classical commonplaces and literary motifs of 
friendship, woven into a debate between a Scythian, Toxaris, and his future friend, a Greek called 
Mnesippus, over which of the two peoples holds friendship in higher regard. The argument starts once 
more with a reference to the friendship of Orestes and Pylades, depicting it as an example of the 
unswerving loyalty of friends, and after also mentioning Achilles and Patroclus, and Theseus and 
Pirithous, each of the speakers presents a series of five made-up stories, which indeed reflect many of 
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necessary precondition of any true friendship was indeed a Renaissance commonplace 
of the topic, but in contrast to the classical conception that the friends should also 
ideally be of the same rank or have the same social background—a view that Cicero as 
well as Aristotle expound in their treatises—this was now no longer seen as a 
necessary prerequisite as long as the friends were similar in their manners and 
interests and equal in their virtuousness. This notion, that friends who are united in a 
perfect friendship are not necessarily of the same social standing but always of the 
same moral integrity, and that it is this equality of virtuousness that characterises the 
friendships of all model friends of classical history, is also presented by Petrarch in his 
epic on Scipio Africanus, Africa, where we can read in a speech addressed to Scipio 
about his friendship with Laelius: 
Rebus in humanis nil dulcius experiere 
Alterno convictu et fido pectore amici. 
Est equidem e multis tibi nunc certissimus unus 
Lelius. Archani sit conscius atque minister 
Ille tui, regat affectus pectusque profundum 
Cernat inaccessum reliquis. Post tempore multo 
Lelius alter erit domui claroque nepoti 
Carus et eximio pariter coniunctus amore. 
Hinc olim multi errabunt, parque omnibus unum 
Lelius et Scipio celebrabitur inter amicos 
Quos tulit extrema veniens ab origine mundus, 
Cum duo sint paria et longo distantia tractu. 
Suscipe tu primum, nec, sic licet altus, amicum 
Despice plebleium, quoniam de plebe verendi 
Surrexere viri, quos nobilioribus equos 
Viva tulit Virtus animusque parentibus impar.26 
                                                                                                                                                            
the classical ideas and views of friendship that have been mentioned above, especially the Pythagorean 
emphasis on fidelity in friendship. 
 The numerous legendary tales telling the stories of the amazing friendship and unswerving loyalty of 
mythological heroes had indeed proved a much more effective method to transport moral 
philosophical ideas of friendship than the purely theoretical treatises on the subject. Of course, this was 
a way to present a certain view of the matter that already Homer (fl. 9th or 8th cent. BC) had employed 
in his portrayal of the friendship of Achilles and Patroclus in the Iliad, but it became particularly 
popular in Roman times, and later on also with the Christian writers of the Middle Ages and the 
humanistic authors of the Renaissance, both looking for suitable examples and classical authority to 
back up their own views of friendship. For this reason we still come across these classical heroes of 
friendship in the tales, plays, and poems of much later times, from the moralizing short stories of the 
Gesta Romanorum to such romanticizing ballads as Die Bürgschaft by Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). 
26 Francesco Petrarca, Africa 2.515-30. –  
"There is naught sweeter in the lot of man 
than intimate exchange of trust and faith 
with a true-hearted friend. And happily 
one such stands with you now, the firmest, he, 
of all your company. May Laelius share 
and counsel your most secret thoughts and guide 
your habits and be free to scrutinize 
your deepest mind, from other men concealed. 
Another Laelius after many years 
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There are, in fact, quite a number of friendship couples that classical literature provides 
as examples of perfect companions. Titus and Gysippus certainly belong to this circle 
as well as Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Pythias, and Scipio and Laelius. The stories 
of their friendships have of course been very popular at all times: long before the 
humanistic Renaissance, and also long after. A German emblem-book of the 
seventeenth century, for example, provides a list of such famous friends in which it ads 
to the above mentioned pairs also the following: Castor and Pollux, Alexander and 
Hephestion, Theseus and Pirithous, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Achilles and 
Patroclus, Aeneas and Achates, David and Jonathan, Nisus and Euyalus, and Lucan 
and Tullus.27 The reason why the stories of the companionships of these famous 
friends have always enjoyed such a great popularity is that they do not only provide 
ideal examples of the most perfect kind of friendship but that the representation of 
these friendships also serves a double didactic purpose. On the one hand, it illustrates 
the concept of vera amicitia, which might otherwise be considered too theoretical, and 
thereby helps the reader to visualize the author's idea of what a perfect friendship 
looks like. On the other hand, it provides a traditional and hence supposedly an 
authentic example of the existence of perfect friendship; it provides, as it were, a proof, 
an evidence that plausibly shows that true friendship is not only an ideal but that it can 
be put into practice, even if only by a very small number of outstanding men. It is 
therefore no surprise that references to these famous pairs of friends frequently occur 
in the friendship literature of all ages and particular in that of the Renaissance, the age 
that was so enthusiastic about the didactic value of literature. In fact, we can find 
references to the different pairs of friends not only in those writings of the time that 
deal with friendship extensively, but also in those that touch only lightly on the topic. 
In the Faerie Queene, for example, Spenser refers to some of these couples to illustrate 
the Platonic idea of the two different kinds of love. 
                                                                                                                                                            
shall by another scion of our house 
be cherished and deserve a special love. 
And men may err and blend the twain in one 
and speak of Laelius and Scipio 
as but one case of friendship and unique 
since time's beginning, though between the pairs 
like-named a lengthy space will intervene. 
Do you first claim your Laelius, nor allow 
your noble blood to shrink from one base-born, 
for many a worthy hero, made the peer 
of senators by active virtue and 
a spirit loftier than his state, has come 
from a plebeian stock." 
 Trans. Thomas G. Bergin and Alice S. Wilson, Petrarch's Africa, by Francesco Petrarca (New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1977) 40. 
27 P. Michaele Pexenfelder, "Vera Amicitia," Ethica Symbolica e Fabulorum umbris ecc. (München, 1675) 650, 
qtd. in Mab van Lohuizen-Mulder, Raphael's Images of Justice - Humanity - Friendship: A Mirror of Princes 
for Scipione Borghese, trans. Patricia Wardle (Wassenaar: Mirananda, 1977) 160-61n320. 
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In the Symposium, Plato has Socrates differentiate between two types of love: the 
'earthly love', i.e. the love of the body, mythologically symbolized by the young and 
beautiful Aphrodite, and the 'heavenly love', i.e. the love of the soul, of virtue, and of 
wisdom, symbolized by the old and wise Aphrodite.28 Following this Platonic 
distinction, Renaissance writers sometimes also related this notion to the idea of the 
two different sorts of friendship, i.e. of the ordinary friendship that is formed for 
reasons of utility or pleasure and the perfect friendship that exists for the sake of virtue 
and the well-being of one's friend. In these representations, true friends are regarded as 
lovers of the intellectual kind, as their love is directed exclusively towards each other's 
soul, whereas those who are primarily interested in their material, sensual, or carnal 
satisfaction are classified as lovers of the 'earthly' kind. This blending of the concepts of 
love and friendship is indeed typical of the literary representation of friendship by 
Renaissance Platonists or by writers who were influenced by their philosophical views. 
It is therefore no surprise that it also occurs in the Faerie Queene, namely in book 4, 
where Spenser explains that in contrast to the lovers (or friends) who are only 
interested in pleasure, there is 
                                                   another sort 
Of louers lincked in true harts consent; 
Which loued not as these, for like intent, 
But on chast vertue grounded their desire, 
Farre from all fraud, or fayned blandishment; 
Which in their spirits kindling zealous fire, 
Braue thoughts and noble deeds did euermore aspire. 
 
Such were great Hercules, and Hylas deare; 
Trew Ionathan, and Dauid trustie tryde; 
Stout Theseus, and Pirithous his feare; 
Pylades and Orestes by his syde; 
Myld Titus and Gesippus without pryde; 
Damon and Pythias whom death could not seuer: 
All these and all that euer had bene tyde 
In bands of friendship, there did liue for euer, 
Whose liues although decay'd, yet loues decayed neuer.29 
Among the numerous legendary tales of the amazing friendship and unswerving 
loyalty of these famous pairs of friends, there was indeed one that enjoyed a much 
greater popularity with the Renaissance writers than any of the others. This was the 
story of Damon and Pithias. The reason for its outstanding popularity was twofold: on 
the one hand, the story of the friendship between Damon and Pithias was of such an 
exemplary kind that its literary representation proved to be indeed a very effective 
means to transport the moral philosophical idea of perfect friendship; on the other 
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hand, their names were closely linked with the philosophical school of Pythagoras. 
This, of course, made the story even more suitable for a didactic representation of vera 
amicitia, since in the Renaissance, as already in classical times, Pythagoreans were 
regarded as the personification of perfect friendship.30 It is therefore not surprising that 
the classification of the friends as Pythagoreans was particularly stressed. In Elyot's 
Governour, for instance, the two friends are referred to as "Pitheas and Damon/two 
Pythagoriens/that is to say studentes of Pythagoras lerninge/beinge ioyned to gither 
                                                   
30 Unfortunately, none of Pythagoras' writings has survived, but from the works of later philosophers, 
and especially from the biographical accounts in Diogenes Laertius' Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers (8.1-50) and Iamblichus' Vita Pythagorica, we know that he considered friendship a 
fundamental necessity of human life. His conception of philia as a universal principle of being is 
probably best portrayed by Iamblichus: "Friendship of all with all, Pythagoras taught in the clearest 
manner: of gods with human beings through piety and scientific worship; of doctrines with one 
another, and generally, of the soul with the body, and of the rational part of the soul with all forms of 
the irrational through philosophy and contemplation in accord with this; of human beings with one 
another: of citizens through sound observance of law and of those of another race through correct 
inquiry into natural laws; of a husband with a wife or children, brothers and relatives, through an 
unperverted spirit of community; in short, friendship of all with all, and furthermore, with certain 
irrational animals through justice and natural union and affability; and friendship of the mortal body 
with itself, by reconciliation and conciliation of the opposite powers concealed in it, accomplished 
through health and a way of life conducive to this and temperance conducive to this, in imitation of the 
efficient functioning of the cosmic elements." – "Φιλ…αν δ διαφανšστατα π£ντων πρÕς ¤παντας 
ΠυθαγÒρας παρšδωκε, θεîν µν πρÕς ¢νθρèπους δι' εÙσεβε…ας καˆ ™πιστηµονικÁς θεραπε…ας, 
δογµ£των δ πρÕς ¥ληλλα καˆ καθÒλου ψυχÁς πρÕς σîµα λογιστικοà τε πρÕς τ¦ τοà ¢λÒγου ε‡δη δι¦ 
φιλοσοφ…ας καˆ τÁς κατ' αÙτ¾ν θεωρ…ας, ¢νθρèπων δ πρÕς ¢λλ»λους, πολιτîν µν δι¦ νοµιµÒτητος 
Øγιοàς, ˜τεροφÚλων δ δι¦ φυσιολογ…ας ÑρθÁς, ¢νδρÕς δ πρÕς γυνα‹κα À τšκνα À ¢δελφοÝς καˆ 
ο„κε…ους δι¦ κοινων…ας ¢διαστρÒφου, συλλ»βδην δ π£ντων πρÕς ¤παντας καˆ προσšτι τîν ¢λÒγων 
ζóων τιν¦ δι¦ δικαιοσÚνης καˆ φυσικÁς ™πιπλοκÁς καˆ κοινÒτητος, σèµατος δ καθ' ˜αυτÕ θνητοà 
τîν ™γκεκρυµµšνων αÙτù ™ναντ…ων δυν£µεων ε„ρ»νευσ…ν τε καˆ συµβιβασµÕν δι' Øγε…ας καˆ τÁς ε„ς 
ταÚτην δια…της κα… σωφροσÚνης κατ¦ µ…µησιν τÁς ™ν το‹ς κοσµικο‹ς στοιχε…οις εÙετηρ…ας." 
Iamblichus 33.229. – Trans. John Dillon and Jackson Hershbell, On the Pythagorean Way of Life, by 
Iamblichus (Atlanta: Scholars P, 1991). 227. 
 After having given this concise account of Pythagoras' theoretical view on friendship, Iamblichus also 
alludes to the dominant role it played for the Pythagoreans in the reality of their every day life, when 
he concludes: "For all these instances taken together, then, there is one and the same word, that of 
'friendship,' of which, by common consent, Pythagoras was the discoverer and legislator, and he taught 
such an admirable friendship to his friends, that even now many say of those who are unusually well-
disposed to one another that they belong to the Pythagoreans." – "™ν π©σι δ¾ τοÚτοις ˜νÕς καˆ τοà 
αÙτοà κατ¦ σÚλληψιν τοà τÁς φιλ…ας ÑνÒµατοςς Ôντος, εØρετ¾ς καˆ νοµοθšτης Ðµολογουµšνως 
ΠυθαγÒρας ™γšνετο, καˆ οÛτω θαυµαστ¾ν φιλ…αν παρšδωκε το‹ς χρωµšνοις, éστε œτι καˆ νàν τοÝς 
πολλοÝς λšγειν ™πˆ τîν σφοδρÒτερον εÙνοοÚντων ˜αυτο‹ς Óτι τîν Πυθαγορε…ων ε„σ…." Iamblichus 
33.230. – Trans. Dillon and Hershbell 227. 
 From the biographical accounts by Iamblichus (c. AD 250-330) and Diogenes Laertius (fl. 3rd cent. AD), 
we also know that Pythagoras divided his followers into two groups, according to their level of 
knowledge. The students belonging to the first group would stay at his academy at Croton like at a 
boarding school, living there together in a kind of religious brotherhood. These students he considered 
his true disciples and called them Pythagoreans (ΠυθαγÒρειο…/Pythagoreioi). Those of the second 
group, however, would only come to the lessons and meetings but would not stay at the school. These 
students he referred to as Pythagorists (Πυθαγοριστα…/ Pythagoristai). Contrary to the Pythagorists, 
who had apparently no other obligation than to regularly participate in the lessons, the Pythagoreans 
were obliged to spend all their time together as friends, abiding by the strict rules of true friendship 
according to Pythagoras' doctrine. This means that their communal live was not only based on the 
principles of equality, loyalty, trust, and mutual aid, but also on that of joint possessions. Cf. 
Iamblichus 18.80, 33.229-230, and 33.232; Diogenes Laertius 8.10; Hyatte 8; White 19; and Holger 
Thesleff, "Pythagoreanism," Encyclopædia Britannica Online.  25 May 2000  <http://search.eb.com/bol/ 
topic?xref=10758&pm=1>. 
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in a parfeite frendship […]"31 In contrast to the majority of classical philosophers who 
merely wrote about the topic of friendship, the Pythagoreans are known to have tried 
to live up to the high standards they set of friendship. Of course, this endeavour to put 
their ideas about what makes a perfect friendship into practice, also lent credibility to 
their theories and made the Pythagoreans become regarded as true authorities in the 
field of friendship philosophy. That their authority was still acknowledged by the 
Renaissance philosophers when they dealt with the topic of friendship, is shown by the 
following example from Giovanni Pico della Mirandola's Oratio de hominis dignitate: 
Tam blande vocati, tam benigniter invitati, alatis pedibus quasi terrestres 
Mercurii, in beatissimae amplexus matris evolantes, optata pace perfruemur; 
pace sanctissima, individua copula, unanimi amicitia, qua omnes animi in 
una mente, quae est super omnem mentem, non concordent adeo, sed 
ineffabili quodam modo unum penitus evadant. Haec est illa amicitia quam 
totius philosophiae finem esse Pythagorici dicunt, haec illa pax quam facit 
Deus in excelsis suis, quam angeli in terram descendentes annuntiarunt 
hominibus bonae voluntatis, ut per eam ipsi homines ascendentes in caelum 
angeli fierent; […].32 
The story of the friendship between Damon and Pithias was already extremely popular 
in ancient times, when it was regarded as a model of true friends' loyalty and 
willingness to self-sacrifice. The ancient writer were in fact so enthusiastic about the 
story that it can be found in quite a number of classical source, in various lengths and 
slightly differing versions. The core of the story, however, always remained the same: 
Damon and Pithias (var.: Pythias or Phintias) are two Pythagoreans, i.e. followers of 
the Pythagorean teaching, and, following this doctrine, are united in the most perfect 
friendship, sharing not only each other's thoughts, joys, and sorrows, but also all their 
possessions.33 They spend their time at the court of king Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, 
when, one day, one of the friends is accused of having conspired against the king. He is 
condemned to death but on request is granted a couple of day's grace to be able to 
settle his affairs before he has to die. As a security for his return, his friend agrees to be 
imprisoned and, in case his convicted friend should not return within the granted 
period of time, to be also executed in his stead. But when the day has come on which 
                                                   
31 Elyot 2.11, 144r. 
32 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, [Oratio] de hominis dignitate / [Rede] über die Würde des Menschen: 
Lateinisch-Deutsch, trans. N. Baumgarten, ed. A. Buck (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990) 20. – "When we have 
been so soothingly called, so kindly urged, we shall fly up with winged feet, like earthly Mercuries, to 
the embraces of our blessed mother and enjoy that wished-for peace, most holy peace, indivisible bond, 
of one accord in the friendship through which all rational souls not only shall come into harmony in the 
one mind which is above all minds but shall in some ineffable way become altogether one. This is that 
friendship which the Pythagoreans say is the end of all philosophy. This is that peace which God 
creates in his heavens, which the angels descending to earth proclaimed to men of good will, that 
through it men might ascend to heaven and become angels." Trans. Elizabeth Livermoore Forbes in 
Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall Jr., eds., The Renaissance Philosophy of 
Man: Petrarca, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Vives (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1948) 231-32. 
33 See 86. 
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the sentence is expected to be carried out, there is still no sign of the friend who has set 
out to arrange his personal affairs, and his friend prepares to be executed for him. Yet, 
to everyone's amazement, the missing friend returns and appears on the scene just in 
time to avert his friend's execution and to take the place on the scaffold that was 
intended for him in the first place. Amazed by this proof of the unswerving loyalty of 
the friends, of their trust in one another, and of their brave readiness to die for each 
other, the tyrant pardons the friends and full of admiration for their outstanding 
friendship even asks them to be allowed to join them in this friendship. 
This is basically the story as it appears in the writings of the classical authors, for 
instance in Cicero's treatise De finibus bonorum et malorum and in his Tusculanae 
disputationes, although he mentions them here only briefly and without any reference 
to the names of the friends.34 However, he deals with the story in more detail in his 
work De officiis.35 Another version is to be found in Plutarch's essay "De amicorum 
multitudine" in his Moralia, and Hyginus presents the story as one of his fables, in 
which the friends appear under the names of Moerus and Selinuntius.36 Finally, a very 
detailed version of the story is provided by Iamblichus in his biography De vita 
Pythagorica.37 This version is based on the treatment of the theme by Aristoxenus, who 
claims to have heard the story told by Dionysius himself.38  
Since ancient times, the tale has been frequently presented or referred to in various 
literary treatments on friendship. In the medieval Gesta Romanorum, for example, it 
appears in an altered version in the story "De promissionis fideli constantia."39 Here, 
however, the friends are not honourable noblemen but ordinary thieves, of which the 
one is not condemned by a king but by a judge, who in the end does not even want to 
be admitted into the friendship of the two. In 1476, when Caxton published The Game 
and Play of the Chess Moralized as one of his first books, he also included a version of the 
Damon and Pythias story, but the way in which he presents the tale, makes it with him 
still a typical example of the chivalric conception of friendship.40 In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, the story then appears in quite a number of writings. Besides the 
mention of it in Elyot's Governour, we can also find it as the topic of a French play by 
Samuel Chappuzeau (1625-1701), his Damon et Pythias (later on reprinted as Les Parfaits 
Amis, ou le Triomphe de l'Amour et de l'Amitié), first acted in 1656.41 And when in 1655 
                                                   
34 See Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum 2.79 and Tusculanae disputationes 5.22.63. 
35 See Cicero, De officiis 3.10.45. 
36 See Plutarch, Moralia 2.4.; and Hyginus, Fabulae fab. 257. 
37 See Iamblichus 33.234-36. 
38 See Iamblichus 33.233. 
39 See Gesta Romanorum, chap. 108. 
40 Cf. Mills, 82-83. In 1476, William Caxton founded the first English press in London, in the same year in 
which The Game and Play of the Chess Moralized was published. 
41 Cf. Mills 416n99. 
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William Painter (c. 1540-94) published his Palace of Pleasure, a collection of some 60 tales 
of classical origin, it also contained a narrative that was almost entirely based on the 
story of Damon and Pithias.42 The story was indeed so popular, that it still occurred as 
the topic of a lengthy poem by Friedrich Schiller in the late eighteenth century.43 
One of the most extensive representations of the tale was though presented in the 
sixteenth century, namely by Richard Edwards (1523-66) in his didactic play Damon 
and Pithias (1561), which Martin L. Kornbluth describes as "virtually a pure 
dramatization of the classical concept of friendship."44 In fact, the whole play is entirely 
about the exemplary friendship between these two classical heroes and is presented for 
the sole reason to illustrate the advantages of such a friendship and to show what dis-
advantages might result from the lack of it. As the play was thus written purely for 
didactic purposes, Edwards had yet to alter some few details of the original story. The 
main difference between most representations of the tale and that of Edwards is that 
with him the friend who is convicted and condemned to death, is not accused of 
having committed an act of treason or of having conspired against the king, but is 
found guilty of espionage.45 This, of course, also means that the friends cannot belong 
to the court of king Dionysius but have to be citizens of another country who are 
merely visiting the tyrant's court. These alterations were certainly made to avoid any 
doubt of the friends' virtuousness, as even in case the accusation had been just, it 
would have been far more honourable to commit espionage for one's own country than 
to betray it, or to conspire against one's own sovereign. 
Another major deviation from all other versions of the story occurs at the end of 
Edwards's play, when the king requests to be admitted to the friendship of the two 
loyal friends. In fact, the story usually ends without mentioning whether they agree or 
not, and in the few versions in which their decision is stated, as in that of Iamblichus, 
for instance, the request is explicitly rejected.46 In Edwards's play, however, the friends 
agree and accept the king into their companionship. This was of course a much more 
effective end as far as its didactic effect on the audience is concerned, since it allows 
them to believe that everyone—even a former tyrant—can have or enter into such a 
perfect friendship when he decides to becomes virtuous. 
Now, the last aspect in that Edwards's story differs from the versions in other 
sources, has nothing to do with the didactic purpose of the play, but rather with the 
necessities of its form. In most versions, the names of the characters are in fact 
                                                   
42 Cf. Mills 172f. 
43 See Friedrich Schiller, Die Bürgschaft. 
44 Martin L. Kornbluth, "The Degeneration of the Classical Friendship in Elizabethan Drama," Costerus: 
Essays in English and American Language and Literature 1 (1972): 161. 
45 In Iamblichus' version, the friend is even falsely accused by Dionysius himself, who thereby wants to 
test the loyalty of the friends. See Iamblichus 33.233. 
46 See, for example, Iamblichus 33.236. 
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mentioned at the beginning but not any more within the story itself, so that there is no 
indication of which of the friends is accused of the crime and which is to be imprisoned 
in his stead. This is, for example, the case in Cicero's description of the tale in his 
treatise De officiis. Although this work is assumed to be the source from which 
Edwards adopted the story when he wrote his play, he, of course, had to determine 
and name the friend who is to be accused. Yet, his choice is again very peculiar, as in 
the classical versions that mention the names of the friends, it is Pithias who is 
condemned to death and not Damon, as in Edwards's play. 
From the very beginning of the play, Edwards leaves no doubt that in presenting 
the story, he solely pursues an educational end. Already in the prologue, he puts much 
emphasis on the fact that his play is not about a purely hypothetical moral 
philosophical ideal of friendship, but about a friendship that has once really existed: 
Which here wee shall present is this: Damon and Pithias, 
A rare ensample of Frendship true, it is no Legend lie, 
But a thinge once donne in deede as Hystories doo discrie, 
Which doone of yore in longe time past, yet present shalbe here, 
Even as it were in dooynge now, so lively it shall appeare."47 
With this last line, Edwards makes clear in no uncertain terms, that he considers 
perfect friendship a phenomenon of the past, which is in his time no longer to be 
found. Instead, he explains in the following, he can only make out flattery and false 
friendliness, which, by his contemporaries, seem to be regarded as the only qualities of 
friendship. It is clear that his criticism is directed against the common attitude towards 
friendship in general and against the customs at court in particular. However, he could 
of course hardly accuse Elisabeth's courtiers openly of flattery and falseness, and so he 
does not hesitate to placate his audience by declaring that the abuse of friendship is 
naturally not taking place at England's court, nor at any other but that of the one 
presented: "Wherein talkyng of Courtly toyes, wee doo protest this flat, / Wee talke of 
Dionisius Courte, wee meane no Court but that […]."48 This declaration might have 
preserved him from a longer stay at the Tower, but it can hardly disguise his real 
opinion about the situation in the second half of the seventeenth century—a situation 
that even caused him to write this didactic play on true friendship. 
Instead of beginning his play with the introduction of Damon an Pithias and their 
companionship, and thus with the perfect example of true friendship, Edwards starts 
with the representation of what he has criticized in the prologue as the ordinary and 
most commonly spread kind of relationship: the court friendship that is merely formed 
for reasons of utility. He illustrates the nature of this kind of friendship by having the 
villain of the play, the flatterer Carisophus, try to make friends with the nobler courtier 
                                                   
47 Richard Edwards, Richard Edwards' Damon and Pithias: A Critical Old-Spelling Edition, ed. D. Jerry 
White (New York: Garland, 1980) 20, ll. 29-34. 
48 Edwards 20, ll. 39-40. 
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Aristippus, a "pleasant Gentilman" as he is called in the list of Dramatis Personae, in 
the hope of personal gain and advantage: 
Yet now I crave your friendship, which if I may attayne, 
Most sure and unfained frindship I promyse you againe: 
So we two linckt in frindshippe brother and brother, 
Full well in the Courte may helpe one another.49 
And after Aristippus has pretended to accept the offer to become his friend, 
Carisophus adds: 
Sith we are now so friendly joyned, it seemeth to mee, 
That one of us helpe eche other in every degree, 
Prefer you my cause when you are in presence, 
To further your matters to the Kinge let me alone in your absence.50 
From this depiction of what he thinks their friendship is going to be like, it becomes 
absolutely clear, what conception of friendship Carisophus has and that his only 
interest is in the advantage he could take of the relation. That his motives are purely 
egoistic is even explicitly stressed by him a bit later in the play, when he reveals his 
true intention in an aside: "I wyll use his friendship to myne owne commodytie […]"51 
Most striking about the notion of friendship that Carisophus here presents, is that 
he still uses the image of two brothers who help each other in times of need to illustrate 
his idea of the duty of friends, and thus returns to the vocabulary of the Christian and 
chivalric friendship conceptions of medieval times. In fact, the notion of the utility 
friendship Carisophus here presents does resemble the chivalric conception of 
companionship in a way, even though, of course, it lacks the aspect of virtuousness 
and hence the major characteristic of friendship in the medieval view of it. This aspect, 
however, is exactly what the whole story of Damon and Pithias is about. Now, that 
Edwards has here used the image of the friends as brothers to remind his audience of 
the stress that was put on the utility of friendship in the feudal-chivalric conception of 
it is though very unlikely, as he also makes use of this image when he talks about the 
friendship between Damon and Pithias. It is therefore very reasonable to assume that 
the use of the image of brothers when referring to friends was still very common in 
Edwards's time. 
Of course, Carisophus' motivation for making friends with others is so obvious that 
also Aristippus knows that it is anything but the virtuous one of a high-minded 
character. Yet, Aristippus has nevertheless pretended to accept his offer of friendship. 
After Carisophus has left the scene, however, he denies that there could ever be a real 
friendship between the two and reveals his true opinion about the false friend before 
                                                   
49 Edwards 24, ll. 69-72. 
50 Edwards 25, ll. 86-89. 
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he finally explains why he made him believe that he would willingly make friends 
with him: 
Is Aristippus linckt in Friendship with Carisophus? 
Quid cum tanto Asino, talis Philosophus [What has such a philosopher in 
 common with such an ass]? 
They say, Morum similitudo consuit amicitias [Likeness of characters cements 
 friendships]. 
Then, how can this Friendship betwene us two come to passe? 
We are as like in condicions, as Jacke Fletcher and his Bowlt, 
I brought up in learnyng, but he is a very dolt.52 
So, Aristippus here at first explains that there cannot be a true friendship between the 
two for they were too different in their characters. That his conception of true 
friendship, in contrast to Carisophus' rather medieval notions, is modelled on the 
classical ideas, is not only skilfully illustrated by the insertion of Latin expressions, but 
becomes explicitly clear by the reference to the classical commonplace that true and 
perfect friendship can only exist between equals. When he now goes into detail about 
Carisophus' character, this serves not only to show the difference between the two but 
also to introduce Carisophus as the villain of the play, and thus to point towards the 
role he will play in the further development of the plot (namely that he will falsely 
accuse Damon of espionage, and will hence be responsible for his condemnation): 
A Villaine for his life, a Varlet died in Graine, 
You lose Money by him if you sel him for one knave, 
for he serves for twaine: 
A flatteryng Parasite, a Sicophant also, 
A commen accuser of men: to the good, an open Foe, 
Of halfe a worde, he can make a Legend of lies, / 
Which he wyll advouch with such tragicall cryes, 
As though all were true that comes out of his mouth, 
Where in dede to be hanged by and by, 
He cannot tell one tale but twyse he must lie, 
He spareth no mans life to get the kinges favour, 
In which kind of servis he hath got such a savour […].53 
With this characterization, Aristippus perfectly foreshadows Carisophus' role in the 
play. But the function of this passage is not only to prepare the audience for the further 
development of the plot, but also to present the image of a certain type of courtier, of 
whom honourable courtiers should be wary and against whose intrigues they should 
take precautions. When Aristippus now explains why he has pretended to make 
friends with Carisophus, this does hence first of all serve a didactic rather than a 
dramatic purpose: 
                                                   
52 Edwards 26, ll. 100-105. Trans. Joseph Quincy Adams, Chief Pre-Shakespearean Dramas (Cambridge: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1924), qtd. by White in Edwards 140. 
53 Edwards 26, ll. 108-118. 
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That he [Carisophus] wyll never leave, me thinke then that I, 
Have done very wisely to joyne in friendship with him, lest perhaps I 
Comming in his way might be nipt, for such knaves in presence, 
We see oft times put honest men to silence: 
Yet I have played with his beard in knitting this knot, 
I promist frendship, but you love few words: I spake it, but I ment it not.54 
Pretending to make friends with flatterers and villains, not in the hope of personal gain 
but to take precautions against their intrigues, is here presented as a just method to 
protect oneself against those whose revenge one had to fear when their offer of 
friendship was rejected. This cunning diplomatic tactic, which in fact dominated the 
reality of many common friendships (or worldly friendships, as Edwards calls them), 
has of course nothing to do with the idea of perfect friendship Edwards really wants to 
propagate with his play. Yet, to do so, he has to illustrate at first the kind of friendship 
he seeks to criticise and the situation in which it usually occurs in practice. He does so 
not only by presenting Carisophus' attempt to make friends with Aristippus but also 
by having Carisophus' servant Jacke—one of the impartial characters who are not 
involved in any true or false friendships at all—refer to the fact that the false kind of 
friendship is indeed often to be found in reality, and especially in the reality of court 
live: 
[…] I have heard say, there is falshod in felowshippe, 
In the Court somtimes, one geves another finely the slippe: 
Which when it is spied, it is laught out with a scoffe, 
And with sporting and playing, quietly shaken of.55 
This negative representation of court relations is indeed an important didactic means, 
as it emphasises the contrast between these false friendships and the perfect one of 
Damon and Pithias. Thus, Edwards has much later in the play, again a very similar 
account of the friendship situation at court given by another minor character, the 
collier Grimme, who, in a typical groundling scene, declares: 
Friendship is dead in Courte, Hipocrisie doth raigne, 
Who is in favour now, to morow is out agayne: 
The state is so uncertaine, that I by my wyll, 
Will never be courtier, but a Colier styll.56 
Edwards leaves no doubt that he condemns the false kind of friendship, but he 
nevertheless has to accept its existence and an honourable man's necessity to be now 
and then engaged in it if he does not want to expose himself to danger. Edwards 
certainly considers it not very honourable to join in such friendships, but he also 
considers it not very wise not to do it, when it is appropriate to the situation. However, 
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he still makes absolutely clear that these should only be regarded as inferior 
friendships and that the value of a true and perfect friendship is far beyond the one of 
such ordinary relations, when he has Aristippus conclude his explanation by 
addressing the audience with the words: 
Who markes this friendship betwene us two, 
Shal jude of the worldly friendship without any more a doo, 
It may be a ryght Patron therof, but true friendship in deede, 
Of nought but of vertue, doth truly proseed […].57 
Having thus prepared the ground for his discussion of true friendship, Edwards begins 
his representation of the friendship between Damon and Pithias not by introducing 
any of the two directly but by having them introduced by their servant Stephano. This, 
in fact, is a very skilful way to do it, as it fulfils a double purpose. On the one hand, it 
gives special emphasis to the nobility of the friends, as truly virtuous men would never 
boast about the perfect friendship that exists between them to impress others; on the 
other hand, it lends much more credence to the description of their friendship when it 
is not given by the friends themselves, as they could of course merely pretend to have 
such a friendship, just as the friends in a false one use to do. The characterization of 
their relationship is therefore better be given by a third person, and who would be 
more suited to do this than the one who knows them best, as he spends most of his 
time with them: their servant. Introducing himself, Stephano immediately comes to 
speak about the extraordinary friendship that exists between his two masters: 
A bondman I am so nature hath wrought me, 
One Damon of Greece, a gentleman bought me: / 
To him I stand bond, yet serve I another, 
Whom Damon my Master loves, as his owne brother: 
A Gentleman too, and Pithias he is named, 
Fraught with Vertue, whom vice never defamed: 
These two, since at Schoole they fell acquainted, 
In mutual friendship, at no time have fainted: 
But loved so kindly, and friendly eche other, 
As thoughe they were Brothers by Father and Mother: 
Pithagoras learnynge, these two have embrased, 
Which bothe are in vertue so narrowly laced, 
That all their whole dooynges do fall to this issue 
To have no respect, but onely to vertue: 
All one in effecte, all one in their goynge, 
All one in their study, all one in their doyng: 
These Gentlemen both, beyng of one condicion, 
Both alike of my service have all the fruition: 
Pithias is joyfull, if Damon be pleased: 
Yf Pithias be served, then Damon is eased: 
Serve one, serve both: so neare, who would win them? 
I thinke they have but one hart betwene them.58 
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Except for the rather medieval image of the friends as brothers, which must have still 
been so closely connected with people's notion of true friendship in Edwards's time 
that Stephano refers to it even twice, the way in which he describes the friendship 
between his two masters is purely classical. Particular stress is here put on the fact that 
their friendship is based on their virtuousness, and that they are so similar to each 
other in their actions and thoughts that it almost seems as if they were one person. 
Stephano even refers to the image of the single soul that is dwelling in two bodies, 
although with him the soul is represented by a single heart that the friends seem to 
share. The idea that the friends are almost like one person is furthermore stressed by 
the fact that they are accompanied by only one servant, just as if they were really 
merely one person, since every nobleman had usually his own. That Stephano serves 
both men, also emphasizes the idea that the friends share all their possessions with 
each other—an idea that is also supported by his description of the friends as 
Pythagoreans, who were known to hold all their belongings in common. 
By having a third party commented on the friends, Edwards has thus made clear 
that there is indeed a perfect friendship between them, one that really exists and is not 
only pretended. Now he can also let the friends speak for themselves. He does so by 
having them ensure each other of their friendship in the most classical terms and by 
making use of nearly all of the typical commonplaces, like that of the friend as another 
self, for example, which he has Pithias here begin with: 
My Damon, of this thyng, there needes no proofe to mee, / 
The Gods forbyd, but that Pithias with Damon in al things shuld agree. 
For why is it said: Amicus alter ipse [A friend is another self], 
But that true friendes should be two in body, but one in minde, 
As it were one transformed into another? whiche against kynde 
Though it seeme: yet in good faith, when I am alone, 
I forget I am Pithias, me thinke I am Damon."59 
Now Damon continues by highlighting the characteristics on which their friendship is 
based, by particularly stressing its deep rootedness in virtue, and thus by differ-
entiating it from the false friendships that commonly exist: 
                                   […] thrise happy are wee, 
Whom true love hath joyned in perfect Amytie: 
Which amytie first sprong, without vaunting be it spoken, that is true, 
Of likelines of maners, tooke roote by company, and now is conserved by 
 vertue, 
Which vertue alwaies through worldly things do not frame 
Yet doth she atchive to her followers immortall fame: 
Wherof if men were carefull, for Vertues sake onely 
They would honour friendship, and not for commoditie: 
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But suche as for profite in friendship do lincke, 
When stormes come, they slide away sooner then a man wyll thinke: 
My Pithias, the somme of my talke falles to this issue, 
To proove no friendship is sure, but that which is grounded on vertue.60 
Damon is here summing up the classical conception: Friendship is based on the mutual 
affection of the friends for each other and on their similarity in character and manners. 
It is strengthened by the time the friends spend together and finally becomes perfect 
and lasting due to their virtuousness. But Damon's account of their friendship is more 
than merely a recapitulation of the classical commonplaces. It supports the main 
message of the play, Edwards's intention to show not only how reprehensible the false 
kind of friendship is, but also how stupid it is to make friends only for reasons of 
utility and advantage. In contrast to Aristippus, who has already blamed this sort of 
friendship for its lack of virtue, Damon now adds a very convincing argument against 
the formation of friendships in the hope of personal gain and security to his criticism. 
He hints at the fact that the situation in which a true friendship proves to be most 
useful, is in times of need, when one friend can rely on the help of the other. This, 
however, only happens when both friends are bound to each other by means of virtue. 
In friendships that are not based on virtue, the friends would of course immediately 
abandon each other as soon as one of them is getting into any kind of trouble, since 
both friends' aim is merely to obtain help, not to provide it. Hence, there is indeed no 
sense in making friends purely for selfish reasons, as one could not look to such friends 
for help when help is most urgently needed. 
However, there are of course also those whose interest is not so much in obtaining 
help from their friends in times of need, as they do everything not to get into 
unpleasant circumstances in the first place. They would even rather betray a friend to 
avoid trouble or critical situations than to expect his help afterwards. The model of 
such a man is Carisophus, as we have already learned from Aristippus description of 
him. He is ruthlessly ambitious, egocentric, and always only feathering his own nest. 
He is a person with no scruples who will stop at nothing to attain his objectives; he 
would not even shrink from scheming against others, from slander, or from crime. He 
reveals his true character in a kind of revelation soliloquy, just as it is later also to be 
found in Shakespeare's plays Othello and Richard III, for example, in which Jago and 
Richard deliver a speech very similar to that of Carisophus: 
He is a foole that for his profit will not take payne: 
Though it be joyned with other mens hurt, I care not at all, 
For profit I wyll accuse any man, hap what shall.61 
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And a bit later, he even confesses: "I care not who fall, so that I may ryse."62 This last 
statement is in fact not merely a perfect characterization of Carisophus' personality but 
also a clear prediction of what is now to come. The one who has to fall that he may rise 
is namely Damon, who is accused by him of espionage in order to win the king's 
favour. Carisophus does in fact not hesitate to sacrifice a stranger, so that he is 
honoured for his concern for the king's interests and security. With no further ado, the 
tyrant condemns Damon to death but on request grants him a couple of day's grace to 
be able to sail home to settle his affairs before he has to die. As a security for his return, 
Pithias agrees to be imprisoned and, in case his convicted friend should not return 
within the granted period of time, to be also executed in his stead. Pithias' willingness 
not only to serve as a hostage for his friend, but also to die for him if necessary, clearly 
corresponds with the classical conception of true friendship as we can find it in 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, for instance.63 And that Pithias is not only ready to take 
the risk of being executed but even prefers to die in his friend's stead is again purely 
classical. For Edwards, this readiness to die for one's friend is the most important 
characteristic of true friendship, as to give one's own life for a friend is indeed the 
supreme sacrifice a man can make. It is, of course, also this readiness to make the 
supreme sacrifice to save a friend's life that is in sharp contrast to the attitude towards 
any kind of sacrifice or help that characterizes the majority of ordinary or even false 
friendships. It is hence not surprising that Edwards places special emphasis on this 
point: 
The kinge hath sworne that Pithias should die, 
Whereof Pithias hath intelligence very secretly, 
Wishing that Damon may not returne, tyll he have payde 
His lyfe for his friend: hath it ben heare to fore ever sayde, 
That any man for his friend would die so wyllyngly? 
O noble friendship, O perfect amitie, 
Thy force is heare seene, and that very perfectlie.64 
It is, in fact, exactly this willingness to die for one another that causes one of the few 
quarrels between the friends. When the day of the execution has come, Damon is not 
yet back and everyone expects to see Pithias being executed in his stead. The faithful 
friend is then already on the scaffold when suddenly Damon appears, just in time to 
avert his friend's execution and to take the place on the scaffold that was intended for 
him in the first place—or so he thinks. What now follows, is a lengthy discussion about 
whether Damon was still in time and should therefore be executed or whether he 
arrived too late so that Pithias has to die in his stead. Both friends are in fact so eager to 
die for each other that none of them would give in.65 In the end, this almost 
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unconsciously funny discussion of who has the right to die for his friend, miraculously 
causes a change of the king's character and of his opinion of the friendship between the 
two Pythagoreans. Cleansed of all evil thoughts, the tyrant suddenly recognizes the 
friendship that he has not long before described as a "straunge thinge" and "mad kind 
of amitie," as the noble and rare kind of friendship that it is.66 He grants the friends a 
pardon and is in fact so fascinated by their loyalty to one another that he even wants to 
participate in their friendship. In contrast to most other versions of the story, Edwards 
sees indeed no reason why this request should be rejected, and has Damon therefore 
reply: "For my part, most noble king, as a third frind, welcom to our friendly societie, / 
But you must forget you ar a king, for frindship stands in tru equalitie."67 
In fact, only this last hint at the friends' equality as a necessary precondition of their 
friendship reveals the inconsequence of Edwards's decision to let a king join the 
friendship of ordinary subjects—at least when seen in regard to the classical 
conceptions on which the rest of his representation of friendship is based. From the 
classical viewpoint, as presented by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, for example, it 
is impossible that a king could make friends with individual subjects as he can only 
have a friendship with his subjects as a whole.68 And even though Damon and Pithias 
are foreigners in Syracuse, and thus in fact not real subjects of Dionysius, the difference 
between a king and ordinary noblemen is still so great that it is unlikely that the 
classics would have thought a friendship between them possible. But Edwards is here 
not so much interested in classical state theory than in presenting his view of the 
perfect kind of friendship that is based on virtuousness—and virtuousness is a quality 
that certainly also becomes kings (and queens). So, at the end of his play, by 
recapitulating the advantages of true and faithful friendship, Edwards even 
encourages his queen, Elisabeth I, to follow the example of Dionysius and to make 
friends with as many good and loyal men as she could find: 
The strongest garde that Kynges can have, 
Are constant friends their state to save: 
True friendes are constant, both in word and deede, 
True friendes are present, and help at each neede: 
True friends talke truly, they glose for no gayne, 
When treasure consumeth, true frindes wyll remayne, 
True frindes for their tru Prince, refuseth not their death: 
The Lorde graunt her such frindes most noble Queene Elizabeth.69 
Interestingly enough, Edwards's play, in contrast to the classical versions of the story, 
does not end with the release of the friends and the king's request to participate in their 
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friendship, as it has not yet completely fulfilled its didactic purpose. Edwards has now 
to bring also the subplot of the play to an end by showing what happens to the villain 
Carisophus and his false friendship with Aristippus. After the tyrant's character has 
changed, he recognizes Carisophus' evil ambitions and the flatterer who has accused 
the king's new friends, now falls from grace. With the example of Carisophus' false 
friendship with Aristippus, Edwards is now able to show that such a friendship has 
necessarily to come to an abrupt end when either the reason for which the relation was 
formed is suddenly of no further relevance to one of the friends (i.e. when one them 
considers their friendship no longer of any use for him), or when one of the friends 
suddenly gets into trouble and asks for the other's help, which is then of course 
refused. This is exactly what happens in the case of Carisophus and Aristippus' 
pretended friendship, which the first has merely initiated for reasons of utility and the 
latter only entered into for reasons of security. When king Dionysius begins to doubt 
about Carisophus' honesty and the honourableness of his intentions when he accused 
Damon, the villainous flatterer suddenly finds himself in danger of falling from the 
king's grace and asks Aristippus for help. Aristippus, however, now free from all fear 
that the villain could bring him into discredit and denounce him to Dionysius 
anymore, does of course not see any reason why he should put in a good word for him 
with the king. Now the time has come for Aristippus to tell Carisophus what he really 
thinks about him, that he has only pretended to enter into the friendship with him, that 
there could be no friendship between them anyway, as they are too different in 
character, and that he is not willing to take any measures to help him: 
What a Devell then ment Carisophus, 
To joyne in frindship with fine Aristippus? 
In whom is as much vertue, trueth and honestie, 
As there are true fethers in the three Craines of the ventrie: 
Yet these fethers have the shadow of lively feathers the truth to scan, 
But Carisophus hath not the shadowe of an honest man 
To be playne, because I know thy villany 
In abusing Dionisius, to many mens injury, 
Under the cloke of frindship, I playd with his head, 
And sought meanes how thou with thine owne fancy might be lead: 
My frindship thou soughtest for thine owne commoditie, 
As worldly men doo by profite measuring amitie: 
Which I perceaving, to the lyke my selfe I framed, 
Wherein I know of the wise I shall not be blamed: 
If you aske me Quare [Why]? I answere, Quia prudentis est multum dis
 simulare [Because it is the part of a wise man to dissemble much]. 
To speake more playner, as the proverbe doth go, 
In faith Carisophus, Cum cretense cretiso [With the Cretan I lie]: 
Yet a perfect frinde I shew my selfe to thee in one thing, 
I doo not dessemble, now I say I wyll not speake for thee to the King, 
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Therefore sinke in thy sorrow, I doo not deceave thee, 
A false knave I found thee, a false knave I leave thee.70 
Here Edwards tries to illustrate the nature of the false friendship between Aristippus 
and Carisophus—certainly also in order to contrast it with the ideal friendship of 
Damon and Pithias. He wants to show that such friendships do not only exist between 
vicious characters but that also actually good men like Aristippus could sometimes get 
into a situation in which they are forced, or in which they are at least well advised to 
pretend to agree to enter into the friendship with a villain, as the rejection of such an 
offer of friendship might turn out to be to their own disadvantage. This is exactly what 
Aristippus did and now he tries to justify his doing. A wise man, he claims, will 
sometimes have to disguise his true intentions not to deceive innocent people but to 
protect himself from harm. Now, it is precisely this difference in the motivation to 
make friends that distinguishes the villain from the wise man. A villain would always 
deceive others in the hope of personal gain, or simply to do them harm. The wise man, 
however, only disguises his true intentions to protect himself. It is, of course, only in 
this latter case that joining a false friendship is acceptable. The inclusion of these 
pragmatic considerations in his treatment of friendship makes Edwards's play so 
remarkable. There is no doubt that he considers the false kind of friendship bad, no 
matter for what reason it was formed or entered into; yet, he can still muster up 
enough understanding for those who participate in such friendships for reasons of self-
protection not to condemn their behaviour. As he has Aristippus put it, these men are 
of course not truly virtuous, but they are at least not as evil and ignominious as the 
flatterers who deceive others only for reasons of utility and personal gain. So, Edwards 
is not the severe critic who rejects the ordinary people's wish for security as pure 
opportunism and who only accepts the truly honourable behaviour of those who 
remain steadfast to the principles of virtue. His representation of friendship is in fact 
not simply the naïve glorification of vera amicitia; it is also a realistic account of the way 
in which friendship manifests itself in the everyday reality of most ordinary men. In 
the very last line of the play, Edwards even admits hat the ideal kind of friendship is 
"so rare, that scarce foure couple of faithfull frends have ben since the world began."71 
The doubt as to whether the ideal of perfect friendship is truly realizable, is therefore 
already indirectly included in Edwards's play. Of course, to evoke this doubt was 
certainly not his intention, but even Edwards cannot still present a plausible image of 
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perfect friendship without hinting at the difficulties the realization of this classical 
ideal would make—especially at his own time. In the course of the Renaissance, this 
doubt as to whether the ideal is translatable into practice at all will indeed turn into the 
certainty that it is not, and at the end of the age the disappointment and frustration 
about this certitude finds expression in the harsh criticism of the idealization of 
friendship and the rejection of the idea of vera amicitia in the plays of writers like Ben 
Jonson (1572-1637) or Francis Beaumont (1584-1616) and John Fletcher (1579-1625). 
After Aristippus has thus broken off his relation with Carisophus, the abandoned 
villain in fact at first complains about being deceived, but then realizes that he could 
hardly expect any help from a friend with whom he had only a false friendship, which 
he himself merely initiated in the hope of personal gain in the first place. And so, 
Edwards has Carisophus utter the play's message for all the villains who make friends 
for reasons of utility, that they might watch out not to be deceived by those they intend 
to deceive themselves, for that they do not fall into the pit they have dug themselves: 
[…] is this frindship to leave his friend in the plaine fielde? 
Well I see now, I my selfe have beguylde, 
In matching with that false fox in amitie, 
Which hath me used to his owne commoditie. 
Which seeing me in distresse, unfainedly goes his wayes, 
Loe this is the perfect frindship among men now a daies: 
Which kinde of frindship toward him I used secretly: 
And he with me the like, hath requited me craftly. 
It is the Gods judgement, I see it playnely, 
For all the world may know, Incide in foveam quam feci. [I have fallen into a 
 pit which I myself digged.]72 
Finally, in a concluding monologue, Edwards has Eubulus, the king's wise adviser, 
recapitulate in a few lines the ideal of true friendship that was presented in the play—
as the quintessence, as it were, that the audience might take out of it. The image he 
draws herein of perfect friendship is almost identical with the one Stephano has drawn 
when he introduced his masters at the beginning of the play. Now, however, Eubulus 
is not referring to the specific friendship between Damon and Pithias anymore, but to 
the abstract concept of true and virtuous friendship as such: 
One loveth another now for vertue, not for gayne, 
Where Vertue doth not knit the knot, there Friendship cannot raigne, 
Without the whiche, no house, no land, ne kingdome can endure, 
As necessarie for mans lyfe, as Water, Ayre, and Fier, 
Which frameth the minde of man, all honest thinges to doo, 
Unhonest thinges Friendshippe ne craveth, ne yet consents thertoo, 
In wealth a double joye, in woe a present stay, 
A sweete compagnion in eche state true Friendship is alway: 
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A sure defence for Kinges, a perfecte trustie bande, 
A force to assayle, a Shield to defende the enemies cruel hande, 
A rare, and yet the greatest Gifte, that God can geve to man.73 
Here Eubulus sums up the classical ideas of friendship and even includes a reference 
to the advantage of which true friendship might be for the state and its leader or 
leaders. Most remarkable, however, is his final statement, in which he presents the 
Christian idea of friendship as a gift given to man by God. This might reveal the 
influence that the Christian view of the matter still has on the humanistic approach to a 
reassessment of the classical notions of friendship. 
Edwards's play does certainly not belong to the masterpieces of Elizabethan drama 
and hence remains in obscurity with most modern readers. Despite its subplot, the 
representation of friendship in the play is rather one-dimensional and too obviously 
following the classical sources to deal with the subject subtly enough or in a way that 
suits a dramatic treatment of the theme. There are problems frequently occurring with 
the maintenance of the metre, as Edwards wants to keep up the very simple rhyme 
scheme abab throughout the whole play. And there are not only technical but also 
logical flaws in it. Edwards puts, for example, some of the Latin proverbs into the 
mouths of servants and other certainly not that well educated characters, while his 
own knowledge about classical mythology proves to be rather sketchy. The major flaw 
in the play, however, is the choice of the reason for which Damon is accused and 
condemned. To have him charged with conspiracy or treason, as in the classical 
sources, is of course only possible when the friends were already courtiers at 
Dionysius' court and had lived there for a longer period of time. As Edwards chooses 
to make them foreigners to Dionysius' court, however, the only logical reason for 
which he could have Damon be accused of is espionage—so far, so good. Now, 
however, it does not make sense to let him sail home to settle his affairs anymore, as 
nobody would let a spy return home, for he would naturally tell his people about what 
he has found out about the enemy. This, of course, makes Edwards's version become 
quite implausible. 
Despite these deficiencies, however, it is precisely the simplicity and straightness of 
the way in which Edwards presents the image of true friendship in his play that makes 
it so typical an example of the literary treatments of the classical ideal in the 
Renaissance. Furthermore, however,—and this is very untypical of such treatments—
he also refers to one of the two major conflicts that the ideal of friendship has to face in 
the course of the age and that in the end will lead to its debasement: the conflict 
between the idealization and the realization of the classical ideas. (The other one is the 
conflict between the concept of friendship and that of love, to which we will come in 
section 4.2) But Edwards's drama is not primarily intended as a discussion of this 
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conflict, but as a didactic play acted by schoolboys to illustrate the advantages of true 
and faithful friendship by means of giving account of the ideal amity between Damon 
and Pithias, who are, as Kornbluth puts it, "about the only pair of friends in an English 
drama who embody so completely the Ciceronian precepts—they live De Amicitia."74 
So, with his play, Edwards certainly did not want to give the impression that perfect 
friendship can only exist on the stage, but rather wanted to encourage his audience to 
make every endeavour to live up to this ideal. With this intention, he produced indeed 
one of the best examples of Renaissance didactic literature on friendship to be found in 
the whole period. 
 
3.2. THE COMMUNITY OF FRIENDS: 
HUMANISTIC 'PEN-PALS' AND THE QUEST FOR REAL FRIENDSHIP 
To make every endeavour to live up to the classically inspired ideal of perfect 
friendship did in fact not simply remain the mere appeal of the numerous didactic 
representations of the matter in Renaissance literature; people now also began to really 
feel an urge to translate the classical ideas into the realities of their personal lives, and 
thus to experience an alternative to the rather professional and hence functional 
relationships that were commonly thought of when the concept of friendship was 
referred to. In other words, as Mills puts it, "as there was a desire to recreate the best 
aspects of classical thought and to embody them in life, there was, especially in the 
Elizabethan period, a longing to experience glowing personal friendship and live up 
to—or exceed—the classical encomiums on it."75 This urge for the experience of a close 
and intimate personal relationship with someone who does not belong to the same 
family was indeed especially felt by the humanistic scholars of the time, who, of 
course, had propagated the ideal in the first place. That it was particularly them who 
were so enthusiastic about the idea of the realization of perfect friendship is in fact 
hardly surprising, as they had both the knowledge of how such a friendship could and 
should look like and the need for such a relationship. In the course of the fifteenth and 
especially the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the meaning of traditional 
relationships and the structures of social interaction changed significantly. One of the 
main aims of humanism was to provide a decent education to a broader section of the 
population, with the result that by the early sixteenth century the educated elite in 
Europe no longer consisted of merely some few clergymen but of thousands of 
theologians, lawyers, physicians, scholars, or teachers, who were not concentrated at a 
few important cities or, like the educated elite of medieval times, gathered together in a 
number of monasteries but spread all over the continent. Forming a completely new 
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stratum of society, these educated men soon found themselves in a situation that Paul 
Münch describes in his work on Lebensformen in der Frühen Neuzeit as a "'besondere 
Existenz'," a 'special existence'.76 They realized that their education had separated them 
from the traditional structures of societies and from their former communities and 
acquaintances. They formed a new social group, the nobilitas litteraria, which consisted 
of members who were spread all over Europe. In nearly every little village, there was 
at least one or two educated men like the pastor, vicar, or priest and the schoolmaster, 
who were, though integrated into the social community of their parish, intellectually 
rather isolated. It was this experience of isolation that made most of them longing for a 
friendly society of equal intellectuals, for a humanistic society of friends. In the cities 
and larger towns, the humanistic elite soon began to meet regularly in scholarly circles, 
and with their colleagues in the countryside, they kept up a frequent correspondence 
and tried to keep in contact also by means of regular mutual visits. Using Latin as their 
common language, it was indeed no problem for the European humanists to get or 
keep in contact with each other. An English scholar, for instance, was thus as easily 
able to keep up the correspondence with his English associates as with his French, 
Dutch, German, Italian, or even Polish colleagues and friends.77 Considering the way 
in which the European humanists in the Renaissance were linked to each other by 
means of correspondence and visits and the friendly and sometimes even intimate way 
in which they addressed and treated each other, one can certainly speak of a broad 
system of various networks of friends that often also overlapped each other. It is, of 
course, not surprising that the leading humanistic scholars of the time also had the 
largest circles of friends and were thus part of the most wide ranging friendship 
networks. Probably the most prominent figure in the European humanistic 'friendship 
scene' at that time was Erasmus, and the friendships he had with many other 
important thinkers of his age almost became legendary. How international his contacts 
indeed were, becomes visible from the long list of his friends, of whom Burke mentions 
some of the best known in his brief essay on humanism and friendship in sixteenth 
century Europe: 
The international circle of Erasmus included Thomas More (a close friend 
for a few years at least), the Valencian humanist Juan Luis Vives (who 
described Erasmus as his amicus probatissimus), the town clerk of Antwerp, 
Peter Gillis, and the German humanists Willibald Pirckheimer (addressed 
by Erasmus as 'incomparable friend'), and Beatus Rhenanus. Rhenanus 
called Erasmus 'most constant in keeping up friendships' and was described 
by him in return as a 'Pythagorean friend' (pythagoricus amicus), presumably 
a reference to Damon and Pythias.78 
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Humanists, however, as members of the group of educated upper and middle class 
citizens that formed a completely new social stratum within the Renaissance society, 
were in fact not the only who felt the need for a new kind of social integration. 
Friendship, as an alternative to the conventional forms of relationship, also became 
popular with those who found themselves facing considerable changes in the 
structures of their traditional social groups. Communities of friends became, as Burke 
puts it, "some kind of substitute for the decline of such groups as the religious 
confraternities, threatened by both the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, the craft 
guilds, threatened by economic changes, brothers-in-arms, threatened by new modes 
of warfare, and finally of youth groups, attacked as sources of disorder by the 
reformers of popular culture."79 This new form of friendship, of course, as every kind 
of relationship, needed its own rituals and symbols to become an acceptable alternative 
to the other, more established forms of human interaction—especially if it was to 
become an alternative to the most ritualized form of relationship with the greatest 
amount of symbolic associations attached to it: the bond of love. So, people began to 
assure each other of their friendship by means of exchanging avowals of their affection 
in written form, as in friendship poems or in contributions to the friend's album 
amicorum (a kind of autograph album, sometimes also referred to as liber amicorum or 
hortus amicorum), or in the form of friendship tokens like friendship rings or friendship 
portraits.80 The most favourite way to assure each other of one's affection and, of 
                                                                                                                                                            
International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies, Louvain, 23-28 August 1971, ed. Jozef Ijsewijn, Eckhard 
Kessler, and Lawrence V. Ryan (Leuven UP: Leuven, 1971-72) 133-41; Yvonne Charlier, Érasme et 
l'amitié: D'apres sa correspondance (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1977); Thomas H. White, "Legend and 
Reality: The Friendship between More and Erasmus," Svpplementvm Festivvm. Studies in Honor of Paul 
Oskar Kristeller, ed. James Hankins, John Monfasani, and Frederick Jr Purnell (Binghamton: Center for 
Medieval & Renaissance Studies, State U of New York, 1987) 489-504; and Forrest Tyler Stevens, 
"Erasmus's 'Tigress': The Language of Friendship, Pleasure and the Renaissance Letter," Queering the 
Renaissance, ed. Jonathan Goldberg (Durham: Duke UP, 1994) 124-40. On some of the friendships 
between other prominent humanists of the time, see, for example, K. J. Wilson, "Vsque ad aras: Thomas 
Elyot's Friendship with Thomas More," Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Sanctandreani: Proceedings of the Fifth 
International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies, St. Andrews, 24 Aug. to 1 Sept. 1982, ed. I. D. McFarlane 
(Binghamton: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1986) 531-35; Virginia Woods Callahan, 
"Andreas Alciatus and Boniface Amerbach: The Chronicle of a Renaissance Friendship," Acta Conventus 
Neo-Latini Guelpherbytani: Proceedings of Sixth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies, Wolfenbüttel, 12 
Aug. to 16 Aug. 1985, ed. Stella P. Revard, Fidel Radle, and Mario A. Di Cesare (Binghamton: Medieval 
& Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1988) 193-200; Robert Seidel, "Gelehrte Freundschaft - die 'Epistula ad 
Philippum Melanchthonem' des Jacobus Micyllus," Daphnis: Zeitschrift für Mittlere Deutsche Literatur 19 
(1990): 567-633; or Philip Caraman, A Study in Friendship: Saint Robert Southwell [1561-1595] and Henry 
Garnet [1555-1606] (Anand: Prakash, 1991). 
79 Burke 270. 
80 Cf. Burke 268-69. "The album amicorum," Burke explains, "was a kind of visitors' book in reverse, in 
which a traveller, usually a student would invite famous people he met (such as Luther or 
Melanchthon), or his teachers, or his fellow-students or other friends, to write something: a proverb, or 
verses, or whatever." Burke 269. About the custom of commissioning and exchanging friendship 
portraits, Burke further explains: "By the early sixteenth century, the friendship portrait seems to have 
become an institution. Raphael made a portrait of his friend the poet Tebaldeo as a gift for the sitter, 
who responded with a sonnet in praise of the painting. Bembo owned a double portrait by his friend 
Raphael of his other friends Andrea Navagero and Agostino Beazzano, until he presented it to 
Beazzano himself in 1538. This looks very much like a portrait commissioned precisely in order to 
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course, to keep the contact, was though still—besides visits or regular meetings—the 
exchange of letters. 
To gain at least an impression of the nature, i.e. of the contents and the tone of such 
letters, we will now take a brief look at two very different series of friendship 
correspondence. One of the two consists of the letters either written or received by the 
fifteenth-century Italian scholar Marsilio Ficino. His letters reflect the way in which the 
members of his circle, the Platonic Academy of Florence, dealt with each other, and 
reveal the conception these classical scholars had of friendship. The other series of 
letters, which we will also begin with, dates back to the sixteenth century. It is the 
correspondence between the English author and nobleman Sir Philip Sidney, whose 
literary representations of friendship have already been mentioned above, and the 
French writer and diplomat Hubert Languet (1518-1581). Unlike the letters of Ficino 
that are to be examined here, the ones by Sidney and Languet only reflect the 
friendship of two men, who were most of the time, also unlike Ficino and his friends, 
unable to visit and see each other regularly. Their letters were not send merely from 
the countryside to the town and vice versa, or even only from one side of a city to 
another, but from and to different places spread all over Europe, due to the various 
travels and diplomatic missions of both men. 
It is, in fact, no accident that the correspondence of precisely these two writers, 
Ficino and Sidney, was chosen to illustrate the nature of the Renaissance custom of 
exchanging friendship letters—instead of, for instance, choosing some of the famous 
letters from Erasmus's correspondence. It is not only that Ficino's and Sidney's letters 
are divided by almost exactly a century's time, but also that they clearly reflect the 
development of the attitude towards personal friendship that took place in the course 
of the Renaissance. Of course, the letters of Ficino are also particularly interesting since 
he was one of the leading figures in the Italian Renaissance; Sidney and his letters of 
friendship, however, are not so much of interest because of their contents or the 
importance of their authors to their time but because of the extraordinary attachment 
Sidney seems to have had for the topic of friendship. In the Renaissance, as we have 
seen, the new enthusiasm for the classical notions of friendship found expression in 
various literary forms. First, there were writers like Lyly or Shakespeare, who 
presented their idealized image of friendship in fictional writings. Then there was such 
theoretical contemplation of friendship as that of Elyot or Edwards, who considered 
the theme in rather idealistic terms. But there were also writers like Montaigne, who 
                                                                                                                                                            
commemorate a friendship. So does the Giorgione Double Portrait of c. 1502, and Giovanni Cariani's Two 
Young Men, though as in so many cases it is impossible to identify the sitters. Another Italian example 
reveals the link with Cicero: a Moroni portrait at Brescia shows a gentleman holding a book entitled 
Dell'amicitia." Burke 268. On the topic of friendship portraits, see also Harald Keller, "Entstehung und 
Blütezeit der Freundschaftsbilder," Essays in the History of Art Presented to Rudolf Wittkower on His Sixty-
Fifth Birthday, ed. Douglas Fraser (London: Phaidon, 1967) 161-73. See also Sidney's letter to Languet 
(Padua, 4 Feb. 1574), 125 below. 
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gave no fictional or theoretical but a very personal account of their own experiences of 
friendship. However, in most cases only one of these forms of expression was used. 
There are in fact not many writers of that time from whose writings we know that they 
were concerned with the linking of all three kinds of representation. One of those very 
few who presented the idealized image of friendship in their fictions but who also 
tried, on the basis of theoretical contemplation, to translate these noble ideas into the 
realities of their own friendships, was Sir Philip Sidney. In fact, we can find exactly the 
same elements of the classical amicitia ideal in the presentation of his actual friendship 
with Languet in their correspondence as in his fictional representation of friendship in 
his Arcadia. We might therefore conclude that friendship obviously played a truly 
significant role in Sidney's entire life and work. 
That Sidney was not only concerned with the composition of fictional prose or lyric 
poetry but that his interest was also directed towards philosophical and theoretical 
considerations has already become clear from the quotations from his works cited 
above. From these citations, it has also become very obvious that he was not only 
familiar with the humanistic commonplaces of friendship, but also with the classical 
sources from which they were extracted—and this can be seen from his letters as well, 
as the way and the terms in which Sidney and Languet describe their friendship are 
unambiguously classical. As an educated nobleman, Sidney certainly knew Cicero's 
Laelius and, as we learn from one of his letters of 1579, he must also have been familiar 
with Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when he wrote his first version of The Arcadia.81 
That he was as well familiar with Plato shows his reference to the Republic in his 
Defence of Poesy.82 That he also knew the Symposium is very likely, since he frequently 
presents some of its Socratic ideas and motifs in the Old Arcadia, as for example in the 
third eclogues when he has Dicus consider the nature of Cupid, which clearly 
resembles the theme of the whole Symposium and especially Agathon's speech.83 The 
same applies to the second eclogues where Sidney presents the dispute between 
Reason and Passion whether reason is to be preferred, or passion.84 One of the sources 
of this motif might again be found in Diotima's reflection on the relation between 
wisdom and love in the Symposium.85 Now, from the correspondence with his friends, 
we can learn that he did not only use these classical notions for the representation of 
friendship in his fictional writings but that he also endeavoured to translate these 
idealistic ideas into the realities of his own friendships, and especially into those of that 
with Hubert Languet. 
                                                   
81 Cf. Sir Philip Sidney, The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet, trans. and ed. Steuart A. 
Pears, facs. rpt. of 1845 ed. (Farnborough: Gregg International, 1971) 195. 
82 See Sidney, Defence of Poesy 234. 
83 See Sidney, Old Arcadia 213-216; and Plato, Symposium 194e-197e. 
84 See Sidney, Old Arcadia 119-120. 
85 See Plato, Symposium 203c-204b. 
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The relationship between Sidney and the Frenchman Hubert Languet was certainly 
both that between friends and that between a mentor and his pupil, as Sidney was just 
in his nineteenth year when he met Languet, who was at that time already in the fifty-
fourth year of his life.86 The educational character of Languet's friendship with Sidney 
becomes visible in the way in which Sidney in one of his letters replies to his mentor's 
advice: "Quod de periculo scribis, ego non secus ac omnia alia tua consilia semper 
observabo."87 From their correspondence, it becomes plainly recognizable how 
important the matter of friendship must have been to them, and the notion of 
friendship that is presented in the letters vividly reflects the conceptions of the classical 
authors. It definitely reminds one of Cicero's proclamation that friendship is to be 
considered the highest good (see 56), when Sidney writes in one of his letters to 
Languet: "Summum bonum (post illam aeternam felicitatem) in colenda vera amicitia 
constituam, in qua re tu facile primas tenebis."88 That Sidney did indeed consider real 
friendship to be a very valuable relationship, possible only between men, and that he 
must have considered it truly important to have such a friendship with an honourable 
and virtuous partner, might also be seen from a passage in one of his letters to 
Languet, which he writes in reply to his friend's complaint about not having heard 
anything from him for quite a while, to which Languet has even added the suspicion 
that Sidney might not really be interested in their friendship: 
[…] quod vero tacite me cujusdam remissionis amoris quo te et divinam 
tuam virtutem prosequutus sum et semper prosequar, incusas, agnosco 
humanitatem tuam, sed id serio et vehementer a te peto, ut quantumcunque 
inter nos sit locorum intervallum, semper tamen id persuasum habeas, me 
non adeo puerili stultitia, aut inconstantia muliebri, aut belluina 
ingratitudine esse praeditum, ut non talis viri amicitiam cupide adipiscar, 
adeptam non conservem, conservatae vero me minus gratum exhibeam 
[…].89 
Whether deliberately or unconsciously, Sidney here indirectly refers to a number of 
classical commonplaces of friendship: that the virtuousness of a friend is the main 
                                                   
86 Cf. Pears, introduction, Correspondence, by Sidney ix, xvi. 
87 (Sidney to Languet: Venice, 5 Dec. 1573.) Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie; Political Discourses; 
Correspondence; Translations, ed. Albert Feuillerat (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1923) 80. – "I will give 
heed to that which you say about danger as I do to all your advice." Trans. Pears 4. 
88 (Sidney to Languet: Padua, 15 Jan. 1574.) Sidney, Correspondence, ed. Feuillerat 83. – "I shall find the 
summum bonum [highest good] (next to eternal bliss) in the cultivation of true friendship, and here you 
will unquestionably hold first rank." Trans. Charles S. Levy, "The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney 
and Hubert Languet, 1573-76," diss., Cornell U (Ithaca), 1962, 55-56. 
89 (Sidney to Languet: Venice, 5 Dec. 1573.) Sidney, Correspondence, ed. Feuillerat 79-80. – "As to your 
implied charge that my affection for you is waning, affection which was and always will be my tribute 
to your surpassing virtue, I acknowledge your kindness; but I very earnestly beg you always, no matter 
how great the distance between us, to retain the conviction that I am not so full of childish stupidity, 
womanly fickleness, or brutish ingratitude as not eagerly to seek the friendship of such a man, once 
having acquired it not to cultivate it, and having cultivated it, not to show myself thankful for it." 
Trans. Levy 15. 
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reason for making friends with him; that friendship is based on love or affection; that 
friendship remains unchanged, even if the friends are separated from each other by a 
great distance; that women cannot have real friendships, for they are too fickle and 
inconsistent friends and lovers; that friendships with good men should be cultivated 
and preserved; and that one should be truly grateful to have such friendships. The 
high esteem in which Sidney held his friendship with Languet—a friendship that he 
really considered to be one of the perfect kind—is clearly reflected in the way in which 
he talks to his friend about the nature and the value of their relation: 
Ego te effigiem meam adeo vehementer a me expetere et laetor quod 
ejusmodi indicia spirant dulcem tuum et jam diu perspectum erga me 
amorem, et doleo quod tam leves res a me cum dubitatione petis, si enim 
inter nos nulla esset vera et perfecta amicitia (quae omnia communia officia, 
ut Sol minora lumina obfuscat) tamen ea a te accepi, ut multo majora quam 
haec debiti loco exigere possis […].90 
The friendship between the two men bears indeed all the characteristics of the classical 
conceptions. It might again remind us of Cicero, for example, that each friend's care 
and interest is only directed towards the sake of the other, and that nothing would be 
expected from the friend that he might not want to do (see 58): "Non expeto ut 
quicquam in mei gartiam facias quod tibi non fore jucundum aut utile existimes: nec 
volo te ulla mihi facta promissione esse obstrictum, praeterquam ea qua pactus es te 
habiturum diligentem curam tuae salutis & incolumitatis […]."91 It is exactly this 
'health and safety' to which the only acceptable self-interest of the friend is directed: 
"Deus te mihi diu conservet."92 The fear, however, that the friend would consider 
himself bound to his companion rather by a promise he had made than by the love for 
him, was obviously a common one among the scholarly friends and pen friends of 
early modern times, since we can also find its expression in one of the letters Marsilio 
Ficino wrote to his 'unique friend' Giovanni Cavalcanti (1444-1509) exactly one 
hundred years before: 
                                                   
90 (Sidney to Languet: Padua, 4 Feb. 1574.) Sidney, Correspondence, ed. Feuillerat 84. – "I am both glad and 
sorry that you ask me so urgently for my portrait; glad, because a request of this kind breathes the 
spirit of that sweet and long-tried affection with which you regard me; and sorry that you have any 
hesitation in asking me so mere a trifle. For even if there were not between us that true and genuine 
friendship which throws into shade all other feelings, as the sun obscures the lesser lights, still I have 
received that from you, which gives you a right to demand from me as a debt greater things than this." 
Trans. Pears 29. 
91 (Languet to Sidney: Vienna, 4 Dec. 1574.) Hubert Languet, Huberti Langueti, viri clarissimi epistolae 
politicae et historicae: Scriptae quondam ad illustrem, & generosum dominum Philippum Sydnaeum (Frankfurt: 
Fitzer, 1633) 8-9. – "I do not wish you to do anything to please me which you do not think you would 
find pleasant and profitable; nor do I want you to be bound by any promise you have made me, 
beyond your promise to be extremely careful of your health and safety […]." Trans. Levy 13. 
92 (Sidney to Languet: Venice, 19 Dec. 1574.) Sidney, Correspondence, ed. Feuillerat 81. – "May God grant 
you long life for my sake." Trans. Pears 10. 
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Sed unum mihi molestum est prae caeteris, quod ideò scribis ad me, quia 
promiseris, ergo pactioni istud tribuo non amori. 
Amatorias posco literas non mercatorias, an es etiam pacto meus scilicet 
quia ego sum tuus, amore uolo sis meus.93 
It might also remind us again of Cicero, when Sidney and Languet consider casual, 
open, and uncensored speech to be one of the fundamental qualities to tell a friendship 
by (see 60): "Peto à te ne ineptas literas quas ad te soleo scribere, cuiquam ostendas. 
Scribo absque; delectu quicquid mihi suggerit animus variis modis affectus, & mihi 
satis est si id apud te consequar, ut credas nihil esse mihi charitus te."94 It is indeed the 
quality of such casual and uncensored speech that marks the conversation between 
friends, and conversation, as the eighteenth-century English essayist Susannah Dobson 
still puts it two hundred years later, is the heart of friendship: "A French writer has 
observed that conversation is the soul of friendship; it may truly be said that friendship 
is the soul of conversation, as it takes away every reserve, and gives the fullest scope to 
the sentiments and emotions of the soul."95 Consequently, the conversation with a 
friend must be a source of much greater pleasure than anything else, and will 
therefore, as Sidney admits, be preferred to all material values: "Et te charissime 
Languete videbo, cujus ego uno colloquio, magis profecto delectarer, quam omnium 
horum magnificorum magnificis magnificentiis."96 
In view of this importance of conversation to friendship, it becomes clear how 
significant the correspondence between friends must be when they are spatially 
separated, even though this kind of communication can only be a substitute for an 
actual conversation. It might therefore be understandable why the absence of any news 
from the friend might cause considerable uneasiness or even annoyance, as it is 
expressed by Languet in one of his letters to Sidney: 
Quanta cura & solicitudine, immo quanto metu me liberasses, si semel atque 
iterum ex itinere ad me scripsisses. Non requirebam operosas literas, sed 
quae tantum continerent, Hoc die huc incolumes pervenimus, vel aliquid 
                                                   
93 (Ficino to Cavalcanti: 5 June 1474.) Ficino, "Quod gratis, gratius est, quam quod ex debito" ("What is 
done freely is more pleasing than an act of obligation"), Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Basileae: Adamus 
Henricus Petri, 1561) 624. – "But, one thing that troubles me more than anything else is that you write to 
me because you promised; and that I attribute to a bargain and not to love. 
 I desire letters of love, not of barter; or are you really mine by contract? Because I am yours through 
love, I wish you to be mine through love too." Trans. members of the Language Department of the 
School of Economic Science, London, The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, by Marsilio Ficino, ed. Paul Oskar 
Kristeller, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1983) 73. 
94 (Languet to Sidney: Vienna, 4 Dec. 1574.) Languet 9-10. – "I beg you not to show anyone the foolish 
letters I am in the habit of sending you. I write, without taking a second thought, whatever my 
changeable moods suggest, and it is enough for me if I can make you believe that nothing is dearer to 
me than you." Trans. Levy 14. 
95 Dobson 1. 
96 (Sidney to Languet: Venice, 19 Dec. 1573.) Sidney, Correspondence, ed. Feuillerat 80. – "And then, my 
very dear Languet, I shall see you, and one conversation with you would give me more delight, than all 
the magnificent magnificences of all these magnificos." Trans. Pears 8. 
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simile. Meministi quam obnixe id à te discedente petierim. At inquies, 
parum tua refert id te scire. Ubi pervenero Patavium vel Venetias, tum 
demum ad te scribam. Potuisses & illud alterum praestare, & si id secisses, 
magno me beneficio à te affectum esse iudicassem.97 
The accusation is in fact a serious one, and correspondingly firm and defensive is 
Sidney's reply: "Non vero, inquam, parum tua refert, id te scire, bene enim novi quam 
res sit solliciti plena timoris amor, sed id dicam et vere dicam me nulli plane obviam 
fuisse, qui iter Viennam versus haberet […]."98 The conviction that it is a matter of great 
importance to a friendship that the postal contact between two separated friends is 
kept alive at any time, as its one-sided interruption would cause one friend's 
displeasure, was in fact a common one in the Renaissance. It is therefore not really 
surprising that we can find nearly the same lamentation as that of Languet also in one 
of Ficino's letters to Cavalcanti: 
At tu cur scribis nihil? Nihil equidem habeo quod scribam, inquies. Id ipsum 
saltem nihil habere te, scribe, quanquam nunquam deest amicis 
argumentum literarum. Quid enim amico charius quam amici uita? Ergo 
uicissim qualis ualitudo sit, saepe significandum. Ego meam ualitudinem 
declarare non possum nisi prius ipse tuam. Quippe ualeo si tu uales, imo si 
te ualere intelligo.99 
This idea, that one's own health depends on the health of the friend and that the 
absence of the friend would necessarily cause discomfort or even illness if he does not 
regularly send letters in which he confirms his well-being, is also expressed in a letter 
addressed to Ficino by Carlo Marsuppini Jnr.: "Salue solus mea salus. Tamdiu enim 
sanus saluusque sum quamdiu tecum sum. Ac tum denique uiuere mihi uideor cum 
tecum uiuo. Quotiens absum, totiens perij. Vide ergo, mi Marsili, ne me deserendo 
hominem perdas, imo amicum occidas."100 
                                                   
97 (Languet to Sidney: Vienna, 19 Nov. 1573.) Languet 3. – "What care and anxiety, nay what fear had you 
spared me, if you had written to me only once or twice on your journey! I did not desire a laboured 
letter, only a word or two, as, 'This day we arrived here in safety,' or the like. You remember how 
earnestly I begged this of you when you were leaving me. But you will say, 'it matters little to you 
whether you hear or not: when I arrive at Padua of Venice, then I will write to you.' You might have 
done both, and if you had, I should have thought myself greatly obliged by you." Trans. Pears 1. 
98 (Sidney to Languet: Venice, 5 Dec. 1573.) Sidney, Correspondence, ed. Feuillerat 79. – "I certainly do not 
say, 'It is of little consequence to you to know this,' for I well know how 'full of anxious fear love is,' but 
I will say this, and say it truthfully, that I came upon absolutely no one who was travelling toward 
Vienna." Trans. Levy 15. 
99 (Ficino to Cavalcanti: 19 Sep. 1468.) Ficino, "Quod necessariae epistolae inter amicos" ("Letters are 
necessary between friends"), Opera Omnia 625. – "But how is it that you don't write? You will say that 
you have nothing to write about. At least write that you have nothing to say; although there is always a 
reason for a letter to friends. What is dearer to a friend than the life of his friend? For this reason they 
should frequently write to each other about the state of their health. I cannot reveal to you my state of 
health unless I hear first of yours. Certainly I am well if you are; or rather, if I know that you are." 
Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 74-75. 
100 (Carlo Marsuppini to Ficino: no date.) Ficino, "Salus amici ab amico" ("The health of a friend depends 
on his friend"), Opera Omnia 638. – "Blessings upon you, sole source of my health. For I am healthy in 
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How important letters indeed were to early modern friends, not only as a 
confirmation of each others health and well-being, but also as a proof of their 
friendship (or simply as a token of their mutual respect and loyalty), might be seen 
from Lorenzo de' Medici's letters to Ficino. In one of them, for instance, he complaints 
about the delay of a letter from Ficino: 
Cum isthinc huc iucundissime Marsili me reciperem, tecum uerbis egi atque 
impetraui, ne absentes diutius literas tuas desideraremus. Quod quidem 
facturum te recepisti, uerùm cum quatuor iam post discessum dies 
praeterierint, neque adhunc tuae literae perferantur, cum aliorum tamen 
familiarium & necessariorum nostrorum plereque perlatae ad nos fuerint, 
tuam in scribendo tarditatem & miror et doleo, nam sane existimabam si par 
in ambobus beniuolentia uigeret, par scribendi studium quod amoris 
officium est non defuturum.101 
The harsh tone of Lorenzo's complaint reveals how seriously the exchange of letters 
was taken. One might sometimes truly wonder, in fact, how the friends managed to do 
anything else at all apart from writing letters to each other, since we are here not 
talking about the exchange of messages between only two friends but between the 
members of a whole community of friends. Politicians and patrons like Lorenzo (1449-
92) and scholars like Ficino or Erasmus must have indeed spend a vast amount of their 
time dealing with their voluminous correspondence, especially as not only the number 
of letters send to different friends but also the frequency with which letters between 
the individual friends were exchanged was quite considerable. Between some friends, 
in fact, this frequency of postal contact must have been so high, that they even saw a 
reason for complaint when they have had no word from each other for only four days, 
as in Lorenzo's case. His complaint impressively shows how important the exchange of 
letters between friends must have been to them as tokens of loyalty and friendly 
affection, but it also reveals the conventionalism of this habit and the constraint under 
which some of these letters were certainly written. Finally, of course, it also shows how 
gravely the violation of the obligation to write was condemned, especially when the 
correspondence became decidedly unbalanced, i.e. when the writing of letters and thus 
the expression of one's respect and affection for the friend became a unilateral activity, 
as Lorenzo, in his next letter to Ficino, claims it to have become the case after Ficino 
had failed to reply satisfactorily to Lorenzo's first message. Now, he bitterly complaints 
                                                                                                                                                            
mind and body, just as long as I am with you. And I seem to be alive only when I live with you. 
Whenever I am absent from you I waste away. So, my Marsilio, see that you do not destroy a man, or 
rather kill a friend, by deserting me." Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 
109. 
101 (Lorenzo de' Medici to Ficino: no date.) Ficino, "Invitatio ad scribendum" ("A request for a letter"), 
Opera Omnia 620. – "DEAREST MARSILIO, when I was leaving for this place I urged you not to let me 
await your letters too long while I was away, and to this you agreed. But already four days have passed 
since our parting and there is still no letter from you; although a great many letters have been delivered 
to me from my household and other friends." Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. 
Kristeller 61. 
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about Ficino's carelessness and accuses him even more harshly than in his first letter of 
disobeying the rules of friendship and of thereby not only betraying the one between 
them but also destroying his confidence in friendship as such: 
O falsum meum de te iudicium, uerumque illud uulgatum prouerbium. 
Locorum, scilicet, interuallum ut ab oculis disiungit, ita nos ab amorum 
cogitationibus separare. Verum quis hoc credidisset? quod ego uix credo 
cum perspexerim. Ego binas ad te literas dedi, tu unam uix epistolam nobis, 
atque ita paucorum uerborum, ut fiex ea primam salutationem atque 
ultimam loci & diei particulam demas, nihil ferè sit reliqui. At non decet 
Philosophum loquacem esse? At non decet mutuum? […] 
Quod tamen tum miror, tum uerò quibus uerbis te accusem non inuenio. 
Nullum est enim tam asperum tamque contumeliosum uerbum, quin 
deterior multo sit Marsiliana taciturnitas, qua & fidem tuam & nostram 
amicitiam fefellisti. Doleo quidem non parum, quod fidem fregeris, atque 
amicitiae nostrae huiusmodi iniuria intuleris. At quod magis mihi molestum 
accidit illud prorsus est, quod dum tu amorem nostrum frustratus es, ita nos 
à caeterorum hominum beniuolentia alienasti, ut nemo supersit, cui fidem 
deinceps adhibere posse uidear. Nihil enim tam perfectum, tam constans, 
tam uerum uidebatur, quam nostra amicitia, quae quidem & tua uirtute & 
temporis diuturnitate a Deo creurat, ut si quodammodo decoxerit, nulla 
restet cui credere tuto possimus.102 
From these words, we might see as what serious and important a matter friendship 
was indeed taken at those times—at least in Florentine circles. Yet, however severe and 
bitter Lorenzo's accusation and condemnation may be, his attitude towards Ficino (and 
towards their friendship) is not really as unforgiving as it might seem. The retrieval 
seems in fact to be as easy as the offence was serious. A simple, even though well-
written letter by Ficino would regain the correspondence's balance, and in expectation 
of receiving such a letter from his friend, Lorenzo finishes his own with more 
conciliatory words: 
Quapropter scito nos ergate mirum in modum iratos esse. Neque tamen ita 
iratos, ut si iucundissimae literae tuae ad nos perferantur, sua illi incredibili 
suauitate cunctam animi asperitatem atque indignationem mulcere non 
                                                   
102 (Lorenzo de' Medici to Ficino: no date.) Ficino, "Amatoria" ("Matters of Love"), Opera Omnia 622-23. – 
"How wrong was my judgment of you, and how right the old saying 'Out of sight, out of mind'. Who 
would have believed it? Indeed, I can scarcely believe my own eyes. I sent two letters to you; you sent 
scarcely one to me, and it was so sparing in words that if you leave out the greetings at start, the 
farewell at the end, the date and address, there is almost nothing left. Should a philosopher be 
talkative, or should he be mute? […] 
 Yet I am amazed and I really cannot find the words with which to accuse you, for there is no word so 
harsh or so abusive that Marsilian taciturnity does not far surpass it. By this you have betrayed your 
faith and our friendship. I am indeed hurt in your breaking faith with me, and by the blow you have 
dealt to our friendship. But much more wounding still is that, in setting the love between us at naught, 
you have separated me from the good will of all other men, and there seems no one left now to whom I 
can entrust my faith. For there appeared to be nothing so perfect, so constant, so true, as our friendship 
which had grown by your virtue and the passage of time, [in God], if this is now bankrupt, there is no 
friendship left in which I can safely trust." Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. 
Kristeller 68. Addition mine. 
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possint. Nam cum Achillis telum in manibus habeas, scito tarditatem in 
scribendo, cuspidem esse qua uulneras, literas uerò ita illato uulneri mederi 
posse, ut non modo uulnus ipsum, sed omnem penitus cicatricem auferre ac 
delere possint.103 
The tone of Lorenzo's letters and the way in which he talks about his relation with 
Ficino clearly reveal the kind of friendship that exists between them, namely that 
between a patron and his protégée. The friendship between Ficino and Cavalcanti, on 
the other hand, is a real one, based on the mutual love of equals. It is true that Ficino's 
demand for Cavalcanti's reply to his letters is almost as insistent as Lorenzo's for his 
own, but contrary to Lorenzo, for whom the exchange of letters seems to be a mere 
duty, Ficino wants his friend to write only for reasons of love and not because he feels 
obliged to (see above). That the friendship between Ficino and Lorenzo de' Medici is 
not primarily based on mutual affection but rather on theoretical considerations, i.e. on 
ideas rather than on emotions, becomes quite clear in another one of Lorenzo's letters 
to his protégée: 
Declaraueras tu quidem saepe mentem erga nos tuam. Verum mecum ipso 
saepius hanc tuam epistolam uoluntati uideris omnem aliud amicitiae 
officium superasse, siue quod primas in amore erga nos partes obtineas, ac 
longe caeteris in amicitia praestes, siue quod ea amicitiae munera abunde 
praestare ualeas quae caeteri nequeant. Caeteri nempe qui nos beniuolentia 
prosequuntur, aut diuitijs iuuare possunt aut honoribus aut uoluptatibus, 
quae quidem omnia in fortunae potestate constituta sunt, ut nihil firmius 
habeamus, nihilque constantius quam eorum imbecillitatem ac mobilitatem, 
quod & tu saepe docuisti, & nos faepius experti sumus. Tu uero his abundas 
praeceptis, atque eo amicitiae genere nobiscum agis, ut facile appareat, sicut 
nemini amicorum uirtute cedis, ita reliquos in amore superare. Facis hoc tu 
quidem naturali quadam beneficentia tua. Facis insuper quod te non fugit, 
hac conditione datas esse ab immortali Deo hominibus uirtutes, ut 
quamplurimos iuuent, neque adduci potes, ut diuina hac liberalitate 
abutaris.104 
                                                   
103 (Lorenzo de' Medici to Ficino: no date.) Ficino, "Amatoria" ("Matters of Love"), Opera Omnia 623. – 
"Know therefore that my anger towards you is exceedingly fierce: yet it is not so fierce that should one 
of your wonderful letters at last arrive, it could not soothe all my resentment and bitterness by its 
incredible sweetness. For since you have in your hands the spear of Achilles, the delay in writing being 
the point with which you pierce me, know that a letter from you could so heal the wound that has been 
inflicted, that it would not only cure the wound itself, but even remove all trace of a scar." Trans. 
Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 68-69. 
104 (Lorenzo de' Medici to Ficino: 10 Oct. 1474.) Ficino, "Responsio ad epistolam de tempore parce 
expendendo" ("Reply to the letter about the sparing use of time"), Opera Omnia 647-48. – "You have 
often unfolded your mind to me, but in this letter of yours you seem repeatedly to have gone beyond 
every other proof of friendship in good will towards me. Perhaps this is because you are first in love 
and far exceed all others in friendship to me; perhaps it is because you are able to bestow abundantly 
those gifts of friendship which other cannot. For others who attend us with their kindness can bestow 
riches, honours, or pleasure. But those gifts are all in fortune's hand, so that we have nothing surer than 
their uncertainty nor more reliable than their inconstancy. This you have often taught and I have even 
more often experienced. But you are such a source of instruction and you show such friendship 
towards me that it is obvious you are second to none of my friends in virtue, as you surpass them all in 
love; and this you do from your own natural goodness. You do this moreover because you are aware 
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At first sight, the friendly tone of the letter might give the impression that the 
friendship between Lorenzo and Ficino is also one based on affection. A closer look, 
however, reveals how theoretical, functional, and unemotional Lorenzo's conception of 
friendship really is. The view of the nature and function of friendship he here presents 
is indeed typical of the way in which the conventionalized and rather utilitarian 
relationships between persons of different social rank were conceptualized at that time. 
Between the lines, Lorenzo makes his understanding of the matter quite clear. For him, 
friendship is constantly in need of a proof of the friends' respect and affection for each 
other, so that the voluntary sending of letters to provide this proof should be one of the 
main duties of every friend. Of course, the permanent verification of the loyalty of 
one's friends was a vital necessity for someone like Lorenzo de' Medici, as his wealth 
and power depended decidedly on the strength and intactness of his friendship 
network. For him, contrary to the classical commonplace, friendship can and should 
therefore not only exist between two persons but between as many friends as possible; 
one has simply to differentiate between one's ordinary friendships, based on utility 
and pleasure, and one's better friendships, based on virtue and love. That he considers 
his friendship with Ficino to be one of the latter kind is of course not surprising, even 
though it was quite obviously rather one of the first sort. 
Ficino, on the other hand, leaves no doubt that for him the friendship with Lorenzo 
is primarily that between a protégée and a patron, and thus first of all one of utility, 
when he directly and repeatedly asks favours of Lorenzo for his other friends. In one of 
his letters of recommendation, for example, he refers to their friendship only to 
persuade Lorenzo to also help one of his acquaintances: "Si Paci docto & bono sacerdoti 
fauebis, fauebis & mihi. Cum enim uiri boni & amici agitur res, res agitur nostra."105 
And in another letter of this kind, he even refers to the virtuousness of the friend 
recommended to have Lorenzo support him for the sake of the idea of friendship per 
se, as it were: "Multi à te digniora se petunt Gregorius Epiphanius longe dignior est his 
quae postulat. Et si nobis amicissimus est, tamen propter eius uirtutem magis quam 
propter amicitiam eum tibi commendo. Nam propter uirtutem est amicus."106 
                                                                                                                                                            
that these virtues have been given to men by immortal God on this condition: that they are used for as 
many people as possible; and you cannot be tempted to misuse this divine generosity." Trans. 
Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 133. 
105 (Ficino to Lorenzo de' Medici: no date.) Ficino, "Qui fauet bonis, sibi fauet" ("He who shows favours to 
good men shows favour to himself"), Opera Omnia 669. – "If you show favour to Pace, that good and 
learned priest, you will also show favour to me. For when something is done for a good man and a 
friend, it is done for me too." Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 184. 
106 (Ficino to Lorenzo de' Medici: no date.) Ficino, "Quae sit petitio & commendatio iusta" ("A fair request 
and commendation"), Opera Omnia 669. – "MANY seek undeserved honours from you, but Gregorio 
Epifanio deserves far more than he asks. Even though he is a great friend of mine, I recommend him to 
you more for his virtue than for his friendship. For he is a friend because of his virtue." Trans. 
Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 184. 
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Probably because of the not always entirely unconstrained relationship between a 
protégé and his patron, Ficino puts much emphasis on the voluntariness with which 
the tokens of affection should be given in true friendships. True friends, Ficino stresses 
in his letters to some of his closer friends, always treat each other unselfishly and not in 
the hope of personal gain or for the sake of anything else but their mutual love. They 
make friends with each other and maintain their friendship only because of their free 
will to do so, and not because they are bound to each other by expectations or 
obligations, as he explains in a letter to Bernado Bembo: "Ergo amori huic in me tuo 
quid gratiae referam? amorem. Caetera ut plurimum alieno pretio comparantur. Amor 
autem cum in libera uoluntate sponte nascatur, ideoque sit liber nullo unquam pretio 
aut emitur aut uenditur, nisi seipso."107 And in a letter to Naldo Naldi, he makes the 
difference between such friendships and the functional ones—like the one he had with 
Lorenzo de' Medici, for instance—quite clear, when he says about true friendship: 
"Nunquid benefica multa ultro citroque accepta id agunt? nequaquam. Voluntas enim 
cum libera sit, libera emitur, uoluntate non pretio."108 
However, that even these true friendships were not completely free of the friends' 
self-interest, or rather self-love, shows Ficino's statement earlier in the same letter to 
Bembo: 
Opinabar, Bernharde, me sic amare Marsilium ut magis eum aliquando 
amare non possem. Quoniam quisque sui gratia singula in singulisque 
seipsum seque ipsum summopere diligit. Sed heri mea haec me feliciter 
nimium fefellit opinio. Tunc enim primum ardentius quam consueueram 
amare me cepi, cum primum certissime agnoui abs te ardenter amari uiro 
prae caeteris amore dignissimo. Tantum equidem Bernhardo tribuo, ut 
quanti ab illo fieri me intelligo, tanti me faciam. Quis igitur mihi magis 
unquam placere potest quam ille per quem magis indies mihi ipse placeo. 
Vtinam tibi placeam, Bernharde semper, ut prudentium nulli displiceam.109 
                                                   
107 (Ficino to Bernardo Bembo: Florenz, 7 March 1474.) Ficino, "Feliciter amatur qui a uiro amatur amore 
dignissimo" ("He is forunately loved who is loved by a man most worthy of love"), Opera Omnia 652. – 
"And for your love towards me, what return can I make but [my] love? Other things are usually 
acquired at the cost of something else. But since love is born of its own free will, it is therefore free and 
is never bought or sold at any price but itself." Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. 
Kristeller 145. Addition mine. 
108 (Ficino to Naldo Naldi: 8 April 1474.) Ficino, "Gratia, Amor, Fides, Amicitia" ("Grace, love, faith, 
friendship"), Opera Omnia 630. – "Is it fostered by the frequent exchange of many favours? No, certainly 
not. For since the will is free, Friendship is obtained by free will and not at a price." Trans. Language 
Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 102. 
109 (Ficino to Bernado Bembo: Florenz, 7 March 1474.) Ficino, "Feliciter amatur qui a uiro amatur amore 
dignissimo," Opera Omnia 652. – "I THOUGHT, Bernado, such was my love for Marsilio, that never could 
I love him more. Since every man loves each single thing for the sake of himself, and himself in each 
thing, it is himself that he loves most. But happily yesterday my opinion proved quite wrong, as I then 
began to love myself even more than usual when I discovered that I was most certainly loved by you, a 
man worhty of love above all others. Indeed, so highly do I esteem Bernardo, that I value myself as 
highly as I feel I am valued by him. So who can ever please me more than he through whom I am daily 
better pleased with myself? Would that I might always please you, Bernardo, and thus displease none 
of the wise." Trans. Language Dept., School of Economic Science, ed. Kristeller 144-45. 
Representations of friendship between idealism and realism 133 
This view of the connection between friendship and self-love is of course wholly un-
Aristotelian, as here (with Ficino), it is not the love of each other and thus the 
friendship itself that originates in the self-love of the friends (as it is with Aristotle), but 
the love of oneself that is only evoked by the already existing friendship. However, 
Ficino's statement is certainly not meant to contradict Aristotle or to establish a new 
theory of the interrelation between self-love and friendship, but obviously simply to 
pay a very cunning compliment to Bembo. 
 
From what we have seen in the letters cited, we can now conclude that apart from the 
idealized representation of friendship in literature, which distinguished between the 
perfect and the inferior kinds of amity, Renaissance friends also had to differentiate 
between two different kinds of friendship in real life: one between equals that was 
based on mutual love and affection, the other between a patron and his protégée, 
formed for reasons of pleasure and utility respectively. And although the latter of the 
two has become rare today, due to the social changes since Renaissance times, its 
nature is not as unfamiliar to us as we at first might think, since it bears indeed a 
number of similarities to modern relationships of dependence, especially to those 
between persons we would nowadays call business associates, rather than friends. And 
this is exactly what makes the understanding of the early modern forms of friendship 
so difficult for modern readers: both kinds of relationship are not only referred to by 
the same name—that of friendship—but are also described by the same kind of 
vocabulary. The rhetoric of friendship is in fact in both cases the same, and one has to 
look very carefully, not for commonplaces of friendship but for sings of true intimacy, 
to tell the difference and to be able to identify whether the friendship referred to is an 
affectionate or a functional one. 
 
3.3. PATRONAGE AND CLIENTAGE: THE VOCABULARY OF 
FRIENDSHIP AND EARLY MODERN PRAGMATISM 
That both kinds of friendship—the affectionate as well as the functional—were 
referred to by the same term makes it not only difficult for us to differentiate between 
them but also caused some considerable confusion concerning the conceptualization of 
the subject in the Renaissance itself. The glorified image of friendship as the most 
exceptionally valuable and affective relationship between two absolutely virtuous men 
that the Renaissance writers presented in their works, had indeed hardly anything to 
do with the use of the term in the language of everyday life or with the actual 
relationships denoted by it. There was in fact such an inflationary use of the term in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that nearly every kind of personal, political, or 
commercial relationship was rhetorically elevated to the level of true and perfect 
friendship. Even in such idealized representations as that of Edwards, who explicitly 
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contrasts the prefect friendship of Damon and Pithias with the false one of Aristippus 
and Carisophus, we can find some instances in which the terms friendship and friends 
are (probably unconsciously) used to describe purely functional relationships. 
Interestingly enough, Edwards does this not only without the criticism of such 
friendships that is so typical of his play, he also has the terms misused, as it were, by 
characters whose virtuous intentions are otherwise beyond all doubt. In a scene 
directly after Damon has been imprisoned, for example, Pithias tries to find himself 
allies who might help him to make representations to the king about his friend's arrest, 
and explains to the audience: "I wyll to the Courte my selfe to make friendes […]."110 
With these 'friends', he does of course not mean true ones but merely those who would 
be willing to help him for some reason or another. In exactly the same way, his servant 
Stephano uses the term friendship a few lines later to explain how he gained access to 
Dionysius court: "By friendship I gate into the Courte […]."111 That he does here of 
course not mean that he really made friends with anybody but that he gained access by 
being friendly to persons who seemed willing to support him in his endeavours goes 
without saying. 
Now, that even someone like Edwards in such a text as his Damon and Pithias fails to 
differentiate between the true and the false type of friendship without at the same time 
unconsciously misusing the term friendship to denote the most ordinary and incidental 
kinds of relationship shows how casually and inflationary the term was in fact used 
and tells us much about the common attitude towards friendship at that time. Despite 
the many instances of friendship idealization in the literature of the age, for most 
people in the Renaissance—not only the ordinary ones—friendship was indeed 
primarily an economic necessity, a means of maintaining and securing one's social and 
financial status, rather than the state of mingled souls that it was for Sidney and 
Languet or Montaigne and La Boëtie (see 79).112 In fact, as Guy Fitch Lytle remarks, 
"one might even suggest that the Renaissance need to emphasize 'ideal' friendships 
was a way to compensate for the unstable, intensely self-interested and self-promoting 
social relationships of that time."113 
That self-interests, economic dependencies, and the giving and receiving of gifts and 
favours in general had already in classical times been considered delicate matters when 
they occur in friendships becomes clear when one looks at Aristotle's reflections upon 
these aspects. In his Nicomachean Ethics, as we have seen, he distinguishes between the 
nobler and the inferior sorts of friendship. In any of the latter kind, he says, it is 
                                                   
110 Edwards 49, l.622. 
111 Edwards 49, l. 631. 
112 Cf. Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800 (London: Weidenfeld, 1977) 97-
98. 
113 Guy Fitch Lytle, "Friendship and Patronage in Renaissance Europe," Patronage, Art, and Society in 
Renaissance Italy, ed. F. W. Kent and Patricia Simons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) 56. 
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essential to return the support that a man gets from his friend to exactly the same 
extent, since otherwise a disharmonious dispute might arise as to whether one friend 
takes more advantage of the friendship than the other. In cases in which one of the 
friends is not able to return the benefits he has received in the same way, he has, 
according to Aristotle, to compensate his friend for the imbalance by an increase in the 
love for him (see 51). A present should therefore never be taken as a friendly donation 
that expects no reply, as to do this would mean to force someone to be a better friend 
than he might probably want to be. Only in perfect friendships it would be acceptable 
not to feel obliged to repay a gift either directly or at a later time.114 Here, the 
repayment of received gifts or favours remains a hypothetical duty anyway, since true 
friends are not interested in the profit they can gain from their friendship but in the 
support they can give each other for the sake of the friend and not for their own. For 
Aristotle, it is one of the main characteristics of a good and virtuous man to give rather 
than to take. A true friend will therefore always try to give more in return than he has 
received. The contrary, however, applies to friends in inferior friendships.115 
Now, in the everyday realities of Renaissance life, the manifestation of friendship as 
a "credit system based on bonds of reciprocal service and gift-exchange," as Lorna 
Hutson puts it, was certainly as common as it had been in classical times.116 This, of 
course, caused many modern critics to take a rather negative view of the early modern 
attitude towards friendship. Hutson as well as Barbara Puschmann-Nalenz, for 
example, though admitting that there was indeed also an affective side to it, explicitly 
stress the pragmatic, economic, and hence rather unemotional part of the Renaissance 
concept of friendship.117 Mainly on the basis of Boccaccio's version of the Titus and 
Gysippus story, Hutson for instance states that friendship in the early Italian 
Renaissance was primarily considered part of the 'capital' of someone and that 
Gysippus, by disappointing his other friends (who had arranged his marriage with 
Sophronia for him, which he then cancelled) consequently loses "the readiness of 
others to assist him in times of need."118 So, deprived of the support of his kin and 
friends, Gysippus' social status soon deteriorates and sinking into poverty, his only 
hope of help remains his friendship with Titus.119 In the end, however, his trust in the 
                                                   
114 In sixteenth-century England, for example, as in classical times, there was in fact no definite difference 
between the terms 'give' and 'lend'. To 'give' something for which one could probably expect something 
in return at some time in the future was also a sign of trust and respect. By this means, economical as 
well as social dependencies were created. Such dependencies were then also called friendships. Cf. 
Hutson 55.  
115 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.13, 1162b-1163a. The same view is expressed by Cicero in his Laelius 
(9.29-32). 
116 Hutson 54. For the role that women played in this "credit system of gift-friendship" (Hutson 7) in the 
Renaissance, see Hutson 7-11. 
117 Cf. Hutson 52ff and Puschmann-Nalenz 76ff. 
118 Hutson 52. 
119 See 96. 
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friend's readiness to help him, and the decision to give up all other relationships for the 
sake of the friendship with Titus proved justified and right. So, at first sight, the story 
seems to be of the same idealized kind as that about Damon and Pithias. Yet, 
questioning the virtuous and particularly the affectionate nature of Titus and 
Gysippus' friendship, Hutson argues: 
To read 'Titus and Gisippus' as a story which introduces into early modern 
culture a new ideal of masculine friendship as 'affective' rather than 
'instrumental' is surely to misrecognize as uncalculated the vastly superior 
instrumentality proved by Titus and Gisippus' version of 'friendship' over 
that practised by the 'frendes' that found Gisippus his bride.120 
Now, whether the fictional friendship between Titus and Gysippus really has to be 
interpreted as instrumental rather than affective, is certainly disputable; the intention 
of the story, at least, is definitely to present an affective one. That many, if not most 
friendships that really existed in Renaissance times were indeed primarily based on 
pragmatic considerations is though less debatable. This does of course not mean that 
the impression one gets from the friendship correspondence examined above that there 
were also truly affectionate friendships—even if they were naturally not as perfect as 
the idealized one between Damon and Pithias in Edwards's play—was wrong. Such 
friendships certainly existed as well. But some of the letters referred to above also 
show that the borderline between these clearly affectionate friendships and the 
obviously instrumental ones is hard to define. Especially from the letters between 
Ficino and Lorenzo de' Medici it becomes clear that there was also a special sort of 
friendship that has to be placed somewhere between the purely affectionate and the 
openly functional ones: differing from the first by the not completely unselfish 
intentions of the friends and from the latter by the degree to which the fact that these 
self-interested intentions truly exist is veiled. This sort of friendship is nowadays 
known as patronage, but in the Renaissance, it was always referred to as real 
friendship—and it was certainly often also truly considered to be one. Yet, the letters 
between Ficino and Medici clearly show that the relationship between a patron and his 
client was in fact a form of friendship in which the concealing of the actual motivations 
for its formation and existence was most skilfully practised. 
As a means of social and economic bonding, the system of patronage and clientage 
was certainly as important to the post-feudal societies of the Renaissance as that of 
livery and maintenance had been to the feudal ones of medieval times.121 But whereas 
                                                   
120 Hutson 64. 
121 On the system of patronage in the Renaissance in general, and on the manifestation of the phenomenon 
in the different national societies of Renaissance Europe in particular, see also, for example, F. W. Kent 
and Patricia Simons, "Renaissance Patronage: An Introductory Essay," Patronage, Art, and Society in 
Renaissance Italy, ed. F. W. Kent and Patricia Simons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987) 1-21; Guy Fitch Lytle 
and Stephen Orgel, eds., Patronage in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981); Louise Rice, ed., 
Patterns of Patronage in Renaissance Italy: Essays in Honor of John R. Spencer (Durham: Duke UP, 1994); 
Mary Hillingsworth, Patronage in Renaissance Italy: from 1400 to the Early Sixteenth Century (London: 
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the relationship between a liveryman and his master was considered in terms of 
loyalty and service, the connection of a client to his patron usually came, as we have 
seen, under the heading of friendship. However, that the relation between a patron 
and his client was referred to as friendship does of course not mean that they had 
necessarily also to be friends in reality, as Guy Fitch Lytle points out: 
The personal and social relationships of the Renaissance were an amalgam 
of overlapping ties: kinship, patronage, and friendship […]. Renaissance 
patronage was much broader than friendship and did not derive its impetus 
or justification from friendship per se. Patrons and clients did not have to be 
personal friends. But the convergence of linguistic usage forces the 
connection in all its ambiguity.122 
So, in general, the concept of friendship was merely used as a euphemism rather than 
as a model for the relationship between a patron and his client. Sometimes, however, 
such relationships bore in fact all the characteristics of truly affectionate friendships. In 
such cases, the friendships were indeed indistinguishable from those between men of 
equal status. This means that "friendships," as Lytle puts it, "could be vertical or 
horizontal with very much the same vocabulary and emotion."123 Yet, the fact that the 
patron-client-friendship was in reality a connection between friends of unequal social 
disposition was then often either ignored, or regarded as a considerable problem. The 
feeling of discomfort that this inequality in status could have caused with the inferior 
friend is still impressively expressed by Henry King in A Letter in 1657: 
You are my friend, and in that word to me 
Stand blazon'd in your noblest Heraldry; 
That style presents you full, and does relate 
The bounty of your love, and my own fate, 
Both which conspir'd to make me yours. A choice 
Which needs must in the giddy peoples voice, 
That onely judge the outfide, and like apes 
Play with our names, and comment on our shapes, 
Appear too light : but it lies you upon 
To justifie the disproportion. 
[……………………………………] 
Indeed 'tis seldom seen that such as you 
Adopt a friend, or for acquaintance sue ; 
Yet you did this vouchsafe, you did descend 
Below your self to raise an humble friend, 
And fix him in your love : where I will stand 
The constant subject of your free command. 
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Had I no ayerie thoughts sure you would teach 
Me higher then my own dull sphere to reach : 
And by reflex instruct me to appear 
Something (though course and plain) fit for your wear 
Know, best of friends, however wild report 
May justly say I am unapt to sort 
With your opinion or society, 
(Which truth would shame me did I it deny) 
There's something in me sayes, I dare make good, 
When honour calls me, all I want in blood. 
Put off your Giant titles, then I can 
Stand in your judements blank an equal man. 
Though Hills advanced are above the Plain, 
They are but higher earth, nor must disdain 
Alliance with the Vale : we see a spade 
Can level them, and make a Mount a Glade. 
Howere we differ in the Heralds book, 
He that mankindes extraction shall look 
In Natures Rolles, must grant we all agree 
In our best parts, immortal pedigree […].124 
In such relationships as here described by King, the friendship of the unequal friends 
was, as Hutson remarks, "evidently an economic dependency as well as an affective 
bond."125 It is indeed the fact that in the Renaissance "'friendship' could be both the 
synonym and the antithesis of 'patronage',"126 as Lytle puts it, that is mainly 
responsible for the difficulties that most modern readers have with the understanding 
of the connection between friendship and patronage at that time. So, to better 
understand the nature of these instrumental friendships of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, and the interpretation of friendship that justified the pragmatic view of it, 
we now have to go a few years back in time, to one of the texts from the beginning of 
the discussion of friendship in the Renaissance, namely to the fourth book of Leon 
Battista Alberti's Libri della famiglia, to his treatise "De amicitia," which has already been 
quoted from above (see 75). 
The Libri della famiglia were at first written by Alberti only for the members of his 
own family and for his friends and were therefore circulating for a very long time 
merely in several manuscript copies (of which at least 13 have survived from the 
quattrocento). The first printing of any part of the work—precisely of the third book, 
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the "Economicus"—took indeed place not before 1734, and since then, either simply 
this third book or the first three books were printed. Only in 1908 a complete edition of 
the Libri della famiglia appeared in print, containing all four books, and thus also the 
one on friendship, the "De amicitia," on which we will concentrate here.127 
Alberti's 'books on the family', or rather 'on the household', might be seen as a 
bourgeois equivalent of the extremely popular mirrors for princes and courtesy books 
of the time. They are, as it were, handbooks for the right conduct and guidelines for the 
right lifestyle of merchants and occasional courtiers. Like most other mirrors that were 
written by humanists at that time, the Libri della famiglia mainly reflect not on Christian 
but on classical authors and sources to support their opinions and ideas concerning the 
important matters of life. For a merchant or a courtier with mercantile interests in the 
early quattrocento, these were such important subjects as, for instance: the fickleness of 
fortune, the meeting of adversity and prosperity, husbandry, education, old age and 
the differences and obligations between the generations, the family, marriage and love, 
and of course friendship, dealt with by Alberti in the four books 'De officio senum erga 
iuvenes et minorum erga maiores et de educandis liberis', 'De re uxoria', 'Economicus', 
and 'De amicitia'. It is quite remarkable that the first three of these four books must 
have been produced before the year 1434 and within a relatively short time, i.e. within 
about 90 days, whereas the fourth book, the one on friendship, was separately written 
in 1437.128 Alberti then obviously considered the subject important enough to write an 
individual treatise about it and to include this a bit later in his Libri della famiglia, after 
he had presented it as one of his contributions to the poetry contest he initiated and 
organized in 1441, the Certame coronario.129 Of course, all the subjects dealt with in the 
four books are topics that had already been extensively treated by the classical 
philosophers, and in imitation of another classical literary tradition, Alberti also 
presents his thoughts in the form of dialogues, dialogues that take place between 
various members of his family and primarily at the dinner table, reminding one the 
form of conversation in Plato's Symposium. 
In contrast to Ficino, who is to write his Platonic-Christian treatise on love, his De 
amore, 30 years later also in dialogue form—yet this time directly imitating the setting 
of Plato's Symposium—Alberti deals with the topic of friendship within the context of 
his whole work, and especially in the fourth book, by entirely following the humanistic 
ideas, drawing the views on friendship he wants to present almost exclusively from the 
classical sources, with hardly any reference to Christian ones. In this respect, Alberti's 
work clearly corresponds to the humanistic vogue of the time. However, rather 
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unusual for a humanistic text—particularly for a text of a more theoretical than 
poetical nature—was apparently his decision to compose the Libri della famiglia not in 
Latin but in the Tuscan vernacular. Up to the early fifteenth century, mirrors and 
courtesy books, like all theoretical texts (theological, philosophical, or political), had 
usually been written in Latin, and even throughout the whole Renaissance the 
medieval tradition to compose non-poetic texts in Latin was largely followed by most 
European writers, and especially by the humanistic ones. In fact, many of the greatest 
theoretical works of the age, written by so prominent authors as Ficino, Pico della 
Mirandola, Erasmus, More, or even still Bacon, had first been written and published in 
Latin, before much later also vernacular versions of their writings appeared. 
Interestingly enough, however, as far as such books as the mirrors for princes, the 
courtesy books, and other enchiridions of this kind are concerned, it seems to have 
been in fact a common habit of the time to write these works no longer in Latin but in 
the respective national tongue of their authors, so that unlike other theoretical texts 
nearly all important examples of this genre that were written in the Renaissance are 
composed in the vernacular, like, for example, Il libro del cortegiano (1528) by Baldesar 
Castiglione, The Boke Named the Governour (1531) by Thomas Elyot, Il principe (1532) by 
Niccolò Machiavelli, or The Schoolmaster (printed posthumously in 1570) by Roger 
Ascham (1515-68). Only Erasmus, perhaps the greatest of all humanists, still wrote 
even his enchiridions in Latin, and so also his handbook of the Christian Soldier, the 
Echiridion Militis Christiani (1503) and his treatise on the education of a Christian 
prince, the Institutio Principis Christiani (1516) are, following the Roman Catholic 
tradition of composing Christian text, written in the language of the Church. It was, 
however, certainly this Christian orientation of his texts, in contrast to the rather 
worldly ones of the others mentioned, that made Latin a much more applicable 
language for their composition. Moreover, Erasmus's texts were in fact not intended 
for a large or even uneducated readership, but instead for a very exclusive and 
international one. His Institutio Principis Christiani, for example, was dedicated to the 
Holy Roman Emperor Charles V (1500-58), but copies of the text were also sent to 
Francis I, the King of France (1494–1547) and to Henry VIII of England.130 
Now, in contrast to Erasmus, Alberti's intention was not to make his work accessible 
only to a highly educated international readership. He wanted his books to be 
understandable for the people most close to him, i.e. at first for the members of his own 
family and later on also for all citizens of Florence—even for the illiterate among them, 
the 'non litteratissimi cittadini', who could only get access to his ideas by having his 
work read to them. As part of his endeavours to establish the volgare, the Italian 
vernacular, as an acceptable alternative to the traditional Latin as the preferred 
                                                   
130 Cf. "Erasmus, Desiderius," Rundle 145. 
Representations of friendship between idealism and realism 141 
language for poetical as theoretical texts, Alberti even produced a first grammar of the 
Tuscan tongue, the Grammatica Lingua Tosca.131 
However, that Alberti considered the volgare and not Latin the ideal language for his 
Libri della famiglia was certainly not only because he wanted all members of his family 
or all citizens of Florence to be able to read them; obviously, he thereby also wanted to 
emphasize his intention to deal with the topics of the four books not merely on an 
academic level but on a very pragmatic one. This attitude towards the treatment of so 
theoretical subjects as those dealt with in his work is, of course, again a typical 
humanist one. To regard the favourite subjects of classical philosophy not simply as 
ideal topics of learned treatises in which the theories of the leading thinkers of ancient 
times simply serve as sources of ideas, conceptions, and commonplaces that might be 
copied and rearranged to produce useful guidelines for real life (as it has been done by 
many Renaissance authors), but to test these theories for their practical value and to 
take them as a basis for one's own reflections on the subjects that really matter in 
people's everyday life, is indeed characteristic of a humanistic approach to ancient 
philosophy. To emphasize this attitude, Alberti thus begins his discussion of the 
practical value of friendship with having Buto, an old servant of his family, comment 
on the view on friendship that was commonly held by the scholars of his time: "Molte 
diceano dell'amicizia cose bella a udirle, ma cose quale a chi poi le pruova favole."132 
And to give a typical example of these idealized but unrealistic ideas about friendship, 
he adds: "Diceano che a ben fermare l'amicizia convenia che due in uno si 
congiungessero, e bisognarvi non so io che moggio di sale."133 With this hit at the 
proverbial bushel of salt that friends should have eaten together before they might 
consider themselves to be real ones, Buto illustrates how unrealistic he thinks the 
classical idealizations to be. 
Whether unrealistic or not, the idea of the union of only two friends that is so close 
and intimate that they even become one another's other self, is not the one that Alberti 
regards as a very useful one anyway. For him, the true meaning of friendship is clear, 
and he has it expressed by his relative Lionardo Alberti already in the second book of 
the Libri della famiglia: "Pertanto a voi sempre stia in mente, dell'altre cose, quali sono 
non molte a numero ma ben necessarie alle famiglie, e sanza le quali niuna può essere 
felice e gloriosa, sola l'amicizia sempre fu quella la quale fra tutte in ogni fortuna tiene 
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132 Alberti, I libri della famiglia 264. – "They said many beautiful and well-sounding things about 
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il principato."134 Friendship is for Alberti therefore not merely a personal matter, it is a 
means by which the members of a family build up networks of contacts that will be 
useful and advantageous not only for the individual but for the family as such. So, the 
friendships of the individual become here an instrument for the security and the 
support of all of his relatives as well. 
To illustrate how such friendships might be formed, Alberti, at the beginning of the 
fourth book, introduces a distant relation of him, the courtier Piero Alberti (1357-1429), 
and has him tell of his life and his experiences as a 'friend' of a duke, a king, and a 
pope, "per fare noi altri, quali ancora in questa età di dì in dì cerchiamo essere, in farci 
amare più dotti, onde alla famiglia nostra quanto in noi sia accresciamo da ogni parte 
presidio e molto favore."135 So, when Piero now comes to describe how he made 
friends with these important and powerful men and thus secured their goodwill and 
support for himself, he emphasizes at first again how interesting and useful he thinks 
his listeners will find his narration: "E credo vi diletterà udire mie varie e diverse vie, 
mie caute e poco usate forse e raro udite astuzie, molto utilissime a conversare con 
buona grazia in mezzo el numero de' cittadini."136 He then begins his report with the 
story of how he became the friend and protégée of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the Duke of 
Milan. As he had never met the duke before, who therefore could not know him, 
Piero's initial aim was to get access to Visconti's inner circle of courtiers by first making 
friends with one of his closest confidants. He did in fact succeed in his aims, became 
acquainted with the duke, won his favour, and then even became one of his closest 
confidants himself. The duke soon held him in high regard as he especially appreciated 
Piero's restrained and moderate character, his wise and knowledgeable advice, and his 
apparent virtuousness. Once Piero had thus made friends with Visconti, he did not, in 
fact, make use of the trust that the duke put in him and the favour he bestowed on him 
merely for his own sake, but successfully tried to employ his influence with Visconti 
also for the benefit of his relatives. Here, the idea that to have the opportunity to make 
use of one's friendships to support one's family was one of the major advantages and 
one of the main functions of patronage is again explicitly stressed by Alberti, when he 
has Piero remark: "E le amicizie de' principi massime si voglion acquistare e aoperare 
                                                   
134 Alberti, Della famiglia 100. – "Always keep in mind that among the few things which are really vital to 
the family, and without which none can be fortunate and distinguished, friendship has always, under 
all circumstances, been the [first]." Trans. Watkins 106. Alteration mine. 
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per accrescere e amplificare a' suoi e alla famiglia sua nome e buona fama e degna 
autorità e laude."137 
Piero then comes to continue his narration with the story of how he won the favour 
of King Ladislas of Naples, after Visconti had died and he had to leave the duke's court 
in search of a new patron. He became acquainted with the king on an occasion when 
Ladislas was hunting and suddenly got into the precarious situation of being attacked 
by a bear. Piero came to his assistance and saved the king's life—though not by actively 
fighting with the bear but by merely having it brought done by the two dogs he had 
with him. Afterwards, however, Piero declares in front of the king's men that it was 
Ladislas himself who had bagged the bear. This, of course, secured him the favour of 
the king, who, in contrast to the duke, who had always most appreciated Piero's 
intelligence and virtuousness, liked Piero also in the following most for his sporting 
and fighting spirit, and for his flattering remarks about him.138 
Now briefly reflecting on his friendships with the duke and the king, Piero explains 
what difficult and hard a work it is to stay in a patron's favour. With the duke, he 
always had to be vigilant and well-informed, as he had to have good advice and 
pleasant news ready at any time to serve him. With Ladislas, however, he was 
constantly busy entertaining the king with new games and sporting activities, so that 
he had hardly any time for himself. Being a courtier and client at his time thus seems to 
have been a full-time job indeed.139 
Finally, Piero comes to describe how he managed to win the favour of pope 
Giovanni XXIII in Bologna, when he had to find a new patron after Ladislas's death. 
This time, he became acquainted with his new patron, the pope, not on his own but on 
the pope's initiative, namely, when he was summoned to appear before him because 
Giovanni was in need of money, which he intended to obtain from the Alberti family. 
So, Piero seized the opportunity to make friends with the pope and by assuring him of 
the humble obedience and loyalty of the House of Alberti—and, not least, by also 
paying him 80.000 gold coins—secured for the Albertis (and for himself as their 
representative) the pope's favour, good graces, and benevolence. So, by taking 
advantage of the pope's greed for money and his belief that the wealthy Albertis would 
also in the future assist him with their financial strength, Piero used the pope's 
patronage to be granted many wishes, favours, offices, and benefices—and if he asked 
not for himself, he made sure that the other members of his family benefited from his 
friendship with Giovanni.140 
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Most striking about the patron-client-relationship between Piero and the pope that 
Alberti here presents is in fact the way in which both parties are seeking to take 
advantage of each other without having to give too much in return themselves. Now, 
as far as the client is concerned, this seems to have been regarded as just the usual and 
commonly accepted way to look after one's own interests. On the other hand, however, 
Piero fiercely complains about this behaviour by the pope, for he, as the patron, should 
not seek to make friends with his clients in the hope of personal gain. This was 
obviously considered an indecent and even ignominious practice that is not becoming 
a patron. The picture that Alberti here gives of the pope does in fact correspond to the 
utterly negative one that we can find in so many sources of the time, which harshly 
criticize the papacy as the Catholic Church as such, not only for the pope's insatiable 
lust for power but also for the priests' wantonness, gluttony, avarice, and all too 
worldly lifestyle. This widespread disapproval of the priests' manners and especially 
of the greedy and miserly behaviour by those of the higher ranks among them, is also 
shared by Buto, the old servant, who sums up the common opinion about the clergy 
when Piero has finished his narration: "E troverrete così essere el vero: la natura ce 'l 
dimostra, che di cucuzzolo raso non bene si cava pelo. E sono questi preti fatti come la 
lucerna, quale posta in terra a tutti fa lume, e in alto elevata, quanto più sale, tanto di 
sé più rende inutile ombra."141 
The account Piero here gives of his life as a client to several patrons shows quite 
clearly, as Watkins puts it, "what it meant to be a Machiavellian courtier before the 
time of Machiavelli and Castiglione."142 With the stories of his friendships with the 
three princes—the duke, the king, and the pope—and the description of the three 
different ways in which Piero won their favour, Alberti apparently also wants to create 
a connection with Aristotle's theory of the three different kinds of friendship. When we 
look at the princes' motivation for making friends with Piero, we will in fact find that 
with the duke it was Piero's virtuousness, with the king his pleasant company, and 
with the pope his usefulness as the provider of his family's money, for which he was 
most appreciated.143 And Adovardo, another one of Alberti's relatives, refering to 
Piero's friendships even explicitely speaks of "quelle tre oneste, voluttuose e utile 
amicizie."144 Yet, however obvious the connection at first seems to be, on closer 
examination we will find that there is merely a very superficial correspondence 
between Piero's friendships and those mentioned by Aristotle. In each of the three 
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kinds of friendship that Aristotle refers to in his theory, the friends meet on an equal 
basis and have almost the same motivation for making friends with each other. Of 
course, also Aristotle acknowledges the possibility that in a friendship of the inferior 
kinds one friend likes the other for his usefulness while the other likes him for his 
pleasant company, but in a friendship of the perfect kind, according to his theory, both 
friends cannot but love each other for their virtuousness. In a friendship of this kind, 
there is indeed no place for any reflections upon the utility value of their friendship. 
So, we might say, that although Piero's friendships with the king and with the pope 
were in fact such of the inferior kind described by Aristotle, his friendship with the 
duke was by no means one of the perfect kind, as it was not founded on the friends' 
mutual interest in the virtuousness of each other. Piero's motivation for making friends 
with the princes was in fact always the same, and one that was far from being a 
virtuous one: the hope of personal gain. The classical idea that true and perfect 
friendship could in any case merely exist between equals—an idea that is not only 
stressed by Aristotle but also by Cicero and many other ancient writers—is of course 
not even mentioned by Alberti, as, in the given context, it would indeed hardly 
support his view of patronage as an honourable kind of friendship. 
On the whole, the classical conceptions of friendship and the philosophical 
reflections upon it are indeed not really supporting Alberti's view of the matter. And 
although, by indirectly referring to Aristotle, he obviously seeks to create a connection 
between the practical examples of friendship just given and the ancient conceptions of 
it, he cannot really provide any classical idea that would justify his pragmatic attitude 
towards the subject. In fact, the only of the classical notions of friendship that would 
somehow correspond with the way Piero seems to understand the meaning of 
friendship are those in the Epicurean tradition, but due to the bad reputation that 
Epicurus enjoyed in the Renaissance—mainly because of the fierce criticism of his 
views by so popular and highly esteemed writers as Cicero—they are, of course, not 
applicable.145 All the approved views on friendship that derived from the classical 
                                                   
145 According to the Epicurean conception, a friendship, once it is formed, is indeed cherished for its own 
sake. The initial motivation to form friendships, however, is nothing but man's natural quest for 
happiness and pleasure, since a happy life can only be enjoyed when it remains happy, and the 
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view on friendship it has to be seen against the background of Epicurus ethical philosophy. He and his 
followers believed pleasure (¹δον»/hēdonē) to be the chief good of life, and friendship to be the 
natural means to achieve and maintain pleasure. (Cf. Diogenes Laertius 10.127-132; Carlo Diano, 
"Epicureanism," Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 25 May. 2000 <http://search.eb.com/bol/ 
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has the Epicurean view of friendship presented by his friend L. Manlius Torquatus, who has obviously 
been in sympathy with this conception himself: "Nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et 
metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe 
pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. Atque ut odia, invidiae, despicationes adversantur 
voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam 
146 The marriage of true minds 
conceptions, however, are far too idealized as to support Alberti's approach to a 
practical theory of the subject. He has therefore Adovardo claim that, after they have 
listened to Piero's practical examples of friendship, they are now in need for a thread 
and a texture ("filo e testura"), i.e. for a closer analysis of the matter.146 For Adovardo, 
as he makes it very clear, only the practical value, i.e. the utility of friendship is of any 
interest. As he is in the field of medicine more interested in the practical means by 
which a man's health might be maintained or regained than in any theoretical 
statements about what the scholars think health really is or what the function of the 
different parts of the body might be, he is also in the discussion of friendship rather 
interested in the methods and means by which one can make friends and keep them, in 
the ways a good friendship can be fostered, and in how bad friendships might be 
ended without having to break them off and thereby make a former friend one's 
enemy, than in the learned contemplations of what the nature of friendship is or 
should be.147 We might therefore sum up his argumentation by saying that if the idea 
that friendship is a virtue, or at least something that leads to virtue, which then leads to 
happiness, is true, it would be much more interesting to know which realistic way one 
can go to achieve this happiness, rather than to reflect upon the question what this way 
                                                                                                                                                            
amicis quam sibi; quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac 
posteri temporis. Quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere 
possumus neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri nisi aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc 
ipsum efficitur in amicitia et amicitia cum voluptate connectitur. Nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia 
aeque atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. Quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga 
amicum quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, eosdem suscipiet 
propter amici voluptatem." Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum 1.20.66-68. – "A solitary, friendless life 
must be beset by secret dangers and alarms. Hence reason itself advises the acquisition of friends; their 
possession gives confidence, and a firmly rooted hope of winning pleasure. And just as hatred, jealousy 
and contempt are hindrances to pleasure, so friendship is the most trustworthy preserver and also 
creator of pleasure alike for our friends and for ourselves. It affords us enjoyment in the present, and it 
inspires us with hopes for the near and distant future. Thus it is not possible to secure uninterrupted 
gratification in life without friendship, nor yet to preserve friendship itself unless we love our friends 
as much as ourselves. Hence this unselfishness does occur in friendship, while also friendship is closely 
linked with pleasure. For we rejoice in our friends' joy as much as in our own, and are equally pained 
by their sorrows. Therefore the Wise Man will feel exactly the same towards his friend as he does 
towards himself, and will exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as he would for his own." 
Trans. H. Rackham, De finibus bonorum et malorum, by Marcus Tullius Cicero, The Loeb Classical Library 
40 (London: Heinemann, 1971) 71. 
 Yet, the dislike of the Epicurean conception, and especially of the idea that friendships are merely 
formed for the sake of utility, was in fact a feeling commonly experienced by stoically influenced 
philosophers at that time. Cicero himself, for example, after having Torquatus present the Epicurean 
conception of friendship in book 1 of his De finibus bonorum et malorum, criticizes this view in book 2. 
Here he even assumes that the Epicureans only pretended to love friends for their own sake, since this 
affectation of affection would help them to benefit even more from their friendships, as the feeling of 
being loved, even if it is only pretended, would flatter their friends and thus preserve their friendships, 
and would hence provide the Epicureans with security, utility, and pleasure on a permanent basis. For 
Cicero, the essence of the Epicurean conception of friendship can therefore be summed up in a single 
statement: "Utilitatis causa amicitia est quaesita." Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum 2.26.84. – 
"Utility is the reason for which friendship is sought after." Trans. mine. 
146 Cf. Alberti, Della famiglia 283. 
147 Cf. Alberti, Della famiglia 284. 
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could ideally look like. This is then also precisely what Adovardo criticizes the classical 
treatments of the topic for: 
Nam e che utile porge in vita sapere disputando persuadere che la sola qual 
sia amicizia onesta persevera durabile e perpetua più che l'utile o la 
voluttuosa? che ancora troverrò io forse più numero d'amici, quando 
Pitagora filosofo m'arà persuaso che degli amici tutte le cose debbano fra chi 
insieme s'ama essere comuni? che credo quelli me ameranno con più fede e 
più constanza, quando Zenone, quell'altro, o Aristotele filosofo m'arà 
persuaso che l'amico, come domandato Zenone rispuose, sia quasi un altro 
sé stessi, o sia, come rispuose Aristotele, l'amicizia ha due corpi, una anima? 
Né Platone ancora mi satisfa dicendo che alcune amicizie sono da essa 
natura quasi constituite, alcune unite con semplice e aperta coniunzione ed 
equalità d'animo, alcune con minor vinculo collegate e solo con 
domestichezza, conversazione e convivere, uso d'amicizia, contenute; […]. 
E dicono che la virtù è vinculo e ottima conciliatrice della amicizia, e che 
l'amicizia fiorisce a buon frutto, poiché fra loro el beneficio sia ricevuto, lo 
studio conosciuto, adiuntovi consuetudine. E dicono starvi la virtù ad 
onestà, la consuetudine ad iocondità, ed esservi una quasi necessitudine 
creata dai benefici, quale induca ad amare. Simile né molto suttili, né assai al 
vivere utilissimi detti sì certo sapevi tu non inesperto prima che mai gli 
leggessi altrove scritti.148 
In contrast to Lionardo, to whom these words are addressed, Adovardo does not 
believe in the practical value of these notions. For him, in this wicked world people 
would always only feather their own nest, and one has therefore to be at any time very 
cautious and alert not to be deceived by them. So, he doubts that the classical 
propositions are of any practical use for the actual making of friends, since, as he 
rhetorically asks, "chi mai si credesse colla sola simplicità e bontà potersi agiugnere 
amicizia, o pur conoscenze alcune non dannose e alfine tediose?"149 Lionardo, however, 
                                                   
148 Alberti, Della famiglia 284, 287. – "Really, what is the practical use of being able to argue in debate that 
only friendship based on virtue is strong and enduring while friendships for utility and pleasure are 
transitory? Shall I find more friends, perhaps, when I have been persuaded by the philosopher 
Pythagoras that all things ought to be held in common by truly affectionate friends? And those I have, 
shall I suppose they will love me with greater faith and constancy when, from that other philosopher, 
Zeno, or from Aristotle, I have learned to consider a friend another self, as Zeno once called him, or to 
view friendship with Aristotle as a being composed of two bodies and one soul? Nor does Plato satisfy 
me any better when he instructs us that some friendships arise as if by nature, others through the 
simple and open alliance and congruence of souls, and still others only through the lesser bonds of 
habit, association, and continued intimacy; […]. 
 They say that virtue is the bond and the best source of friendship, and that friendship flourishes and 
brings forth good fruit where there is good will, agreement on goals, and frequent association. They say 
that virtue leads to an honorable friendship, and frequent meeting gives pleasure, while mutual service 
creates a near certainty of mutual affection. You, who have some experience, certainly knew such 
things, which are neither very subtle nor very practical in their application, long before you ever read 
them written anywhere." Trans. Watkins 266, 268. Alberti's knowledge of Aristotle's ideas of friendship 
certainly derives from a reception of the Nicomachean Ethics, that about Pythagoras, Zeno, and Plato, 
however, can only be an indirect one acquired from Diogenes Laertius' doxographical account of these 
philosophers. Cf. Diogenes Laertius 8.10, 7.23, and 3.81. 
149 Alberti, Della famiglia 285. – "[…] how can anyone [believe] that mere simplicity and goodness will get 
him friends, or even acquaintances not actually harmful and annoying?" Trans. Watkins 266. Alteration 
mine. 
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argues that it is well worth taking into consideration what the classical authors have to 
say about the subject, as their notions of friendship are not wrong and are at least 
providing a first approach to an understanding of the subject and thereby also a 
theoretical foundation, a guideline as it were, for the actual handling of friendships in 
reality.150 He does indeed succeed in convincing Adovardo of the not completely 
useless meaning of the classical ideas, who then even has to admit: "Queste adunque 
simili scolastice e definizioni e descrizioni in ozio e in ombra fra' litterati non nego 
sono pur ioconde, e quasi preludio come all'uso dell'arme lo schermire."151 And a bit 
later he seeks to compromise with Lionardo by concluding: "Né io a te negherei, 
Lionardo, e' precetti antiqui assai essere utilissimi, né però ti concederò che in questo 
artificio siano quanto vi desidero scrittori molto copiosi; già che oggi, come tu sai, 
troviamo in questa materia de' nostri scrittori non molti più che solo Cicerone, e in 
qualche epistola Seneca; e de' Greci hanno Aristotele, Luciano."152 
Since Adovardo agrees with Lionardo about the importance that friendship has to 
man's life, but insists on his view that one needs practical guidelines for the right 
conduct in friendship rather than an idealized description of it, they now come to a 
discussion of how friendships should best be handled in reality. On the question of the 
best way to make friends, Adovardo first explains that one has to act very cleverly and 
skilfully to endear oneself to one's future companions ("E meco compresi bisognarci 
varie arti, vario ingegno, e non poca prudenza, e molto uso a legarsi gli animi degli 
uomini, […]."153), and Lionardo adds that one has to arouse in them a feeling of 
benevolence and goodwill for oneself, just as strong as it is necessary for the beginning 
of a friendship ("[…] quanto basti in loro accrescere molta benivolenza e ferma grazia 
[…]."154). To maintain the friendships that were formed in this way, Lionardo remarks, 
one has to cultivate them by regularly meeting with one's friends and by making the 
contact for both sides a jolly, honourable, and useful one: "[…] quale, a mantenerla, 
                                                   
150 Cf. Alberti, Della famiglia 288. 
151 Alberti, Della famiglia 285. – "I don't deny that the scholastic definitions and descriptions composed by 
learned men in their sheltered leisure are useful as a kind of preparation, like jousting for the use of 
arms." Trans. Watkins 266. 
152 Alberti, Della famiglia 286. – "I won't deny, Lionardo, the usefulness of the old writers' counsels. Yet I 
cannot agree that there is [as] much written on this problem and the art of resolving it [as I would 
wish]. Today, as you know, we have of our own writers only Cicero and an occasional letter of Seneca 
and not much more on the subject; among the Greeks we have Aristotle and Lucian." Trans Watkins 
267. Addition mine. From Adovardo's assertion that there were not many classical sources dealing with 
friendship, and from the few text he explicitly refers to, we can quite clearly see which and how few of 
the many texts on friendship that classical literature in fact provides, were actually only known in the 
early quattrocento—at least when we assume, as we might certainly do, that Alberti, as a well-educated 
humanist, had indeed knowledge of all sources on the topic accessible at his time. 
153 Alberti, Della famiglia 292. – "I have found, too, that we must know diverse arts, must have a supple 
spirit, must show no little discretion as well as assiduity, if we would attach the spirit of men to 
ourselves." Trans. Watkins 273. 
154 Alberti, Della famiglia 291. – "[…] to increase as much benevolence and steady kindness in them as 
necessary […]." Trans. mine. 
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nulla stimo più ivi ben sia accommodato che l'uso frequente, lieto, onesto e nutrito non 
senza qualche utile."155 Here, Alberti now combines the three different types of 
friendship, which he has, in the description of Piero's friendships, just before regarded 
separately, into a single one, one that is at the same time pleasant, useful, and 
honourable. This, however, is exactly the major characteristic that Aristotle ascribes to 
only the perfect friendship, which is first of all honourable because of the virtuousness 
of the friends, and which thereby then also becomes pleasant and useful. So, Alberti 
tries once more to create a connection between his idea of a practicable friendship and 
Aristotle's idealized concept of true and perfect friendship. 
Now proceeding to the question what kind of men one should choose as friends, 
Adovardo stresses that the best candidates are the rich and powerful, as those are the 
ones whose wealth and influence will be of the greatest use to oneself. Besides this, by 
the friendship with these men, who have also got many other friends, one will get into 
contact with various other, probably less influential or rich but still useful people one 
can then make friends with. The friendship with such men will therefore have a 
snowball effect and one can finally choose from a great variety of potential friends and 
can acquire as many of them as one likes to. Of course, it is not that easy to make 
friends with the rich and powerful, as many others are also trying to become 
acquainted with them, and so we are again facing the problem that might be seen as 
the key question of Alberti's whole treatise and to which already Piero, at the 
beginning of the book, could not provide a satisfying answer, and had thus to admit: 
"Non sapre' io qui certo averarvi qual più sia, o la virtù, o pure le ricchezze, utile a farsi 
amare."156 This is in fact the one question that dominates Alberti's reflections upon the 
topic throughout the whole book: shall we really try to translate the idealized 
philosophical idea of perfect friendship that is based on virtue, which the ancients have 
bequeathed us, into reality, or shall we rather conceive of friendship as a practical and 
useful relationship with the rich and powerful that redounds to our own advantage, 
and try to set up guidelines that, when put into practice, might help us to acquire such 
friendships? That Alberti himself, in contrast to many other humanistic writers of his 
time (here, in Della famiglia, represented by Lionardo, who always advocates the 
classical conceptions), rather supports the latter view (here held by Adovardo), 
becomes quite clear from the way in which he deals with the topic. 
Now, Adovardo at least admits to agree with Lionardo and the classics about the 
notion that true friendship can only exist between really good men, as only the good 
could love each other and themselves. Although not mentioning him directly, 
                                                   
155 Alberti, Della famiglia 291. – "To maintain these I suppose there is nothing better than frequent 
intercourse, happy, honorable, and substantial--[not without any usefulness to it]." Trans. Watkins 272. 
Addition mine. 
156 Alberti, Della famiglia 267. – "I am not sure whether I should declare to you that it is virtue that makes a 
man well loved, or wealth." Trans. Watkins 250. 
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Adovardo refers to the idea Aristotle elaborates in the Nicomachean Ethics that merely a 
good man could love himself, as a bad one had not only nothing to be proud of and 
thus no reason for self-love but would also compromise himself by his vicious 
behaviour, what a man who loves himself would never do.157 A man who cannot love 
himself, Adovardo states, has no moral principles he would act according to, and must 
thus be considered an immoral character. The reason for which such a person should 
not be chosen as one's friend, according to Adovardo, has though nothing to do with 
this philosophical estimation but with the fact that the friendship with such a man 
would not only not redound to one's advantage and honour but would on the contrary 
bring one even into disrepute, due to the bad reputation of one's friend. Yet, Adovardo 
also admits that he still wants to be loved not only by the good but also by such bad 
men, as it is much more advantageous to have them as friends than as enemies.158 One 
has therefore to be very careful in choosing one's friends.159 Now, this is of course a 
very practical view of the matter, though not really an honourable or even virtuous 
one. 
Coming to the classical notion that true friendship can only exist between equals, 
which is expressed by the ancient authors in references to the friends as alter egos, for 
example, or by making use of the image of the single soul that dwells in the two bodies 
of the friends, Adovardo now agrees that one should be equal to ones friends—or 
rather that one should seem to be equal to them. For him, it is in fact not necessary—as 
far as the acquisition of new friends is concerned—that one is really equal to one's 
future friends as far as one can at least appear to be so: "E come diceano sapea 
Alcibiade, così noi imitaremo el cameleonte, animale quale dicono a ogni prossimo 
colore sé varia ad assimigliarlo. Così noi co' tristi saremo severi, co' iocundi festivi, co' 
liberali magnifici […]."160 The mere appearance of equality, according to Adovardo, is 
often indeed sufficient to arose in others a feeling of goodwill for us. Yet, although the 
                                                   
157 See 52. 
158 After the discussion of friendship, Alberti in fact also devotes a considerable part of the fourth book of 
the Libri della famiglia to his reflections upon the topic of enmity. In the present study, we are not going 
any further into detail about this part as our interest shall here be limited to Alberti's representation of 
friendship only, but the mere fact that he includes a lengthy discussion of enmity in his treatise on 
friendship clearly shows that for him, there is indeed a close connection between the two subjects. 
Regarding the point of view from which he considers the matter, this does of course make sense, as he 
is interested not so much in any isolated philosophical theory but in the practical value of things. 
According to this pragmatic attitude towards the matters of life, he has to regard others of course as 
people who are either good, bad or negligible concerning one's own interests. Therefore, he puts much 
emphasis on his opinion that for a man who has to survive in such insecure times as his own, it is not 
only important to know how to make friends but also to know how to avoid making enemies. See 
Alberti, Della famiglia 319-335. 
159 Cf. Alberti, Della famiglia 293. 
160 Alberti, Della famiglia 335. – "And as Alcibiades, as they say, was able to do, so let us imitate the 
chameleon, an animal which is said to be able to vary its color to suit its environment. Therefore, with 
sorrowful men we will be serious, with cheerful men joyous and with liberal men generous." Trans. 
mine. 
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pretence of equality is a well-tried method to win the favour of new friends, it is also 
an art that requires not little skill and cunning, as he explicitly stresses:  
Ma per in tempo accommodarsi e accrescere amicizia, fia luogo 
comprendere ne' gesti, parole, uso e conversazioni altrui, di che ciascuno si 
diletti, di che s'atristi, qual cosa el muova a cruccio, ad ilarità, a favellare, a 
tacere. E per più certificarsi quali in loro siano affetti e proclinazioni d'animo 
e volontà, non manca certa ottima astuzia da non molti conosciuta […].161 
This, of course, rather sounds like a piece of advice addressed to prospective diplomats 
or governors than to prospective friends. So, once again, one is inclined to compare 
Alberti's work with Machiavelli's Il principe, written almost a century later. The 
parallels in the two texts, at least, are most striking. 
According to the pragmatic attitude towards friendship that Adovardo here takes, 
he is of course not only interested in the ways in which one can make friends but also 
in those in which one can abandon them once they have become unpleasant, awkward, 
or simply useless. Concerning this question, Lionardo now suggests that the best 
method would be to merely reduce the frequency of the contact with those friends one 
wants to part from: "[…] a discinderla chi negasse che'l disuso più che cosa altra alcuna 
molto giova? Cosa niuna tanto cancella dell'animo qualunque ferma inscritta si sia 
memoria, quanto fa la dissuetudine."162 Here, it becomes very obvious that Alberti's 
practical view of friendship has indeed nothing to do with the classical one of vera 
amicitia, as with the classics, friendship is nearly always represented as precisely that 
kind of relationship that withstands the discomforts of the partners' absence from each 
other best. True friendship, they say, can even survive the longest separation of the 
friends, as they would remain close to each other in spirit.163 On the other hand, of 
course, Lionardo's suggestion does indeed also remind one of Cicero's advice given in 
the Laelius that when the friends are seriously at variance with each other over certain 
key issues and their friendship is past saving it should rather peter out than be 
abruptly broken off.164 Although Alberti does not mention Cicero or his Laelius directly, 
it is quite clear from which source he borrows his views on the topic of friendship 
dissolution. Like Cicero, he stresses that it is very important to avoid the rise of enmity 
between former friends, and that one should therefore treat someone who has once be 
one's friend accordingly, i.e. in a respectful way that makes it not impossible that he 
                                                   
161 Alberti, Della famiglia 297. – "But to adapt quickly to a situation and to make friends it is necessary to 
study the gestures, words, customs, and conversation of others. One must learn what pleases and what 
saddens each one, what moves him to anger, to laughter, to talk, and to silence. Truly to know the 
emotions, to recognize the inclinations of people's temperament and character, one must not lack a 
special kind of excellent cleverness which is rare in the world." Trans. Watkins 277. 
162 Alberti, Della famiglia 291. – "As to dissolving friendships, who would deny that lack of contact is the 
most applicable means. Nothing so thoroughly cancels out even the strongest impression as absence." 
Trans. Watkins 272. 
163 See, for example, 50. 
164 See 58. 
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might become one's friend again some day. It is hence especially important to keep the 
former friend's secrets as if one was still his confidant and to do or say nothing that 
might damage his reputation, as any violation of these principles would naturally 
make him one's enemy. In fact, also the instances in which a friend can and should be 
abandoned are for Alberti the same as for Cicero, namely when one's friend undergoes 
a negative alteration of character, or when he expects one to do something that is 
morally wrong or even illegal. Yet, the explanation why one should abandon a friend 
under these circumstances is with Alberti no longer a moral philosophical but a 
thoroughly practical one. For him, it is not as for Cicero of any significance that the 
friend, because his actions are now bad, immoral, or even criminal, is violating the 
principles of virtue, which one would even support if one remains his friend. For 
Alberti, it is much more worrying that one's friend, by acting in this way, is not only 
compromising himself but might also be damaging one's own reputation—and a man's 
reputation, according to Adovardo, has to be considered his highest good.165 Lionardo, 
fully convinced by him of this view, hence accordingly concludes: "Lodoti. E parmi 
così vuoi: se dallo amico per suo vizio a te impendesse infamia, conosciutola 
gravissima, per deporre ogni sinistro nome sarà permesso segregarselo e da sé volerlo 
lungi."166 
Although Alberti adopts many ideas from the writings of the classical authors, and 
especially from those by Aristotle and Cicero, he never refers to them directly. There is, 
of course, a very good reason for this. Cicero and Aristotle, as most other classical 
writers, put much emphasis on virtue and on the importance of which it is to 
friendship as both its source and its end. Virtue, however, only plays a minor role in 
Alberti's conception of friendship. For him the end of friendship is the benefit one can 
derive from it, and the source of it is one's good reputation. Reputation is for Alberti, in 
fact, what virtue is for Aristotle and Cicero, since, as bad friends can damage one's 
reputation, so can a good name help one to make new friends and to win their favour. 
It is therefore essentially necessary to maintain an impeccable reputation—of oneself as 
well as of one's family as a whole: "Uno atto di levità, una parola inconsiderata cancella 
di noi spesso buona oppinione. Adunque in ogni nostro processo serviremo agli occhi 
della moltitudine, poiché nostro officio fie piacerli quando indi instituimo sceglier 
copia d'amici a noi."167 Reputation is thus defined as the public opinion of someone. 
But when Alberti stresses that it is important to serve the eyes of the masses in order to 
                                                   
165 Cf. Alberti, Della famiglia 310. 
166 Alberti, Della famiglia 316. – "I admire you. It seems to me, then, that this is your answer: if our friend, 
by his vices, imperils our reputation, we recognize the evil of this thing. We may to keep from getting 
some sort of bad name segregate ourselves from him and try to put plenty of distance between us." 
Trans. Watkins 294. 
167 Alberti, Della famiglia 294. – "One frivolous act, one unconsidered word, cancel out the good reputation 
we have won. Let us therefore, in everything we do, serve the public eye, for it is our task to please the 
public if we hope to draw an abundance of friends to ourselves, whom we shall choose from the 
public." Trans. Watkins 274. 
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achieve their good opinion of us, this also indirectly implies the rejection of the 
necessity to be good as long as one can merely appear to be so. In fact, Alberti only 
mentions the idea that real virtuousness is a requirement for friendship in passing, and 
when he explicitly emphasizes the means by which one can make friends and maintain 
them, he does not even refer to it at all. For him, it seems only necessary to appear 
good and virtuous—not to be or act like that. It is precisely this disparity between 
appearances and reality that is later on to become one of the most popular topics of 
Renaissance literature and especially of late Renaissance drama, and the pretence of 
goodness one of the most fiercely criticized behaviours in any treatment of the matter 
dating from that time. In fact, when Alberti recommends his readers to pretend to be 
good and virtuous, especially when they are not, he anticipates the advice Machiavelli 
is to give a century later in the eighteenth chapter of his Principe, a work that in the end 
is to evoke a widespread hostility towards this point of view. Yet, although he is to 
become the sole target of criticism, Machiavelli does indeed not invent anything new, 
but merely borrows the advice Alberti has already given to his bourgeois audience to 
recommend it now also to his princely readership: 
A uno principe, adunque, non è necessario avere tutte le soprascritte qualità, 
ma è bene necessario parere di averle. Anzi, ardirò di dire questo, che 
avendole et osservandole sempre, sono dannose, e parendo di averle, sono 
utile: come parere pietoso, fedele, umano, intero, relligioso, et essere; ma 
stare in modo edificato con l'animo, che, bisognando non essere, tu possa e 
sappi mutare el contrario. […] 
Debbe adunque avere uno principe gran cura che non li esca mai di bocca 
uno cosa che non sia piena delle soprascritte cinque qualità, e paia, a vederlo 
et udirlo, tutto pietà, tutto fede, tutto integrità, tutto relligione.168 
So, to refer to Alberti's view of friendship as a Machiavellian conception of it is actually 
wrong, as we should indeed rather speak of Machiavelli as an Albertian than of Alberti 
as a Machiavellian. However, it would certainly be wrong to see the Libri della famiglia 
as a direct model for the Principe. Instead, we should rather take Alberti as a forerunner 
of Machiavelli, as his language and the rigour with which he presents his thoughts are 
not yet as blunt and obviously unscrupulous as they are to become with Machiavelli. 
Both derive the justification for their theories from the classical sources, but in contrast 
to Machiavelli, Alberti still veils his thoughts with a thin cover of moral philosophical 
                                                   
168 Niccolò Machiavelli, Il principe (Verona: Valdonega, 1968) 55. – "In actual fact, a prince may not have all 
the admirable qualities listed above, but it is very necessary that he should seem to have them. Indeed, 
I will venture to say that when you have them and exercise them all the time, they are harmful to you; 
when you just seem to have them, they are useful. It is good to appear merciful, truthful, humane, 
sincere, and religious; it is good to be so in reality. But you must keep your mind so disposed that, in 
case of need, you can turn to the exact contrary. […] 
 Hence a prince should take great care never to drop a word that does not seem imbued with the five 
good qualities noted above; to anyone who sees or hears him, he should appear all compassion, all 
honor, all humanity, all integrity, all religion." Trans. Robert M. Adams, The Prince, by Niccolò 
Machiavelli, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1992) 48-49. 
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and ethical ideas and commonplaces, which lays loosely over his work without really 
being attached to it. In the end, of course, it becomes clear that already Alberti is not so 
much interested in the philosophical considerations he refers to as such, but rather in 
the assessment of their practical applicability to real life. Both writers thus do not want 
to simply represent or reformulate classical ideas; they want to develop a new 
approach to their subjects, to draw up a code of ethics that is realistic and applicable 
and to thereby create a new philosophy of pragmatism, as it were. In contrast to 
Machiavelli, however, Alberti still tries to include the classical notions in his practical 
considerations, and in most cases even to base his own teachings on those of the 
ancient philosophers. This commitment to the classical ideas is in fact almost 
completely vanishing with Machiavelli. 
Adovardo's reflections upon the importance of one's reputation lead him now to the 
last aspect of friendship Alberti discusses in his treatise: that of a friend's help when 
help is needed. This aspect of friendship, with which already Plutarch has concerned 
himself at length, is, according to Adovardo, the most characteristic feature of this kind 
of relationship—at least if it is given of one's own free will, unhesitatingly, unbidden, 
and generously—and certainly also the most useful one, of course. In fact, nothing is 
more useful than to receive kindness and help when they are most needed. For this 
reason, Adovardo regards this aspect not only as the most characteristic but also as one 
of the most important, if not the most important feature of friendship, and backs up his 
view with a reference to the classical sources: "E quella antiqua notissima oppinione di 
que' filosofi, quali affermavano l'amicizia solo essere nata per sovvenire l'uno all'altro 
ne' nostri quasi assidui d'ora in ora varii bisogni e necessità, potrà ella nulla a 
persuaderci che a' bisogni dello amico sia officio dell'amicizia sovvenirli?"169 That 
Adovardo, in spite of his reservations about the teachings of the classics, here willingly 
refers to them is not really surprising. He needs the support of their moral 
philosophical authority, as it were, to justify his demand for the performance of this 
duty that he considers so important to friendship. Accordingly, he is very ill-disposed 
towards those hypocrites and deceiving flatterers who withhold their support from 
their friends in times of need by abandoning them when they were supposed to help 
them: "Odiosi! e quanto vero! Nulla tanto stimerò alieno da chi sia uomo iusto e buono, 
quanto non odiar molto simile astuzie, certo villane e brutte, e al tutto contrarie a chi 
meriti e cerchi amici."170 
                                                   
169 Alberti, Della famiglia 314. – "Does not the ancient opinion of some philosophers run that friendship 
was invented precisely so that we might assist one another in our ever recurring needs and wants? 
Doesn't that help to persuade us that it is the duty of friendship to assist a friend in need?" Trans. 
Watkins 292. 
170 Alberti, Della famiglia 314. – "How disgusting! And how true. Nothing is further from the mind of a just 
and good man than to see no evil in such vile and ugly cunning. It is altogether foreign to one who 
deserves and who seeks real friends." Trans. Watkins 292. 
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Of course, one is inclined to return this expression of indignation to Adovardo, i.e. 
to Alberti himself, as his own practical attitude towards friendship seems to be not so 
much different from the one he is criticising here. Yet, on closer examination we will 
find that there is a decisive difference between his notion of friendship and that of a 
common flatterer or false friend. Alberti's Adovardo is not only demanding the friend's 
help when he needs it, he is also willing to provide help when his friends need it. For 
him, in real friendship, the giving of aid is a reciprocal duty of the friends, and like 
Aristotle, he sees not only the advantage one might gain from the friend's help one 
receives, but also the benefit one might gain from the help one gives. In contrast to 
Aristotle, however, for whom the benefit one gains from one's help is of course the 
increase in virtuousness one achieves by aiding others, Alberti's interest is not in the 
intensification of virtue but in the enhancement of one's reputation.171 For him, the help 
one provides for a friend always also contributes to the enrichment of one's good name 
and should therefore—however expensive this aid may be—be willingly given: "Non 
so degli altri, ma io certo per acquistar lode esporrei molte richezze."172 
So, Alberti is once again using Aristotle's theory as a foundation or a framework for 
his own by simply substituting reputation for virtue. The major difference between the 
two conceptions, however, becomes quite clear when we look at the actual limits of the 
readiness to help one's friends. With Aristotle, an honourable man would always be 
willing to sacrifice himself for his best friend, as he has in fact no other choice if he 
wants to remain virtuous. Saving his friend's life would be a virtuous act, but not 
doing so would mean to behave in a dishonourable way. A virtuous man will therefore 
rather choose to lead a shorter but honourable, virtuous, and therefore happier life 
than a longer but disgraceful one in ignominy.173 For Alberti, however, this would go 
much too far, as a dead man can naturally gain no advantage from his good reputation 
anymore. Yet, in fact, he has Adovardo claim that there is almost nothing he would not 
do to enhance his good reputation, and that neither the fear of loosing possessions nor 
the one of suffering pain and misery would keep him from helping his friends, as the 
good reputation one is going to gain will compensate one for one's efforts. He has him 
therefore finish his argumentation with the conclusion: "E riputeremo ogn'altra cosa 
minore che la infamia."174 
In the end, Adovardo has thus convinced Lionardo, who was so taken with the 
idealized ideas of the ancient writers, that in practice there is much more to learn about 
friendship than the classical works of moral philosophy—or, as he puts it, books and 
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173 See 53. 
174 Alberti, Della famiglia 315. – "[And] anything else is negligible compared to a bad name." Trans. 
Watkins 293. Addition mine. 
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scholarship—are able to teach us. So, even if Adovardo (and thus Alberti) does not 
intent to criticize the study of classical works in general, he here at least impeaches the 
practicability of their teachings and thereby indirectly also the practical value of 
academic erudition as such. For Alberti, as for most humanists, the mere study of 
philosophy remains in fact useless if one is not able to apply the findings of one's 
reflections to reality.175 
 
In conclusion, we must say that Adovardo's view of friendship and of the ways to 
achieve it is indeed not without its problems. For him, the world on the whole is bad 
and the circumstances in which the individual has to live usually disadvantageous, but 
by the means of friendship, one might be able to place oneself in a more advantageous 
position. In order to make friends, however, one has to act very cleverly and skilfully. 
This is the negative view of one's usual situation that he presents throughout the whole 
of the fourth book of the Libri della famiglia, and his idea of the practical way to deal 
with it. Yet, there is a crucial contradiction in this representation. Adovardo agrees 
with the ancient philosophers that friendship is an expression of virtue and that virtue 
leads to happiness. But since by mere virtuousness, friendliness, and helpfulness, 
according to him, no one would be able to make friends in reality, one has to employ 
cunning and trickery to become the friend of others and to achieve thereby happiness. 
That his definition of happiness is no longer the achievement of virtuousness but the 
securing of financial support and the obtaining of a good reputation and useful 
connections becomes here quite clear. Of course, the idea that the motivation for 
making friends with others, with whom one can then have a virtuous friendship, 
might be based on self-love and the longing for happiness, is still Aristotelian, but with 
Adovardo, this idea now lacks the concern for the friend, which is for Aristotle the 
decisive source of justification for the advantage one derives from the friendship. For 
him, one may speak of a true and virtuous friendship only when the friend derives the 
same advantage from the friendship as oneself and when everything one does is 
equally good for both. This concern not only for oneself but also for the friend occurs 
with Adovardo at best in his treatment of the aspect of the friends' reciprocal help in 
times of need, but even here the concern for the friend is indeed rather a concern for 
the enhancement of one's own reputation. In all other cases in which Adovardo refers 
to the ways in which one should deal with one's friends, he stresses the necessity to 
flatter and deceive them in order to appear as a pleasant, useful, or virtuous friend and 
as a companion who is equal to them in character and manners and who has similar 
interests and opinions and similar likes and dislikes. As far as any giving is concerned, 
he even recommends to give only as much as is essentially necessary to maintain the 
friendship by appearing generous and pleasant to one's friends. The advantages that a 
friend might derive from the friendship are therefore not in the least what Adovardo is 
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interested in; his focus is merely on the advantage that he or his family can gain from 
it. 
This restriction of his view of the subject to only those aspects that concern his own 
interests or, at best, those of his family, is though not the most crucial characteristic of 
Alberti's understanding of the meaning of friendship. The most significant feature of 
his conception is the substitution of cunning and trickery for affection and 
virtuousness as the means by which he expects to make friends. Yet, that this has of 
course nothing to do with virtue and, according to the classical conceptions, can 
therefore hardly lead to happiness, is a fact that Alberti seems to ignore. When he has 
Adovardo explain his view of the matter, the argumentation proves to be indeed 
somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand, Adovardo criticizes the classical authors for 
the idealized and thus impracticable nature of their ideas, but on the other hand, he 
frequently refers to precisely these ideas to support his own. By using the classical 
notions as a foundation for his own conception, however, he mingles, as it were, the 
idealized image of perfect friendship with his practical one of friendship as a patron-
client relationship, and thus the specific qualities of two kinds of friendship of which, 
according to Aristotle's theory, one is superior and the other inferior. Now, this is in 
fact the main problem of the whole treatise. Reflecting upon the philosophical 
conceptualization of friendship with the classical writers, Alberti puts particular 
emphasis on Aristotle's theoretical division of the subject into the three categories of 
friendships that are based on either virtue, pleasantness or utility. Dealing with the 
topic at first on a theoretical level, Alberti makes the distinction between these different 
kinds of friendship indeed quite clear, but as soon as he has Piero describe his 
friendships with the princes, and furthermore when he has Adovardo explain his 
practical view of the matter, the distinction between the three types of friendship 
becomes blurred and the specific qualities of the different types are blended into a dim 
view of friendship that seems to be full of logical contradictions when seen against the 
background of the philosophical theory on which it pretends to be based. Alberti 
describes his idea of friendship without really specifying it. In fact, he never directly 
refers to the friendships he speaks of as belonging to either of the three groups, but he 
leaves no doubt that he or his family would only be engaged in honourable 
friendships, which would therefore have to belong to the superior one.176 In actual fact, 
however, he only describes friendships and their specific characteristics that rather 
belong to the inferior kinds. So, to sum it up, we might say that, in practice, Alberti 
tries to acquire true friendships, i.e. those of the perfect kind, by means and for 
purposes that are typical of the ordinary and thus inferior kinds. Moreover, he does 
not even seem to realize this contradiction, as he does not hesitate to criticize most 
severely those whom he regards as flatterers and false friends for their selfish attitude 
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towards friendship and for the deceiving behaviour towards their companions—
although this is almost exactly the kind of attitude and behaviour he recommends to 
his relatives. Now, we have to conclude that his attempt to apply the theoretical 
tripartite division of friendship to the realities of friendship in practice has indeed 
failed because of the incompatibility of the altruistic love of the friend and of virtue per 
se that characterizes the idealized conception of true friendship and the pursuit of 
wealth and security that dominates the realities and the constraints of a life as a 
merchant or courtier in the Renaissance. The specific qualities of Aristotle's three 
different types of friendship do never appear in really existing friendships in isolation 
but always only in mixtures. In practice, there is nothing like a true and perfect 
friendship in which the friends would not also be concerned with their own interests, 
i.e. profit and pleasure. This is what Alberti's treatise has shown most clearly, even 
though it might not have been the author's intention. 
Alberti's treatment of friendship and his endeavour to develop a practicable image 
of it is indeed symptomatic of the humanistic attempt to apply the teachings and 
idealized notions of the classical philosophers to the realities of their own age, an age 
on the threshold of modern times that experiences rapid changes in almost all areas 
and that therefore really demands for completely new conceptions. Contrary to 
Machiavelli, for example, who is to break with this idea of the applicability of ideals to 
reality and who is to exclude all moral philosophical principles from his pragmatic 
considerations only a hundred years later (an offence against common philosophical 
and literary conventions, of course, that is to earned him quite an unsavoury 
reputation), Alberti, as Renaissance humanism as such, is yet not able to take this 
step—at least not in regard to the conception of friendship. This inability to adapt the 
concept of friendship to the requirements of a new time, however, will finally 
contribute to the concept's decline in the early seventeenth century. 
 4 THE CONCEPTUAL CRISIS OF FRIENDSHIP 
IN THE LATE RENAISSANCE 
he discrepancy between the wish for a true, honest, virtuous, and affectionate 
relationship and the recognition of both the necessity for useful friendships—
and thus of the priority that these functional relationships should take over 
affectionate ones—and the impossibility of actually translating the idealized ideas of 
friendship into the reality of this kind of relationship that took place in the course of 
the Renaissance finally led to a considerable disenchantment with the classical 
conceptions of friendship. It was clearly this disenchantment with the ancient ideals, in 
connection with the emergence of mercantilism and the according attitude towards the 
meaning of economic success in the late Renaissance, that decidedly determined the 
further development of the view of friendship in the seventeenth century. 
Another factor that had a considerable effect on the estimation of friendship in the 
seventeenth and the following centuries, was the conflict between the concepts of 
friendship and love that appeared at the end of the Renaissance—a conflict from that 
the concept of love could finally emerge victoriously by taking over the characteristic 
quality of the intellectual unity between the two partners of a relationship from the 
concept of friendship, with the consequence that it determined the ideas of intimate 
relationships from then on. 
Both factors together—the recognition of the necessity of the formation of 
practicable and useful relationships in an increasingly mercantilistic environment and 
the adoption of the typical quality of friendship, the intellectual unity of two partners, 
by the concept of marital love—led at first to a reduction of the meaning of friendship 
by the limitation of the conceptions of it to one of a mere functional relationship, and 
then to its final debasement by the increasing criticism of this reduced functionalistic 
view of friendship, now lacking the virtuous qualities of the classical conceptions, and 
the consequential condemnation of the concept of friendship as such. 
In the end, the idealized concept of friendship had to meet the same fate as 
Renaissance humanism, whose child it once was, itself. Just as humanism was 
superseded by a new scientific movement in the seventeenth century, initiated by 
scholars like Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and later Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), the 
idea of perfect friendship was at the same time superseded by the new one of perfect 
T 
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love.1 Of course, the idealized view of friendship did not disappear immediately, but it 
was now pushed into the background—and it never regained its former position in the 
foreground, its position as the ideal kind of relationship. This position was from then 
on occupied by the concepts of love and marriage. 
 
4.1. FROM CLASSICAL TO MODERN VIEWS OF FRIENDSHIP: 
THE DECAY OF THE IDEALIZED IDEAS 
The emergence of mercantilism at the beginning of the seventeenth century and the 
general development of a clear consciousness of economic structures, processes, and 
requirements also led to a change in the view of friendship. Now the relationship 
between two persons was no longer primarily evaluated by taking into account the 
intimacy that there was between them, or the virtuousness that characterized their 
relation, but first of all by estimating the usefulness that their friendship had for each 
of the friends. Of course, the emphasis on the usefulness of a friend is already to be 
found in Alberti's treatment of the subject almost two hundred years earlier. The 
difference between the old view of friendship and the new, mercantilistic attitude 
towards the matter is, however, that Alberti and his fellow humanists still tried to 
reconcile the classical ideals of the concept and the practical requirements of friendship 
that one has to face in reality. The poets, philosophers, and essayists of the seventeenth 
century, on the other hand, did obviously no longer feel such an obligation towards the 
classical ideals, and although their notions of friendship still seem to be founded on the 
basic ideas of the old conceptions, their representations of the subject have now clearly 
become emancipated from the ethical precepts that characterized those of their 
predecessors. 
This change from the idealized view of friendship that dominated, or at least clearly 
influenced the humanistic conception of the matter in the Renaissance to the purely 
pragmatic and functionalistic attitude towards friendship in the early seventeenth 
century, is perfectly illustrated by the way in which one of the leading representatives 
of this new time deals with the subject. In Francis Bacon's brief treatment of friendship, 
which he included in his collection of Essays, we can find the tenor of this new attitude 
most clearly reflected. Even though his essay speaks in the end in favour of friendship, 
it also includes remarks that reveal Bacon's decidedly critical if not sceptical attitude 
towards the subject. That he sees the intimacy between two friends as a quality of 
friendship that is not without its problems when the bond between the friends 
becomes too close, is, for example, made clear when he states: "Certainly, if a man 
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would give it a hard phrase, those that want friends to open themselves unto, are 
cannibals of their own hearts."2 That Bacon's view of friendship was indeed not 
unreservedly positive is also shown by some of his statements in other works. In The 
Advancement of Learning, for instance, he incidentally mentions that at his time teachers 
"use to advise young students from company keeping, by saying, Amici fures temporis 
[…]," without rejecting this opinion by any means.3 These two remarks might hint at 
the critical view that was commonly held of friendship as too intimate a relationship at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century. At that time, with its increasingly 
mercantilistic atmosphere that was characterized by greed and competition, there was 
a clearly recognizable fear to become vulnerable and to expose oneself to 
disadvantages by making friends with others. On the other hand, the benefits of 
friendship could hardly be denied. So, people began to weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of friendship—just as Bacon does in his essay "On Friendship," when he 
finishes his discussion of the topic with what he calls the "Antitheta on friendship:" 
Pro. 
'Pessima solitudo, non veras habere amicitias.' 
'The worst solitude is to have no real friendships.' 
'Digna malæ fidei ultio, amicitiis privari.' 
'To be deprived of friends is a fit reward of faithlessness.' 
 
Contra. 
'Qui amicitias arctas copulat, novas necessitates sibi imponit.' 
'He who forms close friendships, imposes on himself new duties' 
'Animi imbecilli est, partiri fortunam.' 
'It is the mark of a feeble mind to go shares in one's fortune with another.'4 
Of course, the use of classical Latin adages was still common literary practice in the 
seventeenth century, even though they were often merely used for traditional reasons, 
but Bacon here refers to these ancient commonplaces deliberately, in order to show 
that the topic of friendship had already in classical times been controversially looked 
upon—just as if he wants to justify his critical approach to a subject that has been so 
glorified in the preceding two centuries. He makes thus as much use of the classical 
commonplaces of friendship to support his critical view of the matter as the 
Renaissance humanist have made use of them to support their idealized notion of it. 
It is hence no surprise that Bacon, even when he refers to the positive aspects of 
friendship, remains purely rational, emphasizing its utility value instead of employing 
the old humanistic standardized images of friendship as a virtuous and entirely 
unselfish kind of relationship in which the friends' whole attention is given only to 
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each other's well-being. And although he still avoids speaking about the usefulness of 
friendships directly, he makes the focus of his treatment quite clear by metaphorically 
using the image of three different fruits of friendship. Now, fruits, of course, are both: 
on the one hand, they are sweet, delicious, and thus pleasant; on the other hand, 
however, they are primarily nutritious and nourishing foodstuffs, and as such not only 
useful but even indispensable to our health and well-being. And so, by choosing this 
image, Bacon shows that he is in total agreement with Jeremy Taylor, who is a bit later 
to sum up this argument by claiming that "that which in friendship is most pleasing 
and most useful, is also most reasonable and most true."5 
The first fruit of friendship, according to Bacon, is the pleasure and the relief that a 
close and trustworthy friend can give when we share our joys as well as our sorrows 
with him. Other than the classics or the Renaissance philosophers, however, Bacon 
does not put any stress on the moral duty to help a friend in times of trouble or on the 
wish to entertain him and make him happy when we are happy ourselves. With Bacon, 
the focus is not on the service we could do our friends—it is on the service that they 
could do us. This becomes quite clear from the standpoint from which he looks at the 
matter. The advantages and disadvantages of friendship are always estimated by only 
seeing them from the perspective of the friend who gains something, never from that 
of the one who has to give. This makes the focus of his argumentation extremely one-
sided, as, for instance, when he here, in the discussion of the first fruit of friendship, 
explains that "this communicating of a man's self to his friend, works two contrary 
effects, for it redoubleth joys, and cutteth griefs in halfs; for there is no man that 
imparteth his joys to his friend, but he joyeth the more, and no man that imparteth his 
griefs to his friend, but he grieveth the less."6 This statement shows how the focus is 
here clearly on the friend who shares his joys and sorrows, not on the one who has to 
participate in his friend's emotions. 
This emphasis on the usefulness of a friend and the focus of the discussion on his 
benefiting partner, is yet not only to be found in Bacon's treatment of the pleasure that 
a friend can give on the emotional side. Also on the rational side, a friend, according to 
Bacon, is a helpful and thus useful device, as he here functions as a kind of catalyst for 
the development of one's own cognition, as it were. By "communicating and dis-
coursing" with a friend, Bacon explains, a man "tosseth his thoughts more easily—he 
marshalleth them more orderly—he seeth how they look when they are turned into 
words—finally, he waxeth wiser than himself; and that more by an hour's discourse 
than by a day's meditation."7 This discourse with a friend, is here of course again not 
thought of as a balanced, reciprocal exchange of ideas for the sake of acquiring 
knowledge on both sides, but as a mere monologue, a presentation of the ideas of only 
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one of the friends for the sake of only his cognitive development. His friend does here 
merely function as an audience, as the passive receiver of his partner's thoughts, who 
could have as well talked to a blank wall with almost the same effect. The listening 
friend's only task is to occasionally respond to his performing friend's statements, 
either by showing agreement with his opinions or by questioning his friend's views. 
Now, if this one-sided dialogue with the friend has not yet solved one's problems or 
has not resulted in the satisfactory coordination of one's thoughts, there is of course 
still the chance that the friend might help one with his "faithful counsel."8 Of course, if 
a man forms his opinion without the influence of others and is thus able to solve his 
problems by himself and without the help of his friends, he does not have to confide in 
anyone and does thus of course avoid showing any weakness. Yet, the great advantage 
of asking a trustworthy friend for his view on a troublesome matter is, according to 
Bacon, that "the light that a man receiveth by counsel from another is drier and purer 
than that which cometh from his own understanding and judgment, which is ever 
infused and drenched in his affections and customs. So as there is as much difference 
between the counsel that a friend giveth, and that a man giveth himself, as there is 
between the counsel of a friend and of a flatterer; for there is no such flatterer as is a 
man's self, and there is no such remedy against flattery of a man's self as the liberty of a 
friend."9 
Interestingly enough, the fear of being flattered by one's friends, which we can find 
in so many other treatments of the topic, is here not mentioned. On the contrary, the 
friend is here presented as an effective remedy for flattery, or rather for self-deception. 
But even though the friend is here portrayed as a positive element in a man's life, he is 
not depicted as an equal partner who derives as much advantage from the situation as 
his friend. Bacon's representation of the advantages of friendship is of course far from 
being innovative but indeed still utterly classical, as the same or at least similar 
arguments are already to be found in the texts of the ancient philosophers. The 
perspective of Bacon's approach, however, is now a very different one. The emphasis is 
with him no longer on our virtuous behaviour towards our friends, a behaviour that is 
characterized by our selfless devotion to them—a virtuousness that is merely indirectly 
rewarded by the way in which our friends treat us in return. The focus of Bacon's 
discussion is no longer on the reciprocity of the usefulness in friendship or on the 
commonly accepted principle that only who gives can also receive. With him, only 
taking is of interest, and the duty to give is merely subliminally implied as the logical 
requirement for a lasting friendship. 
After having discussed these first two fruits of friendship, "peace in the affections 
and support of the judgment," as he sums them up, Bacon now comes to the last and 
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most fruitful fruit, "which is, like the pomegranate, full of many kernels—I mean, aid 
and bearing a part in all actions and occasions."10 Now the friend is no longer just a 
companion but rather becomes an assistant and in the following even a deputy, a 
personal clone as it were. Bacon here simply reinterprets and redefines the classical 
image of the friend as another self, as one's alter ego, which the classical philosophers 
set up to illustrate the idea of the close intellectual connection that there is between two 
good friends, in a purely utilitarian sense: 
Here, the best way to represent to life the manifold use of friendship, is to 
cast and see how many things there are which a man cannot do himself, and 
then it will appear that it was a sparing speech of the ancients, to say 'that a 
friend is another himself,' for that a friend is far more than himself. Men 
have their time, and die many times in desire of some things which they 
principally take to heart; the bestowing of a child, the finishing of a work, or 
the like. If a man have a true friend, he may rest almost secure that the care 
of those things will continue after him; so that a man hath, as it were, two 
lives in his desires.11 
With this definition of a friend's function, Bacon completes his perversion of the 
classical concept of friendship. Not just that he speaks quite bluntly about the 
'manifold use of friendship'—and thus, in fact, about the kind of utility friendship that 
Aristotle has described and defined as one of the two inferior forms of friendship—
even the idea of the single soul that dwells in two bodies, which in the classical 
conception represents the ideal of a true and virtuous friendship, is here redefined to 
suit his utilitarian view of the matter. Now the main focus of the image is no longer on 
the single soul that exists in two bodies, and hence on the intellectual unity of the 
friends, but merely on the second body that, thanks to their shared soul, is now also at 
the first one's disposal. The friend thus now becomes almost the instrument of his 
partner, a reliable means to pursue one's interests even beyond the grave. 
But not only on tasks that one cannot do oneself, due to one's decease, also on such 
that one considers not appropriate or convenient for oneself, one can of course employ 
one's friend—or one's deputy, as Bacon calls him: "A man hath a body, and that body 
is confined to a place; but where friendship is, all offices of life are, as it were, granted 
to him and his deputy; for he may exercise them by his friend."12 The situations in 
which one can send his alter ego to do unpleasant jobs or jobs that are better be done 
by someone else than by oneself are indeed as manifold as the use of friendship itself: 
A man can scarce allege his own merits with modesty, much less extol them; 
a man cannot sometimes stoop to supplicate or beg, […] but all these things 
are graceful in a friend's mouth, which are blushing in a man's own. […] A 
man cannot speak to his son but as a father; to his wife but as a husband: to 
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his enemy but upon terms: whereas a friend may speak as the case requires, 
and not as it sorteth with the person.13 
A friend can therefore not only be of use in so noble a matter as the wooing of a lady in 
one's behalf or the caring for one's children after one's untimely death. Also in 
ordinary, banal, and trivial matters, like in the begging for money or the boasting 
about one's merits, the friend could prove to be one's useful and indispensable 
representative. So, it is no surprise when Bacon, despite his initial reservations about 
friendship, finally declares: "I have given the rule, where a man cannot fitly play his 
own part; if he have not a friend, he may quit the stage."14 
It is precisely this special stress on the services a friend can do for us that we can 
also find a bit later in the treatment of the matter by Jeremy Taylor, when he states: 
"And although I love my friend because he is worthy, yet he is not worthy if he can do 
no good."15 Bacon would have certainly agreed with this estimation, and he would 
have certainly also agreed with Taylor when he declares: "He only is fit to be chosen 
for a friend, who can do those offices for which friendship is excellent. For (mistake 
not) no man can be loved for himself; our perfections in this World cannot reach so 
high."16 So, with Taylor, the parting of seventeenth-century conceptualizations of 
friendship from one of the most fundamental principles of the old conceptions, namely 
the idea that the friend has first to be loved for nothing but his own sake, becomes 
manifest. In fact, Bacon has not yet dared to present his view of the matter so bluntly, 
but the conclusion that Taylor now draws form his reflection and the spirit of his 
justification for holding this view, is also implicit in Bacon's treatment: 
He only is fit to be chosen for a friend who can give counsel, or defend my 
cause, or guide me right, or relieve my need, or can and will, when I need it, 
do me good. […] For can any wise or good man be angry if I say, I chuse this 
man to be my friend, because he is able to give me counsel, to restrain my 
wandrings, to comfort me in my sorrows; he is pleasant to me in private, 
and useful in publick; he will make my joys double, and divide my grief 
between himself and me? For what else should I chuse.17 
Bacon and Taylor's functionalistic view of friendship is indeed typical of the 
seventeenth century. It has no longer anything of the intimacy that characterized 
Montaigne's friendship with La Boëtie or of the mutual respect that marked Sidney's 
relation with Languet. Bacon and Taylor's idea of a perfect friend is now rather that of 
a private secretary, and their essays on friendship provide a model image of the subject 
that a hundred years later, in the eighteenth century, is really to become a common 
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kind of relationship between two men of unequal standing. Now, in the period of the 
Enlightenment, the idea of a friendship in which one of the friends clearly dominates 
the other—usually intellectually—becomes a commonly accepted conception of a 
possible form of friendship. The most prominent examples of such unbalance 
relationships might be the friendships of Dr Samuel Johnson (1709-84) and Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) with their 'friends' James Boswell (1740-95) and 
Johann Peter Eckermann (1792-1854), whose positions have indeed to be described 
rather as being that of their mentor's confidants and secretaries than as being that of 
their friends in the classical sense.18 This inequality between the friends has though 
certainly not been realized, or if, at least not been thematized by any of those involved 
in such friendships. Ironically, it is Dr Johnson himself who emphasizes in one of his 
articles in The Rambler the necessity of equality in friendship, as any considerable 
imbalance in a kind of relationship that is like this based on the reciprocal usefulness of 
the partners would inevitably lead to its breach: 
Friendship is seldom lasting but between equals, or where the superiority 
on one side is reduced by some equivalent advantage on the other. Benefits 
which cannot be repaid, and obligations which cannot be discharged, are 
not commonly found to increase affection; they excite gratitude indeed, and 
heighten veneration, but commonly take away that easy freedom, and 
familiarity of intercourse, without which, though there may be fidelity, and 
zeal, and admiration, there cannot be friendship.19 
This passage should though not lead one to the estimation that Johnson's general view 
of friendship was still as functionalistic and utilitarian as it has been with Bacon or 
Taylor. His attitude towards friendship was now, as it was typical of the 
Enlightenment, rather rationalistic. In contrast to most writers of the early and the mid-
seventeenth century, the majority of eighteenth-century writers now held the classical 
ideals of friendship in high esteem again—even though they now, contrary to their 
Renaissance predecessors, took them as what they are, namely as mere ideals. That 
Enlightenment writers like Johnson had indeed not completely given up the hope that 
there might be still some who make friends for reasons other than purely egoistic ones, 
becomes clear in one of Johnson's statements in the same article in The Rambler: "Some 
however, though few, may perhaps be found, in whom emulation has not been able to 
overpower generosity, who are distinguished from lower beings by nobler motives 
than the love of fame, and can preserve the sacred flame of friendship from the gusts of 
pride, and the rubbish of interest."20 
                                                   
18 It is precisely this kind of friendship that was later on also to be glorified in fictional literature, as, for 
instance, in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's stories of the adventures of Sherlock Holmes and Dr Watson. Cf. 
June Thomson, Holmes and Watson: A Study in Friendship (London: Constable, 1995). 
19 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler (no 64. Saturday, 27 October 1750), ed. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss 
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1969) 344. 
20 Johnson 344. 
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That, due to the treatment of the matter in the preceding century, there was yet also 
still a considerable disenchantment with the idea of friendship from which it had not 
been able to fully recover, can be seen from a statement made by Claude Adrien 
Helvétius (1715-71) in his essay De l'Amitié about the reason for the widespread 
disregard of friendship that is still to be found in the eighteenth century: 
Dans la forme actuelle de notre gouvernement, les particuliers ne sont unis 
par aucun intérêt commun. Pour faire fortune on a moins besoin d'amis que 
de protecteurs. En ouvrant l'entrée de toutes les maisons, le luxe, et ce qu'on 
appelle l'esprit de société, a soustrait une infinité de gens au besoin de 
l'amitié. Nul motif, nul intérêt suffisant pour nous faire maintenant 
supporter les défauts réels ou respectifs de nos amis. Il n'est donc plus 
d'amitié; on n'attache donc plus au mot d'ami les mêmes idées qu'on y 
attachoit autrefois [i.e. in the Renaissance]; on peut donc en ce siecle s'écrier 
avec Aristote, O mes amis! il n'est plus d'amis.21 
The criticism of the purely mercantile attitude towards friendship that characterized 
the representations of the topic in the first half of the seventeenth century emerged 
though indeed much earlier than just with the writers of the Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century. Already in the second half of the seventeenth century, the 
increasingly functionalistic and utilitarian attitude towards friendship evoked severe 
criticism by the moralists of the time, and writers now began to lament the increasing 
decay of the friendship ideal.22 In 1665, for example, a friendship sceptic like François 
duc de La Rochefoucauld (1613-80) was even ready to give such a devastating 
comment on the common usage of the term in his time as the following: "Ce que les 
hommes ont nommé amitié n'est qu'une société, qu'un ménagement réciproque 
d'intérêts, et qu'un échange de bons offices; ce n'est enfin qu'un commerce où l'amour-
propre se propose toujours quelque chose à gagner."23 
                                                   
21 Claude Adrien Helvétius, "De l'Amitié," De L'esprit 3.14, rpt. of Paris 1795 ed. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1967) 
111-112. – "In the actual form of our government, the individuals are not united by any common 
interest. In order to make our fortunes, we have less need of friends than of an infinite number of 
protectors. Luxury, and what is called the spirit of society, have secured a great number of men from 
the want of friendship. No motive, no interest, is now sufficient to make us overlook the seeming or 
real faults of our friends.—There is therefore no friendship; we do not affix to the word friend even the 
same ideas as formerly; we may in this age cry out with Aristotle, 'O my friends! no longer is there a 
friend to be found.'" Trans. anon., De l'esprit: or Essays on the Mind and its Several Faculties, by C[laude] 
A[diren] Helvétius, rpt. of 1810 ed. (New York: Franklin, 1970) 274. 
22 Niklas Luhmann assumes that these lamentations occurred under the probable influences of political 
conflicts and courtly intrigues. Speaking about the situation in Europe in general he is though 
concentrated on the circumstances at the French court. See Niklas Luhmann, Liebe als Passion: Zur 
Codierung von Intimität (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1982) 101. 
23 François duc de La Rochefoucauld, "Maxime 85," Maximes: Suivies des Réflexions diverses, du Portrait de La 
Rochefoucauld par lui-même et des Remarques de Christine de Suède sur les Maximes, ed. Jacques Truchet 
(Paris: Garnier Frères, 1967) 26. – "What people have called friendship is nothing but an association, a 
reciprocal management of interests, and an exchange of good offices; in short it is nothing but a 
transaction from which the self always means to gain something." Trans. Dennis Joseph Enright and 
David Rawlinson, eds., The Oxford Book of Friendship (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) 20. 
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In 1665, La Rochefoucauld was certainly only one of the few early friendship 
sceptics, but in the course of time, more and more writers began to take a similarly 
sceptical view of the development of the common attitude towards friendship. And 
nearly 200 years later, the image of this relationship was so disparaged that in 1851 the 
German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) resignedly comments:  
Der Mensch edlerer Art glaubt, in seiner Jugend, die wesentlichen und 
entscheidenden Verhältnisse und daraus entstehenden Verbindungen 
zwischen Menschen seien die ideellen, d. h. die auf Aehnlichkeit der 
Gesinnung, der Denkungsart, des Geschmacks, der Geisteskräfte u. s. w. 
beruhenden: allein er wird später inne, daß es die reellen sind, d. h. die, 
welche sich auf irgend ein materielles Interesse stützen. Diese liegen fast 
allen Verbindungen zum Grunde: sogar hat die Mehrzahl der Menschen 
keinen Begriff von anderen Verhältnissen.24 
Now, this comment shows to which disenchantment with the topic of friendship the 
writers of the nineteenth century have finally come. Now the impossibility of realising 
the classical ideals was eventually accepted and the idea of true and perfect friendship 
irretrievably lost its fascination. 
That it was yet not only the increasingly functionalistic view of friendship, the 
consequential criticism of this conception by the moralists of the time, and the final 
disenchantment with the classical ideals that led to the debasement of the concept in 
the seventeenth century and to its further negative development in the following 
centuries—a development that in the end resulted in the low esteem in which 
friendship is commonly held today (compared to the high regard in which love is 
nowadays held)—will be shown in the following. 
 
4.2. THE CHALLENGE: FRIENDSHIP VERSUS LOVE - 
AND THE CONCEPTUAL RIVALRY BETWEEN REASON AND PASSION 
Since Plato's Socratic reflections upon love and friendship, the conception of each has 
been closely connected with the conception of the other. And as it has always been 
difficult to determine the exact nature of friendship, it has also been problematic to 
find a distinct definition of love. In general, the term only denotes a strong feeling of 
affectionate sympathy that can underlie a number of different relationships. It is 
therefore rather the way in which this emotion finds expression and the object to which 
it is directed that determines the name under which it comes. The feeling of love might 
                                                   
24 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1938) 488. – "A man of noble 
kind, in his youth, believes that the essential and crucial relations and the relationships between 
persons that arise from them, would be the spiritual ones, i.e. those which are based on the similarity of 
convictions, mental attitude, taste, mental abilities etc.: however, he will later on realize that they are 
the real ones, i.e. those which are based on some material interest. They are the basis of nearly all 
relationships: in fact, the majority of people has no notion of other relations." Trans. mine. 
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be equally aimed at individuals or at humanity in general, but it can also be directed 
towards animals and even inanimate objects. And in each case, the character and the 
intention of love will be a different one. When it is mainly a feeling of affection that is 
directed towards the soul and the mind of a single person, it might be called 
'friendship'. If it is aimed at the beauty and the body of someone, it will commonly be 
called 'love'—or might be denoted by the Greek term 'eros'. In this case, 'love' does not 
only denote the feeling of passion but also the kind of relationship of which this 
emotion is so characteristic. 
The difference between intellectual friendship and sensual love is certainly the most 
distinct among the various forms of love relationship, and since Socrates and Plato, the 
relation and the distinction between both—symbolically represented by the two 
Aphrodites—has always been considered a significant one.25 Now, almost at the same 
time at which people began to keep these two kinds of love distinct, they also began to 
determine the sex of the person to which each love should be directed. In Socrates 
times, the sexual love of boys was still customary and so both kinds of love were 
equally directed towards the beloved boy—although the emphasis was clearly placed 
on the intellectual friendship with him. The love of mature men, in fact, was at any 
time only considered acceptable as a purely spiritual one. The love of women, 
however, was apparently not held in the same esteem as that of boys or men and was 
generally rather considered possible merely as a sexual one.26 This sex-specific 
distinction between the two kinds of love and the disadvantaged role of women in 
general led to the emphasis on male friendship and the disparagement of marital love 
in ancient times, as Mills explains: 
Vitally connected with the distinction between the two kinds of love was the 
view concerning marriage held by Socrates and by the Greek thinkers in 
general. Marriage was not a union of souls; it was considered a means of 
perpetuating the race and a convenient domestic and economic 
arrangement. Woman was held to be intellectually inferior to man. Man 
found his intellectual and spiritual companions outside the home. Hence 
there was no very chivalrous attitude toward woman; hence also the 
immense emphasis on friendship. In proportion as love was debased, 
friendship was elevated.27 
However, that there are in fact in Greek as well as in Latin a variety of terms denoting 
the different types of love and friendship—i.e. the various kinds of personal 
                                                   
25 For an explanation of the image of the two Aphrodites, see 101, and Plato, Symposium 180c-181e. 
26 In classical times, carnal love in general, i.e. directed towards either sex, was a quality surely enjoyed 
but apparently not held in high esteem. In contrary to Socrates and Plato, it plays in fact hardly any role 
in Aristotle's theory of friendship. The reason for this is obvious: the feeling of passionate love must 
result from the libido of the lover, the affectionate love for the friend, however, from his noble state of 
character—and this, of course, makes it superior to the first. See Aristotle Nicomachean Ethic 1157b. For a 
closer analysis of Aristotle's attitude towards erotic love, see, for example, Price 236-250. 
27 Mills 381n10. 
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relationship and the emotions involved in them—indicates that already the classics 
had their difficulties in defining the exact nature of both and might illustrate how 
closely the notions of love and friendship are indeed connected with each other. Now, 
it might be due to the fact that the conception of love has always incorporated specific 
ideas of friendship—and vice versa—that these forms of relationship had to come into 
conflict with one another sooner or later. 
This conflict first emerged when a decisive change in the attitude towards women 
took place in the Middle Ages. The love relationship between man and woman that 
had been so disparaged in classical times was now reassessed and under the influence 
of the enthusiasm for the new literary genre of courtly love poetry the view of women 
underwent a definite alteration—at least in chivalric circles. Although women were not 
yet regarded as being intellectually equal to man, they were now seen not only as the 
appropriate objects of men's love and affection but also as their most favourable ones. 
Most of the attention that was formerly paid to the friend was indeed now paid to the 
mistress. A man's friendship had thus become secondary to the love for his lady. The 
conflict that might arise from a situation in which a man has to choose between his 
friend and his lady and particularly from the consequence, the usual preference for the 
woman, was certainly realized by a number of medieval writers, and has even been 
dealt with in the works of a few of them, but was in general not considered a really 
serious one—at least not one worthy of extensive literary treatment. The reason for this 
was quite obviously the attitude towards friendship in medieval times, which was 
decidedly different from that of classical ones, as Mills points out: "It was a case of see-
saw: with the ancients, friendship was up, love down; in chivalric and courtly love, 
love was up, friendship down."28 However, although usually preferred to friendship, 
the love of women was not yet conceptualized in a way that would have secured it the 
dominant position among the various forms of relationship in the long term. It was not 
yet seen as the kind of love between equal partners that characterizes modern love 
relationships or the modern idea of marriage. The woman was still merely the object of 
the man's love and not really required nor even expected to reciprocate this love. 
Together with a number of other factors, however, this chivalric attitude towards 
women contributed to the development of the conception of love into the view of the 
matter that we can find in much later times, as Mills explains: 
It is a decided change from ancient ways of thinking when we come to the 
modern emphasis on conjugal love as the basis of society. Yet that change 
has its roots in the classical philosophers themselves; viz., in the Platonic 
discussions of love, which, subject to the handling of the neo-Platonists and 
to the influence of Mariolatry, combined with the medieval chivalrous 
attitude toward woman to form modern ideas.29 
                                                   
28 Mills 52. 
29 Mills 10. 
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In fact, the emergence of such modern ideas about love in combination with the 
humanistic revival of the classical glorification of friendship led to the inevitable 
outbreak of the conflict between both concepts in the Renaissance, as Mills points out: 
The sixteenth-century emphasis on friendship was in deepest fact a rebirth, 
but came at a time when social conditions and literary traditions were quite 
different from those of ancient days. It had to struggle against a new set of 
ideas and traditions, and that struggle became one, not of widespread actual 
fact, but of assumed ideas that found best expression in literature, 
particularly the drama.30 
 
Now, looking at love and friendship from a modern perspective, the main difference 
between them—besides the sexual aspect—seems to be, as C. S. Lewis puts it, that 
"lovers are always talking to one another about their love; Friends hardly ever about 
their Friendship. Lovers are normally face to face, absorbed in each other; Friends, side 
by side, absorbed in some common interest."31 Lewis also states that this common 
interest must be the heart of friendship, just as affection or a passionate feeling is that 
of love. Without this common interest—of whatever kind it might be—there can 
consequently be no lasting friendship. Moreover, he stresses that erotic love can only 
exist between two persons, as a love of this kind that is divided between more than 
two lovers would necessarily lead to anger and jealousy. Friendship, on the other 
hand, is not only possible between more than two persons but even also in addition to 
existing love relationships that the friends have, for friendship is a kind of love that is 
completely free of jealousy.32 Now, this is indeed quite a modern view of the matter, 
based on a conception of friendship that only acknowledges a very restricted function 
of this kind of relationship. Of course, already Aristotle knew that it is the emotional 
factor that makes the difference between these two kinds of love, and that erotic love, 
in contrast to friendship, is highly susceptible to jealousy, as it always implies the 
lover's demand to be loved in return—which inevitably leads to distress if the lover 
thinks this demand not fulfilled.33 But contrary to Lewis, he still believed friendship to 
be a relationship that—just like erotic love—could also ideally exist only between two 
partners. And, in general, the modern idea that love and friendship could coexist with 
each other, i.e. that someone could have an erotic love relationship with one person 
and a close and intimate friendship with another one, has not always been considered 
                                                   
30 Mills 10. Indeed, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the literary treatment of friendship was as 
popular as that of love, but whereas friendship was rather a topic for the stage or for fictional and non-
fictional prose, love was the favourite one not merely of the neo-Platonic philosophers but particularly 
of the sonneteers. (That Mills here limits his statement to the sixteenth century is due to the focus of his 
study on the literature of Renaissance England and thus to his exclusion of the one of the Italian 
quattrocento, to which it might though be applied as well.) Cf. also Puschmann-Nalenz 73. 
31 Lewis 73. 
32 Lewis 79-80. 
33 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.8, 1159b. 
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as unproblematic as it here appears with Lewis. In the main, in fact, the literature of the 
past rather provides us with representations of love and friendship in which one of 
them is preferred, or in which a conflict occurs that demands for a decision in favour of 
one or the other. 
The idea of the opposition between intellectual and sensual love, which for a very 
long time meant that between homosocial friendship and heterosexual love, is indeed 
almost as old as the idea of friendship itself. And the comparison between these two 
kinds of love and the idea that the friendship between men is based on an affectionate 
feeling that is at least as emotional and intensive as men's love of women is even to be 
found in the oldest representations of the topic. In The Epic of Gilgamesh, for example, 
there is much emphasis placed on the great affection that Gilgamesh felt for Enkidu, 
and that he "loved him and embraced him as a wife."34 About a millennium later, the 
ancient Greek and Roman philosophers also put much emphasis on their preference 
for the love of the mind over that of the body and even in the Old Testament, in the 
second book of Samuel, David compares his friendship with Jonathan with the love of 
women—and stresses his preference for the first—when he laments over his friend's 
death: "doleo super te frater mi Ionathan / decore nimis et amabilis super amorem 
mulierum."35 
In the literary representation of these two loves in medieval times, it was then the 
love of a man for a lady that was preferred, and whenever it came into conflict with his 
friendship or friendships with other men, the problem was usually solved in favour of 
the love of the lady, as in Chaucer's Knight's Tale or in the different versions of the 
Tristan and Isolde story, for example. In general, however, the conflict between the two 
concepts was not one widely dealt with in medieval literature. This only changed with 
the revival of the classical idealizations of friendship that was following from the rise 
of humanism in the late fourteenth century. In Renaissance literature, the conceptual 
conflict between male amity and conjugal love now became a very popular motive 
indeed. Even in such a pure friendship story as that of Edwards's Damon and Pithias, in 
which the love of women plays hardly any role at all, and is in connection with the two 
protagonists not even mentioned, the extraordinary value of friendship is emphasized 
by briefly contrasting its nature with that of conjugal love, when Gronno, the 
hangman, astonished by Pithias' wish to be executed on his friend's behalf asks him: 
                                                   
34 The Epic of Gilgamesh (1.252), trans. Kovacs 12. 
35 Vulgate [Biblia Sacra iuxta Vulgatam versionem], 2 Sam. 1.26. – "I am distressed for thee, my brother 
Jonathan: very pleasant hast thou been unto me: thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of 
women." King James Version. Instead of citing passages from the Scripture in their Hebrew or Greek 
original they shall here be quoted from the Latin version, the Vulgate, which was—despite the various 
versions in different vernaculars that appeared in the course of the age—still by far the most widely 
accessible and commonly read in Renaissance times. Moreover, the passages are always quoted from a 
modern revised version of the Editio Vulgata, since—in spite of the revisions and corrections—this 
comes still closest to the Bible people in the Renaissance would have read, when they were able to read. 
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Here is a mad man: I tell thee, I have a wyfe whom I love well, 
And if iche would die for her, chould ich weare in Hell: 
Wylt thou doo more for a man, then I would for a woman?36 
The answer he gets is of course a definite yes. So, with this little passage of just three 
lines Edwards simply dismisses the possibility that love could ever be a potential rival 
to friendship. He does so by illustrating the inferiority of love in even two respects: 
Pithias is ready to do something for friendship what Gronno would not even do for 
love. So, Gronno does indeed rate love higher than friendship and would do more for 
love than for friendship—but he is a hangman and thus a representative of the lowest 
social class. His preference of love over friendship is therefore marked as the typical 
choice of the populace, which supports the view of friendship as the relationship of 
those of noble mind and origin even more. So, friendship is here not only presented as 
the nobler relationship of both, but also as the one for which the partners are most 
ready to make a sacrifice, and which is hence also the more valuable one of the two. On 
the whole, however, this superiority of friendship over love was in Renaissance times 
not always considered so definite, obvious, and indisputable as here with Edwards. 
With Renaissance writers, considerations of the differences between friendship and 
love and of the advantages and disadvantages of friendship in comparison with those 
of love were indeed very popular, and opposing views on the value of both occurred 
frequently in their writings. One of the earliest discussions of this topic in Renaissance 
literature is, for example, again to be found in Alberti's Libri della famiglia. The second 
book of the work starts—after a brief introductory passage—with a dispute between 
Lionardo and Leon Battista himself over the question whether love should be preferred 
or friendship. Lionardo, again representing the typical humanistic point of view, 
begins his argumentation in favour of friendship with the following advice to his two 
listeners, Battista and his brother Carlo: "Così vi conforto facciate: giudicate niuna cosa 
quanto l'amicizia essere utile e molto atta a vivere bene e beato. Persuadetevi al tutto, 
come fo io a me stessi, questa vera una amicizia nella vita de' mortali doppo la virtù 
essere tale che molto sé stessi possa non solo agli altri amori, ma a qual si sia cara e 
pregiata cosa preferirsi e soprastare."37 Battista, however, disagrees with Lionardo 
about the superiority of friendship and states that it is rather marital love that is by 
many people preferred to friendship, and, moreover, that it is often not only preferred 
to friendship but even also to a good reputation, to honour, and to fame. Thus, he 
concludes, it has to be conjugal love and marriage (as the kind of relationship in which 
this love is manifested) that should be considered the most important kind of union 
between two human beings: 
                                                   
36 Edwards 60, ll. 878-880. 
37 Alberti, Della famiglia 86. – "[I advise you to do this: judge nothing as so useful and beneficial to a good 
and happy life as friendship.] You may become persuaded, as I am, that, after [virtue], true friendship 
is the one thing in human life to be preferred and exalted, not only above all other kinds of love but 
above whatever is precious and highly prized." Trans. Watkins 94. Addition and alteration mine. 
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Puossi l'amor tra moglie e marito riputar grandissimo, però che se la 
benivolenza sorge da alcuna voluttà, el congiugio ti porge non pochissima 
copia d'ogni gratissimo piacere e diletto; se la benivolenza cresce per 
conversazione, con niuna persona manterrai più perpetua familiarità che 
colla moglie; se l'amore si collega e unisce discoprendo e comunicando le tue 
affezioni e volontà, da niuno arai più aperta e piana via a conoscere tutto e 
dimonstrarti che alla propria tua donna e continua compagna; se l'amicizia 
sta compagna della onestà, niuna coniunzione più a te sarà religiossima che 
quella del congiugio.38 
That Alberti has here himself hold the opinion in favour of love should though not be 
mistaken as a hint of his actual attitude towards the matter. On the contrary, by 
making himself the advocate of love, he indeed cunningly disparages the idea of its 
superiority. Only by pretending to hold this view himself, he can reveal its wrongness, 
as by proving himself wrong he avoids offending one of his relatives. Moreover, in the 
context of the story of the Libri della famiglia Alberti describes himself as being still a 
young man. So, by having a youth holding the opinion in favour of love, he can 
represent this view as a typical misconception of the young, who are naturally rather 
ruled by passion than by reason. The outcome of the discussion leaves of course no 
doubt that this folly does not become an older and thus also wiser man, and that now, 
at the time he writes the story down, he is himself no longer holding this view 
anymore as well. 
But for the time being, in the story, he still continuous to speak in favour of love, 
presenting it as a divine gift that—in contrast to friendship—is able to rejuvenate the 
hearts of the old and to make such worldly things as social standing, reputation, and 
even the bonds of friendship and kinship become insignificant. So, opposing 
Lionardo's view, Battista thus claims to prefer love to all other things in life: "Non 
dubitare ch' io statuirei l'amore essere, sopra non dico all'amicizia, ma a qualunque 
gloriosa cosa, degno molto e divino."39 
Lionardo, of course, rejects this view and dismisses Battista's statement as the 
typical foolish talk of lovers. Moreover, he states that, when talking about love, it is at 
least necessary to distinguish the love between lovers who are physically attracted to 
one another from the love that friends feel for each other: 
                                                   
38 Alberti, Della famiglia 90. – "We may consider the love of husband and wife greatest of all. If pleasure 
generates benevolence, marriage gives an abundance of all sorts of pleasure and delight: if intimacy 
increases good will, no one has so close and continued a familiarity with anyone as with his wife; if 
close bonds and a united will arise through the revelation and communication of your feelings and 
desires, there is no one to whom you have more opportunity to communicate fully and reveal your 
mind than to your own wife, your constant companion; if, finally, an honorable alliance leads to 
friendship, no relationship more entirely commands your reverence than the sacred tie of marriage." 
Trans. Watkins 98. 
39 Alberti, Della famiglia 93. – "Yet doubt not that I would put love not only above friendship but above 
whatever is glorious, whatever is most noble and divine." Trans. Watkins 100-101. 
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E perché il nostro conferire sia più chiaro, questa furia, cioè amore venereo, 
chiamerollo inamoramento, e chi da essa sia preso dicasi inamorato. Quello 
altro amore libero d'omni lascivia, el quale congiugne e unisce gli animi con 
onesta benivolenza, nominiàllo amicizia. Questi di così onesto e benivolo 
animo affezionati chiaminsi amici.40 
Unsurprisingly, Lionardo, the humanistic classicist, thus refers to the classical idea of 
the two kinds of love—in ancient times represented by the two Aphrodites, the 
younger and the older one—to illustrate the nature of these two different kinds of 
affection that are based on either passion or reason. The discussion of whether passion 
should be accepted as the drive that rules man's life or whether reason should be 
employed to keep control of one's decisions and actions is indeed frequently to be 
found in the humanistically inspired literature of the Renaissance and the hostility 
against the first and the glorification of the second that is here presented by Alberti is 
indeed typical of early modern treatments of the matter. 
To back his argument up, Lionardo now also refers to another two classical ideas 
that were very popular with Renaissance humanists not only at Alberti's time but 
throughout the whole age: those of the dignity of man and of the freedom of the will. 
Carnal desires, which Lionardo considers the origin and the basis of sensual love, are, 
according to him, first and foremost the typical quality of beasts. Such desires can 
indeed be attributed neither to inanimate objects nor to plants but only to animals and 
humans. In contrast to man, however, beasts are not able to control or suppress their 
desires. For this reason, passion is—according to the idea of the chain of being and the 
different levels of existence, which ascribes specific qualities to the various classes of 
being—one of the characteristic attributes of animals, as it belongs to the features that 
distinguishes beasts from all inferior forms of being, i.e. plants and non-living objects. 
Reason, on the other hand, which animals lack, is the most characteristic quality of 
man, as he is the only being who is, due to his dignity and the freedom of his will, able 
to make use of the power of mind over matter.41 This view is based on a conception of 
man's role in this world that is about half a century later to be most perfectly 
represented by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in the probably best-known passage 
from his Oratio de hominis dignitate: 
Statuit tandem optimus opifex, ut cui dare nihil proprium poterat commune 
esset quicquid privatum singulis fuerat. Igitur hominem accepit indiscretae 
opus imaginis atque in mundi positum meditullio sic est alloquutus: 'Nec 
certam sedem, nec propriam faciem, nec munus ullum peculiare tibi 
                                                   
40 Alberti, Della famiglia 93. – "To make our discussion more clear, that madness, that is, erotic love, I shall 
call infatuation, and anyone taken with it, I shall describe as enamored. The other love, free from all 
lasciviousness, which joins and unites our [souls] in honorable [benevolence], I shall call friendship. 
Those bound by such an honorable and benevolent affection may be called friends." Trans. Watkins 
101. Alterations mine. 
41 For a detailed description of the early modern idea of the chain of being, see E. M. W. Tillyard, The 
Elizabethan World Picture (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) 33ff. 
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dedimus, o Adam, ut quam sedem, quam faciem, quae munera tute 
optaveris, ea, pro voto pro tua sententia, habeas et possideas. Definita 
ceteris natura intra praescriptas a nobis leges coercetur. Tu, nullis angustiis 
coercitus, pro tuo arbitrio, in cuius manu te posui, tibi illam praefinies. 
Medium te mundi posui, ut circumspiceres inde commodius quicquid est in 
mundo. Nec te caelestem neque terrenum, neque mortalem neque 
immortalem fecimus, ut tui ipsius quasi arbitrarius honorariusque plastes et 
fictor, in quam malueris tute formam effingas. Poteris in inferiora quae sunt 
bruta degenerare; poteris in superiora quae sunt divina ex tui animi 
sententia regenerari.'42 
So, since man is therefore free to choose the way in which he leads his life, as he 
incorporates in addition to his own specific quality—namely reason—also all the 
characteristic qualities of the forms of being inferior to his own class, he is also free to 
choose whether he wants to act like a beast, following his drives and abandoning 
himself to the pleasures of love, or whether he rather behaves as it becomes a rational 
being, preferring the virtuous union of two souls in friendship to the libidinous union 
of two bodies in carnal love. Thus, with Lionardo, friendship here becomes, as it were, 
a measure of one's own personal dignity.43 
In a last forceful exhortation, Lionardo now addresses his two younger listeners 
almost in the tone of a Savonarolan sermon and makes his hostile view of love and his 
favourable one of friendship once more unmistakably clear: 
Tanto vi ramento, frategli miei, fuggiamo questa furia amatoria, né 
monstriamo preporla all'amicizia, me neanche la diciamo tra' beni della vita 
umana, imperoché l'amore sempre fu pieno di fizioni, maninconie, 
suspizioni, pentimenti e dolori. Fuggiamo adunque questo amore. Sia in noi 
verso di lui quanto si richiede non poco odio, poiché manifesto si vede e con 
dolore si pruova ch'egli è cagione d'ogni scandolo e d'ogni male.44 
                                                   
42 Pico della Mirandola 5-6. – "At last the best of artisans ordained that that creature to whom He had been 
able to give nothing proper to himself should have joint possession of whatever had been peculiar to 
each of the different kinds of being. He therefore took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and, 
assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: 'Neither a fixed abode nor a form 
that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that 
according to thy judgment thou mayest have and possess what abode, what form and what functions 
thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of 
laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose 
hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature. We have set thee at the 
world's center that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have 
made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice 
and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever 
shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are 
brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, 
which are divine." Trans. Livermoore Forbes in Cassirer et al. 224-225. 
43 Cf. Alberti, Della famiglia 94-95. 
44 Alberti, Della famiglia 97. – "This much I do urge on you, my little brothers, let us flee this amatory 
madness, nor seem to put it above friendship. Better, let us not even call it one of the goods of this life. 
Love has always been burdened with deceit, sorrow, suspicion, regret, and grief. Let us flee, then, from 
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To bring the discussion to an end and to a solution in favour of friendship, Alberti has 
himself eventually give in to Lionardo's argumentation when he has the Battista of the 
story now vow to take heed of the advantages of friendship and to devote himself to 
the making of friends and the cultivation of his friendships in future. Yet, he has 
himself also say something that—although apparently only meant as a final excuse for 
his enthusiasm for love—might be taken, as it were, as a prophetic prediction and even 
as an explanation of the whole development of the conflict between the two different 
concepts of relationship and their rivalry that is to dominate the view of love and 
friendship in the forthcoming two centuries of the European Renaissance: 
Io e per età e per ogni reverenza, Lionardo, non ardirei oppormi all'autorità 
e ragioni tue. […] Io mai ardirei negarti la vera amicizia non essere forte, ma 
forse la credo meno veemente che l'innamoramento. Ma chi sarà, se già tu 
uomo eloquentissimo uno solo quello fussi, el quale mi provasse mai oggi in 
questa età nostra trovarsi quelle piladee e lelie amicizie? Certo 
gl'innamoramenti oggi sono qual sempre furono ne' ricchi, ne' poveri, ne' 
signori, ne' servi, ne' vecchi, ne' giovani, tale che niuna età, niuna fortuna, 
niuno petto umano si truova vacuo dalle fiamme amatorie.45 
Certainly without being aware of this, Alberti here already alludes to three major 
factors that are to be responsible for the debasement of the concept of friendship at the 
end of the Renaissance and the following triumph of love as the preferred form of 
intimacy: 
1. Just as the young Battista is not able to successfully oppose the eloquent 
argumentation of his older cousin Lionardo, or even dares to challenge his authority 
and thus his view of the value of friendship, and so finally fails to stand firm in his 
preference of love over friendship, the humanists of the age were completely devoted 
to the teachings of the ancient philosophers and were equally not able to question the 
classical views on the matter or even to challenge the authority of the classical works 
on the subject. In fact, there is hardly any theoretical treatise dating from that time in 
which its author is not citing at least some classical writers or commonplaces in the 
hope of supporting or even legitimizing his own thoughts or statements by referring to 
these classical authorities. The phenomenon of such an unrestricted devotion to 
traditional authorities is of course not only to be found in the Renaissance with its 
enthusiasm for the ancients, but already in medieval times, when theologians and 
                                                                                                                                                            
this kind of love. Let us give it the ample detestation it deserves. Clearly do men see and sadly do they 
experience that this is a source of all kinds of disgrace and suffering." Trans. Watkins 104. 
45 Alberti, Della famiglia 97-98. – "Because of my age and my reverence for you, Lionardo, I dare not resist 
your authority and your arguments. […] I would never dare to deny your claim that true friendship is 
strong, but I think, perhaps, it is less powerful as a force than passion. Who indeed, unless it be you 
with your eloquence, could persuade me that today in our time there are friendships like those of 
Pylades and Laelius? Passionate love, certainly, is just what it has always been, in rich and in poor, in 
lords and in serving men, in old and in young. It remains such that no age, no estate, no human heart is 
empty of that amorous flame." Trans. Watkins 104-105. 
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other clergymen considered it obviously not sufficient to rely on the Scripture alone 
but frequently also referred to the writings of the Fathers of the Church, which were 
seen as almost as authoritative as the text of the Bible itself, to support and legitimize 
their own views. And even today, in some relatively new fields of research, the 
devotion to the founders of specific schools of thought and to their theories is often so 
unswerving and sometimes even so fanatical that it is quite difficult to overcome the 
common belief in these views. So, the reason for the widespread uncritical adoption of 
the classical ideas and ideals of friendship in Renaissance humanism is to be found in 
its lack of emancipation from the authorities of classical thought until about the second 
half of the sixteenth century, when increasing criticism of the classical friendship 
conceptions began to establish an opposition against the idealized view of this kind of 
relationship. 
2. When Battista claims that only Lionardo's eloquence could persuade him that 
friendships like those of Pylades and Orestes or Laelius and Scipio would or could 
exist at his own time, he indirectly also alludes to another cause of the negative 
development of the common attitude towards the ideal of friendship. The doubt that 
the classical representation of friendship, with its various examples of perfect 
friendship couples from Achilles and Patroclus to Orestes and Pylades, to Laelius and 
Scipio, and finally to Damon and Pithias, which the humanists frequently referred to as 
a proof of the realizability of the friendship ideal, might no longer be translatable into 
the socio-political reality of a constantly changing world, and that it has therefore to 
remain a pipedream, an unrealizable ideal, was thus already subliminally existent in 
Alberti's time. This doubt, as Alberti clearly illustrates, can here, at his time, still be 
dispelled by the eloquent and persuading rhetoric of the humanists, but one and a half 
centuries later, at the latest, this doubt is no longer to be smothered, and is then to find 
expression particularly in the English stage plays of the early seventeenth century. 
3. A third reason for the common preference of love over friendship that is to 
prevail in the end—again a reason that Alberti here already alludes to—is to be found 
in the characteristic natures of both the two different kinds of affection and the forms 
of relationship that results from them. It is precisely the apparent advantage of the 
nobility of friendship as a product of reason and the supposed disadvantage of the 
instinctiveness of love as a product of passion that are to turn out as the main causes 
for the eventual decline of the first and the triumphant progress of the latter. The idea 
of a purely rational friendship, as it is idealized in the classical theories, might in fact 
only be put into practice, if at all, in times in which the socio-political conditions permit 
or even support the emergence and flourishing of an intellectual elite. Yet, even then, it 
would merely be realizable within this social class, i.e. between its philosophically 
educated members. This, however, means that it needs a society in which broad 
sections of the population have access to a humanistic education, and a certain wealth 
of the community to make this mass education affordable, before the classically 
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inspired ideal of amity could become established as a commonly accepted concept of 
friendship or even as a commonly aspired model of relationship. Love, on the other 
hand, as Battista correctly explains, is a much more democratic kind of affection, as it is 
for everyone possible to love or to be loved, no matter what his age, social standing, or 
educational level might be. Furthermore, it is also much more independent of the 
current socio-political climate than friendship and can thus also flourish when the 
cultural conditions are not in favour of erudition and of spiritual relationships that are 
built exclusively on the moral philosophical values of ancient times. The libidinous 
motivation for loving is hence not a disadvantage of this sort of affection; it rather 
makes it the most natural one, and the union of two lovers thus the most universally 
valid of all types of relationship. This, in fact, is one of the main reasons for the 
forthcoming success that this kind of relationship is to have in the centuries following 
the Renaissance. 
For the time being, however, the common Renaissance attitude towards the matter 
is usually still pro-friendship, so that, whenever it comes to the question whether 
friendship should be preferred or love, in most literary treatments the choice is still 
made in favour of friendship, as, for example, by Spenser in his Faerie Queene: 
Hard is the doubt, and difficult to deeme, 
When all three kinds of loue together meet, 
And doe dispart the hart with powre extreme, 
Whether shall weigh the balance downe; to weet 
The deare affection vnto kindred sweet, 
Or raging fire of loue to woman kind, 
Or zeale of friends combynd with vertues meet. 
But of them all the band of vertuous mind 
Me seemes the gentle hart should most assured bind. 
 
For naturall affection soone doth cesse, 
And quenched is with Cupids greater flame : 
But faithfull friendship doth them both suppresse, 
And them with maystring discipline doth tame, 
Through thoughts aspyring to eternall fame. 
For as the soule doth rule the earthly masse, 
And all the seruice of the bodie passe, 
So loue of soule doth loue of bodie passe, 
No lesse then perfect gold surmounts the meanest brasse.46 
Here, it is now the Socratic-Platonic idea originally expressed in the Symposium that 
'loue of soule doth loue of bodie passe' that Spenser presents, and this emphasis on the 
intellectual or spiritual quality of friendship in contrast to the inferior characteristic of 
love—the sexual desire—is once more used as the main argument for the preference of 
the first over the second. It is, in fact, the one and only argument that the 
pro-friendship writers of the Renaissance put forward to explain this preference. Thus, 
                                                   
46 Spenser 4.9.1-2.1-18. 
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we can find the same way of argumentation also in Montaigne's essay "De L' Amitié" 
when he praises the advantages that friendship has over love: 
/ D'y comparer l'affection envers les femmes, quoy qu'elle naisse de nostre 
choix, on ne peut, ny la loger en ce rolle. Son feu, je le confesse, 
 
neque enim est dea nescia nostri 
Que dulcem curis miscet amaritiem, 
 
est plus actif, plus cuisant et plus aspre. Mais c'est un feu temeraire et 
volage, ondoyant et divers, feu de fiebvre, subject à accez et remises, et qui 
ne nous tient qu'à un coing. En l'amitié, c'est une chaleur generale et 
universelle, temperée au demeurant et égale, une chaleur constante et 
rassize, toute douceur et polissure, qui n'a rien d'aspre et de poignant. Qui 
plus est, en l'amour, ce n'est qu'un desir forcené après ce qui nous fuit: 
 
Come segue la lepre il cacciatore 
Al freddo, al caldo, alla montagna, al lito; 
Ne pui l'estima poi che presa vede, 
Et sol dietro a chi fugge affretta il piede.47 
Most Renaissance writers did indeed come to the conclusion that passion and desire, as 
the emotional seeds of carnal love, are feelings that do not become the natural 
disposition of man, as they are quite comparable with the symptoms of a feverish 
illness, and that they must therefore be controlled by reason to prevent them from 
prevailing over man's mind. Only the dominance of reason over these emotions would 
enable man to become virtuous and thus to occupy the place in God's divine order, the 
chain of being, that He has designed him for as the only rational being in this world. 
This view is summed up, for example, in a brief statement by Ottaviano Fregoso in 
Baldesar Castiglione's Libro del Cortegiano, his famous courtesy book on the right 
conduct of courtiers: "[…] perché sempre quella cosa per la quale l'appetito vince la 
ragione è ignoranzia, né po mai la vera scienzia esser superata dallo affetto, il quale dal 
                                                   
47 Montaigne 233-34. –  
 "[A] You cannot compare with friendship the passion men feel for women, even though it is 
born of our own choice, nor can you put them in the same category. I must admit that the 
flames of passion – 
 
 for I am not unacquainted with that goddess who mingles sweet bitterness with love's cares – 
 [Catullus, Epigrams, 66.17-18. (Annotations 209.)] 
 
 are more active, sharp and keen. But that fire is a rash one, fickle fluctuating and variable; it is 
a feverish fire, subject to attacks and relapses, which only gets hold of a corner of us. The love 
of friends is a general universal warmth, temperate moreover and smooth, a warmth which is 
constant and at rest, all gentleness and evenness, having nothing sharp nor keen. What is more, 
sexual love is but a mad craving for something which escapes us: 
 
 Like the hunter who chases the hare through heat and cold, o'er hill and dale, yet once he has 
bagged it, he thinks nothing of it; only while it flees away does he pound after it. 
 [Ariosto, Orlando furioso, 10.7. (Annotations 209.)]" 
 
 Trans. Screech 208-09. 
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corpo e non dall'animo deriva; e se dalla ragione è ben retto e governato, diventa virtú, 
e se altrimenti diventa vicio; […]."48 
Now, one might be inclined to say that the literary treatment of the opposition 
between reason and passion, and correspondingly also the one of that between 
friendship and love, was simply the consequence of the general enthusiasm for 
antitheses that was so typical of the Renaissance. "Antithesis, or the juxtaposition of 
opposites," as James Saslow explains in the introduction to his edition of 
Michelangelo's poetry, "was frequent in Renaissance literature," and appears, for 
example, in "such traditional oppositions as burning-freezing, sun-shade, fire-ice, life-
death, and pleasure-pain [...]."49 That it was yet much more than just the fashion of an 
age to create an artificial conflict between these two pairs of concepts for mere literary 
purposes, shows the enduring popularity of theoretical treatments of both the 
antithesis between reason and passion and, frequently associated with this one, that 
between friendship and love in the centuries following the Renaissance. In his 
biography of Samuel Johnson, for instance, James Boswell describes in the entry for 
Sunday, 16 April 1775, a dispute between him and Dr Johnson whether love is more 
pleasing than friendship or vice versa:  
I maintained that Horace was wrong in placing happiness in Nil admirari 
['Nought to admire'], for that I thought admiration one of the most agreeable 
of all our feelings; and I regretted that I had lost much of my disposition to 
admire, which people generally do as they advance in life. JOHNSON. 'Sir, 
as a man advances in life, he gets what is better than admiration—
judgement, to estimate things at their true value.' I still insisted that 
admiration was more pleasing than judgement, as love is more pleasing 
than friendship. The feeling of friendship is like that of being comfortably 
filled with roast beef; love, like being enlivened with champagne. 
JOHNSON. 'No, Sir; admiration and love are like being intoxicated with 
champagne; judgement and friendship like being enlivened.'50 
Boswell's view is here in fact already foreshadowing the common Romantic attitude 
towards love and friendship, which is a bit later to find expression in allegories as the 
one by John Keats (1795-1821), who speaks of "the wine of Love—and the bread of 
Friendship."51 However, although representing a typical disagreement of the 
                                                   
48 Baldesar Castiglione, Il libro del Cortegiano 4.16. – "For reason is always overcome by desire because of 
ignorance, and true knowledge can never be defeated by the emotions, which originate in the body 
rather than the soul. And if the emotions are properly governed and controlled by reason, then they 
become virtuous, and if otherwise, then vicious." Trans. George Bull, The Book of the Courtier, by 
Baldesar Castiglione (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976) 293. 
49 James M. Saslow, introduction, The Poetry of Michelangelo, by Michelangelo Buonarroti, trans. James M. 
Saslow (New Haven: Yale UP, 1991) 42. 
50 James Boswell, [The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL. D.] Boswell's 'Life of Johnson', ed. R. W. Chapman 
(London: Oxford UP, 1965) 624. Trans. in square brackets Chapman 624n3. 
51 John Keats, Letter to John Hamilton Reynolds, Teignmouth, 3rd May [1818], Letters: 1814 to January 1819 
(New York: AMS, 1970) 110, vol. 4 of The Complete Works of John Keats, ed. H. Buxton Forman. 
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eighteenth century between an early romanticist (Boswell) and an ardent advocate of 
the ideas of the Enlightenment (Dr Johnson), the dialogue here described does clearly 
resemble the discussions of the matter in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Only the 
view on the sensual aspect of love was then even more hostilely expressed than here 
with Johnson. 
In Renaissance literature, such an expression of an utterly disparaging view on the 
sexual aspect of love is to be found, for example, in Shakespeare's sonnet 129, where 
the poet impressively illustrates his vision of what happens when reason is supplanted 
by passion, desire, and lust: 
Th' expense of spirit in a waste of shame 
Is lust in action, and till action lust 
Is perjured, murd'rous, bloody, full of blame, 
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust, 
Enjoyed no sooner but despisèd straight, 
Past reason hunted, and no sooner had, 
Past reason hated as a swallowed bait, 
On purpose laid to make the taker mad, 
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so, 
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme, 
A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe, 
Before, a joy proposed, behind, a dream. 
All this the world well knows, yet none knows well 
To shun the heav'n that leads men to this hell.52 
It is quite remarkable that Shakespeare does here not speak of love directly, but only of 
lust, the sexual desire, the carnal aspect of love. Spiritual love, if this interpretation 
may be proposed, is here only mentioned as the heaven that will lead the lover in the 
end to the hell of sensual passion. That Shakespeare, as most of his contemporaries, is 
indeed not simply equating lust with love, is most clearly shown in his Venus and 
Adonis when Adonis rejects Venus attempt to seduce him with the following comment 
on love and lust: 
I hate not love, but your device in love, 
That lends embracements unto every stranger. 
You do it for increase : O strange excuse, 
When reason is the bawd to lust's abuse! 
 
'Call it not love, for Love to heaven is fled, 
Since sweating Lust on earth usurp'd his name ; 
                                                   
52 Shakespeare, Sonnets No 129. It is though not only sensual love itself that Shakespeare so disparages in 
his Sonnets; it is especially the object of this passionate love that is presented in the most negative way, 
as J. K. Gardiner explains: "He projects all his negative emotions on the wicked woman, the she-'devil' 
or 'female evil.' Like a female version of Persephone's ravisher Hades, the dark lady is associated with 
sexuality, violence, grief, sin, and death, as she takes the friend from the poet and carries him off to her 
'hell.' " J. K. Gardiner, "The Marriage of Male Minds in Shakespeare's Sonnets," Journal of English and 
German Philology 84 (1985): 343. 
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[………………………………………………] 
 
'Love comforteth like sunshine after rain, 
But Lust's effect is tempest after sun ; 
Love's gentle spring doth always fresh remain, 
Lust's winter comes ere summer half be done ; 
Love surfeits not, Lust like a glutton dies ; 
Love is all truth, Lust full of forgéd lies.53 
From this view on love, however, there are two difficult problems arising: at first the 
question "wie ein Mann in Kenntnis der unersättlichen, polymorphen libidinösen 
Lebensgier der [menschlichen] Kreatur […] am Ideal der Liebe festhalten kann,"54 as 
Alan Posener puts it, and furthermore, if he does hold on to the ideal, how a friend in 
love with a woman, can resolve the conflict arising from this situation and might fulfil 
the duties of friendship and the duties of love at the same time. Now, that this might 
be possible at all is indeed to be doubted. It is, in fact, much later even to be explicitly 
denied by Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97) in her famous Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman: 
Friendship is a serious affection; the most sublime of all affections, because 
it is founded on principle, and cemented by time. The very reverse may be 
said of love. In a great degree, love and friendship cannot subsist in the 
same bosom; even when inspired by different objects they weaken or 
destroy each other, and for the same object can only be felt in succession. 
The vain fears and fond jealousies, the winds which fan the flame of love, 
when judiciously or artfully tempered, are both incompatible with the 
tender confidence and sincere respect of friendship.55 
Now, whether friendship and love can exist simultaneously in someone's life or not, it 
is at least very difficult for the individual to cope with the problems that are involved 
in the endeavour to satisfy both the demands of the friend and those of the lover at the 
same time. The realization of this fact led Renaissance writers, and especially the 
English dramatists of the time, not only to the conclusion that one has therefore to 
make a choice between these two kinds of affection and relationship but also to the 
discovery that the inner conflict that the individual might be subjected to because of 
this need to choose between the friend and the lover, would provide a suitable 
starting-point for a stirring story. In other words, they realized, as Mills points out, that 
"the stress on love, chivalric or courtly, exalted one loyalty; the revived admiration for 
friendship exalted another; and when those two loyalties came into conflict as they 
                                                   
53 Shakespeare, Venus and Adonis 132-34.789-804. 
54 Alan Posener, William Shakespeare (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1995) 78. – "[…] how a man, knowing about the 
[human] creature's insatiable, polymorphic libidinal appetite for life […] can still hold on to the ideal of 
love." Trans. mine. 
55 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: An Authoritative Text, Backgrounds, The 
Wollstoncraft Debate, Criticism, ed. Carol H. Poston (New York: Norton, 1988) 73. 
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well might, a crucial and absorbingly interesting situation was created."56 From the 
conflict between these two loyalties, in fact, various plot patterns are thinkable to 
develop, and the authors of the time proved to be quite resourceful and imaginative 
indeed when they set out to enrich their stories with this intriguing theme—
particularly when they were to be presented on the stage. As the way in which the 
representation of this fictional conflict between friendship and love in English 
Renaissance literature developed in the course of the age—from the glorification of 
friendship to the preference of love—does indeed not only reflect but, by intensely 
influencing it, also fostered the gradual change in the common attitude towards the 
matter that in fact took place in the reality of the time as well, we will in the following 
take a closer look at this development in literature that, as it were, foreshadowed the 
real development of the conflict at the end of the period. 
The initial situation is in all of such stories the same: two male friends, A and B, live 
happily and enjoy their friendship, when suddenly a woman, lady C, enters the scene 
and causes one of the friends (or both) to fall in love with her. The friendship of A and 
B, of course, is then affected by this love of the one (or both) for C. The further 
development and the outcome of this conflict varies, but in principle, every possible 
plot pattern might be classified as belonging to one of the six different variants that 
Mills categorizes as follows: 
1. A and B are friends; B loves C; consequently A loves C, since A and B 
are alike in interests and equal in most ways—'One soul in two bodies.' 
B resigns C to A. Friendship surpasses love. 
2. A and B are friends; B loves C; A voluntarily or by request woos C for B. 
C loves A instead of B. B, learning of the situation, resigns C to A. 
3. A and B are friends; B loves C; A woos C for B; C loves A (as in 2). B 
accuses A of unfair tactics. A duel ensues, followed by reconciliation or 
fatal results. 
4. A and B are friends; B loves C but for some reason ceases to love her and 
resigns her to A. C refuses to accept A unless he kills B. A reconciliation 
or tragic results follow. 
5. A and B are friends; B loves C and invites A to accompany him a-
wooing. A refuses, lest he fall in love with C. C's curiosity is aroused and 
she visits A. Tragic results. 
6. A and B are friends; both love C. But because of their friendship neither 
will take advantage of the other. A woos C for B; C loves A. Likewise B 
woos C for A; C loves B. Consequently, as C falls in love with both A 
and B, the solution of the impasse is still to seek. A and B become rivals, 
but rivals in magnanimity; each is resolved to bring about success in 
love for the other. Various circumstances and means are used to resolve 
the situation.57 
                                                   
56 Mills 376. 
57 Mills 377. The extraordinary popularity of the literary treatments of this conflict between friendship and 
love appears to be, according to Mills, an exclusively English phenomenon in the Renaissance (just like 
the Freundschaftskult, the cult of friendship in the eighteenth century in Germany, which was an 
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As Mills here mentions, one of the ways most frequently used by Renaissance writers 
to introduce the conflict between friendship and love is the representation of a 
situation in which one of the friends is wooing a lady for the other. Little has indeed 
changed since medieval times in the enthusiasm for the chivalric custom to woo a lady 
for one's friend.58 It was still regarded as one of the major duties of a friend to 
undertake this delicate task and as one of the best ways to show one's confidence in the 
person entrusted with this duty, as a passage from Castiglione's Libro del Cortegiano 
shows: 
[…] perché ogni amante desidera far conoscer le sue passioni alla amata, ed 
essendo solo è sforzato a far molte piú dimostrazioni e piú efficaci, che se da 
qualche amorevole e fidele amico fosse aiutato; perché le dimostrazioni che 
lo amante istesso fa dànno molto maggior suspetto, che quelle che fa per 
internunci, e perché gli animi umani sono naturalmente curiosi di sapere, 
súbito che uno alieno comincia a sospettare, mette tanta diligenzia, che 
conosce il vero, e conosciutolo non ha rispetto di publicarlo, anzi talor gli 
piace; il che non interviene dell'amico il qual, oltre che aiuti di favore e di 
consiglio, spesso rimedia a quegli errori che fa il cieco innamorato, e sempre 
procura la secretezza e provede a molte cose alle quali esso proveder non 
po; oltre che grandissimo refrigerio si sente dicendo le passioni e sfocandole 
con amico cordiale, e medesimamente accresce molto i piaceri il poter 
comunicargli.59 
                                                                                                                                                            
exclusively national phenomenon as well), as one will find, when examining the writings of 
Continental authors of the time, that "in the foreign productions the primary interest is love." And he 
adds: "It is when that primary interest meets the time-honored and widely known theme of friendship 
in English literary tradition that the essential conflict becomes of first importance." Mills 431n269. 
58 The wooing of a lady for a friend has indeed already been a very popular literary motive frequently 
appearing in courtly love poetry. The different representations of this traditional chivalric service, 
however, vary considerably. Of course, not all love stories can have a happy ending; some, in fact, must 
end in tragedy, and the portrayal of the unforeseeable and often disastrous consequences that can 
result from a situation in which a man courts a lady in behalf of his friend was apparently much more 
popular than that of a story in which everything turns out well in the end. The realization that love and 
friendship can easily come into conflict with each other when a man has to make a decision between 
the love for his lady and the loyalty to his friend was yet not new, as the view that love is a serious 
threat to friendship, since it undermines the lover's loyalty to his friend, is in fact a classical one. In 
medieval literature, however, the treatment of this conflict became one of the leading motifs in courtly 
love poetry and the consequences that result from this conflict were the topic of many tragic love 
stories. In medieval writings, contrary to classical and most early modern ones, the emphasis is though 
put on the threat that friendship can be to love, not on the threat that love can be to friendship. For a 
detailed study of courtly love poetry and the relation between love and friendship that it usually 
presents, see Bernard O'Donoghue, The Courtly Love Tradition (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1982); and 
Anna Hubertine Reuters, Friendship and Love in the Middle English Metrical Romances (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Lang, 1991). 
59 Castiglione 3.73. – "For every lover wants to let his beloved know what he is suffering; but if he has to 
rely on himself he has to make many more and stronger demonstrations than if assisted by some loyal 
and loving friend. Then the demonstrations of affection made by the lover himself arouse far more 
suspicion than those made through intermediaries; and since people are naturally inquisitive, as soon 
as some stranger begins to suspect something he at once works diligently to find out the truth, and 
when he has discovered it he doesn't scruple to tell the world; on the contrary, quite often he is 
delighted to do so. This is not the case with a friend; indeed, a friend not only helps the lover with 
sympathy and advice but often repairs the errors into which he stumbles, always ensures secrecy and 
looks after many things that the lover cannot. Moreover, it is a welcome relief for the lover to be able to 
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The conflict now emerges, when the one who is supposed to woo the lady for his 
friend is, for some reason or another, believed to woo her for himself. Probably the 
best-known scene in which this suspicion is expressed by the friend who thinks himself 
to be betrayed, is the one in Shakespeare's Much Ado about Nothing, where Claudio 
suspects his friend Don Pedro, who had offered him to woo his beloved for him, of 
courting the lady for himself: 
'Tis certain so; the Prince woos for himself. 
Friendship is constant in all other things 
Save in the office and affairs of love: 
Therefore all hearts in love use their own tongues; 
Let every eye negotiate for itself, 
And trust no agent; for beauty is a witch 
Against whose charms faith melteth into blood.60 
The same situation appears in The Trial of Chivalry, an anonymous drama first printed 
in 1605. In this play, the king of Navarre's son Ferdinand falls in love with the French 
princess Katherine and entreats his English friend Pembrooke to woo the lady for him. 
Since Pembroke is not instantly eager to do his friend this favour, Ferdinand beseeches 
him to serve as a go-between by appealing to his sense of honour and by reminding 
him of the duties of a true and loyal friend and of his chivalric obligations: 
[…] by our vowes, 
Which in the booke of heauen are registred, 
By all the rightes of friendship, by that loue 
Thou bearst thy natiue Countrey, I coniure thee, 
This day to be the Trumpet of my worth, 
To speake the passions of thy grieued friend, 
To Katharine's eares, till those pure Iuory gates, 
Pearst with the volley of thy battring words, 
Giue way to my lament to touch her heart: 
For this haue I extracted thee from many, 
Made thee my fellow Pilgrim to her shrine, 
Knowing thy thoughts from loue's Religion free, 
When my prayers fayle, thy tongue may plead for me.61 
As a soldier, Pembrooke still feels a bit uneasy with this task, claiming that it would 
really pose a challenge to him. However, in the end he finally gives in and promises to 
woo Katherine for his friend: 
Must I be spokesman? Pembrooke plead for loue? 
Whose toung tunde to the Instruments of war, 
                                                                                                                                                            
unburden himself by telling his sorrows to a faithful friend, just as it augments his joy when he can 
share it with someone else." Trans. Bull 274. 
60 Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing 2.1.162-68. 
61 The Trial of Chivalry, ed. John S. Farmer, facs. rpt. of London, 1605 ed. (n.p.: Tudor Facsimile Texts, 1912) 
Br-Bv (no lines). 
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Neuer knew straine of fancy on my breath: 
Affection neuer dwelt, but war and death. 
[………………………………………………] 
I am too blunt and rude for such nice seruice. 
Yet since my friend inioynes me to this taske, 
Take courage, ile both speake, plead, woo for thee, 
And when I want fit words to moue her mind, 
Ile draw my sword, and sweare she must be kind.62 
Unfortunately, Pembrooke is not successful in his attempt to woo the lady for the 
friend. Instead, he rather inadvertently succeeds in arousing Katherine's interest in 
himself. Although he remains loyal to his friend and rejects the lady's advances to him, 
he is suspected by Ferdinand of having betrayed him, since Katherine in a following 
conversation with Ferdinand reacts to his inquiry about Pembrooke's courtship by 
calling upon the prince to woo for his friend as he has wooed for him. Now, in fact, 
Ferdinand believes himself to be the victim of an extremely vicious and subtle betrayal: 
Why, he was Orator in my behalfe: 
If I should speake for him, as he for me, 
Then should I breathe forth his passions, not mine owne. 
I, I, tis so; the villaine, in my name, 
Hath purchas'd her affection for himselfe, […].63 
After a turbulent plot that develops from this initial situation, the play finally ends 
happily. The friends renew their friendship and Ferdinand and Katherine become 
engaged. So, in the end, both kinds of relationship succeed, and the play thus provides 
not only an utterly romantic but, as it were, also a decidedly undecided solution of the 
conflict as it shirks making a clear decision in favour of either love or friendship. 
Equally undecided is the ending of another story that begins with a situation quite 
similar to that of the first scene of The Trail of Chivalry, Robert Green's Friar Bacon and 
Friar Bungay. Here, Edward, the Prince of Wales and son of Henry III is in love with 
Margaret of Fressingfield and asks his friend and confidant Lacy, the Earl of Lincoln, to 
woo the lady for him. He watches Lacy's endeavour to win Margaret's affections in his 
friend's behalf through the magic perspective glass of Friar Bacon. Contrary to the 
loyal Pembrooke in The Trail of Chivalry, however, Lacy falls in love with the lady 
himself and Friar Bacon has to prepare the Prince for what he is to see by breaking the 
news to him that "friends are men, and loue can baffle Lords; / The Earl both woes and 
courtes her for himselfe."64 Lacy, meanwhile struggles with himself what to do: 
Daphne, the damsell that caught Phaebus fast, 
And lockt him in the brightnesse of her lookes, 
Was not so beautious in Appollos eyes, 
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As is faire Margret to the Lincolne earle; 
Recant thee, Lacie—thou art put in trust, 
Edward, thy soueraignes sonne, hath chosen thee 
A secret friend, to court her for himself: 
And darest thou wrong thy Prince with trecherie?— 
Lacie, loue makes no exception of a friend, 
Nor deemes it of a Prince, but as a man: 
Honour bids thee controll him in his lust, 
His wooing is not for to wed the girle, 
But to intrap her and beguile the lasse: 
Lacie, thou louest, then brooke not such abuse, 
But wed her, and abide thy Princes frowne: 
For better die, than see her liue disgraced.65 
Although Lacy thus decides to betray his friend and consequently also their friendship, 
and although he puts his plans in the following also into action, the story finally takes 
a favourable turn and ends—just like the one of The Trail of Chivalry—happily with the 
renewal of the friendship between the prince and the earl and with the engagement of 
the latter to the lady Margaret. Thus, here again the conflict between the two kinds of 
affection is represented but no clear choice in favour of either love or friendship is 
made. In contrast to The Trail of Chivalry, however, where the conflict emerges from a 
mere misunderstanding and Ferdinand's groundless jealousy, in the story of Friar 
Bacon and Friar Bungay there is indeed not just an imaginary conflict but a very actual 
one, as Lacy, contrary to Pembrooke, really falls in love with the woman he is 
supposed to woo for his friend. The conflict is thus initially an inner one, one that Lacy 
has first of all to cope with by himself. It is indeed this inner conflict of a friend to have 
to make a choice between the two loyalties mentioned above that—in addition to the 
outer conflict between the three protagonists involved in it (the two friends and the 
lady)—adds to the story an extra dramatic quality. 
Another play in which this inner conflict of the friend and lover is impressively 
represented is, for example, John Lyly's Endymion: The Man in the Moone. Here, it is 
Endymion's friend Eumenides, unhappy in love with Seleme, who suddenly finds 
himself in the difficult situation in which he has to make a choice in favour of either his 
friend or his beloved. Given the opportunity to look into a magic fountain and to find 
the answer to only one single question written on the ground of the well, he now has 
to decide whether he should use his chance to learn what he could do to make Seleme 
love him in return, or to find a remedy with which he could deliver his friend 
Endymion, on whom the old witch Dipsas has cast a spell, from the charmed sleep in 
which he has fallen. This situation, of course, is an utterly mystical and surreal one, but 
the inner conflict Eumenides is here subjected to, is indeed as realistic and 
understandable as it has been in the plays mentioned above. Eumenides is in fact torn 
as to what to do, and his inability to make a choice in favour of either his friend or his 
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beloved is revealed in his soliloquy, in which he makes the seriousness of his dilemma 
impressively clear: 
What now, 
Eumenides? Whither art thou drawn? Hast thou forgot- 
ten both friendship and duty, care of Endymion and the 
commandment of Cynthia? Shall he die in a leaden sleep 
because thou sleepest in a golden dream?—Ay, let him 
sleep ever, so I slumber but one minute with Semele. 
Love knoweth neither friendship nor kindred. 
Shall I not hazard the loss of a friend, for the obtaining 
of her for whom I would often lose myself?—Fond 
Eumenides, shall the enticing beauty of a most disdainful 
lady be of more force than the rare fidelity of a tried 
friend? The love of men to women is a thing common, 
and of course; the friendship of man to man infinite, and 
immortal.—Tush, Semele doth possess my love.—Ay, 
but Endymion hath deserved it. I will help Endymion; I 
found Endymion unspotted in his truth.—Ay, but I shall 
find Semele constant in her love. I will have Semele.— 
What shall I do?66 
Thus unable to make a decision, Eumenides seeks advice from Geron, an old and wise 
man who offers to help him in his misery. Geron's recommendation now represents 
once more the typical humanistic attitude towards the matter and perfectly reflects the 
common Renaissance views on the nature of friendship and love and on the question 
which of the two should always be preferred by a truly virtuous person of moral 
integrity: 
Eumenides, release Endymion; for all things, friend- 
ship excepted, are subject to fortune. Love is but an eye- 
worm, which only tickleth the head with hopes and 
wishes; friendship the image of eternity, in which there is 
nothing movable, nothing mischievous. As much differ- 
ence as there is between beauty and virtue, bodies and 
shadows, colours and life, so great odds is there between 
love and friendship. Love is a chameleon, which draweth 
nothing into the mouth but air, and nourisheth nothing in 
the body but lungs. Believe me, Eumenides, desire dies in 
the same moment that beauty sickens, and beauty fadeth 
in the same instant that it flourisheth. When adversities 
flow, then love ebbs, but friendship standeth stiffly in 
storms. Time draweth wrinkles in a fair face but addeth 
fresh colours to a fast friend, which neither heat, nor cold, 
nor misery, nor place, nor destiny can alter or diminish. 
O friendship, of all things the most rare, and therefore 
most rare because most excellent, whose comforts in 
misery is always sweet and whose counsels in prosperity 
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are ever fortunate! Vain love, that only coming near to 
friendship in name, would seem to be the same, or better, 
in nature!67 
Eumenides, of course, acts on this wise man's advice, or rather, he defers to Geron's 
greater wisdom and declares himself convinced: 
Father, I allow your reasons and will therefore 
conquer mine own. Virtue shall subdue affections, wis- 
dom lust, friendship beauty. Mistresses are in every place, 
and are as common as hares in Athos, bees in Hybla, fowls in 
the air; but friends to be found are like the phoenix in 
Arabia, but one, or the philadelphi in Arays, never above 
two. I will have Endymion.68 
In the end, Eumenides realizes that he has indeed done very well making this morally 
correct choice, as he is doubly rewarded for this 'right' decision: his friend Endymion is 
delivered from the curse and awakes from his bewitched sleep, and additionally—as a 
reward for his honourable behaviour and his readiness to abandon his feelings of love 
to fulfil his duties as a faithful friend—Eumenides is given Seleme's hand by Cynthia, 
the Queene, who is in turn engaged to Endymion. The representation of friendship and 
love that Lyly here provides is thus an utterly classical one in which the union of two 
male friends is given precedence over the love of a man for a woman. This love, in fact, 
is merely seen as a libidinous desire that only by those under its influence might be 
considered a possible alternative to friendship. Every man in his right mind, however, 
would clearly see the superiority of friendship to love. That the choice Eumenides has 
to make is not one between the preservation of either his friendship or his love affair 
but one between the preservation of his existing friendship with Endymion and the 
mere possibility of a love affair with Seleme, even underlines the irrationality to which 
a lover is thought to be subjected to additionally, and, of course, supports the idea of 
the mind affecting qualities of love. How insane does one have to be not to instantly 
prefer an existing pleasure to the mere fantasy of a pleasure? Or, in other words, who 
would give up a valuable treasure one has already found to gain a treasure of 
uncertain worth? This alone reveals the low regard that is shown for love in the play. 
Furthermore, however, love is here, with Lyly, only represented as the one that the 
friend and lover feels for his mistress, the object of his love. That the feelings of the 
woman are obviously of no interest at all is shown by the way in which Seleme 
becomes engaged to Eumenides. At first, she is far from being enthusiastic about the 
idea that she has to marry him merely because she should serve as a reward, as it were, 
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for his loyalty to his friend Endymion. Eventually, of course, she acquiesces in the 
marriage—but it is, in fact, hardly more than merely the acquiescence in the marriage, 
as she is not really in love with Eumenides.69 This, however, seems to be of no 
importance in a play that only wants to present the superiority of the friendship 
between two men to their feelings of love for women. 
A very similar message is conveyed in another Elizabethan play, the well-known 
Merchant of Venice by Shakespeare. Presenting almost the entire repertoire of classical 
commonplaces of friendship, the play represents one of the last unreserved glori-
fications of the traditional friendship ideal of the period. Antonio, the merchant of 
Venice, and his friend Bassanio are enjoying a friendship that instantly reminds one of 
that between Damon and Pithias. Bassanio, in need of some money to woo the heiress 
of Belmont, the fair, virtuous, and (most important of all) rich lady Portia, asks his 
friend to lend him 3000 ducats so that he might be able to compete with all the other 
suitors courting her. Antonio, however, has invested all his fortune in his ships at sea 
and has now no liquid assets at hand to make such a sum of money immediately 
available. So, in order to help his friend none the less, he goes to the Jewish 
moneylender Shylock who consents to lend him the money on condition that, if it is 
not repaid within three months, he may take a pound of Antonio's flesh off him. Only 
interested in helping his friend, Antonio foolishly agrees. Unfortunately, Bassanio, 
having successfully wooed Portia, has now to learn that all of Antonio's ships seem to 
have been either lost or destroyed, and that he was not able to repay Shylock in time, 
who therefore now insists on taking the pound of flesh off Antonio. As Shylock rejects 
all offers of a belated repayment, the case is brought before the Venetian court. 
Bassanio, still in Belmont, receives the money he needs to save his friend from Portia 
and leaves her immediately after their marriage in haste for Venice. 
In this play, the conflict is not at first sight one between friendship and love but one 
between the old classical conception of friendship and the new mercantilistic attitude 
towards it—an attitude that is to dominate the forthcoming seventeenth century. In The 
Merchant of Venice, love is indeed not represented as an alternative to friendship but 
rather as a means of its preservation. Contrary to the traditional courtship stories in 
which the friend merely serves as a go-between, only fulfilling his function as a means 
of help in the other friend's endeavour to wed a lady, here, the friend's mistress serves 
as a means of help in her lover's endeavour to save his friend and thus to perpetuate 
their friendship. By providing her lover with the money he needs to release his friend, 
and by encouraging him to leave her immediately after their marriage, she clearly 
accepts the superiority of her husband's relationship with another man over that with 
her—an attitude she is then even explicitly praised for by Lorenzo, one of Bassanio's 
fellows: 
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Madam, although I speak it in your presence, 
You have a noble and a true conceit 
Of god-like amity, which appears most strongly 
In bearing thus the absence of your lord. 
But if you knew to whom you show this honour, 
How true a gentleman you send relief, 
How dear a lover of my lord your husband, 
I know you would be prouder of the work 
Than customary bounty can enforce you.70 
Her reply to Lorenzo's well-meant compliment, however, clearly shows that she is not 
only familiar with the classical friendship ideal and its symbolism, but also that she is 
well aware that in her case the perpetuation of the men's friendship is the key to her 
own happiness in the marriage with Bassanio, since only by saving Antonio as her 
husband's 'other half'—and thus also the friendship between the two—she will ever be 
able to fully enjoy Bassanio's love for her: 
I never did repent for doing good, 
Nor shall not now: for in companions 
That do converse and waste the time together, 
Whose souls do bear an egall yoke of love, 
There must be needs a like proportion 
Of lineaments, of manners, and of spirit; 
Which makes me think that this Antonio 
Being the bosom lover of my lord, 
Must needs be like my lord. If it be so, 
How little is the cost I have bestowed 
In purchasing the semblance of my soul, 
From out the state of hellish cruelty!71 
Of how little importance the woman and the marriage with her really is to Bassanio, 
compared to his friend Antonio and the friendship with him, finally reveals one of his 
statements in the trial scene, when there seems to be no further hope of preventing 
Shylock from implementing the gruesome contract by killing Antonio: 
Antonio, I am married to a wife 
Which is as dear to me as life itself, 
But life itself, my wife, and all the world, 
Are not with me esteem'd above thy life. 
I would lose all, ay sacrifice them all 
Here to this devil, to deliver you.72 
Despite her appreciation of Bassanio's affectionate feelings for his friend Antonio, 
Portia, who, disguised as Antonio's lawyer, is present at the scene, is now of course not 
pleased to hear this from her husband, who mistakenly believes to have left her behind 
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in Belmont, and scolds him for this remark: "Your wife would give you little thanks for 
that / If she were by to hear you make the offer."73 However, she does not receive any 
direct reply to her criticism. Yet, a bit later she is once more shown the inferiority of the 
position she holds on Bassanio's list of priorities, compared to that of Antonio, when 
she, still in the disguise of the lawyer, asks Bassanio for the ring she has given him in 
Belmont before his departure for Venice as the only reward for the good service she 
has done his friend Antonio as his lawyer by winning the case against Shylock for him. 
At first, in fact, Bassanio hesitates to give the supposed lawyer the ring for fear of 
betraying his wife: 
Good sir, this ring was given me by my wife, 
And when she put it on, she made me vow 
That I should neither sell, nor give, nor lose it.74 
Antonio, however, allays his doubts and, by indirectly urging him to get his priorities 
right, persuades him to give the lawyer what he asked for: 
Ant: My Lord Bassanio, let him have the ring, 
Let his deservings and my love withal 
Be valued 'gainst your wife's commondement.75 
Thus persuaded, Bassanio, giving precedence to his friend's request over that of his 
wife, sends one of his fellows after the lawyer to hand the ring over to him: "Go 
Gratiano, run and overtake him, / Give him the ring […]."76 
Thus, the message that the play conveys, is, as Mills puts it, "that happiness in love 
(as in Endimion) can be gained only by respect to friendship as having a prior claim."77 
Yet, in both plays, in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice as in Lyly's Endymion, the 
conflict between love and friendship is not so fierce that love would be denied its place 
in the story—as long as this place is accepted to be one inferior to friendship. A 
situation in which love is completely excluded from the ending of a play, due to the 
final triumph of friendship, is in fact only very seldom to be found in Renaissance 
drama. One of these rare exceptions, however, is the story of The Dutch Courtesan by 
John Marston (1576-1634), first performed sometime around 1604. Here, a gentleman 
with the meaningful name Malheureux falls passionately in love with Franceschina, 
the Dutch Courtesan. Franceschina, however, has just been abandoned by Freevill, 
Malheureux's best friend, who has ended the love affair with her in order to marry 
another lady, Sir Hubert Subboys's daughter Beatrice. Driven by feelings of jealousy 
and injured pride, Franceschina promises to return Malheureux's love on condition 
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that he first kills his friend Freevill. Malheureux, of course, now finds himself subjected 
to one of the most excruciating inner conflicts thinkable: the dilemma of having to 
make a choice between his love for the lady and his friend's life: 
  O heaven, there is no hell 
But love's prolongings! 
[………………………………………] 
To kill my friend! Oh, 'tis to kill myself! 
Yet man's but man's excrement, man breeding man 
As he does worms, or this.    He spits. 
   To spoil this nothing! 
The body of a man is of the selfsame soil 
As ox or horse; no murder to kill these. 
As for that only part which makes us man, 
Murder wants power to touch't. O wit, how vile, 
How hellish art thou when thou raisest nature 
'Gainst sacred faith! Think more, to kill a friend 
To gain a woman, to lose a virtuous self 
For appetite and sensual end, whose very having 
Loseth all appetite and gives satiety— 
That corporal end, remorse and inward blushings 
Forcing us loathe the steam of our own heats, 
Whilst friendship clos'd in virtue, being spiritual, 
Tastes no such languishings and moments' pleasure 
With much repentance, but like rivers flow, 
And further that they run, they bigger grow! 
Lord, how was I misgone! How easy 'tis to err 
When passion will not give us leave to think! 
A learn'd, that is an honest, man may fear, 
And lust, and rage, and malice, and anything 
When he is taken uncollected suddenly: 
'Tis sin of cold blood, mischief with wak'd eyes, 
That is the damned and the truly vice, 
Not he that's passionless, but he 'bove passion's wise. 
My friend shall know it all.78 
Here, the contrast between the noble friendship of two virtuous men and the evil lust 
and passionate desire that marks men's love of women is indeed most impressively 
illustrated. This view of love and friendship, of course, clearly reflects the common 
humanistic attitude towards the matter: it represents the familiar conflict between 
reason, represented by the ideal of classical friendship, and passion, represented by the 
disastrous love for the evil woman, that 'a learn'd, that is an honest, man' (i.e. a 
humanistically educated man), would always solve in favour of reason. This is then, of 
course, also what Malheureux does. At the end of the play, the friends are again 
happily reunited and the evil woman is condemned "to the extremest whip and jail."79 
                                                   
78 John Marston, The Dutch Courtesan 2.2.190-91; 198-224. 
79 Marston 5.33.59. 
The conceptual crisis of friendship in the late Renaissance 195 
Even that Freevill in the end still intents to marry Beatrice can now not really pose a 
threat to his friendship with Malheureux anymore. 
This clear preference of friendship over love characterizes in fact the great majority 
of dramatic treatments of the topic in the stage plays of the late sixteenth century. Only 
a couple of decades later,  however, in the plays of first half of the seventeenth century, 
the protagonists' priorities then usually turn out to be quite the opposite. Now it is 
mostly the plea for love that dominates the outcome of such plays. One of these, in 
which this inner conflict of the friend and lover is at first still presented in quite the 
same way and tone as in those of the sixteenth century, yet which finally produces a 
very different ending—one in favour of love—is The Combat of Love and Friendship by 
Robert Mead, written in 1636 (though not printed before 1654) and performed at Christ 
Church, Oxford. The story of the drama tells of Lysander and his love for the lady 
Artemone. Artemone's brother Theocles, however, is Lysander's best and most 
intimate friend. Agreeing with the view that one can only be loyal to either one's friend 
or one's beloved, because of the "antipathy 'twixt love and friendship," as the character 
Marcus Tullius puts it in The Faithful Friends (another play on love and friendship, 
commonly ascribed to Beaumont and Fletcher), Lysander sees the necessity to make a 
choice in favour of either his love for Artemone or his friendship with her brother.80 So, 
he presents the inner conflict he is subjected to right at the beginning of the play in his 
opening soliloquy: 
Instruct me some kinde Power, 
To which I may most Lawfully prove false; 
My friend, or Mistress. 
But what talk I of Law? as if that faith 
Could ere be broke with Justice! 
Rather, which 
Can my heart suffer to be torn away, 
And snatch'd from its own sinews? 
Which of them can my soul part with upon easiest tearms? 
For thus stands my ambiguous fate, that one 
Side of my heart must needs be ript from t'other, 
For so these two had fill'd it; one side each: 
My share was almost nothing; only that 
Which knit the other two, I cal'd my own. 
Friendship, thou art a name, and nothing real, 
A meer and empty word, and 
Here I quit thee, 
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Ile not be fetter'd in fantastick chains, 
To court Ideas, nothings, and adore 
A strange Platonick Cupid. Give me Love, 
That has some Life and vigor in it: Love 
That shall delight our bloods as well as Fancies. -- 
But stay: Is this Lysander No, some Fiend, 
Some false malicious spirit crept within me, 
To poyson all my Faith. Methinks 
I am too earthly; and 
I feel my clogg'd thoughts groveling 
To baseness. O my Theocles! 
Pardon me friend; when I forget that name, 
May I be miserable; nay I need not with it, for 
'Tis imply'd in that, and I may well 
Now save my curse.81 
Now, from these lines one might expect that The Combat of Love and Friendship is one 
that will end with the victory of friendship over love, especially when one takes into 
account that Mead has even created a special character, Misterotos, who's only 
function in the play seems to be to denigrate love, to mock at those in love and to 
deride their attempts to win the favours of their beloveds as ridiculous acts of sheer 
folly. Just at the beginning of the second act, for instance, Misterotos mocks at two 
lovers who are eagerly busy quarrelling about a mistress with whom both of them are 
in love: 
Ha, ha, ha, I have ee'n burst my self yonder with laughing. and am now 
forc't to retire for feare of my ribs; The most prodigious Contention about a 
Mistresse that e're I beheld: A Ballad-singer and a vext Constable I should 
take e'm for; but that I know the one to be a boysterously valiant Captain, 
and t'other a Gentleman abus'd into a Poet by his Mistresse: who, having for 
a long time courted her with verses only and Sonnets, is now injoyn'd by 
Her to speak nothing but Rime. The Captain being his Rival hath now 
provok't the Quarrel, he hath drawn his Faulchion, and wheeling about, lies 
at his Guard most fiercely, whiles my Riming Gentleman makes at him with 
a pair of Heroick Verses, which he again puts by with a warlike Oath or two: 
Such strange Passadoes there are between e'm, such Hermaphroditical Play; 
short sword and long verse, as I ne're saw the like.82 
However, in spite of this clear antagonism towards love that Mead here expresses at 
the beginning of his play, the outcome of The Combat of Love and Friendship is, contrary 
to expectation, not a definite plea for friendship. The plot develops in a way that causes 
Lysander, despite his initial decision in favour of friendship, to fall out with his friend 
Theocles, and love now seems to become the main theme of the drama. As in The Trail 
of Chivalry and in Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay, the friendship of the men is in the end 
renewed, but the emphasis is clearly on the successful and happy ending of the love 
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affairs that have developed in the course of the play. So, "on the whole," as Mills points 
out, "the love interests are paramount; the friendship element merely complicates the 
love situations. It is far from being a play where a love element merely complicates the 
friendship relations."83 Now, this representation of the dominance of love over 
friendship would indeed be highly unusual for a sixteenth-century play, even for one 
of the late 1690s. It makes it, however, in fact a typical example of what it is, a play of 
the early seventeenth century, a century that is, contrary to the previous one, rather 
characterized by an increasingly favourable view on love and an increasingly sceptical 
view on idealized friendship. 
In most plays dating from the sixteenth century, the emphasis on the aspect of love 
is indeed still much less dominant; instead, it is rather put on the one of friendship. 
There is, however, also at least one example of Renaissance drama of that time in 
which the solution of the conflict between friendship and love is not at first sight to be 
recognized as one in favour of friendship—and in the end, it remains indeed 
disputable whether it really is. Despite an outcome of the play that clearly emphasizes 
the superiority of true friendship over lustful love, the triumph seems here to be at first 
that of love, and friendship is not even allowed to remain. This play, in which the inner 
conflict of the friend who is in love with a woman is pushed to exactly the same 
extremes as in The Dutch Courtesan, is Thomas Kyd's Solyman and Perseda. Solyman 
(var.: Solimon) the Emperor is in love with Perseda, the beloved of his friend Erastus. 
His inner conflict is the usual one: he is torn between the love for the lady and the 
loyalty to his friend. The decision he finally makes, however, is decidedly different 
from all those discussed above. Overcome by his passionate desire for Perseda, he 
makes his choice in favour of love and not of friendship, and thus betrays his friend 
Erastus. Ironically under the pretext of having been betrayed by him, Solyman even 
has him executed—although, not long before, he has still promised him everlasting 
friendship and his undiminished loyalty by making use of the typical classical 
imagery: 
Wert thou my friend, thy minde would iumpe with mine; 
For what are friends but one minde in two bodies? 
Perhaps thou doubts my friendships constancie; 
Then doost thou wrong the measure of my loue, 
Which hath no measure, and shall neuer end.84 
The following actions, however, shall soon prove Solyman's words to be scarcely more 
than empty phrases, if not even mere hypocrisy. For Martin Kornbluth, these empty 
phrases, which refer to the classical ideal of friendship without really meaning 
anything to the person who speaks them anymore, are indeed characteristic of the 
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general situation at the end of the Renaissance.85 The classical ideal of friendship is still 
glorified, yet the message does no longer convey any meaning to the audience. In the 
plays of the late sixteenth century, the humanistic enthusiasm for the classical 
conception of perfect friendship seems indeed to have turned into a mere pointless 
repetition of the classical commonplaces of friendship. 
In Kyd's play, the Emperor immediately regrets his villainous deed, but his wrong 
decision is irrevocable. Since Kyd's intention is of course not to glorify villainy and the 
killing of one's friends, he has to lead the plot eventually to a tragic end in which 
Solyman and Perseda are both meeting death. In this sense, the play's moral still holds 
to the classical ideal of friendship. However, Kornbluth is certainly right when he 
remarks: "The motivations for friendship are still close enough to classical tradition in 
Kyd, but the seeds of degeneration have been planted."86 
It is, however, not only the turn from the mere representation of an ideal to a more 
realistic and thus a more dramatic representation of friendship on the stage that 
characterizes most of the plays mentioned above. There is also another aspect that 
distinguishes these late sixteenth-century plays from the ones written before, an aspect 
that is also to play an important role in the conceptual change of friendship at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. Kyd, for example, as most of the other writers of 
his time, is no longer interested in using the representation of friendship in his play as 
a means of conveying a moral message to the audience of what friendship should 
ideally be like. For him, as for the others, the representation of friendship, or rather of 
its conflict with love, is first of all a means of creating a dramatic situation on the stage 
and thus to entertain his audience. The English plays of the eighties and nineties of the 
sixteenth century have indeed little in common with plays like that of Edwards with its 
unconditional idealization of friendship, an idealization that was in fact typical of the 
moralities and the moralizing plays of Tudor and early Elizabethan times. So, Mills is 
certainly right, when he states in his commentary on Kyd's Solyman and Perseda: 
It is not to be inferred […] that Kyd wrote this tragedy to deplore 
inconstancy, as Edwards wrote his play to applaud constancy; Kyd is not 
upholding a theory, he is using a friendship-love situation for dramatic 
effect. In this respect Kyd, like Lyly in Endimion, belongs to the generation of 
dramatists succeeding Edwards; the drama of propaganda is passing into 
the drama for the sake of drama.87 
And he is indeed also right, when he finally concludes: 
The period from Lydgate [(c. 1370-1449)] to Lodge [(c. 1557-1625)] is one of 
transition in the treatment of friendship. A great change has taken place 
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since the time when Caxton printed an English translation of the De amicitia 
and Elyot rather hesitatingly told a good friendship story for cultural 
purposes, or even from the time that Edwards delighted his audience with a 
play that embodies the right and the wrong of friendship and its political 
bearings, to the day when a Sidney or a Lodge, or […] a Shakespeare can 
take the theme for granted and use it with a free hand.88 
In fact, by the end of the sixteenth century, the ideal of friendship has become a very 
hollow concept indeed. And every concept that merely exists as a commonplace 
without really meaning anything to the people anymore, is sooner or later inevitably 
facing a conceptual change. Although this change is not to become clearly apparent 
until the early seventeenth century, it is yet already foreshadowed in the 
representations of friendship and of its rivalry with love in the literature of the late 
sixteenth century—and this not only in drama but also in prose fiction. There is, 
however, a distinctive difference between the representations of the conflict between 
friendship and love in these two genres. Although "the dramatists at the end of the 
century were utilizers, not propagandists, of the friendship theories," as Mills points 
out, they usually still solved the conflict between love and friendship represented in 
their plays in favour of friendship, or at least not to its disadvantage.89 A somewhat 
different attitude towards the possible outcome of such a conflict is yet to be found in 
the representations of the topic in the novels of the time. Although friendship is here 
also held in high esteem and is theoretically still considered to be nobler than love, the 
representation of the rivalry between friendship and love in prose fiction does not 
necessarily have to end with the triumph of friendship—probably because of the much 
less educational function of novels, which, in Renaissance times, were exclusively read 
by the educated elite anyway, compared to the stage plays, which were of course 
written already with a much less educated audience in mind. 
One of the best-known representations of the familiar situation in which the 
friendship of two men is endangered by the love of one for a woman in prose fiction is 
to be found in Sidney's pastoral romance, The Arcadia. The perfect friendship between 
the two princes Musidorus and Pyrocles has to face a first threat when both fall in love 
with the princesses Pamela and Philoclea. As long as both are equally enthralled by 
their love for the ladies, however, the conflict merely remains a rather theoretical one. 
Yet, when the circumstances take a turn for the worse and force Musidorus and 
Pamela to flee the country if they want to continue their love affair, the friendship of 
the two princes is suddenly facing an actual threat. As Pyrocles cannot join Musidorus 
in leaving the place without giving up his own love, the two friends now have to make 
a decision about what to do. Musidorus knows that when he leaves his friend for the 
sake of his love for Pamela, this will "violate that holy band of true friendship" that is 
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between him and Pyrocles.90 He is also well aware that it would be rationally 
unjustifiable for a virtuous man to prefer his sensual love for a woman to the virtuous 
friendship with his 'other I'. Here, Sidney has Musidorus make a truly ingenious 
gambit: he leaves the decision to Pyrocles whether they should separate for the sake of 
love or should stay together and abandon the ladies. Thus, he has not only relieved 
himself of the load to take the only decision possible for a virtuous man (namely to 
give up his love for Pamela for the sake of his friendship with Pyrocles) but has also 
even made it possible for Pyrocles to make his choice in favour of love by still acting in 
a virtuous way, which he then also does. Claiming to be only concerned with the 
friend's fortune he gives in to Musidorus request: 
'But because indeed I love thee for thyself, […] I am content to leave all that 
which might please myself. I am content to build my pleasure upon thy 
comfort; and then will I deem my hap in friendship great when I shall see 
thee, whom I love, happy. Let me be only sure thou lovest me still—the only 
prize of true affection. […] I joy in your presence; but I joy more in your 
good. That friendship brings fourth the fruits of enmity which prefers his 
own tenderness before his friend's damage. For my part, my greatest grief 
herein shall be I can be no further serviceable unto you.'91 
So, both can still enjoy their love for their ladies without having betrayed the principles 
of friendship. Thus, friendship, as it were, is here outmanoeuvred by its own 
characteristic values. The example of the story of Musidorus and Pyrocles might reveal 
how problematic the nature of the conflict between love and friendship was indeed 
considered to be—even by someone like Sidney. His representation of the rivalry 
between love and friendship truly ends with love's victory over friendship, but with 
Sidney, the friends are still allowed to part in harmony. This is certainly due to the 
high regard in which Sidney held the idea of friendship himself. On the other hand, he 
was writing The Arcadia for the entertainment of his sister and her ladies, who would 
certainly have been offended if he had presented the triumph of male friendship over 
their love of women. 
In some literary representations of the situation in which a man's love for a woman 
interferes with his friendship with another man, the conflict does yet not just lead to a 
spatial separation of the friends—as in Sidney's Arcadia—but even causes them to 
break their friendship off completely. An example of such an unpleasant development 
is given in Lyly's Euphues—The Anatomy of Wyt, in which Euphues gives up his 
friendship with Philautus for the sake of his love for a truly doubtful woman.92 
Philautus, disappointed by Euphues's betrayal of their friendship, writes to him: 
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Couldest thou Euphues for the loue of a fruitlesse pleasure, vyolate the 
league of faythfull friendshippe? Diddest thou waye more the entising 
lookes of a lewd wenche, then the entyre loue of a loyall friende? If thou 
diddest determine with thy selfe at the firste to be false, why diddest thou 
sweare to bee true? If to bee true, why arte thou false? If thou wast mynded 
both falselye and forgedlye to deceiue mee, why diddest thou flatter and 
dissemble with mee at the firste? If to loue me, why doest thou flinche at the 
last? If the sacred bands of amitie did delyght thee, why diddest thou break 
them? if dislyke thee, why diddest thou prayse them? Dost thou not know 
that a perfect friende should be lyke the Glaeworme, which shineth most 
bright in the darke? or lyke the pure Franckencense which smelleth most 
sweete when it is in the fire? or at leaste not vnlyke to the Damaske Rose 
which is sweeter in the still then on the stalke?93 
Euphues's reply to these lines is in fact as harsh as the accusation itself and leaves no 
doubt about the preference he has for love over friendship. The view of love and 
friendship that is expressed in his answer to Philautus is definitely no longer the 
classical one that it has been before (see 76). Yet, his complete change of opinion does 
in fact impressively foreshadow the decisive change that the common attitude towards 
friendship is to undergo at the end of the Renaissance: 
Tush Philautus, I am in this poynt of Euripides his minde, who thinkes it 
lawfull for the desire of a kingdome to transgresse the bounds of honestie, 
and for the loue of a Lady to violate and breake the bands of amitie. 
The friendshippe betweene man and man as it is common so is it of course, 
betweene man and woman, as it is seldom so is it sincere, the one 
proceedeth of the similitude of manners, ye other of the sinceritie of the heart 
[…]. 
But thou canst blame me no more of folly in leaunig thee to loue Lucilla, then 
thou mayst reproue him of foolishnesse that hauing a Sparrowe in his hande 
letteth hir go to catch the Phesaunt, or him of vnskilfulnesse that seeing the 
Heron, leaueth to leauell his shoot at the Stockedoue, or that woman of 
coynesse that hauing a deade Rose in hir bosome, throweth it away to 
gather the fresh Uiolette.94 
Lyly, of course, is still a typical sixteenth-century author, and his primary intention by 
presenting Euphues's speech and his decision is certainly not to strike a blow for love, 
but merely to add a dramatic effect to the story of Euphues and Pilautus's friendship 
by having one of them make a fierce attack on classical moral values—an attack that is 
here of course still considered truly condemnable. But whether consciously or not, with 
this speech, Lyly here also already predicts the common attitude towards the concepts 
of love and friendship that we can find reflected in the writings of the following 
century, of which Mead's play about The Combat of Love and Friendship has already 
given us a first impression above. 
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 5 FRIENDSHIP AS LOVE - LOVE AS FRIENDSHIP: 
THE CONCEPTS REDEFINED  
he general attitude towards love that it is reflected in the literature of the late 
sixteenth century is in fact still a rather ambiguous one, showing unanimous 
enthusiasm neither for nor against it. However, irrespective of whether love is 
represented in a favourable way or not, in all the examples of Elizabethan drama given 
above the plays end with a definite plea for friendship—either directly as in Marston's 
Dutch Courtesan or Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice or indirectly as in Kyd's Solyman 
and Perseda. And even in the prose writings of that time, despite the serious crises that 
the friendships have to suffer in these stories, the friends remain loyal to one another—
at least theoretically—or become in the end reconciled. Yet, this cannot conceal that 
from Alberti's early fifteenth-century discussion on friendship and love to these late 
sixteenth-century and very early seventeenth-century treatments of the conflict 
between them—so roughly from the beginning of the European Renaissance to its 
end—there has not only been a gradual yet decided change in the conception of 
friendship but also a decisive one in the conceptualization of love. 
Of course, at first sight, the opposition between friendship and love presented in the 
Libri della famiglia seems to be not so different from the one presented in the plays and 
prose writings of Elizabethan times. But on closer examination, we will recognize that 
the choice in favour of love in preference to friendship is in Alberti's book merely made 
by an immature youth, who finally even accepts the arguments of his elder and 
humanistically educated relative for the advantages that friendship has over love. In 
the literary examples of the following century, however, the characters who are forced 
to make a choice between love and friendship are usually not only grown men but also 
experienced friends and thus certainly aware of the pleasures and noble qualities of 
friendship. So, love has here indeed become a potential rival to amity—an actual, not 
merely a rhetorical one—and is thus allowed to occupy a place almost equal to that of 
friendship. And even though in most cases the conflict between love and friendship is 
simply used as a dramatic means to create tension, and although love is still scarcely 
allowed to prevail in the end over friendship, it has nevertheless achieved a status of 
enhanced importance. And it is first of all this enhanced status that is to enable love to 
become in the following centuries what will then be considered the most intimate form 
of relationship.  
Now, the conflict between the idealistic concepts of homosocial friendship and 
heterosexual love was though at first indeed almost entirely a conceptual one that took 
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place in Renaissance literature rather than in Renaissance reality—although it did of 
course reflect the time's actual attitude towards both kinds of relationship and indeed 
foreshadowed the fate that they had to face in the future. Beyond this conceptual level, 
however, in the realities of both loves, there was in fact another conflict emerging that 
was far subtler and much more complex. This conflict had its roots in the Renaissance 
but it was not until the eighteenth century—the century of the Enlightenment—that 
the results of it became evident to the full extent. With fifteenth and sixteenth-centuries 
writers, intellectual relationships had usually still been ascribed solely to persons of the 
same sex, predominantly men, while sensual love had been regarded as only possible 
between man and woman. In the course of the Renaissance, however, the view of the 
role of women had undergone another definite alteration—the second since ancient 
times. For the Sonneteers, women had still been the mere objects of courtship but the 
relation between men and women gradually became a different one. In the literary 
representations of marriage towards the end of the Renaissance and in the following 
century, men began to consider their wives to be more than simply the 'means of 
perpetuating the race'. From then on, they began to regard them as probable partners 
for a kind of relationship in which both man and woman were considered lovers and 
friends.1 
Yet, before this could have happened, the concept of love had at first to adopt 
certain characteristic qualities of the concept of friendship—namely those that had 
made the old concept of friendship one of an outstandingly intimate relationship. Only 
with such a new conception of love that incorporates the union of bodies and souls, it 
was now able to challenge the old conception of friendship as "the marriage of true 
minds," as Shakespeare puts it in one of his Sonnets with a realistic prospect of success.2 
This it did, and finally, towards the eighteenth century, the new conception of marital 
love was no longer that of a merely sensual relationship, but had indeed adopted 
characteristic aspects of the friendship conception. Conjugal love was thus now to 
become a real substitute for male friendship. 
On the other hand, however, also the concept of friendship underwent a decided 
alteration. More and more deprived of its emotional and particularly its intimate 
qualities by the increasingly mercantilistic attitude towards this kind of relationship 
and the commonly accepted adoption of these qualities by the concept of love, there 
was no longer any room for the homoaffectionateness and homoeroticism that could 
have formerly been covered up by the classically inspired concept of friendship in the 
Renaissance. The yearning for the satisfaction of these homoaffectionate or even 
homoerotic feelings therefore had to find a new form of expression and led in the 
eighteenth century eventually to the development of a homosexual identity and the 
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conception of a new kind of male friendship that also included the fulfilment of the 
friends' emotional and sexual desires. 
So, there was at first an overlapping and then a gradual mingling of the concepts' 
main characteristics in either kind of relationship that of course led to considerable 
problems of definition and in the end even to completely new conceptualizations of 
love and friendship. 
 
5.1. FRIENDSHIP AND THE SEXES: 
CAN A WOMAN ALSO BE A FRIEND? 
As we have seen in the last section of the previous chapter (4.2), the idea that some 
people might seriously want to substitute love for friendship as their prior choice of 
relationship has already been expressed in the sixteenth century. In Euphues's letter to 
Philautus in Lyly's Euphues—The Anatomy of Wyt, for instance, he speaks of the 'fresh 
violet' of love that must replace the 'dead rose' of friendship, as he believes love to be 
the better kind of amity. This notion of love as the better kind of friendship, in contrast 
to the traditional view of friendship as the better kind of love, has indeed still been a 
very uncommon one when Lyly wrote his work in the late 1570s. It is also certainly not 
reflecting the author's own opinion on the matter, but Lyly here already makes clear on 
which condition the choice in favour of love can only be made: if the idea of love wants 
to be preferred to that of friendship, it has to bear the characteristic qualities of the 
classical conceptions of friendship as well. Before this can happen, however, another 
change has to take place. Before the concept of love can be brought into line with that 
of friendship, the object of love, the beloved, has to achieve an equality of status with 
the object of friendship, the friend. 
The classical ideal of friendship, however, is an exclusively male concept, which 
means that true and perfect friendship in the classical sense is thought to be possible 
first of all between two (or more) men. The concept of love, on the other hand, is 
traditionally one of an intimate sexual relationship between a man and a woman. Now, 
the literature of the past that deals with either of these concepts usually provides us 
only with the male views on the subjects. This is, of course, because it has for the main 
part been written by men for men. And as to this, the writings of the Renaissance are 
no exception. The treatment of philosophical and conceptual matters is in the fifteenth 
to seventeenth centuries indeed still a man's work. Conceptual changes at the time we 
are here talking about are thus tantamount to changes in the general male attitude 
towards certain ideas or concepts. So, the approximation of love to friendship can 
therefore only take place when a man considers his female beloved as equal a partner 
in their love relationship as he would consider a male friend in their friendship. This, 
of course, requires a view of woman that conceives of her not only as being equal to 
Friendship as Love – Love as Friendship: The concepts redifined 205 
man but also as being capable of taking part in an equally intellectual relationship as it 
is friendship—or even in a friendship in the traditional sense itself, may it be with 
another woman or with a man. 
That the Renaissance attitude towards this matter was indeed far from being 
unanimous is most illustratively shown by Castiglione in a fictive discussion between 
Pallavicino Gaspare and Guiliano de'Medici in his Libro del Cortegiano. Here, Signor 
Gaspare, in reply to Guiliano's preceding praise of women and his description of an 
ideal court lady, continues the argument about the nature and worth of ladies, which 
has already been going on for some while, by giving a full account of his disparaging 
view of women: 
Ché ben bastar vi dovea far questa donna di palazzo bella, discreta, onesta, 
affabile e che sapesse intertenere senza incorrere in infamia con danze, 
musiche, giochi, risi, motti e l'altre cose che ogni dí vedemo che s'usano in 
corte; ma il volerle dar cognizion di tutte le cose del mondo ed attribuirle 
quelle virtú che cosí rare volte si son vedute negli omini, ancora nei seculi 
passati, è uno cosa che né supportare né a pena ascoltare si po. Che le donne 
siano mo animali imperfetti e per conseguente di minor dignità che gli 
omini e non capaci di quelle virtú che sono essi, non voglio io altrimenti 
affirmare, perché il valor di queste signore bastaria a farmi mentire; dico ben 
che omini sapientissimi hanno lassato scritto che la natura, perciò che 
sempre intende e disegna far le cose piú perfette, se potesse, produria 
continuamente omini; e quando nasce una donna, è diffetto o error della 
natura e contra quello che essa vorrebbe fare. Come si vede ancor d'uno che 
nasce cieco, zoppo, o con qualche altro mancamento e negli arbori molti 
frutti che non maturano mai, cosí la donna si po dire animal produtto a sorte 
e per caso; e che questo sia, vedete l'operazion dell'omo e della donna e da 
quelle pigliate argumento della perfezion dell'uno e dell'altro. 
Nientedimeno essendo questi diffetti delle donne colpa di natura che l'ha 
produtte tali, non devemo per questo odiarle, né mancar di aver loro quel 
rispetto che vi si conviene; ma estimarle da piú di quello che elle si siano, 
parmi error manifesto.3 
                                                   
3 Castiglione 3.11. – "For it should have been quite enough for you to make this lady beautiful, discreet, 
pure and affable, and able to entertain in an innocent manner with dancing, music, games, laughter, 
witticisms and the other things that are in daily evidence at Court. But to wish to give her an 
understanding of everything in the world and to attribute to her qualities that have rarely been seen in 
men, even throughout the centuries, is something one can neither tolerate nor bear listening to. That 
women are imperfect creatures and therefore of less dignity than men and incapable of practising the 
virtues practised by men, I would certainly not claim now, for the worthiness of these ladies here 
would be enough to give me the lie; however, I do say that very learned men have written that since 
Nature always plans and aims at absolute perfection she would, if possible, constantly bring forth men; 
and when a woman is born this is a mistake or defect, and contrary to Nature's wishes. This is also the 
case when someone is born blind, or lame, or with some other defect, as again with trees, when so 
many fruits fail to ripen. Nevertheless, since the blame for the defects of women must be attributed to 
Nature, who has made them what they are, we ought not to despise them or to fail to give them the 
respect which is their due. But to esteem them to be more than they are seems to me to be manifestly 
wrong." Trans. Bull 217-18. 
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In reply to this diatribe against women, Guiliano now presents his idea of the equality 
between the sexes in an eloquent and skilfully prepared speech in favour of women, in 
which he argues: 
[…] come niun sasso po esser piú perfettamente sasso che un altro quanto 
alla essenzia del sasso, né un legno piú perfettamente legno che l'altro, cosí 
un omo non po essere piú perfettamente omo che l'altro, e 
conseguentemente non sarà il maschio piú perfetto che la femina, quanto 
alla sustanzia sua formale, perché l'uno e l'altro si comprende sotto la specie 
dell'omo e quello in che l'uno dall'altro son differenti è cosa accidentale e 
non essenziale. Se mi direte adunque che l'omo sia piú perfetto che la donna, 
se non quanto alla essenzia, almen quanto agli accidenti rispondo che questi 
accidenti bisogna che consistano o nel corpo o nell'animo; se nel corpo, per 
esser l'omo piú robusto, piú agile, piú leggero, o piú tollerante di fatiche, 
dico che questo è argumento di pochissima perfezione, perché tra gli omini 
medesimi quelli che hanno queste qualità piú che gli altri non son per quelle 
piú estimati; e nelle guerre, dove son la maggior parte delle opere laboriose 
e di forza, i piú gagliardi non son però i piú pregiati; se nell'animo, dico che 
tutte le cose che possono intender gli omini, le medesime possono intendere 
anche le donne; e dove penetra l'intelletto dell'uno, po penetrare eziandio 
quello dell'altra. […] 
Non sapete voi che in filosofia si tiene questa proposizione, che quelli che 
sono molli di carne sono atti della mente? perciò non è dubbio che le donne, 
per esser piú molli di carne, sono ancor piú atte della mente e de ingegno 
piú accommodato alle speculazioni che gli omini. […] Se considerarete poi 
l'istorie antiche (benché gli omini sempre siano stati parcissimi nello scrivere 
le laudi delle donne) e le moderne, trovarete che continuamente la virtú è 
stata tra le donne cosí come tra gli omini; e che ancor sonosi trovate di quelle 
che hanno mosso delle guerre e conseguitone gloriose vittorie; governato i 
regni con somma prudenzia e giustizia e fatto tutto quello che s'abbian fatto 
gli omini.4 
                                                   
4 Castiglione 3.12-13. – "[…] just as one stone cannot, as far as its essence is concerned, be more perfectly 
stone than another stone, nor one piece of wood more perfectly wood than another piece, so one man 
cannot be more perfectly man than another; and so, as far as their formal substance is concerned, the 
male cannot be more perfect than the female, since both the one and the other are included under the 
species man, and they differ in their accidents and not their essence. You may then say that man is 
more perfect than woman if not as regards essence then at least as regards accidents; and to this I reply 
that these accidents must be the properties either of the body or of the mind. Now if you mean the 
body, because man is more robust, more quick and agile, and more able to endure toil, I say that this is 
an argument of very little validity since among men themselves those who possess these qualities more 
than others are not more highly regarded on that account; and even in warfare, when for the most part 
the work to be done demands exertion and strength, the strongest are not the most highly esteemed. If 
you mean the mind, I say that everything men can understand, women can too; and where a man's 
intellect can penetrate, so along with it can a woman's. […] 
 Do you not know that this proposition is held in philosophy: namely, that those who are weak in body 
are able in mind? So there can be no doubt that being weaker in body women are abler in mind and 
more capable of speculative thought than men. […] Therefore if you study ancient and modern history 
(although men have always been very sparing in their praises of women) you will find that women as 
well as men have constantly given proof of their worth; and also that there have been some women 
who have waged wars and won glorious victories, governed kingdoms with the greatest prudence and 
justice, and done all that men have done." Trans. Bull 218-19. 
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The view on the matter Guiliano here presents is in fact almost a modern one. And 
when he replies to Gaspare's assumption that the phenomenon that most women 
would rather like to be men was merely due to the recognition of their own 
imperfection when they compared themselves to men—who were in contrast to them 
of course perfect—by arguing that "le meschine non desiderano l'esser omo per farsi 
piú perfette, ma per aver libertà e fuggir quel domino che gli omini si hanno vendicato 
sopra esse per sua propria autorità," he thereby even anticipates the feministic 
argumentation of much later times.5 
The disagreement between these two characters in Castiglione's book, is, despite the 
fact that they really existed, of course merely a fictional one. There is though indeed 
little doubt that Castiglione here represents two views on the matter that could have 
really been found held by a number of men in the Renaissance—if these have not even 
been the two views on the topic most commonly held by men at that time. 
However, even with the most open-minded or even sympathetic attitude towards 
the idea of the equality of the sexes, there might have still been some reservations 
about the idea that women could not only be equal to men but also capable of true 
friendship. In classical times, the question whether women could be good and true 
friends was not really one considered worth thinking about, for friendship was, as we 
have seen, an exclusively male concept. In medieval times, the attitude towards female 
friendship was at least no longer such a disparaging one. The Christian doctrine 
emphasized the spiritual qualities of man and put much stress on the purity of man's 
soul. And as souls were regarded as sexless, friendship, as the union of souls for the 
sake of Christ and God, was now in principle considered possible between women as 
well, at least between those who dedicated their lives to God, as Reginald Hyatte 
points out: 
Of no small interest here is the admission, at last, of woman into the domain 
of perfect friendship of the virtuous and the Good. Gender is, in principle, 
relatively unimportant in Christian amicitia as long as the partners are 
chaste; and because women on the path to heavenly glory reject the 
traditional household and marriage dominated by males, they operate, in 
practice, outside the social context assumed in classical amicitia.6 
This view of friendship as a union of souls rather than one of men only has then been 
adopted by the Renaissance philosophers. Friendship was therefore considered a union 
that was theoretically possible between men as well as between women. Philosophy 
and literature, however, were still almost entirely male domains and it is therefore 
hardly surprising that we can find only very few representations of female friendship 
                                                   
5 Castiglione 3.16. – "The poor creatures do not wish to become men in order to make themselves more 
perfect but to gain their freedom and shake off the tyranny that men have imposed on them by their 
one-sided authority." Trans. Bull 221. 
6 Hyatte 51. 
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in the writings of the time. Renaissance literature, as the majority of writings of the 
past in general, presents the world primarily from a male perspective, and that has 
only seldom been interested in female affairs—probably because men never had, as a 
rule, more than a dim understanding of what these affairs are about. However, in some 
pieces of Renaissance literature—even though they have been written by men—we can 
indeed find representations of an intimate and loyal friendship between women that 
meets the high standards of the classical friendship ideal.7 In Shakespeare's As You Like 
It, for example, the friendship between the two female friends Celia and Rosalind is 
described in terms almost equal to those in which Sidney has described the one 
between his heroes Pyrocles and Musidorus when Celia explains to her father the 
extraordinary nature of her relationship with Rosalind: 
We still have slept together, 
Rose at an instant, learn'd, play'd, eat together, 
And whereso'er we went, like Juno's swans, 
Still we went coupled and inseparable.8 
That the conception of female friendship also clearly resembled the one of the classical 
amicitia ideal when since the late Renaissance women writers began to represent their 
view of friendship on their own, shows, for example, the mid-seventeenth-century 
poem L'amitie by Katherine Philips, which the author dedicated to her close friend 
Mary Awbrey: 
Soule of my soule! my Joy, my crown, my friend! 
A name which all the rest doth comprehend; 
How happy are we now, whose souls are grown, 
By an incomparable mixture, One: 
Whose well acquainted minds are now as neare 
As Love, or vows, or secrets can endeare. 
I have no thought but what's to thee reveal'd, 
Nor thou desire that is from me conceal'd, 
Thy heart locks up my secrets richly set, 
And my brest is thy private cabinet. 
Thou shedst no teare but what my moisture lent, 
And if I sigh, it is thy breath is spent. 
United thus, what horrour can appeare 
Worthy our sorrow, anger, or our feare? 
Let the dull world alone to talk and fight, 
And with their vast ambitions nature fright; 
Let them despise so inocent a flame, 
While Envy, pride and faction play their game: 
But we by Love sublim'd so high shall rise, 
To pitty Kings, and Conquerours despise, 
                                                   
7 For a detailed discussion of the representation of female friendship in the English Renaissance for 
instance, see Jo Eldridge Carney, "Female Friendship in Elizabethan Literature," diss., U of Iowa, 1983. 
8 Shakespeare, As You Like It 1.3.69-72. 
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Since we that sacred union have engrost, 
Which they and all the sullen world have lost.9 
Here, in the last few lines of the poem, Philips refers to the degeneration to which the 
classical friendship ideal had been subjected in the first half of the seventeenth century 
and from which it had not yet recovered in Philips's time. That women like Katherine 
Philips now began to adopt the classical concept of friendship to fashion their image of 
female friendship—and this at a time at which men used to conceptualize their own 
friendships as much less idealized relationships—was indeed not regarded with 
universal sympathy by their male contemporaries. That women claimed to have 
perfect friendships with other women when most men have come to regard such a 
relationship as a kind of union that was almost impossible to be realized, and who 
have therefore already banished the classical ideal from their conception of friendship, 
of course implied the notion that between women there could exist a dignified kind of 
relationship based on the spiritual nobility of the partners that was not possible to be 
realized between men. So, there was indeed some considerable hostility shown in the 
attitude towards the idea of female friendship on the part of the men, as most of them 
considered such a relationship not possible between women if it was not even possible 
between men. Thus, women writers like Philips had to defend their concept of female 
friendship against the numerous attacks on it by their male colleagues. Such a defence 
of the worth of female friendship is expressed, for example, in the fourth stanza of her 
lengthy poem A Friend: 
If soules no sexes have, for men 't'exlude 
Women from friendship's vast capacity, 
Is a design injurious and rude, 
Onely maintain'd by partiall tyranny. 
Love is allow'd to us, and Innocence, 
And noblest friendships doe proceed from thence.10 
A similar defence, brought forth by Susannah Dobson in her Dialogue on Friendship and 
Society, shows that even in the late eighteenth century—so right at the height of the 
Age of Enlightenment—there was obviously still need for such a plea for the general 
acceptance of the worth of female friendship: "There are men who have confined this 
blessing [i.e. friendship] to their own sex; its nature say they, is too exalted to suit 
minds occupied with trifles, and in consequence subject to envy and caprice; but 
without any invidious comparisons, it may be asserted, there is a dignity in true 
friendship, to which mean souls of neither sex can never attain."11 
                                                   
9 Katherine Philips, "L'amitie" The Collected Works of Katherine Philips, The Matchless Orinda: Vol. I: The 
Poems, ed. Patrick Thomas (Stump Cross: Stump Cross Books, 1990) 142. For his edition of Philips's 
Works, Thomas used her autograph manuscript as the original source of the poems. 
10 Philips, "A Friend," ll. 19-24, Poems 166. 
11 Dobson 14. 
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That men's reservations about the value of female friendship have indeed never 
been entirely obliterated is revealed by a number of statements made by men even in 
the last two hundred years. In Friedrich Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra, for 
instance, we can find a passage in which he speaks about women and friendship in 
quite a disparaging way: 
Bist du ein Sklave? So kannst du nicht Freund sein. Bist du ein Tyrann? So 
kannst du nicht Freunde haben. 
Allzulange war im Weib ein Sklave und ein Tyrann versteckt. Deshalb ist 
das Weib noch nicht der Freundschaft fähig: es kennt nur die Liebe. 
In der Liebe des Weibes ist Ungerechtigkeit und Blindheit gegen alles, was 
es nicht liebt. Und auch in der wissenden Liebe des Weibes ist immer noch 
Überfall und Blitz und Nacht neben dem Lichte. 
Noch ist das Weib nicht der Freundschaft fähig: Katzen sind immer noch die 
Weiber, und Vögel. Oder, besten Falles, Kühe. 
Noch ist das Weib nicht der Freundschaft fähig. Aber sagt mir, ihr Männer, 
wer von euch ist denn fähig der Freundschaft?12 
This last sentence, of course, makes clear that he had obviously not a much better 
opinion of male friendship too, but it makes his estimation of female friends indeed not 
less disparaging. Now, one might certainly claim that his negative attitude towards 
female friendship was merely due to the fact that Nietzsche (1844-1900) had not a very 
high opinion of women anyway. However, he was far from being alone with his 
negative view on the matter. And even in the more recent past, the attitude towards 
the worth of female friendships has often not really been a favourable one, as the 
passage from one of the writings by Randolph Bourne (1886-1918) shows: 
The fatal facility of women's friendships, their copious outpourings of grief 
to each other, their sharing of wounds and sufferings, their half-pleased 
interest in misfortune—all this seems of a lesser order than the robust 
friendships of men, who console each other in a much more subtle, even 
intuitive way—by a constant pervading sympathy which is felt rather than 
expressed.13 
However, so far we have only had a look at men's attitude towards the friendship 
between women, but what was their opinion about the question whether there can also 
                                                   
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, ed. Karl Schlechta (München: Hanser, 1980) 321. – "Are you 
a slave? Then you cannot be a friend. Are you a tyrant? Then you cannot have friends. 
 Far too long has there been a slave and a tyrant concealed in woman. On that account woman is not yet 
capable of friendship: she knows only love. 
 In woman's love there is injustice and blindness to all she does not lov. And even in woman's conscious 
love, there is still always surprise and lightning and night, along with the light. 
 As yet woman is not capable of friendship: women are still cats and birds. Or at the best, cows. 
 As yet woman is not capable of friendship. But tell me, you men, who of you is capable of friendship?" 
Trans. Thomas Common, Thus Spake Zarathustra, by Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. H. J. Birx (Buffalo, NY: 
Prometheus, 1993) 81-82. 
13 Randolph [Silliman]Bourne, The Radical Will: Selected Writings 1911-1918, ed. Olaf Hansen (New York: 
Urizen, 1977) 111-12. 
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be amity between a man and a woman? In classical times, this problem was regarded 
as an equally insignificant matter as that of the friendship between two women, and 
thus as too unimportant than to be dealt with in philosophical treatises. In medieval 
times, the idea that there could be a non-sexual relationship between man and woman 
that was similar or equal to friendship, was—due to the notion of friendship as the 
union of two souls and the conception of the soul as a sexless entity—at least 
theoretically not rejected. In practice, however, the friendship between a man and a 
woman was far from being an accepted kind of relationship that was not always 
regarded with suspicion, as Hyatte explains: 
In theory, the Christian context affords woman equal footing with men in 
sublime friendship. But in practice—that is, in the texts usually composed 
by men—one often encounters traditional distrust of sexuality that makes 
amicitia christiana between religious man and woman seem much more of an 
intellectual and literary construct than a reality.14 
In Renaissance times, the distrustful attitude towards the idea that a friendship 
between a man and a woman could not only really exist but could also have the same 
value and sublimity as that between two men remained prevalent among male writers 
throughout the whole of the age. In the fourth book of his Libri della famiglia, the one on 
friendship, Alberti has one of the characters make a statement that might be regarded 
as the expression of the opinion commonly held on the matter in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. When Buto, the old servant of the Alberti family speaks about the 
idealized view of friendship that is to be found in the writings of the classical 
philosophers, he also remarks: "Forse que' vostri savii, quali scrissero quelle belle cose 
dell'amicizia, poco si curavano in quella parte amicarsi femmine, o forse così a tutti 
stimorono essere noto che con femmina si può non mai contrarre certa amicizia."15 
Alberti here refers to the neglect of the matter in classical literature, and from the way 
he has Buto talk about it we can certainly assume that he did not consider it necessary 
to change this attitude towards the subject. In his own treatise on friendship, at least, 
there is no further mention of this kind of amity—just as there is scarcely any in 
Renaissance literature as a whole. 
This negative attitude towards the idea of a woman who, instead of being merely 
the object of a man's love, is rather a valuable friend to him only began to change in the 
course of the seventeenth century. In his Discourse of the Nature and Offices of Friendship, 
Taylor, for example, admits that a woman could be a man's friend, even though she 
would not be as equally valuable to him as a male friend: 
                                                   
14 Hyatte 51. 
15 Alberti, Della famiglia 264. – "Perhaps the wise men who wrote those pretty things about friendship 
cared little about making friends with women, or perhaps they thought everyone knew you could 
never have a true friendship with a woman." Trans. Watkins 247. 
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I cannot say that Women are capable of all those excellencies by which Men 
can oblige the World; and therefore a female friend in some eases is not so 
good a counsellor as a wise man, and cannot so well defend my honour; nor 
dispose of reliefs and assistances if she be under the power of another: but a 
woman can love as passionately, and converse as pleasantly, and retain a 
secret as faithfully, and be useful in her proper ministeries; and she can die 
for her friend as well as the bravest Roman Knight […].16 
Here, Taylor makes clear that in his opinion a woman could only be a second-class 
friend, as it were, but that she can still fulfil a number of duties that are required of a 
friend. He therefore considers a female friend not completely useless: 
[…] though a Knife cannot enter as far as a Sword, yet a Knife may be more 
useful to some purposes; and in every thing, except it be against an enemy. 
A man is the best friend in trouble, but a woman may be equal to him in the 
days of joy: a woman can as well increase our comforts, but cannot so well 
lessen our sorrows: and therefore we do not carry women with us when we 
go to fight; but in peaceful Cities and times, vertuous women are the 
beauties of society and the prettinesses of friendship.17 
In both passages, in fact, Taylor stresses an idea that played in the classical conception 
only a subordinate role: the idea that a friend has to be useful. Now, this is indeed, as 
we have already seen, that quality of a friend that in the common conception of 
friendship in the seventeenth century was considered the most important one. And 
this is precisely the typical male view of friendship that Philips criticizes in her poem 
quoted above. In fact, it was primarily this mere interest in the usefulness of a friend 
and thus in the utility value of friendship as such at that time that played not only a 
decisive role in the general debasement of the concept of friendship in the seventeenth 
century but also in the delaying of the acceptance of women as equally valuable 
friends as men. 
In Taylor's time, the idea that a woman could be as valuable a friend to a man as 
another man would be, was still regarded with reservations, but the idea that women 
could possibly be better friends than men, was completely rejected. However, that it 
might have been precisely this strong rejection of the latter idea that led in the end to 
the gradual acknowledgement of the first, is indicated by the somewhat strange 
argumentation with which Taylor justifies his willingness to admit women into the 
circles of friends that had formerly consisted exclusively of male members: 
[…] we shall do too much honour to women if we reject them from 
friendships because they are not perfect: for if to friendships we admit 
imperfect men, because no man is perfect: he that rejects women does find 
fault with them because they are not more perfect than men, which either 
                                                   
16 Jeremy Taylor 64-65. 
17 Jeremy Taylor 65. 
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does secretly affirm that they ought and can be perfect, or else it openly 
accuses men of injustice and partiality.18 
So, the acceptance of the idea of women as proper friends of men was a necessity, as it 
were, since its rejection would have either revealed men's fear to be inferior to women 
in terms of perfection or simply been a proof of male chauvinism. In fact, neither of 
these implications was one that men would have liked to be accused of. However, 
most men still considered female friends inferior to male ones as long as there was not 
added a specific quality to the friendship between them that would enhance its value. 
Now, there was yet only one thing that was acknowledged to be able to enhance the 
friendship between a man and a woman: sexual love. The inclusion of this aspect in the 
relationship between a man and a woman was, of course, only possible in the one 
between a husband and his wife. Consequentially, it did not take long and a woman 
was only regarded as a man's valuable friend—a friend who was then even equal in 
her worth to a man's male friends—when she was also his wife. This idea, that a 
woman could merely be equal to a man's male friends when she was married to him, 
soon dominated the common male attitude towards the idea of female friends. That 
also Taylor held this view, is revealed by one of his remarks when he directly 
addresses the dedicatee of his work, Katherine Philips, and tries to convince her of his 
liberal attitude towards the question whether woman should be admitted into the 
friendship with men or not: "[…] you may see how much I differ from the morosity of 
those Cynicks who would not admit your sex into the communities of a noble 
friendship. I believe some Wives have been the best friends in the World […]."19 
Indeed, in the friendship between a man and a woman who are not married to each 
other, the fact of their sexual difference seems to have never really ceased to constitute 
a major problem—in theory as well as in practice. In the Renaissance, as still in the 
mid-seventeenth century, there was usually only one way to cope with this problem: 
the female friend had to be conceptualized as a male one. In practice, this meant that 
the woman had to be described as if she had been a man. When Michelangelo 
Buonarotti, for example, writes about his close female friend Vittoria Colonna, with 
whom he shared an intimate and exclusively spiritual friendship, he refers to her in 
one of his madrigals as "un uomo in una donna."20 And even in the mid-seventeenth 
century, Owen Felltham explains that the perfect wife, if she also wants to be her 
husband's best friend, has to be like a male soul dwelling in a female body: "A wise 
wife comprehends both sexes: she is woman for her body, and she is man within: for her 
soul is like her Husbands'."21 The conception behind both descriptions is obvious. 
                                                   
18 Jeremy Taylor 66. 
19 Jeremy Taylor 63. 
20 Michelangelo Buonarroti, The Poetry of Michelangelo, trans. James M. Saslow (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1991) 398; (poem no 235). 
21 Owen Felltham, Resolves: Divine, Moral, Political, 9th ed. (London, 1670) 130. 
214 The marriage of true minds 
Friendship was still considered a union of souls, and even though in principle the soul 
was regarded as being sexless, there was still the more popular notion of a difference 
between a male and a female soul. And as there was of course little doubt that the male 
soul was the more rational of the two, the ideal friendship was consequently believed 
to be that between two male souls. If a woman wanted to become the friend of a man 
on a purely spiritual basis, she had therefore, as it were, to change the sex of her soul 
from female to male. Only then, the problems that a friendship between two persons of 
different sexes could cause were thought to have been successfully avoided. 
However, towards the end of the seventeenth century, in the early Enlightenment, 
the common attitude towards the matter became increasingly liberal and when in 1688 
Jean de La Bruyère formulates his opinion about the possibility of a friendship between 
persons of different sexes, he presents a view of the affair that has indeed to be 
regarded as an utterly modern one: "L'amitié peut subsister entre des gens de 
différents sexes, exempte même de toute grossièreté. Une femme cependant regarde 
toujours un homme comme un homme; et réciproquement un homme regarde une 
femme comme une femme. Cette liaison n'est ni passion ni amitié pure : elle fait une 
classe à part."22 Now, it is precisely this 'class à part' as which the intellectual 
friendship between a man and a woman was seen from then on. And there has indeed 
little changed in the common conception of this kind of friendship since La Bruyère's 
time. 
 
5.2. THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE PLATONIC THEORY OF LOVE 
AND THE NEW CONCEPT OF COMPANIONATE MARRIAGE 
The notion of the possibility of a non-sexual relationship between man and woman has 
indeed often been regarded with suspicion. And even those who accepted the idea that 
such a relationship could exist, hesitated to call it a proper friendship and rather 
preferred to consider it a kind of relationship that forms a class of its own, as La 
Bruyère puts it. The conception of friendship has thus usually been one of an unerotic 
and purely homosocial union between two persons generally conceived of as men. It is 
this common notion of friendship that Dobson speaks of when she remarks that there 
are men who "have supposed this sympathy an union of soul alone, subsisting 
between persons of the same sex, and subject to no ties but those of the mind […]."23 
                                                   
22 Jean de La Bruyère, "Du C[oe]ur, no 2," Les Caractères, ed. Pierre Sipriot and Pierre Ronzeaud (Paris: 
Librarie Générale Française, 1985) 99. – "Friendship can last between people of different sexes, even 
exempt from all grossness. However, a woman always regards a man as a man, and reciprocally a man 
regards a woman as a woman. Such a relationship is neither passion nor pure friendship: it forms a 
class apart." Trans. Enright and Rawlinson 130. 
23 Dobson 14-15. 
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However, apart from this idea of an unerotic, purely spiritual friendship, whether 
existing exclusively between men, solely between women, or between man and 
woman, there was at least since the early seventeenth century also a clearly perceptible 
longing for the concept of a new kind of relationship that would combine both the 
union of souls and that of bodies. Whether it was due to a growing respect for women 
in general or simply to men's search for a concept that morally legitimises sexual 
activities for reasons other than procreation, there was now indeed much interest in the 
redefinition of the concept of love and of that of the relationship related to it, 
marriage—especially in England under the increasing influence of the Puritans. The 
theoretical foundation for this redefinition of love, however, had already been laid a 
century before. 
In the Renaissance, the common philosophical conception of love was primarily 
based on the Socratic-Platonic theory of eros presented in the Symposium. Renaissance 
Platonists, and first of all of course Marsilio Ficino with his De amore, his commentary 
on Plato's Symposium, have made the ideas elaborated in this work so popular that 
there is hardly any philosophical treatment of the subject dating from that age that is 
not dominated or at least heavily influenced by them.24 However, while the Platonist 
philosophers of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries still remained faithful to the 
original meaning of Plato's ideas in their interpretation of his theory, the Platonists of 
the later sixteenth century became a bit more daring in their understanding of his 
conception and thus also in their definition and representation of the nature of love. To 
Ficino and his friends and philosophical colleagues, sensual love and the passion for 
bodily beauty had still been merely a rung on the ladder leading to the perception of 
true beauty. And this is also the view that Castiglione still presents in his Libro del 
Cortegiano when he has Pietro Bembo at the very end of the work deliver a eulogy of 
love that clearly stresses the disparaging attitude towards carnal love that characterizes 
the traditional interpretation of Plato's theory: 
O Amor santissimo, […] correggi tu la falsità dei sensi e dopo 'l lungo 
vaneggiare donaci il vero e sodo bene; facci sentir quegli odori spirituali che 
vivifican le virtú dell'intelletto, ed udir l'armonia celeste talmente 
concordante, che in noi non abbia loco piú alcuna discordia di passione; […] 
purga tu coi raggi della tua luce gli occhi nostri dalla caliginosa ignoranzia, 
acciò che piú non apprezzino bellezza mortale e conoscano che le cose che 
prima veder loro parea, non sono, e quelle che non vedeano veramente 
sono; accetta l'anime nostre, che a te s'offeriscono in sacrificio; abbrusciale in 
quella viva fiamma che consuma ogni bruttezza materiale, acciò che in tutto 
separate dal corpo, con perpetuo e dolcissimo legame s'uniscano con la 
                                                   
24 On the spread of these Platonic ideas in the Renaissance and the status of Platonic philosophy in the 
period in general, see, for example, Sears [Reynolds] Jayne, Plato in Renaissance England (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1995); Henri D[ominique] Saffrey, Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne au Moyen Âge et à la 
Renaissance (Paris: Vrin, 1987); Ernst Cassirer, Die Platonische Renaissance in England und die Schule von 
Cambridge (Leipzig: Teubner, 1932); or Kurt Schroeder, Platonismus in der englischen Renaissance (Berlin: 
Mayer; Müller, 1920). 
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bellezza divina, e noi da noi stessi alienati, come veri amanti, nello amato 
possiam transformarsi […].25 
Now, the dominance of this negative attitude towards the sexual aspect of love in the 
interpretation of the Platonic conception began to vanish only after the posthumous 
publication of the Dialoghi d'amore by Leone Ebreo (orig. Giuda Abarbanel, c. 1460-after 
1521) in 1535. In one of these dialogues on love, Ebreo reinterprets Plato's theory of the 
ladder of love in a way that allows him to reintegrate the aspect of sensuality into the 
theoretical conception of sublime love as the end of the lovers' striving. By simply 
reversing the direction of the lovers' ascent on the Platonic ladder, Ebreo has them start 
off from pure reason, ascend the original ladder downwards, as it were, and finally 
arrive at the level of sensual love, with the effect that it is now precisely this aspect of 
sensuality that becomes the focus of attention.26  
Ebreo's work consists of three separate dialogues that all take place between two 
lovers, or rather between a lover, Philo, and his mistress, Sophia. In the course of the 
different parts of their conversation, the male character explains to the female one his 
notions of the nature of love. In the first of the three dialogues, the one on love and 
desire ("D'amore e desiderio"), he also tries to define the nature of desire and that of 
the connection that there is between desire and love. Towards the end of this dialogue, 
Philo comes eventually to the point where he begins to elaborate his idea of the 
important role that sensuality and sensual love play in the strengthening of the 
spiritual union that results from the love of two souls. At first, he tries to convince 
Sophia of the unifying power of sex by claiming that the function of copulation is in 
fact not only to satisfy the desires of the lovers and their passion for each other's bodies 
but also to deepen their love on the spiritual level: 
E se bene l'appetito de l'amante con l'unione coppulativa si sazia, e di 
continente cessa quel desiderio o veramente appetito; non per questo si 
priva il cordiale amore, anzi si collega piú la possibile unione. La quale ha 
attuale conversione d'uno amante ne l'altro, o vero è fare di due uno, 
removendo la divisione e diversitá di quelli quanto è possibile, restando 
l'amore in maggiore unitá e perfezione. E resta in continuo desiderio di 
godere con unione la persona amata; che è la vera diffinizione d'amore.27 
                                                   
25 Castiglione 4.70. – "O most sacred Love, […] correct the falsity of our senses, and after our long 
delirium give us the true substance of goodness. Quicken our intellects with the incense of spirituality 
and make us so attuned to the celestial harmony that there is no longer room within us for any discord 
of passion. […] With the rays of your light cleanse our eyes of their misty ignorance, so that they may 
no longer prize mortal beauty but know that the things which they first thought to see are not, and that 
those they did not see truly are. Accept the sacrifice of our souls; and burn them in the living flame that 
consumes all earthly dross, so that wholly freed from the body they may unite with divine beauty in a 
sweet and perpetual bond and that we, liberated from our own selves, like true lovers can be 
transformed into the object of our love […]." Trans Bull 341-42. 
26 For Plato's original conception of the ladder of love, see 41. 
27 Leone Ebreo, Dialoghi d'amore, ed. Santino Caramella (Bari: Laterza, 1929) 49-50. – "And although it may 
be the case that a lover's appetite is sated by the union of copulation, and that his desire is, as a 
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Sophia, however, surprised by this unconventional interpretation of the role of 
sexuality, still holds to the traditional view of the minor value of sensual love and 
questions that the satisfaction of sensual pleasures could be the end of love if love is 
really so spiritual a union between two lovers as Philo has claimed before. To make his 
meaning clear and to convince her of his conception, he has therefore to elaborate his 
argumentation: 
Non ti concedo che sia questo il fine del perfetto amore: ma t'ho detto che 
questo atto non dissolve l'amore perfetto, anzi il vincola piú e collega con gli 
atti corporei amorosi; che tanto si desiderano quanto son segnali di tal 
reciproco amore in ciascuno de' due amanti. Ancora perché, essendo gli 
animi uniti in spirituale amore, i corpi desiderano godere la possibile 
unione, acciò che non resti alcuna diversitá e l'unione sia in tutto perfetta; 
massime perché, con la correspondenzia de l'unione corporale, il spirituale 
amore s'augumenta e si fa piú perfetto, cosí come il conoscimento de la 
prudenzia è perfetto quando corrispondeno le debite opere.28 
Philo thus makes clear that in his conception of perfect love, the physical expression of 
the love between two lovers is just the result of their love on the spiritual level. 
Libidinous desire and the passion for bodily beauty are therefore the consequences of 
true love, and not the other way round, as it was indeed the case in the inferior kind of 
love. Contrary to perfect love, this ordinary type of love results from desire and 
passion, i.e. the beloved one is loved merely because he or she has been desired in the 
first place. It is this opposed causal connection between love and desire that makes the 
difference between the perfect kind of love and the inferior one, as Philo now explains 
when getting to the heart of his argumentation: 
L'amore è di due sorte. L'una genera il desiderio o vero appetito sensuale: 
ché, desiderando l'uomo alcuna persona, l'ama. E questo amore è 
imperfetto, perché depende da vizioso e fragile principio, perché è figlio 
generato dal desiderio: e tale fu l'amore d'Amon verso di Athamar. E questo 
è vero (come dici che interviene) che cessando il desiderio o appetito 
carnale, per la satisfazione e sazietá di quello, incontinente cessa totalmente 
l'amore; perché cessando la causa, che è il desiderio, cessa l'effetto, che è 
                                                                                                                                                            
consequence of this, extinguished, still the love in his heart is not sated. Indeed, it makes possible a 
closer and more binding union which actually converts the one lover into the other or, rather, fuses 
them both in one, eliminating, so far as this is possible, any difference between them. Thus the love 
endures in greater perfection and unity; and the lover remains continuously desirous of enjoying the 
beloved union, which is the true definition of love." Trans. Arturo B. Fallico and Herman Shapiro, "On 
Love and Desire: A Dialogue between Philo and Sophia (Dialoghi d'amore, The First Dialogue, 
complete)," by Leone Ebreo, The Italian Philosophers: Selected Readings from Petrarch to Bruno, ed. Fallico 
and Shapiro (New York: Modern Library, 1967).217. 
28 Ebreo 50. – "I did not say that this is the end of perfect love; what I have been insisting, however, is that 
this act, far from destroying perfect love, proves and integrates it by means of the bodily acts of love, 
which acts are desired because they give evidence of the reciprocity of love between the lovers. Further, 
when two spirits are absorbed in spiritual love, their bodies desire to further the union so that no 
distinction whatsoever may obtain between them, with the union being in all ways complete—the more 
so, as a corresponding physical union augments and completes the spiritual love, even as prudence is 
perfected by the congruity of prudent actions." Trans. Fallico and Shapiro 217. 
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l'amore, e molte volte si converte in odio, come fu quello. Ma l'altro amore è 
quello che di esso è generato il desiderio de la persona amata, e non del 
desiderio o appetito; anzi, amando prima perfettamente, la forza de l'amore 
fa desiderare l'unione spirituale e corporale con la persona amata: sicché, 
come il primo amore è figliuolo del desiderio, cosí questo gli è padre e vero 
generatore.29 
With this conception, of course, Ebreo sets up a theory of love that is indeed a clear 
negation of the Platonic original. While for Socrates and Plato, the perfect kind of love 
derives from a libidinous desire and the passion for bodily beauty, the kind of love that 
is generated in this way can for Ebreo only be an imperfect one. His idea of a perfect 
love is that of an affection that first develops on the intellectual level and then becomes 
desirous and in the end sensual. Ebreo thus simply reverses the traditional direction of 
the lovers' ascent on the Platonic ladder, having them climb from its top end to its 
bottom to reach the perfection of their love.  
Yet, whatever Ebreo's intentions might have been to set up this new approach to the 
Platonic theory, they are not reflected by the intentions that his male protagonist in the 
story obviously has. Philo's aim is here indeed not to present a reinterpretation of the 
Platonic original but to win the favour of his mistress. Thus, he does of course not 
hesitate to assure her that his love for her is purely one of the perfect kind, and that his 
desire and his passion for her only derive from the love he feels for her on the spiritual 
level. Sophia, however, not yet fully convinced, demands to know what has brought 
his love for her about in the first place, if it was not his desire, which, as he has 
claimed, was not the cause of his love but merely its result. Now, this is the point 
where Ebreo has Philo present his new theory of a reversed Platonic ladder of love 
most clearly:  
Il perfetto e vero amore, che è quello che io ti porto, è padre del desiderio e 
figlio de la ragione; e in me la retta ragione conoscitiva l'ha prodotto. Che, 
conoscendo essere in te virtú, ingegno e grazia non manco di mirabile 
attraizione che di ammirazione, la volontá mia desiderando la tua persona, 
che rettamente è giudicata per la ragione in ogni cosa essere ottima e 
eccellente e degna di essere amata; questa affezione e amore ha fatto 
convertirmi in te, generandomi desiderio che tu in me ti converti, acciò che 
io amante possa essere una medesima persona con te amata, e in equale 
amore facci di due animi un solo, li quali simigliantemente due corpi 
vivificare e ministrare possino. La sensualitá di questo desiderio fa nascere 
l'appetito d'ogni altra unione corporea, acciò che li corpi possino conseguire 
                                                   
29 Ebreo 51. – "Love is of two varieties: one is engendered by desire or sensuous appetite—a man may love 
a woman, that is, because he desires her. This kind of love is not perfect; it derives from an inconstant 
and vicious source: desire. Amnon's love for Tamar was of this kind; and in cases of this sort it does, as 
you observe, eventuate with the cessation of all love; because when the cause, desire, no longer 
operates, neither does its effect, love, which may even be converted to abhorrence, as happened in this 
case. But the other love generates desire of the beloved, rather than the other way around. In fact, we 
first love perfectly, in this second kind of love, and then the strength of that love makes us desire 
spiritual and bodily union with the beloved. Thus the first kind of love is the child of desire, while the 
second is the true begetter of desire." Trans. Fallico and Shapiro 218. 
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in quella la possibile unione de li penetranti animi. Guarda, of Sofia, che per 
essere cosí successivamente in me da la ragione conoscitiva prodotto l'amore 
e da l'amore prodotto il desiderio, apprendesti per le mie prime parole, che 
il conoscerti causò in me amore e desiderio.30 
Thus, for Ebreo, it is knowledge, or reason, that leads the lover to the love of his 
beloved's soul, which then leads him to the love of her body and finally to the desire to 
unite with her not only spiritually but also physically. This distortion of the Platonic 
theory of the ladder of love, which places the emphasis not only on the chaste 
intellectual aspect of love but particularly on the sensual one, arrested in fact much 
attention in the time following its publication.31 Probably written in the late 1490s 
though not published before 1535, Ebreo's work became in fact soon extremely popular 
and certainly the most widely read work on love in the Renaissance after Ficino's De 
amore. Written in Italian and translated into French, Spanish, Latin, and Hebrew it 
clearly influenced all subsequent treatises on the subject in the following two centuries 
and beyond.32 
Especially in the early seventeenth century, as already mentioned above, the idea of 
the reversed ladder of love that leads from the love of souls to the love of bodies seems 
to have still been extraordinary popular indeed. One of the literary masterpieces of the 
time that reflects this idea most perfectly is John Donne's The Ecstasy.33 This excellent 
poem illustrates the conception of the lovers' ascent on the reversed Platonic ladder of 
love so impressively by describing the different rungs of the ladder form the chaste 
beginning when the lovers are merely holding each other's hands to the union of their 
                                                   
30 Ebreo 52. – "Such perfect and true love as I bear you, which begets desire, is born of reason. True reason 
has engendered it within me. I know you to possess virtue, intelligence, and beauty, admirable and 
seductive, and my will desired your person, which reason correctly judged to be noble, excellent, and 
worthy of love in every way. My affection and love has transformed me into you, begetting in me a 
desire that you may be fused with me, in order that I, your lover, may create with you, my beloved, a 
single being, with our mutual love making of our two souls, one, which may in the same way vitalize 
and inform our two bodies. The sensual element in this desire excites a longing for bodily union, so that 
the union of bodies may match the unity of spirits which wholly mesh with one another. Observe, 
Sophia, how this sequence of reason and knowledge, which first begot love, and which then begot 
desire, was implicit in my opening words to you—that my acquaintance with you had awakened love 
and desire within me." Trans. Fallico and Shapiro 219. 
31 For an overview commentary on Ebreo's Dialoghi d'amore in general and discussions of other 
Renaissance treatises on love, see, for example, John Charles Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love: The 
Context of Giordano Bruno's Eroici furori (New York: Columbia UP, 1958). On Ebreo, see particularly 
84ff. 
32 Cf. T. Anthony Perry, ed., introduction, Dialogues D'Amour: The French Translation Attributed to Pontus de 
Tyard and Published in Lyon, 1551, by Jean de Tournes, by Léon Hébreu (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina 
P, 1974) 9-11. 
33 As one of the poems included in the collections of Donne's Collected Poems (published posthumously in 
1633) and his Songs and Sonnets (published in the second edition of the Poems two years later), The 
Ecstasy became thus known to a larger readership only from the 1630s onwards, but it was presumably 
written already sometime after Donne's marriage in 1601. Cf., for example, Marion Wynne-Davies, ed., 
"Songs and Sonnets," The Renaissance: A Guide to English Renaissance Literature: 1500-1660 (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1992) 259-60. 
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souls and finally to the union of their bodies in every detail, that it shall here, despite 
its extent, be cited in full length: 
Where, like a pillow on a bed, 
A pregnant bank swelled up, to rest 
The violet's reclining head, 
Sat we two, one another's best. 
 
Our hands were firmly cemented 
With a fast balm, which thence did spring; 
Our eye-beams twisted, and did thread 
Our eyes, upon one double string; 
 
So to intergraft our hands, as yet 
Was all the means to make us one, 
And pictures in our eyes to get 
Was all our propagation. 
 
As, 'twixt two equal armies, Fate 
Suspends uncertain victory, 
Our souls (which to advance their state 
Were gone out) hung 'twixt her and me. 
 
And whilst our souls negotiate there, 
We like sepulchral statues lay; 
All day, the same our postures were, 
And we said nothing, all the day. 
 
If any, so by love refined 
That he souls' language understood, 
And by good love were grown all mind, 
Within convenient distance stood, 
 
He (though he knew not which souls spake, 
Because both meant, both spake the same) 
Might thence a new concoction take, 
And part far purer than he came. 
 
This Ecstasy doth unperplex, 
We said, and tell us what we love; 
We see by this it was not sex; 
We see we saw not what did move:* 
 
But as all several souls contain 
Mixture of things, they know not what, 
Love these mixed souls doth mix again, 
And makes both one, each this and that. 
 
A single violet transplant, 
The strength, the color, and the size, 
(All which before was poor, and scant) 
Redoubles still, and multiplies. 
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When love, with one another so 
Interinanimates two souls, 
That abler soul, which thence doth flow, 
Defects of loneliness controls. 
 
We then, who are this new soul, know 
Of what we are composed, and made, 
For the atomies of which we grow 
Are souls, whom no change can invade. 
 
But oh, alas, so long, so far 
Our bodies why do we forbear? 
They're ours, though they're not we, we are 
The intelligences, they the sphere. 
 
We owe them thanks because they thus 
Did us to us at first convey, 
Yielded their forces, sense, to us, 
Nor are dross to us, but allay. 
 
On man haeaven's influence works not so, 
But that it first imprints the air; 
So soul into the soul may flow, 
Though it to body first repair. 
 
As our blood labors to beget 
Spirits as like souls as it can, 
Because such fingers need to knit 
That subtle knot which makes us man: 
 
So must oure lovers' souls descend 
To affections, and to faculties, 
Which sense may reach and apprehend, 
Else a great Prince in prison lies. 
 
To our bodies turn we then, that so 
Weak men on love revealed may look; 
Love's mysteries in souls do grow, 
But yet the body is his book. 
 
And if some lover, such as we, 
Have heard this dialogue of one, 
Let him still mark us, he shall see 
Small change, when we're to bodies gone.34 
Now, despite all the enthusiasm for this conception in the first half of the seventeenth 
century, there were in fact also those who held a very sceptical view on this 
                                                   
34 John Donne, "The Ecstasy," John Donne's Poetry: Authoritative Texts, Criticism, ed. Arthur L. Clements, 2nd 
ed. (New York: Norton, 1992) 32-33. *(l. 32: "[…] what did move" = what was the cause and source of 
our love.) Clements, annotations 33. 
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interpretation of Platonic love and who did not hesitate to reveal it as what it really is: 
the expression of the wish for morally justifiable sex. Such a negative attitude towards 
the idea of an exalted union of souls and bodies is most clearly communicated, for 
example, in William Cartwright's poem No Platonic Love, written as a parody of 
Donne's Ecstasy: 
Tell me no more of Minds embracing Minds, 
And hearts exchang'd for hearts; 
That Spirits Spirits meet, as Winds do winds, 
And mix their subt'lest parts; 
That two unbodi'd Essences may kiss, 
And then like Angels, twist and feel one Bliss. 
 
I was that silly thing that once was wrought 
To Practise this thin Love; 
I climb'd from Sex to Soul, from Soul to Thought; 
But thinking there to move, 
Headlong I rowl'd from Thought to Soul, and then 
From Soul I lighted at the Sex agen. 
 
As some strict down-look'd Men pretend to fast, 
Who yet in Closets Eat; 
So Lovers who profess they Spirits taste, 
Feed yet on grosser meat; 
I know they boast they Soules to Souls Convey, 
How e'er they meet, the Body is the Way. 
 
Come, I will undeceibe thee, they that tread 
Those vain Aëriall waies, 
Are like young Heyrs, and Alchymists misled 
To waste their Wealth and Daies, 
For searching thus to be for ever Rich, 
They only find a Med'cine for the Itch.35 
Despite such occasional criticism, as here expressed by Cartwright, of the 
reinterpretation of the Platonic theory and of the endeavour to establish the resulting 
view of Platonic love as the concept of a new kind of relationship that incorporates 
both the union of souls and that of bodies, the majority of writers and philosophers of 
the time were in fact longing for such a new concept. This longing for an incorporating 
conception of love, which combines the traditional characteristics of love with the 
typical qualities of friendship, can at least be found frequently expressed in the 
writings of the seventeenth century. Now, the only kind of relationship in which such 
a unified love-friendship was at that time thinkable, was of course marriage. So, it does 
indeed not surprise that it is primarily the attempt to set up a new definition of 
marriage that is to be found in the writings of the time, as, for example, in Robert 
                                                   
35 William Cartwright, "No Platonique Love," The Plays and Poems of William Cartwright, ed. G. Blakemore 
Evans (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1951) 494-95. 
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Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy: "Such should conjugal love be, still the same, and as 
they [husband and wife] are one flesh, so should they be of one mind, as in an 
Aristocratical government, one consent, Geryon-like, join in one, have one heart in two 
bodies, will and nill the same."36 And Jeremy Taylor even goes as far as to claim that 
[…] Marriage is the Queen of friendships, in which there is a communication 
of all that can be communicated by friendship: and it being made sacred by 
vows and love, by bodies and souls, by interest and custome, by religion 
and by laws, by common Counsels, and common fortunes; it is the principal 
in the kind of friendship, and the measure of all the rest.37 
Both authors do here in fact employ a vocabulary to describe their notion of love and 
marriage that was formerly exclusively used to describe friendships. However, 
although it seems to be an enormous step from the rejection of love as a potential rival 
to amity to this equation of conjugal love with friendship, a process that took place 
within not even half a century, this new idea of friendship in love is yet still far from 
being what modern readers would understand by it, or from being what Georg Simmel 
calls the sociological idea of modern marriage that is marked by the community of all 
interest and purposes in life.38 It is yet also far from being equivalent to the classical 
idea of friendship. The definition of marital love that Burton gives in his Anatomy of 
Melancholy, for instance, does of course instantly remind one of the Aristotelian and 
Ciceronian notions of friendship. But even when Burton speaks of the wife as a 
husband's 'other self', he has obviously something in mind that is completely different 
from what the classical philosophers had when they referred to the 'other self' that a 
male friend is.39 To believe that at Burton's or at Taylor's time the partners in a 
friendship-like marriage, i.e. in a so-called companionate marriage, have automatically 
been considered equal to each other, would certainly be wrong. In fact, Burton's 
description of the ideal wife reveals that women were yet by no means regarded as 
being equal to men: "A good wife, according to Plutarch, should be as a looking-glass, 
to represent her husband's face and passion. If he be pleasant, she should be merry; if 
he laugh, she should smile; if he look sad, she should participate of his sorrow, and 
bear a part with him, and so they should continue in mutual love one towards 
another."40 A woman's function, however, was not only to resemble her husband. 
According to Burton, her role was obviously rather that of a man's servant: 
Women are the sole, only joy, and comfort of a man's life, born for the use 
and pleasure of men, and the founding of a family. […] A wife is a young 
                                                   
36 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (London: Routledge, 
1931) 655. 
37 Jeremy Taylor 53. 
38 Cf. Georg Simmel, Soziologie, ed. Otthein Rammstedt (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1992) 403. 
39 Cf. Burton 815. 
40 Burton 655. 
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man's Mistress, a middle age's companion, an old man's Nurse: sharer of 
joys and sorrows, a prop, an help, &c. […] There is no joy, no comfort no 
sweetness, no pleasure in the world like that of a good wife.41 
In this statement, Burton also indirectly refers to the main motivations men had for 
getting married: "legitimate procreation, sinless sexuality, and marital love," as 
Gardiner sums it up.42 The sexual aspect of love was still a dominant one in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in the realities of most marriages of that time, 
the role of a woman was presumably not that of her husband's best friend. Her 
function was, as Gardiner remarks, mostly a different one: "The woman who will bear 
his heir exists solely for this function, not as the man's companion or confidante."43 It is 
hence no surprise that the educated women of the time usually showed a different 
attitude towards the idea of companionate marriage and rather still considered 
friendship "nobler then kindred or the marriage band, / Because more free […]," as 
Katherine Philips puts it in one of her poems.44 
So, there was a clear discrepancy between the idealistic conception of companionate 
marriage that these early seventeenth century authors propagated and their actual 
view of the subordinate role of their partners in such a relationship—their wives. 
However, the idea of the companionate marriage that writers like Burton or Taylor 
were so keen to present and elaborate in their writings might have not really been 
suitable to support their view of wives as the subordinates of their husbands, but it 
was indeed suitable to bring about the changes—not only in the conceptualizations of 
love and friendship but also in those of many other ideas—that took place in the course 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Lawrence Stone points out: 
The many legal, political and educational changes that took place in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were largely consequences of changes 
in ideas about the nature of marital relations. The increasing stress laid by 
the early seventeenth-century preachers on the need for companionship in 
marriage in the long run tended to undercut their own arguments in favour 
of the maintenance of strict wifely subjection and obedience.45 
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Now almost at the same time at which we notice a change in the conception of 
marriage, there is in fact also a change in the common view of women and especially of 
wives to be recognized. Christopher Hill, for instance, referring to the change in the 
general attitude towards marriage and women and to the reflection of these altering 
views in the stage plays of the time, speaks of a strengthened position of wives in the 
early seventeenth century—at least of one of wives belonging to the middle class—
when he remarks: 
Historians of literature have made us familiar with controversies on the 
Jacobean stage over marriage and the position of women. By and large the 
popular theatre for which Shakespeare wrote was in favour of monogamous 
wedded love; the aristocratic coterie theatre was more cynical and 
contemptuous in its attitude towards women. This may in the main be 
attributed to a rise in economic importance of those middling-sized 
households, in town and country, in which the wife was a junior partner in 
the business.46 
That the enhancement of the status of women was though not only a process taking 
place in the middle class households of the time, but—if not simultaneously then at 
least not more than merely a few decades later—also in those of the upper classes, is 
emphasized by Norbert Elias, when he states in his notable sociological study Über den 
Prozeß der Zivilisation: 
Die Ehe in der absolutistisch-höfischen Gesellschaft des 17. und 18. 
Jahrhundert gewinnt dadurch einen besonderen Charakter, daß hier durch 
den Aufbau dieser Gesellschaft zum erstenmal die Herrschaft des Mannes 
über die Frau ziemlich vollkommen gebrochen ist. Die soziale Stärke der 
Frau ist hier annähernd gleich groß, wie die des Mannes; die 
gesellschaftliche Meinung wird in sehr hohem Maße von Frauen 
mitbestimmt […].47 
The change in the conceptualizations of marriage and the role of wives was thus 
apparently one that took place gradually over quite a period of time and might 
therefore be located somewhere between the late sixteenth and the late eighteenth 
centuries. And in the end, we can indeed find a completely new attitude towards 
marital love that has succeeded the old views on the matter, as Stone points out: 
Once it was doubted that affection could and would naturally develop after 
marriage, decision-making power had to be transferred to the future 
spouses themselves, and more and more of them in the eighteenth century 
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began to put the prospects of emotional satisfaction before the ambition for 
increased income or status. This in turn also had its effect in equalizing 
relationships between husband and wife.48 
This is then also exactly what Niklas Luhmann refers to, when he remarks about the 
conception of marital love-friendship in the eighteenth century: "Liebe als Pflicht wird 
in Liebe als Sympathie umgeformt und dem Freundschaftsideal angeglichen […]. Das 
ganze 18. Jahrhundert durchzieht diese Bemühung, den Code für Intimität von Liebe 
auf 'innige' Freundschaft umzustellen […]. Die liebevolle Freundschaft läßt den 
Unterschied der Geschlechter fast verschwinden."49  
However, even with the most idealistic conception of love as a marital friendship, in 
the realities of most marriages, the equality of the partners certainly remained merely a 
farce. The new conception of love—which the Renaissance had gradually paved the 
way for, which the seventeenth century eventually brought about, yet which became 
established and widely accepted only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—had 
indeed adopted many features of the traditional conceptions of friendship, but 
apparently not all. In the end, it appears to have been only an ingenious means of male 
self-deception, designed to provide men with the delusion that they could legally unite 
with both the soul and the body of the same person. Such a union, of course, was for a 
very long time merely conceivable—or, at least, publicly discussible—as one between 
the sexes. 
 
5.3. A LOVE FEARFUL TO NAME: 
AFFECTIONATE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN VIRTUE AND SODOMY 
The redefinition of the concept of marriage as a relationship that is based on both the 
love and the friendship between the two partners engaged in it was certainly the most 
promising means to accomplish the common wish for the concept of a relationship that 
would include the union of souls as well as that of bodies—and it was clearly regarded 
as the only conceivable and thus possible one. There was, however, a potential 
alternative, although it was not yet conceptualized as such. 
The basic problem with the idea of marital friendship, in fact, was that in reality a 
relationship between a man and a woman at that time lacked, almost by definition, the 
significant feature of the partners' equality. In the seventeenth century, as in the 
centuries before, true equality was—despite the increasing endeavours to change this 
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Friendship as Love – Love as Friendship: The concepts redifined 227 
view—still widely regarded as thinkable only between members of the same sex. True 
friendship, in its classical sense, was therefore theoretically just possible between two 
male or, at best, two female partners. The original concept of Platonic love, on the other 
hand, and thus—at least in theory—also Ebreo's redefined version of it, was applicable 
to the relationship between a man and a woman as well as to that between two 
partners of the same sex. In other words, if the new conception of heterosexual love 
was able to adopt the characteristic qualities of that of homosocial friendship, was not 
the same possible the other way round? 
Now, this question was certainly not one that people at that time would have dared 
to reflect upon openly. For them, a spiritual and sexual relationship between partners 
of the same sex was in fact nothing that could have been considered a possible form of 
relationship at all—not even secretly—, still less one that could be an alternative to 
marriage. And the (male) authors that made use of the Platonic conception of love as 
the passion for beauty, eliminated the sexual aspect included in the original theory in 
fact explicitly from their own representations of this kind of love when they applied it 
to a male object, as, for example, Shakespeare in those of his Sonnets addressing his 'fair 
friend', or Michelangelo in his Rime dedicated to his friend Cavalieri. The homoerotic 
passion for someone of the same sex was indeed, as Saslow explains, "a profound love 
that could not be fully understood, much less accepted, by the lover himself as 
anything more than either chaste longing or 'concealed sin'."50 For this reason, any 
indication of a homosexual desire, and particularly one of that of a man for his (male) 
friend or one of that of two male friends for each other, had to be concealed or even 
suppressed, or had at least to be eliminated from the representation of their friendship 
in any kind of writing.51 Sexuality was indeed nothing that was thought to be an 
acceptable part of the friendship between two friends of the same sex. The common 
opinion on the matter is clearly expressed by John Dryden when he writes about the 
nature of friendship: 
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For 'tis the bliss of Friendship's holy state 
To mix their Minds, and to communicate; 
Though Bodies cannot, Souls can penetrate.52 
And yet, the sexual connotation is here still implied in the image of penetration. Sexual 
undertones like this are indeed frequently to be found in the literary treatment of male 
friendship by writers of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. And it is certainly due to 
this ambiguity and suggestiveness that modern scholars and writers have not long 
since begun with the 'outing' of supposed homosexuals of this period. 
In today's post-Romantic and post-Freudian times, the general attitude towards any 
kind of relationship is indeed so much affected by the dominating concepts of love and 
sexuality that nearly every relation between two persons is believed to be—at least 
unconsciously—based on libidinal desires. Especially concerning male friendship this 
means, as C. S. Lewis remarks, that "it has actually become necessary in our time to 
rebut the theory that every firm and serious friendship is really homosexual."53 That 
not every intimate friendship between men is rather a homosexual love affair or 
partnership is surely as true for our own time as it was for the Renaissance. But, on the 
other hand, not every text "of the period can always be explained in other terms and in 
ways in which anything like sex disappears into the 'convention' of friendship," as 
Jonathan Goldberg rightly states."54 
For Renaissance men, however, it was indeed necessary to explain their sexual 
feelings for one another or even the actual sexual intimacy between them in terms 
other than those of homosexuality, since there was not yet anything like an exclusive 
conception of a homosexual identity that they could have referred to, even if they had 
been willing to do so. What we would consider the homosexual identity of the 
individual is indeed something that was to develop only in the following period and 
the first signs of its emergence were not to be recognized before the second half of the 
seventeenth century. Therefore, as Bray puts it in his excellent study of homosexuality 
in Renaissance England, "to talk of an individual in this period [the Renaissance] as 
being or not being 'a homosexual' is an anachronism and ruinously misleading."55 And 
the development of a sexual identity of any kind would have been very difficult indeed 
at a time in which not even the concept of sexuality itself was an established one, as 
Goldberg remarks: "[…] the Renaissance comes before the regimes of sexuality, and to 
speak of sexuality in the period is a misnomer."56 
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That in the Renaissance there was no specific conception of homosexuality as we 
know it does of course not mean that the persons, actions, and emotions that we would 
nowadays associate with the term did simply not exist at that time. They definitely 
existed, but instead of being conceptualized under the name of homosexuality they 
were rather seen as part of a different concept—that of sodomy.57 Sodomy was though a 
term that was not only used to denote homosexual activities. Sodomy, as Goldberg 
explains, was rather seen "as a range of desires and acts that the period thought anyone 
could have or do, [and that] in its most capacious definition [included] just about 
anything but unprotected vaginal intercourse between a married couple."58 Thus, the 
image of sodomy, closely connected with that of buggery, included the whole variety 
of all kinds of reputed sexual debauchery. And so, the sexual intimacy between men 
was considered equally damnable as that between man and beast. The common 
contemporary attitude towards these "things fearful to name," as William Bradford 
puts it in his history of Plymouth Plantation, is quite plainly reflected, for example, in 
Robert Burton's comment on the matter:59 
And not with brutes only, but men among themselves [had sexual 
intercourse], which sin is vulgarly called Sodomy; this vice was customary 
in old times with the Orientals, the Greeks without question, the Italians, 
Africans, Asiaticks. […] Among the Asiaticks, Turks, Italians, the vice is 
customary to this day. […] And terrible to say, in our own country, within 
memory, how much that detestable sin hath raged.60 
He continues to report that in 1538, Henry VIII had the 'Doctors of Law' Thomas Lee 
and Richard Layton inspect the monasteries of England. And in the course of this 
investigation, according to Burton, they 
found among them [monks, priests, and votaries] so great a number of 
wenchers, gelded youths, debauchees, catamites, boy-things, pederasts, 
Sodomites, (as it saith in Bale), Ganymedes, &c., that in every one of them 
you may be certain of a new Gomorrah. […] If 'tis thus among monks, 
votaries, and such-like saintly rascals, what may we not suspect in towns, in 
palaces? what among nobles, what in cellars, how much nastiness, how 
much filth!61 
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Sodomy, in fact, was not simply seen as an offence against Christian morality and 
common sexual ethics; there was a certain mythological quality that was attributed to 
the idea of sodomy. Even though everything was believed to be somehow part of the 
divine order, sodomy was excluded from this order and was rather related to the chaos 
outside the divine system. Yet, that it was not conceived of as belonging to God's 
divine system, consequentially also means that it was not even regarded as a product 
of Satan's maliciousness, since he and his hell were also considered parts of God's 
system.62 So, as Bray puts it, "whatever homosexuality was clearly it was not God's 
creation."63 This attitude towards the matter might illustrate how strange and alien the 
idea of sodomy must have been to ordinary people in the Renaissance. And indeed, as 
Bray rightly remarks, "there was no civilisation in the world at that time with as violent 
an antipathy to homosexuality as that of western Europe."64 It was therefore nearly 
impossible for the individual to develop a homosexual identity under such 
circumstances. The only way in which the individual and society in general could cope 
with the discrepancy between the hostile conception of sodomy and its actual 
occurrence in every day life, was to keep both detached and to regard them separately, 
as Bray explains: 
It was this that made it possible for the individual to avoid the psychological 
problems of a homosexual relationship or a homosexual encounter, by 
keeping the experience merely casual and undefined: readily expressed and 
widely shared though the prevalent attitude to homosexuality was, it was 
kept at a distance from the great bulk of homosexual behaviour by an 
unwillingness to link the two.65 
In literary treatments of friendship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
homosexual desires were therefore either totally denied or referred to by another 
name. In prose, such desires were usually represented as belonging to friendship. In 
lyric poetry, the representation of homosexual emotions was generally declared to be 
nothing more than a literary exercise, a poem written in imitation of ancient poetical 
traditions.66 But again, this does of course not mean that every representation of male 
friendship was really a description of a homosexual partnership in disguise and that 
every love poem dedicated to a man was in actual fact a homosexual declaration of 
love. It is indeed very difficult to say whether a Renaissance text that, from our point of 
view, appears to give a clear indication of the author's homosexual inclination is really 
what we consider it to be or whether it is in fact only what it claims to be, namely 
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either a mere literary exercise or simply the representation of an intimate and 
affectionate friendship between two men that is still free from any libidinous desire. 
To illustrate this problem and the consequential danger of misinterpretation Bray 
refers to Richard Barnfield's Affectionate Shepherd, an apparently homosexual love-
poem written by a definitely heterosexual author.67 That even Barnfield himself was 
quite aware of the possibility that his readers might misinterpret the poem is shown by 
a remark in the preface to Cynthia, his third book of poetry: 
Some there were, that did interpret The affectionate Shepheard, otherwise then 
(in truth) I meant, touching the subject thereof, to wit, the love of a 
Shepheard to a boy; a fault, the which I will not excuse, because I never 
made. Onely this, I will unshaddow my conceit: being nothing else, but an 
imitation of Virgill, in the second Eglogue of Alexis.68 
And Bray, convinced by this assertion, says about Barnfield's poems: "Like other self-
consciously classical poetry of this kind they were the product of a literary genre which 
(if it was more than a mere exercise) was about friendship, the 'insensible part' of love, 
not sexuality but a Platonic meeting of minds. It was not about homosexuality."69 The 
example indeed shows how difficult it is to conclude a writer's sexual inclination from 
his writings. In some cases, like that of Barnfield, we know that the author was writing 
the texts merely as literary exercises. In others, as for example in that of Christopher 
Marlowe's writings, we are quite certain that the author had what we would nowadays 
refer to as homosexual leanings. But there are still many cases in which we simply do 
not know whether the author of homoerotic poetry gives us an autobiographical 
account of his own love life or whether he is merely presenting literary exercises. The 
most famous of such cases is probably that of Shakespeare's Sonnets, the series of 
poems describing the author's relationships with a 'fair friend' (whom he also calls the 
'master-mistress of his passion') and a 'dark lady'—whom he refers to as the 'two loves' 
he had.70 Especially the great number of sonnets dedicated to his young friend, in 
comparison with the relative small number that are addressed to his mistress, and the 
way in which the author praises the beauty of the youth have ever since inspired the 
suspicion that Shakespeare might have had indeed homosexual, or at least bisexual 
leanings. Concerning this, Stefan George says in the introduction to his German 
translation of the Sonnets: 
Im mittelpunkte der sonettenfolge steht in allen lagen und stufen die 
leidenschaftliche hingabe des dichters an seinen freund. Dies hat man 
hinzunehmen auch wo man nicht versteht und es ist gleich töricht mit 
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tadeln wie mit rettungen zu beflecken was einer der grössten Irdischen für 
gut befand. Zumal verstofflichte und verhirnlichte zeitalter haben kein recht 
an diesem punkt worte zu machen da sie nicht einmal etwas ahnen können 
von der weltschaffenden kraft der übergeschlechtlichen Liebe.71 
Now, in the end, we do in fact not even know with certainty whether Shakespeare's 
sonnets are an autobiographical account or mere fiction, much less whether the 
friendship between Shakespeare and his friend was of a sexual nature or of the 
metasexual kind of which George speaks.72 In fact, to spot the homosexuals of the 
Renaissance with certainty is a very difficult task indeed, since almost all of them 
either consciously or unconsciously made use of a strategy to conceal their desires that 
even protected them against themselves, i.e. it even prevented them from conceiving of 
themselves as having a special sexual orientation. This strategy was to see their desires 
either as the mere expression of Platonic love (in its original sense) or as part of a true 
and affectionate friendship that has been modelled on the perfect ones of the great 
classical friendship couples.73 
However, this self-deceptive attitude towards one's own homosexual leanings 
began to change right at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Now the situation 
became in fact a completely different one, as Rictor Norton points out in his study of 
the male homosexual subculture in eighteenth-century England: "Narrowly defined, 
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homosexuals have of course existed during all periods of history, but it was not until 
about 1700 that gay men began to gather together within a structured social 
organisation which we can properly call a subculture."74 This sudden and rapid 
development of a homosexual subculture also brought about the development of a 
distinct homosexual identity of homophile men who were not yet called homosexuals 
but 'mollies' in imitation of the name for the clubs and bars in which these men used to 
meet, the molly houses.75 
Of course, not all men who had homosexual desires were now also able or willing to 
think of themselves as being something special, or even as being 'mollies'. Especially in 
the country—and for England at that time, for example, this actually meant anywhere 
outside London—neither the conception of nor the attitude towards homosexual 
feelings or activities had changed in any way. For anyone with homosexual desires 
living outside the major cities, the situation became in fact extremely fierce, as the only 
remaining category in which he could think of himself after having given up the 
strategy to conceal these desires was still that of a sodomite. In the capitals, however, 
the possibility to conceive of oneself as being something else than a sodomite now 
became a reality. Yet, it is truly difficult to say what exactly had brought about the 
emergence of a homosexual identity and in its consequence a homosexual subculture 
in the early eighteenth century. We can though assume that the general development 
of the ideas of individuality and subjectivity in the Renaissance, and thus the discovery 
of the self as such—a development that is especially towards the end of the period 
reflected in so great literary works as, for instance, Shakespeare's plays or Montaigne's 
Essais—as well as the development of a general conception of sexuality in the 
seventeenth century, had indeed contributed most to the eventual emergence not only 
of a heterosexual but also of a homosexual identity in the eighteenth century. Another 
two factors, however, which have certainly played a significant role particularly in the 
birth of the homosexual identity, were the adoption of characteristic features of the 
concept of friendship by the concept of love and the concurrent decline in the common 
belief in the realizability of the classical ideal of friendship in consequence of the 
increasingly mercantilistic attitude towards friendship in the seventeenth century. In 
other words, because friendship was now in practice no longer exclusively 
conceptualized as an intimate and affectionate relationship between two partners of 
the same sex but in the main rather as a functional alliance primarily based on 
utilitarian interests, it could no longer cover the homoerotic desires that could have 
easily been satisfied under the classical concept of friendship before—provided that 
this satisfaction had strictly been limited to occasional simple caresses and that real 
sexual activities had thus remained excluded. Due to the changed and decidedly de-
                                                   
74 Rictor Norton, Mother Clap's Molly House: The Gay Subculture in England 1700-1830 (London: GMP, 1992) 
9. 
75 Cf. Bray, Homosexuality in Renaissance England 80-81; Norton 9. 
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emotionalized general conception of friendship in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the satisfaction of these desires could only be obtained in a relationship that 
had to be defined by a different concept. And since there was no other concept that 
could have incorporated such desires than that of marriage, there had to be a new one 
created, one of a homosexual relationship in the disguise of friendship. 
In all conceptions of friendship in which carnal love played a significant role, 
however, one problem remained: the impossibility of achieving true equality between 
the sexual partners. Now, this has indeed not only been the crucial problem with the 
idea of a sexual friendship between man and woman, conceptualized as companionate 
marriage, but also with that of a sexual friendship between men themselves. Michel 
Foucault presents a plausible explanation for this apparent impossibility to combine 
sensual love and intellectual friendship into the ideal of an absolute relationship when 
he says: 
L'amitié est réciproque, ce que ne sont pas les rapports sexuels: dans les 
rapports sexuels, on est actif ou passif, on pénètre ou on est pénétré. Je suis 
tout à fait d'accord avec ce que vous dites de l'amitié, mais je crois que cela 
confirme ce qu'on disait de l'éthique sexuelle grecque: là où il y a amitié, il 
est difficile d'avoir des relations sexuelles.76 
Now, if Foucault is right, this was certainly as true for friendship-love-relationships in 
the early modern period as it had been for those in ancient Greek times—and it would 
thus explain why the concepts of love and friendship turned out to be in actual fact 
incompatible when they were meant to be united in the late Renaissance. And that it 
was indeed the aspect of sexuality that prevented the two concepts from being united, 
is also maintained by Niklas Luhmann when he remarks: "[…] eine Zeitlang sieht es so 
aus, daß Liebe und Freundschaft verschmolzen werden könnten, wenn nicht das 
Störproblem der Sexualität zu einer Unterscheidung zwänge. Jedenfalls konkurrieren 
jetzt beide Begriffe um die Anwartschaft, den Code für Intimbeziehungen zu 
bestimmen."77 In the end, in fact, it was also the attempt to combine the two in-
compatible concepts (and its failure) that, in connection with the causes mentioned in 
the sections and chapters above, led in the short term to the decay of the traditional 
classically inspired ideal of perfect friendship and in the long term not only to a much 
more complex system of relationship categorization in general and to a diversification 
                                                   
76 Michel Foucault, "Le sexe comme une morale," Le Nouvel Observateur 1021 (1984): 64. – "Friendship is 
based on equality, which does not apply to sexual relationships: in sexual affairs one is either active or 
passive, penetrates or is penetrated. I totally agree with what you have said about friendship, but I 
think, this only confirms what we have said about Greek sexual ethics: where friendship exists, it is 
difficult to have sexual relationships." Trans. mine. 
77 Luhmann 104. – "[…] for some time it seems as if love and friendship could be merged, if not the 
disturbing problem of sexuality enforced a distinction. However, both concepts are now competing for 
the candidacy for determining the code of intimate relationships." Trans. mine. 
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of the conceptions of friendship in particular but finally also to the victory of the idea 
of love in the competition to which Luhmann here refers. 
Besides a rather traditional conception of affectionate and intimate homosocial 
friendship that yet henceforth only consisted of mere remnants of the old ideal of this 
relationship and a notion of heterosexual love that predominantly emphasized its 
sensual aspect, finally another four concepts took shape: that of a utilitarian one of 
homosocial friendship as a rather functional than affectionate relationship (and thus 
much more similar to the medieval conception of friendship than to that of the 
Renaissance), that of a marital friendship in a companionate marriage, that of 
homosexual love, and that of non-sexual heterosocial friendship. In fact, besides the 
first two of these new concepts, which had almost immediately commonly been 
acknowledged, now also the friendship between friends of the opposite sex was as 
conceivable as that between two men or two women, and the sexual love between two 
men (much more, in fact, than that between two women) became gradually as 
thinkable as that between man and woman. That relationships of these four new kinds 
were now equally conceivable as those of the rather traditional types does of course 
not mean that they were also equally accepted. Utilitarian friendship between men, for 
example, became indeed instantly the commonly acknowledged standard variant of 
amity. Heterosocial friendship, i.e. the unerotic friendship between man and woman, 
was now indeed much more accepted and much less suspiciously regarded than 
before, but it seems as if in the seventeenth century and even throughout the 
Enlightenment people still rather preferred the idealistic concept of marital friendship 
as their favourite idea of a relationship between the sexes. And homosexual love was 
still as condemned as before; yet, it was no longer seen as a mere variant of sodomy. It 
too, had now become a 'classe à parte.' 
The form of relationship in which this love found expression, however, was still 
conceptualized, or rather, disguised as male friendship. The concept of homosexual 
love was now in existence and was also acknowledged as such, but the actual 
expression of this love was still neither accepted nor tolerated. For someone who had 
developed a homosexual identity and who had come to terms with it, it was hence still 
necessary to conceal his sexual relationship with another man and to present it as 
something that was still widely accepted as a close bond between two men, viz. as 
friendship. As there was no institutionalized form of a homosexual relationship or 
even the hope of creating one that would have been socially approved and then 
legalized, there was obviously also no need for a concept of such a relationship other 
than that of friendship. The idea of a male friendship that is primarily based on the 
sexual attraction of the friends for each other thus became then simply just another one 
of the increasing number of various conceptions of friendship. Due to the increasing 
diversification and individualisation of the conception of friendship in the course of 
the following centuries, we can nowadays find a common idea of friendship that has 
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become undefined and almost meaningless. The clear notion of what friendship is 
about, which characterized the old traditional conception, has now been lost. Love has 
instead become the dominant kind of relationship. Concerning the possible reason for 
this development Luhmann says: 
Aufs Ganze gesehen hat jedoch die Liebe und nicht die Freundschaft das 
Rennen gemacht und letztlich den Code für Intimität bestimmt. Warum? 
Die Gründe dafür sind nicht leicht aufzutreiben und zu belegen. Man kann 
jedoch vermuten, daß die Freundschaft trotz aller Privatisierung und aller 
Unterscheidung täglicher und absonderlicher Freundschaft (Thomasius) 
sich als nicht abgrenzbar, als nicht ausdifferenzierbar erwies. […] Ferner 
wird soziale Reflexivität jetzt zur Interaktionsmaxime schlechthin, so daß 
dieser Gesichtspunkt allein nicht mehr ausreicht, um einen Spezialcode für 
Intimbeziehungen besonders zu profilieren. Nicht zuletzt ist aber auch 
daran zu denken, daß der symbiotische Mechanismus der Sexualität, der die 
Ausdifferenzierung auf der Ebene der Interaktionsbeziehungen trägt, der 
Freundschaft, denn das gerade unterscheidet sie von der Liebe, nicht zur 
Verfügung steht.78 
Luhmann here refers to two important factors that might have indeed been responsible 
for the development. He first claims that despite the increasing diversification and 
finally the total individualisation of the conception of friendship this has never really 
led to a true differentiation between separate original concepts that had been 
independent derivatives of the traditional concept of friendship. This is certainly true. 
Moreover, he claims that since friends do normally not sleep with each other they 
cannot use the sexual act as an indicator for measuring the exclusiveness of their 
friendship—as lovers normally do to distinguish their relationship from others. In 
comparison to lovers, friends have no means of marking their friendship as special. In 
times in which people are predominantly determined by the egoistic and materialistic 
urge to possess and to mark their possessions, this must truly make it inferior to love. 
This view, that it was indeed the aspect of sex—and its universal and democratic 
character that already Alberti had referred to in his Libri della famiglia79—that 
constitutes the essential difference that was responsible for the victory of the concept of 
love over that of friendship, is in fact also supported by Georg Simmel when he says: 
                                                   
78 Luhmann 105. – "On the whole it was however love that succeeded and that, in the end, has determined 
the code of intimacy. Why? The reasons for this are not easily to be denoted and to be proved. One can 
though assume that friendship, in spite of all privatizations and all differentiations between common 
and strange friendships (Thomasius), has proved to be inseparable, to be indistinguishable. […] 
Furthermore, the social reflectivity becomes now the interaction maxim par excellence, so that this 
feature alone is no longer sufficient to establish a specific code for intimate relationships. It has though 
also to be kept in mind that the symbiotic mechanism of sexuality, which carries the conceptual 
distinctions on the level of interactional relationships, is not at friendship's disposal—and precisely this 
distinguishes it from love." Trans. mine. – Luhmann here refers to Christian Thomasius's theory of love 
and friendship elaborated in his Einleitung zur Sittenlehre (1692). 
79 See 177. 
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Ein sehr starkes Beziehungsmoment bricht oft die Bahn, auf der ihm die 
andern, ohne dieses latent gebliebenen, folgen; und unleugbar öffnet bei den 
meisten Menschen die geschlechtliche Liebe die Tore der 
Gesamtpersönlichkeit am weitesten, ja, bei nicht wenigen ist die Liebe die 
einzige Form, in der sie ihr ganzes Ich geben können, wie dem Künstler die 
Form seiner jeweiligen Kunst die einzige Möglichkeit bietet, sein ganzes 
Inneres darzubieten.80 
Now, agreeing with the assumptions Luhmann and Simmel here make, one might 
indeed say that, in addition to the causes analysed in the course of the present study, 
these are the most important reasons for the way in which the development of the 
concepts of love and friendship took place in the last four hundred years and for the 
common attitude towards them that we can notice today. On the whole, however, the 
network of causes that have determined this development and thus the history of 
friendship since the Renaissance is in fact much more complex, and it has indeed to be 
doubted whether all of the various causes will ever be determined with certainty.81 
                                                   
80 Simmel 400. – "One extremely strong element in a relationship often opens up a path on which the 
others, which would have remained latent without this strong one, could then follow. And, undeniably, 
it is with most humans sexual love that flings the doors to the whole personality most widely open. 
Indeed, with not a few of them, love is the only means by which they can present their whole self, just 
as the particular art of an artist enables him to expose his whole inner being." Trans. mine. 
81 The further development of the conceptions of friendship in the time following the seventeenth century 
is indeed a story that has to be told in detail at another time, in another study. However, there are 
though, in fact, already a number of studies dealing with the conceptions of friendship in this time. On 
the notions of the subject in the Enlightenment and especially on the national phenomenon of the cult 
of friendship in eighteenth-century Germany there are indeed several works published. The most 
significant among those on the German friendship cult is certainly that by Wolfdietrich Rasch, 
Freundschaftskult und Freundschaftsdichtung im deutschen Schrifttum des 18. Jahrhunderts: Vom Ausgang des 
Barock bis zu Klopstock, Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte: 
Buchreihe 21 (Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1936). See though also on this subject: Albert Salomon, "Der 
Freundschaftskult des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland: Versuch zur Soziologie einer Lebensform," 
Zeitschrift für Soziologie 8 (1979): 279-308; Ernst von Schenck, Briefe der Freunde: Das Zeitalter Goethes im 
Spiegel der Freundschaft, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1949); and Eva Thaer, Die Freundschaft im deutschen 
Roman des 18. Jahrhunderts (Hamburg: Berngruber & Henning, 1917). On the view of friendship in the 
Romantic period, see, for example, Anne Vincent-Buffault, L'exercise de l'amitié: Pour une histoire des 
pratiques amicales aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, (Paris: du Seuil, 1995); Berkeley Stevenson Blatz, 
"Romanticism and the Rhetoric of Friendship," diss., U of California, Los Angeles, 1994; and Klaus 
Lankheit, Das Freundschaftsbild der Romantik (Heidelberg: Winter, 1952). On the individualised notions 
of friendship today, see, for instance, the various essays in Elliott Leyton, ed., The Compact: Selected 
Dimensions of Friendship (St. Johns (Nfld.): Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial 
University of Newfoundland, 1974). 
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 FORMELLER ANHANG 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG IN DEUTSCHER SPRACHE 
 
Da die vorliegende Dissertation nicht in der deutschen Sprache abgefasst ist, folgt nun, 
gemäß der Promotionsordnung der Gemeinsamen Fakultät für Geistes- und Sozial-
wissenschaften der Universität Hannover, § 9 Abs. 2b, eine Zusammenfassung der 
Arbeit in deutscher Sprache. 
 
 
THEMA UND HYPOTHESE DER DISSERTATION 
 
Die Begriffe von Liebe und Freundschaft verkörpern in der okzidentalen Dichtung und 
Philosophie von jeher das Ideal einer vollkommenen zwischenmenschlichen Be-
ziehung. Isoliert betrachtet, repräsentieren beide Begriffe dabei jedoch nicht nur zwei 
gänzlich unabhängige Bereiche einer solchen Idealbeziehung, sondern durch ihre 
divergenten Konzeptionen zunächst vor allem auch zwei völlig unterschiedliche 
Beziehungsarten. 
Diese alternativen Beziehungsformen basieren wiederum auf den spezifischen 
Begriffsmerkmalen von Liebe und Freundschaft. Ist in diesem Zusammenhang von 
Liebe die Rede, so ist jedoch stets bloß die Konzeption von Eros gemeint: Liebe als das 
Gefühl der sinnlichen Zuneigung der Liebenden zueinander. Der Kontext der 
Untersuchung macht diese eingeschränkte Definitionsbestimmung notwendig, da der 
heute gültige Begriff der Liebe in seinem semantischen Gesamtvolumen eine klare 
Abgrenzung der hier diskutierten Beziehungskonzeptionen nicht zulassen würde. 
Während der Begriff der Liebe, gemäß dieser Einschränkung, also grundsätzlich mit 
dem Attribut des Emotionalen und Sinnlichen belegt ist und damit traditionell der 
Verbindung von Mann und Frau zugeschrieben wird, ist die Freundschaft eher dem 
Bereich der Ratio beigeordnet, die geistesgeschichtlich als vornehmlich homosoziale 
Domäne gilt. Die daraus resultierende Unterscheidung zwischen körperlich und 
geistig motivierten Beziehungen mittels der Begriffe von Liebe und Freundschaft hat 
wiederum die separate Untersuchung der Herkunft und Entwicklung der Konzep-
tionen beider Begriffe zur Folge. 
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Während zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Liebesbegriffs bereits ausführliche 
Studien vorliegen, gibt es bislang zur geistesgeschichtlichen Evolution der Freund-
schaftsidee erstaunlicherweise verhältnismäßig wenige Untersuchungen.1 Dies mag 
zum einen an dem allgemein größeren Interesse an der Liebe liegen, dominiert sie 
doch die Vorstellung von einer Idealbeziehung insbesondere in unserer eigenen 
Epoche. Zum anderen liegt es aber sicherlich auch an der besonderen Komplexität des 
Entwicklungsverlaufs der Freundschaftsidee selbst. Es ist daher zunächst das Anliegen 
meiner Arbeit, diesen Verlauf in seiner wesentlichen Ausprägung nachzuzeichnen und 
zu analysieren und so dazu beizutragen, das vorhandene Forschungsdefizit auszu-
gleichen. Der Focus der Arbeit liegt dabei auf der für die Gesamtentwicklung des 
Freundschaftskonzeptes bedeutendsten Periode zwischen dem fünfzehnten und 
siebzehnten Jahrhundert. 
Verfolgt man die geistesgeschichtliche Entwicklung des Freundschaftsbegriffs von 
der Antike bis zur Moderne, so trifft man in jeder Epoche auf eine spezifische 
Konzeption von Freundschaft, deren Wesen sich deutlich vom Freundschaftsbegriff 
der jeweils vorhergehenden Periode abgrenzt. Dabei werden stets bestimmte Aspekte 
des überlieferten Freundschaftsbegriffs übernommen und mit neuen Inhalten 
kombiniert. 
Beim Übergang von der Antike zum Mittelalter und hiernach zur Renaissance, kam 
es jedoch zunächst nur zu einem einfachen Wandel der Begriffsimplikationen von 
Freundschaft. Der Begriff der Freundschaft wurde also lediglich neu definiert. 
Inhaltsschwerpunkte und die Bedeutung des Freundschaftsbegriffs als Beziehung-
sideal wurden in einem solchen Prozess zwar verändert – meist in konträrer 
Wechselbeziehung zu dem Begriff von Liebe – die grundsätzliche Opposition der 
beiden miteinander konkurrierenden Beziehungsformen, Liebe und Freundschaft, 
beeinflusste dies jedoch nicht. Während die Konzeption von Freundschaft stets 
untrennbar mit der Idee von der intellektuellen Einheit der Freunde assoziiert war, 
wurde der Begriff der Liebe meist von ihrem erotischen Aspekt dominiert. Ein 
interkonzeptioneller Austausch begriffsspezifischer Merkmale, oder gar eine 
Verschmelzung derselben miteinander, fand nicht statt. Die Redefinierungen der 
                                                   
1 Stellvertretend für eine Vielzahl diesbezüglicher Untersuchungen sei hier hingewiesen auf: Annemarie 
Leibbrand und Werner Leibbrand, Formen des Eros: Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte der Liebe, 2 Bd. 
(Freiburg: Alber, 1972). 
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Begriffe von Freundschaft und Liebe hatten daher lediglich die Dominanz des einen 
über den anderen zur Folge. 
Beim Übergang vom sechzehnten zum siebzehnten Jahrhundert, d.h. von der 
Renaissance zur Frühaufklärung, stellt sich dieser Transformationsprozess jedoch 
völlig anders dar. Gehörte die Freundschaft zur Zeit der Renaissance noch zu den 
höchsten in der Literatur verherrlichten Idealen und in der Realität zu den 
erstrebenswertesten Zielen einer humanistischen Lebensphilosophie, lässt sich in der 
Darstellung der Freundschaft in der ersten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts nur 
noch ein degeneriertes Zerrbild dieses Ideals wieder finden. Auf der anderen Seite 
konnte sich nun die Liebe als Idealkonzeption einer vollkommenen Beziehung 
endgültig durchsetzen. Die Aufwertung sowohl der Rolle der Frau als auch der der 
Ehe, die zunehmende Betonung des utilitaristischen Aspekts der Freundschaft infolge 
des im siebzehnten Jahrhundert aufkommenden Merkantilismus, und die allmähliche 
Etablierung einer homosexuellen Identität im frühen achtzehnten Jahrhundert, die sich 
vormals unter dem Konzept der innigen Männerfreundschaft subsumieren konnte, 
führten dazu, dass sich das Bild von der Freundschaft grundlegend wandelte. Auf 
lange Sicht als affektive Beziehungsform zur relativen Bedeutungslosigkeit verurteil, 
war die Freundschaft fortan nicht mehr in der Lage, der Liebe als Beziehungsideal 
Konkurrenz zu machen und sie als 'Code für Intimität' abzulösen.2 
Der Niedergang des Freundschaftsbegriffs im frühen siebzehnten Jahrhundert liegt 
jedoch zunächst im übermäßig idealisierten Wesen der humanistischen Freundschafts-
konzeption selbst begründet. Darüber hinaus sind die Gründe für den Abstieg jedoch 
auch in den komplexen Veränderungsprozessen zu suchen, denen die konzeptionelle 
Weltsicht der Renaissance im ganzen unterworfen war. Veränderungen, die ihre 
Ursprünge im fünfzehnten und sechzehnten Jahrhundert hatten, deren Auswirkungen 
jedoch bis weit in das achtzehnte Jahrhundert hinein reichten. 
Die Rückbesinnung auf klassische Freundschaftsideale in der Renaissance entsprach 
durchaus der zeitgemäßen Gepflogenheit, auf tradierte Werte der griechisch-
römischen Antike zurückzugreifen. Die hehren Ideale der klassischen Freundschafts-
konzeptionen erwiesen sich in der Praxis jedoch als rein theoretische Konstrukte, die 
sich in der Realität nicht ohne weiteres umsetzen ließen. 
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Dieser Umstand ist im wesentlichen darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Glorifizierung 
der klassischen Freundschaftsideale in den intellektuellen Kreisen der Renaissance zu 
einem Zeitpunkt betrieben wurde, zu dem sich in der Praxis offenbar bereits ein neues, 
noch nicht konzeptualisiertes Beziehungsverständnis zu etablieren begann. Diese neue 
Denkweise unterschied nun nicht mehr ausschließlich zwischen den traditionellen 
Beziehungsbegriffen von Liebe und Freundschaft – also zwischen körperlichen und 
intellektuellen Verbindungen – sondern differenzierte vielmehr zwischen primär 
utilitaristischen und vorwiegend affektiven Beziehungen. Als Konzeption zwischen 
diesen Extremen erwiesen sich das klassisch inspirierte Freundschaftsideal der 
Humanisten zwangsläufig als inkompatibel zu einem derartig polarisierten 
Beziehungsverständnis und folglich in der Praxis als kaum umsetzbar. 
Durch die zunächst fehlende Konzeptualisierung dieses neu aufkommenden 
Beziehungsverständnisses benutzte man zur Bezeichnung der entsprechenden 
Beziehungen jedoch nach wie vor die traditionellen Begriffe. Ohne eigene Konzeption 
wurden jedoch die neuen Beziehungsformen nicht nur weiterhin mit der alten 
Bezeichnung, sondern auch mit den Konnotationen des bereits überholten Begriffs 
etikettiert. So bezeichnet Montaigne seine überaus affektive Beziehung zu La Boëtie in 
den Essais ebenso als Freundschaft im klassischen Sinne, wie Shakespeare das 
Abhängigkeitsverhältnis des Dichters zu seinem Mäzen in den Sonnets. Neben diesen 
Freundschaftsverhältnissen im Rahmen des im fünfzehnten und sechzehnten 
Jahrhunderts stark verbreiteten Systems der Patronage und Protektion galten auch 
andere gesellschaftliche oder politische Beziehungen durchaus als Freundschaften im 
klassischen Sinne. 
Das bedeutet, dass in der Renaissance bestimmte Freundschaftsbeziehungen allein 
auf Grund fehlender Neukonzeptionen explizit mit einem auf klassischen Freund-
schaftstheorien beruhenden idealisierten Freundschaftsbegriff in Verbindung gebracht 
wurden, obwohl sie von ihrem Wesen her mit dieser Konzeption keineswegs 
übereinstimmten. 
Diese Disharmonie zwischen Ideal und Realität führte im siebzehnten Jahrhundert 
schließlich zu einer kritischen Beurteilung der Freundschaft und letztlich zu dem 
Versuch, den traditionellen Begriff dem neuen Beziehungsverständnis anzugleichen. 
                                                                                                                                                            
2 Niklas Luhmann, Liebe als Passion: Zur Codierung von Intimität (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1982) 105. 
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Dazu wurde der Freundschaftsbegriff denotativ wie konnotativ erweitert, wodurch die 
Konzeption der Freundschaft jedoch nicht etwa bereichert, sondern vielmehr verzerrt 
wurde. Als Folge dieser Mutation ergaben sich neben einer nostalgischen Reminiszenz 
an die alte Vorstellung nun alsbald im Wesentlichen zwei alternative Repräsentationen 
des Begriffs. Freundschaft wurde nunmehr vor allem entweder als eine rein 
utilitaristische oder als eine höchst emotionale Beziehungsform dargestellt. Als 
utilitaristische Beziehung verlor die Idee der Freundschaft ihre idealistische Qualität, 
womit der Begriff zwangsläufig eine Abwertung erfuhr. Als affektive Beziehung 
zwischen gegengeschlechtlichen Partnern ging sie hingegen in dem nun neu 
aufgewerteten Beziehungsideal der Liebe auf und formte mit diesem zusammen die 
Konzeption von einer freundschaftlichen Ehe. Als sensitive Beziehung zwischen 
gleichgeschlechtlichen Partnern bestand sie zunächst unter dem klassischen Begriff der 
Freundschaft weiter, bis sich im frühen achtzehnten Jahrhundert eine erste 
homosexuelle Identität zu etablieren und das alte Konzept damit langsam abzulösen 
begann. 
Da sich die tradierten Idealkonzeptionen von Freundschaft unter dem Einfluss 
dieser neu entstandenen Ideen der modernen Denkart, welche im Verlauf der 
Renaissance immer mehr an Bedeutung gewannen, letztlich weder praktisch noch 
konzeptionell durchsetzen ließen, muss man feststellen, dass der Versuch des 
Renaissancehumanismus, die klassischen philosophischen, und damit vor allem 
theoretischen Idealvorstellungen von der Freundschaft für deren Umsetzung in der 
Realität einer Zeit zu adaptieren, deren kontinuierliche Veränderung währenddessen 
hingegen nach ganz neuen Beziehungskonzepten verlangte, letztlich gescheitert ist. 
Dies erklärt jedoch nur zum Teil das Problem, mit dem der traditionelle 
Freundschaftsbegriff konfrontiert wurde, und beantwortet die Frage, wieso es beim 
Epochenwechsel nicht zu einer einfachen linearen Transformation der Begriffe von 
Freundschaft und Liebe kam, nur ungenügend. 
Wie bereits erwähnt, ist in der Tat eine ganze Reihe von Umständen dafür 
verantwortlich zu machen, dass es schließlich zur völligen Aufspaltung und 
Neudefinierung der Begriffe kommen sollten. Zum einen wurde in der Renaissance die 
Rolle der Frau als Beziehungspartner dahingehend aufgewertet, dass sie nun nicht 
mehr ausschließlich als Symbol der Schönheit und Objekt sinnlicher Liebe betrachtet 
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wurde, sondern nun auch zunehmend als intellektuell gleichwertiger Partner des 
Mannes Anerkennung fand. Synchron zu dieser Entwicklung scheint zum anderen der 
Wunsch nach der Konzeption einer perfekten, absoluten Partnerschaft aufgekommen 
zu sein. Diese Idealkonzeption einer Beziehung strebte die intellektuelle wie auch die 
physische Vereinigung der Partner an, kombinierte also das Ideal des klassischen 
Begriffs der Freundschaft mit dem traditionellen der Liebe. Da die intellektuelle 
Einheit zweier Menschen nach dem Vorbild eines klassischen Freundschaftsideals nun 
auch zwischen Mann und Frau denkbar war, die körperliche Vereinigung zwischen 
Personen des gleichen Geschlechts aber nach wie vor als Sodomie3 galt, lag nichts 
näher, als die Idee der absoluten Beziehung in der Konzeption der ehelichen 
Liebesfreundschaft zu suchen. 
Zur Verwirklichung der neuen Liebeskonzeption musste diese notwendigerweise 
die wesentlichsten Begriffsmerkmale der Freundschaft adoptieren. Die Ideale der 
Freundschaft wurden somit auf den Begriff der Liebe transferiert. Als affektive aber 
asexuelle Beziehung, die hauptsächlich auf der Idee der geistigen Vereinigung der 
Freunde beruhte, konnte sich die Freundschaft gegen die so geschaffene Universal-
konzeption auf Dauer nicht behaupten und verschwand mit der Zeit als alternative 
Form einer affektiven Partnerschaft fast gänzlich. 
Als sich auch die politischen und sozialen Strukturen auflösten, die bisher für ein 
gesellschaftlich relativ hohes Ansehen primär utilitaristischer Freundschaften gesorgt 
hatten, erfuhr der Freundschaftsbegriff auch in dieser Hinsicht eine eklatante 
Abwertung. Zudem fand in der zweiten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts eine 
Rückbesinnung auf die elementaren moralischen Werte der Freundschaft statt, die die 
rationalistische Einstellung der Aufklärung zur Freundschaft als gesellschaftliche 
Notwendigkeit vorwegnahm. Diese Neubetonung der moralischen Qualitäten der 
Freundschaft, die in der ersten Hälfte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts so eklatant 
missachtet wurden, führte natürlich nun auch zu einer harschen Kritik an den primär 
utilitaristischen Ansichten über die Freundschaft und damit an den Freundschafts-
darstellungen dieser Zeit. 
                                                   
3 Unter den in der Renaissance noch sehr weit gefassten Begriff der Sodomie fiel jede außereheliche 
sexuelle Handlung, die nicht dem Zwecke der Fortpflanzung diente. 
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Eine Herabsetzung ganz anderer Art erfuhr die Freundschaft zudem durch den 
Umstand, dass durch das geschrumpfte Volumen des abgewerteten Freundschafts-
begriffs auch der Aspekt der physischen Intimität freigesetzt wurde. In der neuen 
Konzeption von Freundschaft blieb nunmehr kein Raum für die körperlichen 
Zärtlichkeiten, die im klassischen Freundschaftsbegriff sehr wohl ihren Platz hatten. 
Die Liebe zweier Freunde zueinander und der Austausch körperlicher Zärtlichkeiten 
galten durchaus als charakteristische Merkmale einer Freundschaft im klassischen 
Sinne. Solange eindeutig sexuelle Handlungen ausgespart blieben, konnten 
homosexuelle Tendenzen daher problemlos unter dem Begriff der Freundschaft 
ausgelebt werden, ohne in den Verdacht der Sodomie zu geraten. 
Der Verlust der Möglichkeit, diese Tendenzen unter dem Schutz einer anerkannten 
Beziehungskonzeption zu entfalten, hatte zwangsläufig die Suche nach einer 
potentiellen Kompensationsform zur Folge. Dieser Umstand wirkte schließlich mit 
dem in der Renaissance aufkommenden Bestreben des Humanismus nach der 
Identitätsfindung des Einzelnen zusammen und führte im achtzehnten Jahrhundert 
letztlich zu einer Entwicklung, die wir durchaus als das Entstehen einer 
homosexuellen Identität werten können. Die homosexuelle Verbindung zwischen 
Männern wurde zwar gesellschaftlich noch keineswegs akzeptiert, als kon-
zeptualisierbare Beziehung wurde sie aber nun nicht mehr als Teil der Sodomie 
sondern gleichsam als 'classe à parte' betrachtet. 
Als Folge der oben beschriebenen Transformation der traditionellen Begriffe von 
Liebe und Freundschaft – deren Prozess sich letztlich vom fünfzehnten bis zum 
achtzehnten Jahrhundert erstreckt – findet man in der Aufklärung also eine 
Ausdifferenzierung der unterschiedlichsten Beziehungskonzeptionen vor: zunächst, 
neben einem weiterhin bestehenden aber nicht mehr repräsentativen traditionellen 
Begriff der Freundschaft als eher affektive homosoziale Beziehung, vor allem einen 
rein funktionalisierten Freundschaftsbegriff (dem des Mittelalters nicht unähnlich). 
Hierzu kommt der nach wie vor auf dem erotischen Aspekt basierende Begriff der 
(heterosexuellen) Liebe, wie auch das neue Beziehungsideal der ehelichen 
Liebesfreundschaft; weiterhin die Konzeption einer heterosozialen, nicht ehelichen 
Freundschaft zwischen Mann und Frau; und schließlich die Idee einer homosexuellen 
Beziehung zwischen Männern. 
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STAND DER FORSCHUNG 
 
Die gegenwärtige Renaissanceforschung erkennt zwar zweifelsfrei an, dass der 
Idealbegriff der Freundschaft eins der bedeutendsten Themen der frühen Neuzeit war, 
nähere Untersuchungen dieses Phänomens weist sie aber meist mit dem Hinweis ab, 
dass es sich hierbei lediglich um die Adoption tradierter Vorstellungen aus der Antike 
handelte, die jeglicher Innovation entbehrten. Diese Beurteilung ist sicher nicht falsch, 
ignoriert aber die Bedeutung der oben geschilderten Folgen, die sich aus dem Versuch 
der Umsetzung dieser unverändert übernommenen philosophisch idealisierten Werte 
in die Realität einer sich im Umbruch befindlichen Zeit mit einem veränderten Werte-
system ergaben. 
Obwohl in den letzten Jahren ein deutlich erkennbarer Trend zur Beschäftigung mit 
diesem Themenbereich eingesetzt hat, sind umfassende monographische Kultur-, 
literatur- oder sozialgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur Freundschaft bis heute nach 
wie vor relativ selten geblieben. Gewöhnlich erscheint das Thema nur in Verbindung 
mit Fragestellungen, die sich mit den historischen Problemen geschlechtsspezifischer 
Rollenverteilung oder sexueller Identitäten beschäftigen. Freundschaft wird hierbei oft 
nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Funktion betrachtet, welche sie in Bezug auf das 
eigentliche Untersuchungsthema ausübt.4 Die jeweils zugrunde liegende historische 
Konzeption von Freundschaft ist dabei meist nur von marginalem Interesse. 
Komplexere Untersuchungen zur geistesgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des Freund-
schaftsbegriffs – oder eigens zum Freundschaftsideal der Renaissance – wurden in den 
letzten Jahrzehnten – bis auf die auf diesen Themenbereich gerichtete Interpretation 
einiger weniger ausgewählter Texte der Zeit von Ullrich Langer – nicht veröffentlicht.5 
Die einzige umfassendere Arbeit zum Thema der literarischen Behandlung des 
Freundschaftsideals im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert bleibt damit nach 
wie vor Laurens J. Mills One Soul in Bodies Twain von 1937 – und auch diese beschäftigt 
sich lediglich mit der literarischen Darstellung der Freundschaft in der Englischen 
                                                   
4 Die Arbeiten von Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Josef Pequigney und Lorna Hutson sind z.B. von dieser Art. 
Vgl.: Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985); Josef Pequigney, Such is my Love: A study of Shakespeare's Sonnets 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985); und Lorna Hutson, The usurer's daughter: male 
friendship and fictions of women in 16th century England (London: Routledge, 1994). 
5 Vgl.: Ullrich Langer, Perfect Friendship: Studies in Literature and Moral Philosophy from Boccaccio to Corneille 
(Genève: Droz, 1994). 
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Renaissance.6 Die einzigen Untersuchungen der literarischen Bearbeitung des Freund-
schaftsthemas im gesamthistorischen Kontext, Edward Carpenters Ioläus: An Anthology 
of Friendship und Carl Friedrich Stäudlin's Geschichte der Vorstellungen und Lehren von 
der Freundschaft, datieren sogar zurück auf die Jahre 1906 und 1826!7 Alle diese 
Arbeiten werden aber, was ihre wissenschaftliche Genauigkeit und Objektivität 
anbelangt, auf Grund ihres Ursprungs in einer anderen Wissenschaftstradition, 
heutigen Standards nicht mehr gerecht. 
Zum Thema historischer Freundschaftsbegriffe im Allgemeinen gibt es darüber 
hinaus neben einer Reihe von Untersuchungen zu den klassischen Freundschafts-
konzeptionen der griechisch-römischen Philosophie und einigen Studien die sich mit 
der Freundschaftsidee im Mittelalter beschäftigen, lediglich noch eine Anzahl von 
Arbeiten zum Thema des Freundschaftskults im Deutschland des achtzehnten 
Jahrhunderts.8 
Eine detaillierte Untersuchung der geistesgeschichtlichen Bedeutung des Freund-
schaftsideals in der Renaissance und seine Auswirkungen auf die Beziehungs-
konzeptionen späterer Epochen stand daher noch aus. 
 
ANSATZ UND ZIELSETZUNG DER DISSERTATION 
 
Ziel der Arbeit war es demnach, dazu beizutragen, den fehlenden Erkenntnisstand 
auszugleichen. Hierzu musste neben der Analyse des Transformationsprozesses, der 
im siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhundert zu der Neuordnung der Begriffe von 
                                                   
6 Laurens J Mills,  One Soul in Bodies Twain: Friendship in Tudor Literature and Stuart Drama  (Bloomington: 
Principia Press, 1937). 
7 Vgl.: Edward Carpenter, Ioläus: An Anthology of Friendship, 2. Aufl. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906); 
und Carl Friedrich Stäudlin, Geschichte der Vorstellungen und Lehren von der Freundschaft (Hannover: n.p., 
1826). 
8 Zum Thema der Freundschaftskonzeptionen in klassischer Zeit, vgl. z.B.: Horst Hutter, Politics as 
Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship (Waterloo 
(Ont.): Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978); A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle  
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991); and David Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1997). Zum Themenbereich der Freundschaftsdarstellungen im Mittelalter, vgl. z.B.: Robert R 
Edwards und Stephen Spector, Hrsg., The Olde Daunce: Love, Friendship, Sex, and Marriage in the Medieval 
World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Carolinne White, Christian Friendship in the 
Fourth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); und Verena Epp, Amicitia: Zur 
Geschichte personaler, sozialer, politischer und geistlicher Beziehungen im frühen Mittelalter (Stuttgart: 
Hiersemann, 1999). Zum Freundschaftskult des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts in Deutschland, vgl. z.B.: 
Wolfdietrich Rasch, Freundschaftskult und Freundschaftsdichtung im deutschen Schrifttum des 18. 
Jahrhunderts: Vom Ausgang des Barock bis zu Klopstock (Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1936); und Albert 
Salomon, "Der Freundschaftskult des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland: Versuch zur Soziologie einer 
Lebensform," Zeitschrift für Soziologie 8 (1979): 279-308. 
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Liebe und Freundschaft führte, ebenso das Wesen der Freundschaftskonzeption in der 
Renaissance selbst untersucht werden. 
Es erschien hierbei sinnvoll, zunächst das für die Epoche relevante theoretische Erbe 
der antiken Freundschaftsphilosophie kurz zu umreißen. Im Folgenden ist dann die 
Darstellung der entsprechenden Theoriefragmente in der Literatur des fünfzehnten bis 
siebzehnten Jahrhunderts untersucht worden. Dabei kam es zum einen darauf an, 
theoretische, fiktionale und epistolarische Texte miteinander in Verbindung zu setzen, 
um zu untersuchen, wie die übernommenen philosophischen Vorstellungen über 
Freundschaft, insbesondere die idealisierten der klassischen Konzeption, sich durch 
ihre Umsetzung in der Literatur auf das tatsächliche Werteverständnis der Menschen 
in der Renaissance auswirkten. Anhand der Korrespondenz namhafter Dichter der Zeit 
ließ sich z.B. das vergebliche Bemühen Einzelner nachweisen, den theoretischen 
Ansprüchen des damaligen Freundschaftsideals auch in der eigenen Realität gerecht 
zu werden. Zum anderen konnte anhand dieser Texte untersucht werden, wie die 
Unvereinbarkeit bestimmter Attribute des humanistischen Freundschaftsideals mit 
den Gegebenheiten der Wirklichkeit in der frühen Neuzeit bereits im fünfzehnten 
Jahrhundert zu einer janusköpfigen Darstellung des Freundschaftsbegriffs führte. Bei 
der Auswahl der Texte stützt sich die Arbeit neben einigen wenigen französischen 
Schriften im wesentlichen auf italienische und englische Quellen, da diese für die 
Untersuchen des Freundschaftsbegriffs in der Renaissance sich einerseits als am 
Ergiebigsten herausgestellt haben und darüber hinaus eindrucksvoll die 
unterschiedlichen Darstellungsweisen zu Beginn und zum Ende der Renaissance in 
Europa repräsentieren. 
Die anschließende Untersuchung der literarischen Repräsentationen von Freund-
schaft im siebzehnten und achtzehnten Jahrhundert erlaubte es schließlich, den 
Transformationsprozess zu analysieren, dem der Begriff beim Epochenwechsel 
unterlag, und die aufgestellte (und oben erläuterte) Hypothese zu verifizieren. 
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